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Riddle of the universe; being an attempt



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THE RIDDLE OF THE UNIVERSE.



THE RIDDLE
OF
THE UNIVERSE.

BEING AN
ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE FIRST PRINCIPLES
OF METAPHYSIC, CONSIDERED AS AN INQUIRY
INTO THE CONDITIONS AND IMPORT
OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

BY
EDWARD DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

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P R E F A C E.

THE object of this work is a Metaphysic which, stalking naked, but not ashamed, among current iconoclasms, shall proffer a definite, though necessarily tentative, SOLUTION OF THE WORLD-RIDDLE. Circumstances favouring, it is proposed to expand this solution in the course of a series of works.

The procedure adopted in this Prelude has two main aspects. In Part I. is presented a critical survey of the great *landmarks* in the History of Modern Philosophy, with a *primary* reference to their bearing on *metaphysical* (as opposed to merely psychological and other) inquiries. We cannot cope adequately with modern problems unless at least this portion of the intellectual past is with us. In the golden words of Hegel, "the history of philosophy in its true meaning deals not with the past, but with the *eternal and veritable present*; and in its results resembles, not a museum of aberrations of the human intellect, but a pantheon of god-like figures representing various stages of the immanent logic of all human thought."* Whatever our view of the standing of "logic" may be, it is essential to allow for this organic unity of past and present thinking so ably enounced by Hegel. Philosophy, if not the history of philosophy, is inseparably allied with it. Wishing, however, to present a picturesque account of the advance, I have purposely dwelt mainly on the

* *Logic*, p. 137 (Wallace's trans.).

great landmarks, and, to a great extent, on the vital aspects only of these. This essence of the thinking of a few great men will prove the best kindler of insight. All the special analyses found on studies at first hand, either of the original works or translations of them in this and other tongues, and summarize exacting research. Acknowledgments will be found in the text. In regard, however, to the movement from Kant to Hegel, I desire to make known special obligations to Dr. Hutchison Stirling, Kuno Fischer, Dr. Wallace, Chalybäus, Belfort Bax, and Schopenhauer.

Part II. is constructive, a *development*, and, it is hoped, an extensive development, of Metaphysic out of the materials furnished by the great German masters. Incidentally, however, it is critical, assailing—

(a) The various phases of materialism, agnosticism, and current *destructive* idealism.

(b) That too prevalent word-jugglery, termed by Schopenhauer “University-philosophy,” where verbal erudition supplants insight, and dialectical chatter honest confrontation of the enigmas of life.

(c) Theology, and all metaphysic and ethic subservient to theology. Let us carefully avoid pouring new wine into old bottles ;—

“Even gods must yield—religions take their turn.”

The worn-out creed of Christendom must be frankly shelved by Metaphysic. Touching Theism, Metaphysic must be equally outspoken. Atheism, Theism, Pantheism—these are waves only in the ocean of the higher idealism. (Cf. “The Universal Subject,” Part II.)

(d) The defective side of modern mysticism. I say the “defective side,” because with the psychological and other outreachings of modern mysticism we may well, and, to a great extent must, be in sympathy. As a prominent phase of this mysticism, let us take “Theosophy.” Waiving the history of this movement, we may object that it throws no

new light on *Metaphysic*. Thus an Absolute of the abstract Indian type—a “One Reality” phrased as “Absolute Motion” with dualistically interacting sides, Spirit and Matter—is neither a windfall nor even up to date. Further, readers of *Esoteric Buddhism* and the *Secret Doctrine* will confront a loose syncretism, rather than a system. The fact is, that theories which exploit Oriental metaphysic (glimpses of which we shall note anon) do so at their peril; Germany, not India, is the hierophant. On the other hand, their somewhat crude Metaphysic apart, the theosophists have, in *psychological-empirical* domains done much to give even the exacting Hegelian pause. “We find no mysteries, nothing very new, nothing very old,” observes Max Müller, but this criticism hardly meets the case. An able restatement of an old doctrine is often just as valuable to society as is a discovery. And, albeit strongly opposed to the “theosophical” credo on many counts, I cannot be blind to its merits. Among these its restatement (and in an improved form) of the doctrine of “vehicular media,” its “other-world”-lore, and its popularization of the doctrine of palingenesis are prominent. In the concluding chapters of Part II. we shall impinge on modern mysticism, and these points will then profitably delay us. Here I will only say that to have elevated palingenesis into widespread public notice is a feat of sterling merit. Thousands, to whom Eastern sages and Westerns such as Schelling, Schopenhauer, Pezzani, Figuier, Reynaud, Drossbach, and the rest, were mere names, have been now introduced to the doctrine. In the matter of so hoary a view—common to so many races, religions, and philosophies, Western and Eastern alike—the manner of restatement is vital, and in Part II., “On the Mode of Persistence of the Individual,” adverse criticism of the Oriental form of this restatement will be advanced. Still the popularization in question has proved eminently useful. A like tribute must be paid to the various competing French and German

schools who are so strenuously upholding the belief; but of these anon.

So much for the polemical side of Part II. The constructive side must be left to speak for itself. Leibnitz, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, and on one important count—that of Deity as the “total voice” of the Universe (cf. chs. vii. and xi. part ii., and elsewhere)—Renan, are the thinkers to whom I am most indebted. Among tentative advances I may note the treatment of the *cruz* of the Individual Ego or Subject, the Subjective-Objective Idealism, the Monadology with its suggested amendments of Leibnitz and Herbart, the theories of Freedom and the relations of neurosis and psychosis, the exposition of the Universal Subject (including the synthesis of Atheism, Pantheism,) and Theism, the answer to Pessimism and the riddle of Evil at large, the struggle for existence of Monads (as the metaphysical complement of Darwinism and *ἀνάγκη θεία* of the universe solving very numerous riddles), and the novel handling of palingenesis—a handling, however, yet to be developed in the detail. Other subsidiary advances will reveal themselves along with these.

It is requisite to add that this volume (terminating a struggle through various lower standpoints, pantheistic, mystical, and other) alone embodies my views. I shall feel obliged if charitable correspondents will point out any errors in the way of statements or references which may have crept into it. My sincere thanks are due to Mr. Bertram Keightley, both for his comments on portions of the draft of Part II. and for his assistance in the wearisome task of piloting the work through the press.

TEIGNMOUTH,

June, 1893.

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THE RIDDLE OF THE UNIVERSE.

PART I.

PROEM.

“ Whole systems of philosophy have been built upon what is called sensuous experience; and this so-called experience is supposed to be so obvious, so natural, so intelligible, that nothing need be said about it. True philosophy, on the contrary, knows of nothing more difficult, more perplexing, more beyond the reach of all our reasoning powers than what is called experience.”—MAX MULLER.

ON the sombre brow of Night glows a tiara grander than any that ever decked mortal beauty—the tiara of the thick-set stars. Eloquent to the astronomer in his watch-tower, it is doubly so to the philosopher: for it is to him that it speaks of a Sphinx with unread riddle; of a Power, fearful and wonderful, whose mystery enchains his reverence. Gazing upwards at its sheen, his soul is gorged with thoughts—thoughts which, lofty as they are, stream into consciousness tinged with subdued awe and melancholy. Well, too, may this colouring robe them. Sensed through Night's veil, the Sphinx is indeed sublime; but something like mockery seems to haunt her lips: “Grand is my secret; but who of mortals shall seize it?” And, with the sighs of ages in his ears, the watcher may perhaps waver. Why pursue the quest? Knows he not that the history of religions has been largely one of illusion, underpropped by sentiment; that even Philosophy, allied with Science, has often stammered abjectly? The answers come and go, and the Sphinx impassively listens, handing over her answerers to the ruthless jaws of Time. He knows, too, that along with the follies of philosopher, shaveling priest, and salaried divine, is to be noted the

honourable silence of some of the greatest minds. What, however, of that? Beneath that star-lit canopy a thrill, such as stirred Kant, must stir him also. At every sweep his eye harvests mystery; and when it seeks the aid of the telescope, or ranges over the romance of descriptive astronomy, further vistas of vastness, further enhancements of the great enigma, surge restlessly up. Slowly on the mind breaks the full import of the Copernican revolution. His planet a speck hurrying round a colossal sun—itsself a waif amid myriads of suns,—his body a parasite on some indescribably insignificant land-patch, of what account is MAN? Of what account is this creature lost in a cloud of star-dust; in a desert where millions of suns lie scattered like sand-grains in a Sahara? Yet another thought should roll breaker-like on the watcher. He should sense how this spectacle belittles the theology of his fellows. He should realize that before this grand outlook dogmas gasp their life out, founders of religions shrink to filaments, and noisy creeds appear as but transient incidents of transient geographical areas.

The reign of "Enlightenment" has been pictured to us in glowing colours. Theology and its appurtenances are to disappear beneath that benign sway; the service of Man, the "Unknowable," and positive culture, are to replace the old illusions. Theology, however, is only crude metaphysic; and it may well be objected that the metaphysical bias is unconquerable. Destruction, as in the past, will only prompt reconstruction. Liberals may inter clericalism in a pit in the pauper's corner, but they cannot inter the world-problem and the hopes that revolve around it. No longer robed by dogma, this problem will stand forth all the clearer in its nakedness. Not having their beliefs thought for them, men will have to think boldly for themselves; and that they will put up with mere positivism is a supposition too ridiculous to combat. Consider in this regard a bent of thinking just now becoming prevalent among liberal thinkers. It is an ever-recurring question, whether admitting of solution or not, *With what end or meaning is fraught the evolution of men and animals? of what metaphysical significance are these units, often so terribly maltreated by events?* Take the human unit. As organism, it is a quantity to be overlooked; as a thinking

and feeling entity, on the other hand, there has been assigned to it a less disputably important standing in the macrocosm. When it does chance to reflect, it is apt to rate "consciousness" as superior in dignity to the most stupendous forces of so-called external Nature. Its significance is believed to lie deeper. And it is not rashly to be denied that this consciousness in certain, though only certain, aspects is not unadvisedly appealed to. See man, the thinker, gauging the star-depths with artificial vision, plucking from suns, nebulae, and comets the secret of their constitution, and imaging, with fancy checked by sense, the cradle of the planet on which he stands. See him summing up in judicial fashion the testimony of the rocks, visualizing through æons the tree-like differentiation of species, and even turning back consciousness on the inferred antecedents out of which it has grown. See him dying, like Giordano Bruno, for truth, or sacrificing himself for his fellows, like Gautama Buddha. Can this brood lapse into nonentity with a waning sun and a freezing planet? Is the wondrous stream of its Universal History to have flowed for nought? Have the miseries of life been fruitlessly heaped upon it? These are burning questions. Contemplating man's struggles, I see much to regret, should the materialist and the pessimist speak aright. Still, neither the self-styled dignity of thought, nor the unpleasantness of pessimist theories, are of any probative worth. They are sentiments, mere bye-products perhaps, of the very world-order interrogated. They prove nothing, though they surely stimulate inquiry. Here, then, comes the rub. We require a metaphysic, but a metaphysic of the rationalist order alone. In it we have to consider the central enigma of enigmas, the place of the individual in the universe: a task which, discredited by theologies, must nevertheless inevitably occupy the philosopher. It is not to ordinary Science that we should look for much assistance. That "star-eyed" goddess would stray from her rightful domain were she to do more than discuss actual or possible phenomena. So far as utilization of psychology, chemistry, and other *re-interpretable* departments is concerned, our indebtedness to her will be considerable; but there it must needs rest. In the establishment of ontology, in the progress from experience to the interpretation

of that experience, the field is reserved for the metaphysician. The feasibility of this progress is impeached by modern Agnosticism. Thus Wundt would appear to limit us to psychology. It will be the main endeavour of our inquiry to indicate on what lines the momentous advance is practicable.

On the importance of ascertaining all we can concerning the world-riddle, of seizing and exploiting every clue to the unravelling of this sublime mystery, I need not lay stress. It is conceded by philosopher, religionist, poet, and mystic alike. Obviously, however, between desire for and accessibility of such knowledge a great gulf may be fixed. Very warily must this gulf be spanned, and he who rides on a genial fancy will assuredly court failure. Covert begging of issues with obtrusive First Principles or intellectual intuitions must be guarded against. Emotions, those disturbers of judicial thought, must, in such expository ventures, go by the board. It needs no essay to indicate how sentiments warp the judgment, how absurdly pleasurable beliefs are accepted and painful rejected. Catering for mere likes and dislikes is a profitable but disgraceful pastime. To the bias of the emotions must be added that of fixed intellectual associations, often furthered by heredity. Bain, moreover, has contended that hasty and erroneous generalization often proceeds from the "over-vaulting" tendencies of the mind. "That 'we should make our thoughts the measure of things,' which is done in so many celebrated speculations, is the result of the inherent pushing activity of the system, the determination to proceed on a course once entered on until a check is met with, and even in spite of a good many checks."* Doubt, where there is a vigorous motor system, is repugnant. Extreme philosophic scepticism is, I think, found in inactive, easy-going persons. The main caution to be observed is that touching obtrusive feelings. Feelings should be allowed not to sway the reason, but to deck its results. Accordingly, in establishing my several positions, I shall regard emotions as worthless interlopers in the pursuit of truth. Worthless in the sense of sustaining effort, they certainly cannot be termed; detrimental to honesty, they most frequently are.

Touching intuitions superior to intellectual and emotional

* *Logic*, "Induction," p. 378.

springs we have, it is true, heard much of late. But glance at the conflict of the illuminati of the past, at the outcome of, what Whitney terms, the excessive subjectivity of the Hindu mind. Incompatible doctrines loom up in every quarter. Mingled with much that is precious are whole Serapions of a worthless character. Even the authors and disciples of the Darsanas wage fierce war. Kapila accuses the Vedantists of "babbling like children or madmen," the brilliant Sankara denounces a Mimansaka as a bullock without horns or tail, while the Mimansakas retort vindictively against Vedantists. Turning, again, to the Platonic "Ideas" scented only by the favoured philosopher, to the fruits of the neoplatonic ecstasis, to the innate ideas championed by Cudworth or Descartes, to the "faith" of Berkeley, of Jacobi, of Hamilton, to the "practical necessity" of Kant, to the intuition of Schelling, the Platonic mysticism of Schopenhauer, and the *spiritual certitudes* of religionists of *conflicting creeds*, we may well read a useful lesson. We note that privileged deliverances of belief, intuition, "practical reason," etc., have civil wars of their own. What valid "intuitions" are, supposing they exist, we shall inquire hereafter. It is obvious, however, that contingent subjective convictions, albeit as unshakable as a Stoic might require, cannot stand as the basis of a philosophy.

It is certain, however, that reasoning must start from some admitted premise, and the question arises what is that premise to be? The consideration of this point involves a preliminary notice of that great question, "What and whence is Experience?"—a question confronting every system alike, from the subjective idealism of a Leibnitz down to the blunt materialism of a Büchner. First and foremost of the vexed problems of philosophy, it is the one most coldly ignored by the superficial thinker. This evasion is the more remarkable, as its solution one way or another carries with it determination of all the controversies of metaphysic. Nay, its solution must be said to constitute of itself Ontology—it is, as will be seen, the Science of the Absolute itself.

You will remark that even reputable iconoclasts have been content to ignore this matter completely. The case of our modern materialists may be cited. Representatives of this

school of thought mentally reconstruct the world-order on the basis of sensuous experience; gathering from observed coexistences and sequences what they hold to have been their mechanical antecedents æons back in the night of cosmic time. Arguing on these lines, they have found the Ultimate Reality of things to be eternal redistribution of matter and force, or matter and motion in space.* It is the "atoms and space" of Democritus over again. Matter somehow energized in a void does everything; evolves even the consciousness contemplating it. Note, however, the difficulty in ambush. The assumption is that moving bodies (stripped of all attributes save extension and resistance) exist *independently* of experience, as causes of this experience, and the assumption is thought so natural as to require no vindication. Need I say that, so far from being indubitable, it has seemed to some of the acutest intellects in history an excellent butt for ridicule? Need I add the remark, that no materialist has yet succeeded in dressing up this belief in an approximately rational garb? What, then, is the result? Simply this, that a belief incapable of proof is laid at the base of all other explanations of cosmos. How are we to avoid similar fiascoes in the future? By not treating things *cosmologically* where they ought to be treated *metaphysically*, by not discussing the absolute nature of things before we have overhauled the presuppositions with which we start. The error of the materialist lies in starting his hare on scientific territory, and trespassing all unawares into metaphysical preserves. It is the procedure common to all the older thinkers of Greece, but while historically justifiable in their case as stage of a natural development, it has now no legitimate standing. The fallacy is not far to seek. *Experience of things is considered more or less in abstraction from the very consciousness in which it appears, or rather which it helps to constitute.* This experience is then idealized, stripped of most of its content, and hypostatized as *ground of itself*. In elucidating the physical history of a solar system 'twixt nebula and nebula, the materialist is well within his own province. He is portraying events as they might have appeared to human percipients,—he is considering what the

* "Matter in motion," or Matter *plus* a mystical surd Force, are the alternatives which the extreme materialistic schools proffer us.

stages of an imaginary experience might have been. Unfortunately, having long imagined such stages in the abstract, he comes to overlook this primitive abstraction, and that the more easily as it was involuntary. What now more simple than to idealize the experience and project it into independent absolute reality? To such a pass come thousands, re-ifying *abstract* elements of experience in order to account for experience, the *complex*, itself—explaining the whole by the part fictitiously made absolute. To my thinking this is the champion illusion of the century, generating countless diseases of language. An ignoring of the metaphysic of Perception fosters, an account unveils it. Strongly would I urge all not to regard this Perception as a “simple” thing, or a thing smoothly carrying us *beyond itself*. This is the attitude of the yokel, not of the thinker. Surely we cannot be empowered to solve enigmas touching causes alleged to obtain independently of perception, before the genesis of the latter is fully unravelled. Nay, possibly we may come to think that there is no getting beyond or outside of this perceptual experience at all. Of this, however, anon.

I remarked that we must start from something. Now the proposition on which we shall build is no hypothesis, no ontological assumption, but the verbal expression of bare immediate reality. It is to the effect that “states of consciousness appear.”* We will not even urge that we are conversant with these as states of a Self, or Ego. Whether or not there is to be accepted a Self something more than successive states of consciousness, is an issue on which much diversity of opinion prevails among competent thinkers. For this reason the ambiguous formula of Descartes, “Cogito, ergo sum,” must be dispensed with. Not “cogito,” but rather “sunt cogitationes” must run the premise.† Of course, as to the reality of states of consciousness there can be no question. To doubt would, indeed, be itself a sequence of such states,

* The term “states” is in one sense objectionable, as it may be held to connote that atomistic discrete existences are in question. Such of course is not here the case. “Determinations” might have been chosen, but on the whole “states” will bring home our meaning most easily to the majority of readers. The mere *factness* of experience is indicated.

† “Cogitationes” has, of course, a wider meaning here than that ordinarily connoted by “thoughts.” It covers all states of consciousness, perceiving, thinking, feeling and willing alike.

and predication of non-existence a mere eccentricity of language. Hence the all-denying Buddhist Madhyamikas and the agnostic Hume stayed their ravages at this barrier. So far, then, it is evident that we stand on firm ground. In proceeding, however, to unravel the genesis and significance of these states—to probe their conditions and metaphysical import—we launch our bark on a stormy and treacherous ocean. Milton's controversial demons, who found themselves "in wandering mazes lost," could not have entangled themselves in more conflicting theories than have adventurous human philosophers. If we are in a better position to grapple with these problems to-day, it is because the great intellects of the past—the Platos, Aristotles, Sankaras, Leibnitzians, Humes, Kants, Hegels—have reared a scaffolding which, if rickety in parts, affords us, nevertheless, a commanding outlook over the landscape of thought. So dense, however, are the mists which curl along the hedge-rows of this charming prospect, so feeble our individual vision, that it is hopeless to dream of seizing the picture in its fulness. Rather must it be assimilated jointly by those who have earned the right to survey by first clambering up the scaffolding. And it will conduce to sustained enjoyment of that eminence, if those who mount the poles busy themselves in repairing the supports as they proceed.

Now, in the first place, I am anxious to cast my eye over the stays and props of the great scaffolding known as the History of Modern Philosophy. I propose to add, then, various novel structures when once the underlying supports are recognized as adequate to the strain. Whether these structural innovations will prove of a useful character, wear alone can show. At any rate no harm can result from making the attempt, as the lashings will be merely of a provisional nature. Finding, then, that our scaffolding is firmly fixed in the bed-rock of fact—in plain language, that all agree that "states of consciousness appear,"—let us examine the foundation piles, and afterwards the superstructure. To effect this aim, I propose to review the great European thinkers from Descartes to Von Hartmann, as briefly and succinctly as is compatible with insight. Subsequently to this saturation with criticism, it will be possible

to construct with a full sense of the actual obstacles. The first thing in science, says Aristotle in his *Metaphysic*, is to state all the difficulties to be met. These are the different contradictory views of philosophers, and the obscurities which they have failed to light up. The true solution is but the lighting-up of these difficulties. Adequate statement of a problem is often in itself a most useful achievement.

CHAPTER I.

THE CRADLE OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

WE have now got so far as to recognize inquiry into the conditions of consciousness, or Experience-in-general, as the central problem of philosophy. Aware of the folly of dogmatizing about "realities" *beyond experience*, previous to determining the conditions and constitution of that experience, we are content to start and work upward from the very simple formula, "States of consciousness appear." Under "states of consciousness" are comprised determinations both of the OBJECT and the MENTAL side of our experience—those which either are or symbolize for us *external* objects, as well as the pleasurable, painful, and neutral feelings, "Memory," "Conception," "Abstraction," Judgment, "Imagination," etc., which bulk our so-called *internal*, mental, or subjective life. Experience (or consciousness) is to be regarded as presenting two leading aspects or departments—outer experience and inner experience. "Outer" experience, or perception, is illustrated when I touch a chair or see a tree; "inner" or mental experience when I evoke the ideas of the chair and the tree. Regarding, then, both departments of consciousness as merely departments of consciousness *and nothing more*, we may proceed to fasten on one of them as of more especial import for the purposes of our analysis. It is outer experience, or perception, that suggests itself as more convenient in this regard. The reason for the preference is this. An important school regards mind or inner experience as ultimately derived from outer. Sense and association of the echoes of sense are, for it, the sources of thought, will, and emotion. Given the simply related sensations and their faint

echoes as ideas, it seeks to show how association works up its raw material—how the concrete world of things comes to be elaborated in our concepts, how emotions emerge out of simple pains and pleasures, and so on. From this standpoint the “mind” is regarded as *derivative* or *secondary*, perception (or rather the presentative core of percepts) as primary. To much of this no possible exception can be taken. Thus, before I can imagine a tree, I must have perceived one—the mental picture is either a faint echo of a single perception or a composite product of the echoes of several perceptions. In both cases it is derivative. But I have also to note that the percept “tree” is itself a highly complex fact, steeped in acquired associations—it is not pure presentation without alloy. How many of its features are acquired, how many primitive, is a question for psychology to answer and for metaphysic to rethink when answered. Metaphysic, however, is not directly concerned with the narratives of psychology; it deals not with the history of how ideas and percepts are elaborated, but with the import of conception and perception as a whole, with the theory of their ultimate genesis and grounds. And as possibly conception may be wholly derivative, it concentrates attention on its source; holding that explanation of the latter will render the rest easy. “Take care of the Percept,” said the late Professor Green, “and the Concept will take care of itself.” The Goddess Reason herself is “nothing but the re-coördinating of states of consciousness already co-ordinated in certain simpler ways.”* “The highest operations of thought, like the simplest acts of perception, are concerned with the grouping or co-ordination of resemblances previously distinguished from differences.”† Tracing the passage of simply related presentations into the complexly related representations of adult or conceptual thinking is, of course, a most important psychological task. Metaphysic, however, as I must for the sake of emphasis repeat, transcends this and allied inquiries. Its aim is to exhibit the basic conditions of the psychological process itself, nay, to render clear to us the exact import of our consciousness as we now have it. All inquiries touching Theism, Pantheism, Agnosticism, etc.,

* Spencer.

† Romanes.

the status of the individual in the world-plan—if plan there be,—all “rational” cosmology, hinge on its success. Let us proceed, accordingly, to see what the leading thinkers of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries have contributed towards its shaping.

Selection of our starting-point is naturally enough suggested. For the purposes of our inquiry it will suffice to pass over the first stages of the journey rapidly. Kant, indeed, is not to be understood without reference to his predecessors. But mediation of Kant may be effected without a surfeit of detail in exposition. The summary of the lead-up now to be offered aims at compression of the historic significance of many minds into a brief compass. With this prefatory remark, we may first conveniently glance at the cradle in which pre-Kantian Western philosophy itself was rocked.

Like India, Europe had its brood of schoolmen, noisy controversialists, perusal of whose works most scholars must dread. And the schoolmen, like the Bauddhas and their antagonists, fought fiercely over the nature and mode of being of Universals. Other topics they had, of course, but this became the theme of supreme moment. It is customary to scourge the schoolmen, and the temptation is not to be resisted. For thought they yielded us, for the most part, words; for science, exploitation of arbitrarily pre-mised syllogisms; for explanations, rubbish, compared with which Martinus Scriblerus’s theory of roasting is a gem.* There are, however, extenuating circumstances to be taken into account. Scholasticism represents no specific creed, but is the slow and timid reassertion of itself by a half-throttled and half-stupefied reason. In the palmy days of the Church—that incubus of science and philosophy—prelates were not to be gainsaid. They had acuteness to recognize the force of Tertullian’s view that philosophy is the “patriarch of all heresies.” Hence those who wished to reason were at first limited to showing how the certitudes of Faith were also provable by intellect, and in doing so they had to take good care not to overrate the importance of this rational factor.

* The meatjaek which roasted owing to its “inherent meat-roasting quality” may be remembered.

The Church argued like a child; but, unfortunately, it could persecute like a Titan, and, supreme in its egoism, never hesitated to prolong its supremacy by doing so. Warily enough had the first rationalists to proceed; but, grovel as they might, it seemed at one time as if liberty of thought was doomed, and the upholders of pure faith, the *credo quia absurdum* dullards, were to win all along the line. This was towards the close of the twelfth century, ere the labours of the Arabian scholars had been responded to. But even after this revival of rationalism a most unsatisfactory state of thought for long prevailed. What were the causes of the continued block? Largely those previously in operation. I have already indicated one. "The darkness of the Dark Ages was deepest when the power of the Church was least disputed; that darkness began to break when the doctrines of the Church were called in question."* In his *History of the Inductive Sciences*, Whewell ascribes the stationary period to four main causes—obscurity of thought, servility, intolerance of disposition, and enthusiasm of temper. For the obscurity of thought a distorted Aristotelianism is largely accountable. As might naturally be surmised, in the earlier centuries of Christian dominance the Stagirite had been feared as too sturdy an advocate of reason. Even down to the twelfth century we hear of copies of his works being impounded, burnt, and their readers excommunicated. By degrees, however, his utility as a controversial weapon was recognized, toleration developed into liking, and liking into a fanaticism which visited his critics with hatred and cruelty. In Bruno's day the Logic and Physics of Aristotle were no other than Church annexations. The rejected of the builders had become the corner-stone of science and what passed for philosophy. Pernicious proved his works, sheltered so snugly behind the ægis of the Church. The Physics favoured evinced what Sir W. Herschel terms "a deliberate preference of ignorance to knowledge,"† while logical mechanism was transmuted into jargon.‡ It was the eviscerated carcass of Aristotle, not the complete organism,

* Lewes, *Biographical History of Philosophy*, ii. 50.

† *Discourse on Natural Philosophy*, 1851.

‡ Cf. a Proof of the Immutability and Incorrumpibility of the Heavens, cited by Galileo: *The System of Worlds*, dial. i. p. 30.

which thus cumbered the ground. Bye-products, such as a "closed celestial sphere" with a central earth, "natural and unnatural" and "perfect circular" motions, *a priori* biological notions, and so forth, were greedily assimilated, and made the ground-work of armchair interpretations of cosmos. To such an extent did words exclude thought and observation, that when Galileo experimentally disproved an assertion that the velocity of a falling body was proportional to its weight, his scholastic onlookers unblushingly rejected fact for formula. Now mark well this distortion of Aristotle, the seizure of his weak and the ignoring of his strong points. The Stagirite failed in many respects to carry his own principles into practice. But theoretically he was the champion of induction,* deriving even the most far-reaching "axioms" from experience.† His first principles of Demonstration, or ἀρχαὶ συλλογιστικάι, are all of inductive origin, harking back in the long run to sensible particulars.

And if we glance at the history of that cradle of science, the Alexandrian Museum, we shall find his bright side irradiating generations of lofty thinkers. Indirectly due to those great Macedonian conquests, which bridged the expanse between European and Asiatic culture, the Museum founded by Ptolemy Soter was for long the intellectual lighthouse of our hemisphere. It is hallowed with the names of Euclid, Eratosthenes, Archimedes, Hipparchus, Ptolemy, Hero, and Apollonius. Its noble work lay in perpetuating, increasing, and diffusing the stock of then existing knowledge. Its floors were worn by men who questioned Nature by observation and experiment long before Roger Bacon or his greater

* Aristotle, in his *Metaphysic*, xiii. 4, credits Socrates with the authorship of the Inductive Method as consciously posited means of research. The Induction, however, of Socrates is only that by way of simple Enumeration. For the inadequacy of Aristotle's own grasp of Induction the interesting work of Lewes on that thinker should be consulted.

† Aristotle states in the *Analytics* that axioms, though gathered from sense, are nevertheless *approved by the Nōus*. The "dignity" of the principles yielding the διότι of demonstrative reasoning required an honourable housing! But there is no mistaking such utterances as οὐδὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς τὰ ἔκτος μὴ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ὄντα (*De Sensu*, vi. 455), while the attacks on the Platonic *a-priorism* in the *Metaphysic* and elsewhere are uncompromising. Hegel, indeed, combats the view that the Stagirite is empiricist, probably misled by the absolute idealism to which the *Metaphysic* in parts inclines. But a psychological empiricism and an absolute idealism are *by no means incompatible views*—they are maintained, indeed, in company in the present work.

namesake spurred inquirers on to such toil, and with what success history has happily learned to record.* Plato had slighted "opinions" based on the shadows of sensuous perception, and sought a haven in a disdainful mysticism. The Alexandrian men of science as opposed to the metaphysicians evinced a distinctly objective bent, and in favouring this the works of Aristotle must have counted for much. Still curious prejudices crop out. Archimedes, mindful of Platonic diatribes against practice, sneers at his own inventions.

In allusion to Aristotle and the Romanist schoolmen, it is interesting to pause before the spectacle of the Arabian expositors of Aristotle. What these men did for rationalism and how tardily our debt to them was acknowledged are points very ably treated by Draper, with an enthusiasm not, perhaps, beyond the requirements of the case.† The uprising of these thinkers does certainly seem to present an astonishing phenomenon in history. The original Arab was a crude and uncultured fanatic, with few thoughts beyond those evoked by his practical needs and an anthropomorphic and clumsy creed. But all of a sudden a revolution seems to set in. The Mahometan conquerors absorb Greek, Jewish, and Persian lore, and new stars rise hurriedly in their firmament. Learning and cultured tolerance, increase and multiply; Mahomet is distanced by the degree in which he himself distanced the worshippers of the Caaba stone. Caliphs play the part of Ptolemy Soters, collecting libraries, encouraging the study of Grecian thought, and lending their influence to cherish the growth of science, art and literature. This patronage of learning, remarks Gibbon, "was claimed by the independent emirs of the provinces, and their emulation diffused the tastes and the rewards of science from Samarcand and Bokhara to Fez and Cordova." Al-Mamoun Caliph of Bagdad could utter the remarkable words, "They are the elect of God, whose lives are devoted to the improvement of their rational faculties. The teachers of wisdom are the true

* See especially Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe*, ch. vi. It must, of course, be understood that the Museum harboured, beside great minds, a mob of pedants and "metaphysical physicists." Lewes urges that few beside Hipparchus and Archimedes among the ancients illustrate true scientific inquiry (*Aristotle*, p. 59). But he is unduly harsh.

† *Intellectual Development of Europe*, p. 359.

luminaries and legislators of the world." This utterance was made in the ninth century. As late as the twelfth, reason was being trampled on by Christians throughout Europe. Noting these memorable facts, we must state, however, that Arabian Mahometanism is not properly to be credited with their production. The Pure Arabs, as pointed out by Lewes, had no original science or philosophy of their own; they were not even appropriators of what was purveyed to them, the whole rationalistic movement being a sceptical reaction of individuals fostered by sceptical Caliphs and Emirs. This movement was of leading importance as a veiled repudiation of faith, but the innovators accomplished little or nothing new in philosophy, while no "germinal discoveries in science are due to them."* Astronomers, mathematicians, medical writers, physicists and chemists, they did, however effect a considerable harvest of minor results; while as expositors and preservers of Greek writings they profoundly affected the weak-kneed rationalism of the Romanist schoolmen. The worship of these commentators centred round Aristotle. Plato seems to have been more or less unknown or overlooked. His restoration to honour was yet to come.

The final collapse of scholasticism was due to a variety of causes. The schoolmen themselves had been waxing bolder and bolder in the defence of reason, while their audiences, becoming self-reliant, had become disgusted with word-weaving. Science renascent was unveiling nature in numerous aspects; militarism was less prominent, while the advance of industry and leisured wealth favoured independence and reflection. Other causes might be adduced. But perhaps the most effective instrument of all was the seething of the Reformation. "It is chiefly to the great reformation in religion," writes Macaulay, "that we owe the great reformation of philosophy. The alliance between the schools and the Vatican had for ages been so close that those who threw off the dominion of the Vatican could not continue to recognize the authority of the schools." The leaders, indeed, of the Reformation, Luther and Melancthon, detested Aristotle and his works, and showed their appreciation of his votaries by dubbing them "locusts, caterpillars, frogs, and

* Lewes, ii. 63.

lice,"—seasoned with a pungent assortment of epithets. "Nullo apud Lutheranos philosophiam esse in pretio" was the watchword. While tendering Luther's estimate of the schoolmen, we may remark that much of his thinking is on a level with that of his victims; the creed of the Reformation itself being in large part a rolling in the same intellectual quagmire as that hitherto favoured. The individual Protestant began to think for himself, but what poor thoughts he generally cherished! With Protestantism, however, as such, we have no further concern. The sunset of scholasticism is flushing up rosy-red, and that alone interests us. And as it casts its dying glow on the waters we note the awakening of a new movement, that of the revivers of the older classical systems, such as the noble-hearted Giordano Bruno. The mystico-physical doctrines of Paracelsus and his like also find ephemeral favour. Over these later shapings of Mediævalism we cannot, however, linger. We have to pass on at once to the consideration of Modern Philosophy proper. And we shall find that, gradual as is the progress of enfranchisement from dogma, we have here reached a level which bids fair to be adorned with the loftiest known achievements of the human intellect.

One more word. Unsatisfactory as must seem the trifling of scholastic writers, we must not forget to accord them their due meed of praise. Accuracy of terminology was cultivated, and has since stood us in good stead. Instances of high individual merit are universally admitted. It was something, also, to avoid indifferentism as to speculative subjects, something to pave the way for a final exclusion of theology from philosophy by cherishing doubt and dialectics. Modern Philosophy could not have existed had such antecedents not existed. In the later products of the schools one catches, too, foregleams of Locke, while the rough separation of mental and material and the unification of an erst-broken cosmological conception are seen to smooth the track for Descartes. With these considerations we may bid scholasticism adieu, and betake ourselves to our more important business.

The diverse schools mediating our passage to Kant are developments based on two foundation texts, or rather representative methods of research—the one inaugurated by the

Frenchman Descartes, the other by the empirical utilitarianism of Bacon. The former grasped at absolute knowledge by purging sense-deliverances in the fire of intellect; the latter, founding on observation and experiment, ramifies into widely divergent results. From the Cartesian assertion of the validity of the *clear idea* or conception,* beyond experience, sprang the endeavours of Spinoza, and the Leibnitz-Wolffian ontologists. The cautious Baconian Method gave birth to such groups as the Hobbists, Lockeians, Berkeleyans, the following of Hume, the French sensationists and materialists, and the Scotch psychologists Reid, Stewart, etc., and their successors. What this Method was, in what it constituted an advance on foregoing methods, in what it was deficient, I propose briefly to notice forthwith.

We still often hear it said that Bacon "invented inductions." The persons chargeable with this opinion are of M. Jourdain's class, the man who talked prose for so many years without knowing it. They themselves, *ever since they got a grip on language*, have been voluntarily or involuntarily amassing such general truths, and flinging them, too, when requisite, in the teeth of their opponents. It may indeed be held that language is not indispensable to induction, all reasoning being from particulars to particulars, a process which sense and association are of themselves competent to account for. That non-verbal inference is possible, even in thought of the highest order of complexity, I for one would not seek to deny. But when the establishment of a general truth is in process, it is a question of names or nothing. Mill himself points out that in inductions "properly so-called" an inference from the known to the unknown must obtain. This is tantamount to saying that names must stand proxy for phenomena, for it is clear enough that the unknown, as such, does not stand in consciousness. Waiving, however, this point, I repeat that all of us, Baconians or otherwise, are constantly framing inductions, sometimes with voluntary effort, but probably for the most part involuntarily. Generalization from experience, with more or less consciousness of the process as such, and generalization of the passive

* "Credidi me pro regulâ generali sumere posse omne id quod valde dilucide et distincte concipiebam" (Descartes).

kind—this is a distinction of some interest. The contrast of these orders of induction may prove of value in the course of subsequent research.

Since we must naturally make inductions, it is clear that Bacon's forerunners in history equally made them. But to make inductions on principle, and with consciousness of the grounds of their value, is a great advance on natural instinct. To know further in what ways inductions once arrived at are properly to be used is also an acquisition of moment. On these heads Bacon had a great deal to say. It would be erroneous, however, to describe him as the founder of the familiar empirical method, either in natural science or psychology. I need not re-adduce the observations made regarding Aristotle and the "Divine School" of Alexandria. Nor need I even lay undue stress on the assertion of his predecessor Roger Bacon as to the need of founding all knowledge on experience. This celebrated friar did not possess the *seasonableness* which must favour a reforming genius, hence his individual influence was but slight. Yet he expended two thousand livres in experiments, inveighed against syllogistic wordspinning, and brought Utility deliberately to the fore; the resemblances between his statements and those of Francis Bacon being, indeed, sometimes extraordinary. There remain the actual prosecutors of science on the empirical method. What, for instance, are we to make of Leonardo da Vinci, that marvel of versatile genius, who first saw the light in 1452? What of those veritable giants Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler? These men required no stimulus to research vouchsafed by arm-chair methodizers. Bacon, indeed, considered Copernicus a visionary, and snubbed a Galileo and a Gilbert outright. Harvey and Newton did not want him; they would have reared their fabrics had he never lived. "The great discoveries of modern science," writes a most accurate historian, "were neither made on Bacon's method nor under direct guidance from Bacon."* His rules are of no value in practice, albeit they were to minimize the differences of intellects yoked to discovery. In this regard, however, we

* Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, ii. 121. For an exposure of some of Bacon's errors and inadequacies of detail, cf. Bain, *Induction*, 403-409.

may look with suspicion on the rules of all merely logical method. Not discovery, so much as ready criteria of *proof*, are what we owe to them. Discoverers seldom consult such formulas, save when the after-thought of their method strikes them, and the need of proof supervenes. From a theoretical standpoint they must always preserve their value; from a probative one they are often indispensable, but I question whether specific arts of discovery fall usefully within their province. The free initiative of Genius could need few rules of any sort; talent would be deckloaded with their oppressiveness.

The question, therefore, arises, Whence flows our reverence for Bacon? I conceive its source to be one of a perennial character. Bacon had no conversance with science in the working, but he stood forth as the spokesman of the natural growth of the age. He focussed the reaction setting in universally against wordspinner and schoolman. He voiced, in dignified fashion and in soul-stirring prophetic language, the trend of the racial dialectic. There is no mistaking the fact that he merely accelerated what the stream of events was already rolling onward. But, in doing so, he rescued the Inductive Method from the ruts of particular sciences, elevated it into prominence as *the* method of inquiry *par excellence*, and thus made his contemporaries realize explicitly, under the form of full reflective consciousness, what many recked light of and others unduly confined to their private researches or harboured only in vague, undignified, and unsystematic fashion. In fine, Bacon explicitly championed what was implicitly present in the drift of a whole array of specialist researches. He was at once the creature and exponent of the racial dialectic; and, in consequence, while no reviver of, or even guide to any specific, natural *science*, he is recognized as the generalizer of the Empirical Method for modern *philosophy*.

It is needless to insist on the value of referring men to facts. If we are not to live dreaming, we must base knowledge of things on the evidence of things themselves. It is equally needless to dwell on the vices of the Induction by simple enumeration, and the wordspinning which Bacon exposed. The story is an old one. But it is necessary to note that the

rhythmic tendency observable in human thought carried the great Chancellor too far. Inveighing against illegitimate deduction, he underrated the potency of valid deduction, overaccentuated the emphasis of his protest. He noted that the schoolmen and others jumped from particular objects and relations to arbitrary and most general principles "round which, as so many fixed poles, disputation and argument continually revolve," while "from propositions thus unguardedly assumed all things are derived"—by way of laboured deductions. Fervidly, therefore, he attacked both the arbitrarily established premises and the pedantic and futile syllogizing annexed to them. But his remedy was imperfect. To neutralize wordspinning, he drew up rules of Experimental inquiry for the making of inductions, and championed a slow continuous ascent from propositions of low generality through "middle principles" (*axiomata media*) to those of the most comprehensive attainable sort. It is obvious that this mode of procedure allows no room for the Deductive Method proper, for the instrument now supreme in science, mother of all theories which reduce facts to simple laws not directly viewable as pervading these facts. Deduction of this sort serves both to discover and *prove* new laws, and to *explain* already known laws by resolving them into wider existing generalities. "Physical Science," observes Mill, "in its better-understood branches is quite as deductive as Geometry."* In the physico-mathematical sciences, for instance, certain laws having been first ascertained, multitudes of assured truths have been deduced by intervention of Geometry and the Science of Number; a practical reversal of that progress from the lower to the higher generalizations inculcated by Bacon.† Science, too, as a whole ever becomes more deductive as the progress of research admits of the mergence of subordinate in higher laws, and the dependence of the vast variety of facts on the agency of a few simple laws becomes apparent. A caution, however, is here desirable. This dependence is only a

* *Logic*, p. 404.

† Bacon does indeed allude to two divisions of the inquiry into Nature, generalizing principles from experiments and *deducing* new experiments from axioms (*Novum Org.*, ii. aph. 10), but he never carried this second consideration through, his grasp of it being wholly inadequate.

dependence in our concepts. Strictly speaking, the elementary laws *cause* nothing, they are only verbal formulas standing for the agreements, known and inferred, of facts in certain assignable features. Science is no mirror of nature, as it leaves the concreteness of reality for abstractions. The formulas it obtains have an inestimable practical value, as enabling accurate forecasts to be made. But the tendency to hypostatize them is strong. Even now writers frequently discuss the "laws of nature" as if independent forces, adducing them as causes of the particular coexistences and sequences around us. This is one of the evils of a purely bookish training, and may be classed among the various diseases of language.

In the steps leading to the formulation of the complete Deductive Method we trace a triplicity quite Hegelian. First comes the unguarded deductive method characteristic of the Middle Ages, then the Baconian negation of this with the purely experimental and inductive method, and finally the negation of this negation by a method which blends the best features of each. Bacon clearly overstated his case. The scholastic leap from particular objects and relations to highly general principles deductively employed was not of itself vicious—it was akin to the instrument now victorious in science. "The error of ancient speculation did not consist in making the largest generalizations first, but in making them without the aid or warrant of rigorous inductive methods, and applying them deductively without the needful use of that important part of the deductive method termed verification."* As an instrument of discovery the pure Baconian method will not carry us beyond empirical laws, and if brought to bear on very complex investigations, such as Sociology, may prove unreliable even in this secondary regard. Induction, however, married to deduction acquires new powers. Two phases of this alliance are to be noted. In the direct phase of the Complete Method we start from elementary laws got at immediately from observation and experiment (or mediately as deductions from actual inductions), combine these in ratiocination and reason down to novel laws and instances which verification substantiates. In the second or inverse phase, instead of

* MILL.

deducing our derivative laws *a priori*, we first generalize empirical laws from facts, and verify these by affiliating them as consequences on to our known principles. This is the Historical Method of Comte in Sociology. It should be noted that this Logic only succeeds in naming and rendering explicit the processes which investigators discover for themselves in what we may call natural or instinctive fashion. Newton, who ignored Bacon, and knew not, of course, of a Mill, asked no aid of the armchair writers, but left us nevertheless the finest exemplification of the Deductive Method on record. And many eminent discoverers of to-day, who proceed on like lines, would probably be unable to pass an examination on the abstract thinking of the codifiers of logical theory.

In respect of the utilitarian aim of Bacon's propaganda we have his explicit statement that the New Instrument was designed "*efficaciter operari ad sublevanda vitæ humanæ incommoda*"*—it was of an essentially practical character. Its advocate, objective as was his own bias of thinking, probably in no way anticipated the startling developments of doctrine which were to trace their lineage to him. It was enough for him to silence the scribblers who "anticipated Nature" by the inner light of the mind, to replace arbitrary "*primæ causæ*" and exploitation of word-connotations with absorption of living facts. It was enough for him to *bring things to the fore* and expound the new philosophy of Method. It was for others to exploit the Method, now so powerfully upreared against the horizon of reflective thought. The outcome of the stimulus he gave we have shortly to follow in some detail.

Of the two great contemporary developments of thought, affiliated on Bacon and Descartes, it will prove conducive to lucidity if we give precedence to the second. The transition from Hume directly to Kant is in every way to be preferred.

DESCARTES.

The celebrated Descartes (1596–1650) was no unpromising assailant of the lingering scholastic bias of the type we note in Bacon. The British critic pitched his tent

* *De Augmentis*, lib. ii. cap. iii.

far away from the haunts of schoolmen: Descartes, on the contrary, strove to erect a strong fortress almost within their midst. His attitude towards them is that of a man who is disgusted with an impotent enunciation of much that he holds or hopes to be true. Thus originally divorced from philosophy by a loathing of jargon, he returns to reconstruct it, and figures always as a warm friend of theology. But curiously enough his complementary theories proclaim him in addition the herald of an important mechanical way of thinking. Some, indeed, have seen in his declarations in this quarter the index of duplicity. But of this there is not a rag of valid proof. Descartes, if timid, is the representative thinker of his time, and voices as such the racial dialectic.

The method of Descartes is neither that of submission to fancy nor perceptual experience. In order to clear the ground he starts with a "methodic doubt."* True to his mathematical bias, he requires some basic axiom whence shall flow the stream of necessary deductions requisite to an impregnable system. Interrogating scepticism, he notes that, however iconoclastic, it cannot abolish the sceptic himself. If I doubt, I think, and to think is to exist. The "Cogito ergo sum" is, therefore, beyond impeachment. Not only do I exist, but I exist thinking. To the formula as it stands, much damaging criticism is applicable. Thus, considered as an abbreviated syllogism, it veils, as Gassendi remarked, a *petitio principii*. No inference can be stronger than the premises from which it is drawn, and the major premise here is the assumption "all thinking beings exist." But it would be hypercritical to lay undue stress on the form of Descartes' axiom. What he meant was to make the actuality of consciousness the starting-point of reflective thinking, as his predecessors, we may note—St. Augustine,† Bruno, and Campanella—had done before him. The really poignant objection should bear on the ambiguity of the statement. It may or may not imply that the Ego is embraced in consciousness. What is the "I" referred to? Some authorities have iden-

* Both the methodic doubt and the Cartesian test or criterion of truth are to be found in Bruno. For other debts of modern thinkers to this celebrated martyr to truth, cf. Lewes, *Biog. Hist. of Philos.*, ii. 106 et seq.

† "Tu qui vis te nosse, scis esse te? Scio. Unde scio? Nescio. Moveri te scis? Nescio. Cogitare te scis? Scio" (*Sol.*, ii. 1).

tified it with the Ego itself, some with the Ego's "thoughts" or modifications only. It is probable that Descartes never made the point perfectly clear to himself.

The actuality of consciousness was fixed in a definite concept, and that to him was the affair of chief moment.

Having this certitude, this "Cogito," to build upon, Descartes launches forth into ontology. He erects his criterion of truth as unshakable. Just as the idea of myself is valid because clear and distinct, so are equally all other ideas which comply with these conditions—not only valid as clear material for my thinking, but valid also as indices of realities independent of my thought, of absolute truth beyond conscious experience. Note this standpoint; it embodies an evasion of the idealist suggestions of the "Doubt;" it is the covert leap which clears the Rubicon between man and the supposed absolute nature of things. We may at once object that it *assumes* what scepticism is fully entitled to hold dubious. Thoughts may be luminous, but why should luminous thoughts be *also mirrors of realities beyond thought?* I may have a very clear and distinct idea or conception of God, but does that necessarily imply that God is something real apart from the conception itself? Does the *ideal* lucidity of a belief guarantee a *real* correspondent actuality? Not obviously so; we are dealing with an assumption which must be vindicated. In another regard the Cartesian procedure is curious. Not only does it debouch into dualism, but a dualism emphatic in its advocacy of mechanical explanations. Despite what Reid termed the theory of ideas, the view that we only know directly states of our consciousness, there is to be noted in Descartes a strong leaven of mere "common sense"—the sense which regards the perceived world as foreign to the knower. How otherwise could he separate so rigidly the departments of "mind" and "world"? This contrast is but psychological, and has to be transcended by metaphysic. Descartes, however, could not outrun his age completely. His idealism was stifled in its atmosphere. Not yet could a metaphysical Copernicanism like Kant's loom up against the horizon of the racial dialectic. Such teaching was to expand the glimpse of Plotinus—"the only place of the world is the soul" or

knowing Subject,—and to invest the psychological contrast with a significance as yet unsuspected.

Error on Cartesian lines is the voluntary acceptance of an imperfect in place of a completely clear idea. But such a conviction very obviously rests on the supposition that no superior being will deceive me with a clear yet false one. At this stage the proof of a God has to be advanced, the establishment of the being of Deity preceding discussion of his veracity. Now, according to Descartes, I have the idea of an infinite and all-perfect being. This idea must have its cause, for that nothing comes out of nothing is the very clearest of clear conceptions. But as one conversant only with a finite mind and finite objects in space and time, I cannot myself have originated it. It is coeval with consciousness, not coming like some ideas by way of sense (*ideæ adventitiæ*) or a plastic imagination (*ideæ fictæ*) but innate like that of self. Among ideas of all sorts it is pre-eminent. Whence, then, has it come? The answer is that it is, like the workman's mark left imprinted on his work, the index of a Being who implanted it. A further argument is to be found in our consciousness of imperfection, which suggests the existence of an ideally perfect being somehow made known to us. Lastly, there comes the ontological argument assailed later by Kant. It is argued that the idea of necessary existence of God is involved in the very idea of him as the infinite and perfect, just as that of having its angles equal to two right angles is involved in that of a triangle. *Contingent* existence contradicts *infinity*. This idea of God alone of the ideas carries with it necessary existence. Note, here, again, the leap from conception to inferred realities beyond conception. Criticism may well attack this leap. But it may be objected that we do not possess even the conception of any such ideal perfection. I must confess that to me "infinite perfection" of this order is a noise made with words.

Inasmuch, now, as the conception of an infinite being excludes limitation or defect, the veracity of God is unquestionable. Belief, then, in the reality of other minds is assured. Similarly the conception of an independent external world is impregnable.* Would God infinite, hence perfect,

* Descartes does not, however, rest his defence of objectivity solely on this

deceive us with illusory perceptions? At the same time we must be careful not to accept the unpurged deliverances of sense. Descartes here argues that the secundo-primary and secondary qualities popularly ascribed to objects are but subjective affections of consciousness. What exists outside us in an absolute manner is simply extension in three dimensions.* Physics may, accordingly, be identified with mathematics. So complete is his identification of body and space that he contends that the complete removal of matter from the interior of a hollow vessel would annihilate the distance between its walls.† Objective things are nothing more than modifications of extension, a view which was subsequently re-echoed by Spinoza and, in his earlier metaphysical speculations, by Kant. Out of a primary field of Extension, the potentialities of division, figure, and motion were evoked by Divine Power. It appears thus that the "clear and distinct" idea of the external world usually accorded to ordinary persons has no standing. The world in itself is almost naked of qualities.

The periodical melting of the blood of St. Januarius is nothing to the standing miracle whereby the Cartesian God relates consciousness and body. Between these two, the unextended inwardness and the extended outwardness a great gulf is fixed. Their seemingly intimate alliance depends entirely on the Divine Will, omnipotence intervening to mediate the interplay of brain and thought.‡ Inasmuch as Thought—a generic name for all states of consciousness—and Extension are not modifications of other ideas, but conceivable in a Lucretian solid singleness, they are classed as "attributa." § Of these latter only the above two are known

basis. He appeals also to the passivity of mind in having sensations as a highly pregnant fact.

* *Princip. Philos.*, ii. 4.

† *Ibid.*, ii. 18.

‡ Perhaps it was in view of this Divine intervention that Descartes saw fit to deny "minds" to animals. This theory was easily enough developed by Geulinx and the Cartesians into Occasionalism, which required a special intervention for every following of neurosis on psychosis, and vice versa. The general mediation of their interaction was all which Descartes originally ascribed to God in this regard. The objection to both views should be obvious. If God's "mind" can move matter, why not also the human mind in its humble sphere?

§ The notion of "infinity," however, is supposed to accompany these as all other ideas. "Attributa" is interpreted as equal to "â naturâ tributa sunt." The attribute constitutes the nature and being of its substance, a point which is taken up by Spinoza later.

to us, but attributa are, as in the Spinozistic system, numerous in God. And now a fresh element of complexity supervenes. Substances must be found in which Thought and Extension may inhere, and these are the *Mind* and *Matter* of the Cartesian structure. As substances, Mind and Matter are self-complete independent bases relative to cosmos, but relative to God they rank only as creations. Substance proper is what requires no other existence in order to maintain itself, but these latter require God.

Descartes attached a high importance to his researches in physics. His enunciation of the law of Inertia* is of interest in relation to Newton. His affirmation of the constancy in amount of the matter and motion in the universe has been cited as admirable, though its support—the “immutability” of the Deity—may be feeble. In the department of biology, he reduces vital phenomena to mechanics, substituting, however, for indivisible atoms small round particles or splinters.† It is difficult to estimate the value of this fertile working hypothesis to Science. In his *Essay on Descartes*, Dr. Huxley has dwelt in eloquent language on the debt thus incurred.

The doctrines of Descartes were not allowed to pass without evoking severe contemporary criticism. Hobbes, Locke, the revivers of the old Greek lore, and the surviving votaries of the schools had all something to say. The success of the system, however, was such as to influence all advanced thinkers in Western Continental Europe. Into details of this sort we need not enter. Nor is there requisite close analysis of positions that are in large part obsolete, in large part susceptible of illumination under subsequent heads. We should note well, however, four leading points—the criterion of truth adopted, the coincident impulses given to both the idealist and mechanical ways of thinking, the rigid dualism, and the pushing back of metaphysical system-building to its low requisite starting-point. They are all of high significance to the inquirer.

* *Princip. Philos.*, ii. 37.

† “It is not necessary to conceive any other vegetative or sensitive soul, nor any other principle of motion or life, than the blood and the spirits agitated by the fire which burns continually in the heart, and which is in nowise different from the fires existing in inanimate bodies.”

CHAPTER II.

MALEBRANCHE, SPINOZA, LEIBNITZ.

MALEBRANCHE (1638-1715) serves as the next landmark of dogmatic ontology. How to bridge the gulf between mind (consciousness) and matter was for him the dominant issue. The *Deus ex machinâ* is God, the common supporter of both. His solution in some points recalls Berkeley, but (besides conceding an independent external world) he manifests a radical divergence from that thinker. Malebranche accentuates a curious feature of Descartes. Descartes had adduced Divine agency as the efficient cause rendering an alliance of "mind" (consciousness) and body possible. According to the subsequently developed Occasionalism, such intervention is essential on the occasion of every neurosis needing a psychosis, and *vice versâ*—a clumsy doctrine, with very awkward corollaries. But, said Malebranche, If God's agency is held requisite to dole forth our sensations, it will be advisable to go farther and resolve individual consciousness, "inner" and "outer," into a finite portion of the God-consciousness. Thus in perceiving objects we are conscious "as through a glass darkly" of the archetypal ideas of cosmos as present in the mind of God. Unlike Berkeley, for whom every individual has its numerically different world, Malebranche argues for one revealed world, shared in by all individuals alike. Pantheism is barely avoided, and that only in terms. "Unless in some sense we perceived God we should perceive nothing else,"—we float wholly in the atmosphere of Deity, here duly made personal. On Cartesian lines (*ex nihilo nihil fit*) individuals must have had a genesis, and the implication of this theory is that they were spun out of the Divine Substance with which they are now admittedly interwoven.

Malebranche, however, was far too well dominated by the theological bias to press his contentions farther. His tirade against Spinoza is virulent.

Spinoza (1632-1677) carried philosophy into the realms of a naturalistic pantheism. He, too, held that the clear conception furnished its own proof,* but his marked divergence from both Descartes and Leibnitz does not enhance the value of that doctrine. This fearless and outspoken thinker was content to posit one Substance or Reality whence all things emerge, by virtue of the same necessity that attaches to its existence. According to Descartes, Substance is that which requires no other existence to maintain it. According to Malebranche, we see all things in God. According to Spinoza, all facts presuppose God as sole Substance, as the "Εν καὶ πᾶν partially manifested in the order of the universe. The manifested modes of consciousness and objects are all reducible to aspects of two attributes of this one Reality—Thought and Extension. "Individual things are nothing but the modifications of the attributes of God," i.e. the *Unica Substantia* as opposed to a Personal Creator. The employment of the term "god" by Spinoza should be carefully interpreted. It is not anything physical or spiritual, but the indeterminate basis of both which is in question; hence, strictly speaking, the word has no more relevance in this connection than it has in that of Herbert Spencer. In dealing with the world of manifestation, Spinoza is careful to remark that it does not exhaust God, the number of whose attributes is not to be measured by man. Disposing of the dualism of Descartes, he gets rid of the need of explaining the alliance of consciousness and body on the old lines. It is not an alliance of two separate sets of facts, but a double-faced process with which we have to deal. "Substance thinking and substance extended are only one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute and now through the other." In more modern phraseology, consciousness and body are the subjective and objective faces of the same basis, concomitants as opposed to causally related existences. Thus the grey matter of brain viewed physically is a modification (*modus*) of Extension by differences of rest

* "A true idea must agree with its object" (axiom vi.).

and motion, while contemplated from the psychological platform it is found to present a purely subjective side. These two sides are not metaphysically separable. But as they are contrasted as facts, we must take care that spiritual explanations should prevail in psychology, and mechanical in physics and physiology.

This theory of parallelism of "thought" and body suggests the Leibnitzian pre-established harmony. But with Leibnitz the central monad and the bodily monads are no aspects of a unity, but separate existences. The ascription of an ideal side to all modes of extension without exception is more noteworthy, as it conducts easily to a monadology. The "infinite intellect" of God—standing as it were between the pure attribute of thought and the individual—consists of the infinitely numerous finite intellects or "ideas" of bodies. What we call the soul is only the idea of one of a particular class of bodies. Such a view shatters the hope of immortality if duly carried through.

Spinoza's method is even more mathematical than Descartes'. "Mathematical Atheist" he has been called, from his geometrical form of procedure. In his *Ethics*, each book is prefaced with Definitions, Postulates, and Axioms, the object being to secure unflinching accuracy.* Not only the procedure but even the thought is geometrical, and in this regard I conceive Stirling right in terming his philosophy a "clumsy metaphor."† Even his causes appear, as "pre-existing reasons, his effects the necessary logical consequences"—a trait, however, by no means peculiar to him. His Absolute Substance is a poor offer to religion. Holding that all determination is limitation, he strips his Substance of all determinations whatever, but speaks, nevertheless, of a love for this empty surd. The solution is equally useless for philosophy. No ingenuity can dovetail the *variety* of the attribute-modes and the attributes into an *indeterminate* Substance. The monism propounded is verbal—the admitted contrasts cannot possibly be exorcised. Schwegler cleverly notes the blemish. Spinoza "sacrifices all individual existence to the negative thought of unity, instead of enabling this unity, by a living evolution into concrete variety, to negate its own barren negativity."

* For some good observations on the fallacies of this method, cf. Lewes, *Hist. Philos.*, ii. 211 et seq.

† Trans. Schwegler, *Hist. of Philosophy*, 408-410.

The result is that the phenomenal order remains inexplicable, and the existence of us individuals with it. A more dreary system could scarcely be invented.

One word more touching Spinoza. He seeks to abolish the Cartesian dualism. How singularly he effects his aim, relegating the *phenomenal contrast* to a unity "at the back of beyond"! Consciousness and extension are certainly different *for us*, but are made to collapse into the unity—the barren unity we noted—of the Absolute! Is not this a device of transparent worthlessness? Is it not concealing the unwelded portions of a bar under a cloth? There is a muddle somewhere. Here, then, to the fore with an assertion. Extension being *given in consciousness*, it cannot be alien from consciousness, as Descartes originally assumed. As a form of perception, it cannot diametrically differ from perception, and needs no heroic handling. Weigh this well, as it will concern us again hereafter.

The next notable stormer of the Absolute was Leibnitz (1646–1716), a genius whose theologico-metaphysical writings did much to sustain the amended scholasticism which survived the Lutheran Reformation in Germany. It was his aim, by way of a freely ranging reason, to lay bare the rational springs of the universe, and this in justification of and concert with theology. In executing this project he maintains the Cartesian test of truth, with, however, the reservation that the clear conception must found on the most cautious observation and inference. What this reservation amounts to may be gathered from the revision of the popular concept of Extension. For Leibnitz the concept of a real space containing moving masses separated by void intervals is illusory, a product of confused sense.

As a reformed schoolman and téléologist, Leibnitz is sharply contrasted with Spinoza, while his infinity of simple substances or monads is completely antipodal to that Absolute Unity of things taught by the great Jew. Leibnitz, moreover, polishes the key to ontology afforded by abstract thinking with what is known as the Principle of Sufficient Reason.*

* "Nothing exists the nature of which is not capable of being proved and explained *a priori*; the proof and the explanation in the case of contingent facts being derived from the nature of their causes, which could not be causes unless there was something in their nature showing them to be capable of producing that particular effect."

The feature of this innovation is that it furnishes us with a means of detecting the Divine Reason even in the contingent happening of ordinary physical events; the assumption being that nothing takes place which excludes a rational vindication. Though a physical event A may be the necessary resultant of forces B, C, D, yet there is a "power that makes for righteousness" manifested in the very fact of the sequence. The conception of Final Cause buttresses his entire fabric. It is from this necessary trend of things to a wisely ordered end that the belief in "a best of all possible worlds" draws its sanction. Out of an infinite number of possible worlds the omniscience of the *Supreme Monad* must be held to have selected the most perfect and excellent. It is of interest to note that this term "monad" occurs earlier in the writings of Giordano Bruno. According to Bruno, the soul is a simple indissoluble entity which shapes and controls the organism from within. The idea of a "central" monad, or soul, is markedly prominent in Leibnitz; while his "*Monas Monadum*" is the Theistic counterpart of Bruno's pantheistic Deity.

The subordinate monads of Leibnitz are to be confused neither with the atoms of Democritus, Gassendi, and Dalton, nor with the blind force-centres of some dynamists. Such Atoms occupy a *portion of space*. Force-centres, those purely abstract figments, are not customarily endowed with *intelligence*. The monads of Leibnitz have *no spatial attributes*, each possessing qualities of a purely subjective and intelligential order. Their qualitative unlikeness is deduced from the Principle of Variety, which asserts that no two exactly similar, hence indistinguishable, things coexist. Of the experiences of these monads all known Reality consists, Leibnitz expressing a cautious doubt as to whether God had ever created anything except monads. What we call matter is in itself nothing more than a bundle of monads; what we call consciousness is a stream of ideas and feeling which wells up *from the depths of the individual monads*. Prior to consciousness is the simple monad, with its representative force (*vis representativa*), holding the composite in itself. This Monad or individual Substance is radically a spiritual force or activity, and this activity finds expression in the continually changing states that chase one another across the

threshold of consciousness. Each monad is only changed from within itself; each is a "living and perpetual mirror of the universe," containing an infinity of possible perceptions, and standing to lose nothing, were every other such monad annihilated. Were its content elicited into consciousness, the whole past, present, and future of the universe would be revealed. The domain of apperception, or consciousness, is microscopic in comparison with that of unconscious knowledge. It is, we might suggest, like the Azores, which may be the topmost index only of a submerged Atlantis. Leibnitz regarded *ideation* as the root of sensations, emotions, and volitions, as well as of thought in its narrower sense—a view which has been exploited by many thinkers of his stamp. Sensations are confused ideation emerging from the night of the unconscious. But for contrast in these there could be no consciousness, and in the condition of dreamless sleep the conditions of our souls and of the naked monads are identical. The variety of aspects of the world as *consciously perceived* by different monads is nothing more than a variety of standpoints. The specific portions to be consciously perceived by each are provided for in that harmony of adjustments established by the Supreme Monad. Each monad unfolds itself in this way conformably with the unfolding of the rest. It is, indeed, only by virtue of the dependence of the subordinate monads on God that any "vinculum substantiale," or nexus of mutual relations between them, is possible.

The central monad known as a human soul is yoked to a physical body. How are these related when the central monad comes into ideal juxtaposition with those monads constituting brain and nerves? Here another phase of the Pre-established Harmony awaits us. For Leibnitz, occasional causes were altogether too miraculous, while no sufficient reason could be adduced in support of the view that consciousness and body, central monad and physical monads, interact. The assertion that the monad could only be changed from within had to be respected. Accordingly, he fell back again on the pre-established harmony, by which events are so divinely ordered that the streams of neurosis and psychosis flow parallel to each other, independent

but with variations coincident in time. I see a tree, not because a nervous wave starts from the retina and undulates onward to the optic centres, but because it has been from eternity ordained that the nervous wave should concur harmoniously with the uprising of a perception in my monad. This glaringly artificial hypothesis may be dismissed without comment. The identity in kind of the monads renders the weird severance uncalled for. If God causes an *influxus idealis*, why not one subordinate monad for another? Cannot some "window" be found, after all, through which monads might get messages, even if they cannot look out? This crux will concern us anon.

The *Monadology* deals interestingly with the hierarchy of degrees between the unconscious and rational conscious monad, or soul. The gist of it is, that in what is termed dead matter the monads are quite naked: that those of plants manifest as the life principle; those of animals as instinct, perception, etc.; those of man as that which recognizes great cosmic truths as such, and with more or less freedom consciously works out its own development. Much of monadological theory has survived Leibnitz, and figures more or less prominently in the works of Herbart, Lotze, Von Hartmann, and others. We shall probe the hypothesis very carefully hereafter. Properly rethought, it may turn out to be one of the most fertile *aperçus* of modern thought.

The criticism urged by Leibnitz against Locke must not be passed over. The robust British writer had made it his business to trace all knowledge to more or less worked-up experience. Leibnitz, in his reply, gave utterance to the famous retort that the intellect, with its faculties, is at least innate to itself. The soul, as a monad, is impenetrable from without; its experiences are due to its own *vis representativa*, the sufficient cause of them all, and essence of itself. He drew attention, moreover, to an important, or supposed important, distinction between necessary and contingent truths, a step which served Kant in good stead. Locke, he contended, had failed to sever truths demonstrable from innate principles from those which are generalized from experience. A necessary principle carries with it an unconditional "must;" an ordinary induction harks back to particulars which might have been

other than what they were. "The senses tell us, indeed, what happens, but not what necessarily happens." * He also argues for innate notions. Of these two types of *a-priori* deliverances latent in the monad and only elicited by sense, may be cited the Laws of Sufficient Reason and Contradiction, the truths of Arithmetic and Geometry, and the notions of Substance, Unity, Cause, Identity, etc.

We had occasion to allude to the sophistry of Descartes. It consisted in first affirming consciousness as real, and then ASSUMING that an idea valid for this consciousness is also noumenally valid, — a titanic display of confidence. In a like manner, it is impossible to justify the Leibnitzian ontology. If the monad is, as asserted, absolutely confined to its own conceptions and perceptions, how does it transcend this sphere and penetrate in thought into the domain of other monads and a Supreme Monad? It may clear and revise its conceptions through eternities, but the conceptions will still remain *its own!* And touching the flow of physical events in which God's design is alleged to be traceable, might not this said design be referred to the unconscious wisdom of the perceiving-thinking monad itself? Such is a possible outcome of the subjective idealism of Leibnitz, which altogether suspends the world in self.† Nevertheless, all due detractions made, the fertility of the suggestions of this great thinker must be accounted enormous. It is to him, among other things, that we owe the foregleams in Europe of the doctrine of "unconscious intelligence," a speculation which has played and is destined to play a leading part in the chequered history of philosophy. And always especially to be noted, the *Monadology*, however inadequate in parts, is one of the most precious condensations of wisdom ever bequeathed by man to his fellows. Absorbed into absolute idealism, it proffers us the grandest of vistas possible.

* For his detailed criticisms, cf. the dialogue entitled, *New Essays on the Human Understanding*. In his *De Veritate*, Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1624) drew a distinction between *veritas rei*, borne in upon us by particulars from without, and *veritas intellectus*, which is always and everywhere true.

† A point worthy of note is the bearing of Leibnitz' unconscious idea on the doctrine of a Personal Supreme Monad. He does not seem to have suspected that his views regarding the naked monad distinctly suggest a Philosophy of the Unconscious, such as Von Hartmann has enounced.

CHAPTER III.

HOBBS, LOCKE, BERKELEY.

TAKING up the thread of the British post-Baconian development, we confront those robust thinkers who best mediate our comprehension of Kant. Ordinarily Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are classed as empiricists, and contrasted with the ontological thinkers of the Continent. But a caveat must here be entered. It is impossible to term all these four thinkers empiricists of a logically rigorous stamp. Amid these empirical strata are discoverable intrusive sheets of metaphysic. Experience is not merely made the basis of research, but the ladder to metempirical discovery. Thus it is worth noting that neither Hobbes nor Locke can steer quite clear of metaphysic, both falling back, for instance, on the popular assumption of an independent external world. Indeed, of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, I am driven to regard the latter as alone the genuine empiricist. The others do not merely treat of the coexistences and successions of phenomena; they trespass into a supposed ulterior domain. Hobbes assumes a "body without us," and atoms; Locke also argues to an atomic substance, advances a Self or Ego, and an argument for Deity, based on the transcendent validity of the law of causality; while Berkeley is on many counts to be regarded as a true ontologist, though one working up cautiously from empirical data, not from mere "clear ideas." His view of Deity as the ultimate cause of our sense-phenomena, his faith in a rational power manifested in their orderly connection, and his theory of active ideas in the Divine Mind discussed in the *Siris*, stamp him as fundamentally a

metaphysician.* Hume alone (if we ignore his shadowy Theism) holds fast to the sphere of phenomena, and in so doing does much to clear the outlying Augean stables of previous thought.

The psychological reduction of knowledge to experience could at best be only elaborated by the Hobbists and their successors. In the East the theory is as old as the Indian Carvakas. In the West it harks back to the daybreak of Grecian philosophy. And turning to Aristotle, we find that the sage of Stagira derives our most sweeping beliefs and most abstract concepts (*viâ* memory) from sense. Even the laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle as urged against Heraclitus and Anaxagoras are defended by way of inductive appeal to particular statements and facts.† Most polemical writers would have made them intuitive, but that transformation was left to the ingenuity of subsequent writers. We find, moreover, that Aristotle clearly enounces the so-familiar principle of Association, holding that every idea is made to arise in the mind as a sequel to some other idea or sensation; resemblance, contrariety, and contiguity being among the laws of such appearance. No doubt it was for far later thinkers to *elaborate* these brilliant anticipations. And this task Hobbists and their modern successors have grappled with in detail, commencing, indeed, their labours at a time when they were practically novel to modern Europe. We do, indeed, meet with sporadic re-enunciations of empirical psychology in the scholastic period. Witness the *nihil est in intellectu, etc.*, formula of the nominalist Occam. But the natural march of thought had not at that time reached the point where its seasonableness, and hence influential growth, was possible.

A dominant conviction of Hobbes's is that of the natural genesis of knowledge out of outer experience and association. Locke develops the outline sketch of Hobbes, utilizing as his foil the doctrine of innate ideas. By the side of a monument of noble work he leaves the inevitable rubble-heap. Berkeley annexing the monument, and partly carting away the rubble,

* As Reid remarks, with Berkeley "the most important objects [Self, God, etc.] are known without ideas" (*Works*, p. 288).

† *Metaphysic.*

centres his *destructive* empiricism on the name "Matter," and then abandons critical empiricism outright for *constructive ontology*. Hume proceeds to attack the received notions both of "mind" and "matter," and fathers on his researches an important and most embarrassing agnosticism. With the exception of executing an advance on Hume's treatment of Relations, the later non-evolutionist empiricists have done little but furnish his fabric. This is apparent in respect both of his agnostic philosophy and his leading positions in psychology. Thus Mill's rejection of intuitive ideas and of a nexus in causation, his questioning of the belief in an immediate consciousness of a Self, his nominalism, his sweeping reduction of Thought to association of ideas, his view of inference as radically a progress from particulars to particulars, his limitation of our knowledge to resemblances, coexistences, and successions of phenomena, his criticisms of the popular theories of perception, and even portions of his explanation of how we come to believe in a permanent independent external world, all recall patches of doctrine to be found in the writings of his great agnostic predecessor. Bain, again, who denies the reality of an Ego, while disestablishing along with it an independent external world, occupies a position indistinguishable in essentials from Hume's. To employ a geologic illustration, Hume was the igneous agency that primarily upheaved the mountain mass, while Mill and Bain and others are comparable to the sub-aerial agencies which denuded and carved it into valley, ravine, and peak. In the realm of empirical psychology, nothing, indeed, of revolutionary import was open to the older class of associationists. Of course, if associationists of the Spencer-Lewes-Romanes evolutionist school are to be cited, it may be very justly contended that a momentous advance on Hume has really been effected. But this ulterior question of the inheritance of organized ancestral experiences is so hedged in with problems that its discussion would be here inopportune. Suffice it to remark that it accords with the older doctrine on one fundamentally important count. It, too, leans upon experience, though not solely on the restricted experience of the individual. And tracing even experience back to its beginnings, it seeks also to decipher the origin of "faculties"

and the grounds of association itself. The attempt is ambitious, and calls for the fullest aid from science. Fine exemplifications of it are to be found in Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*, and those valuable works of Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, and *Man*. Still, as yet, it is but an attempt and little more.

Hobbes (1588-1679) champions a revival of the older Greek atomism, the ethics of Epicurus, and the experientialism of Aristotle. He pushed the objective bias of Bacon into materialism, and is, perhaps, the only first-class philosophical thinker of recent times who has unreservedly embraced that hypothesis. It is of this that he was the witting, as Gassendi was, perhaps, the unwitting, co-founder for modern thought. The supposition of Hobbes is to the effect that the "world is corporeal," and that any asserted existence not reducible to a part of it is nothing. Philosophy is knowledge based on inquiry into causes and effects. His definition of body as that which has extension, substantiality, and existence, whether we perceive it or not, discloses his Ultimate Reality. Conformably with the foregoing, he maintains that "there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or partially, been begotten upon the organs of sense."* Indeed, having once assumed an external world, with consciousness as the "appearance" or subjective side of special bodily processes, he knows of no more formidable riddle than that of deriving knowledge from sensations; these, in his view, being due to the workings of bodies on our organs. The mental coherence of *ideas* he would ascribe to their "first coherence or consequence at that time when they are produced by sense;" that is, to Contiguous Association—a theory which fails to cover conception and generalization where the originals of the like ideal particulars were remote in space and time. Hobbes is an extreme nominalist, regarding propositions as only concerned with the meaning of words, and denying the presence in the mind of any but particular ideas. The former of these standpoints has been well criticized by Mill, and is at bottom incompatible with Hobbes' own inductive convictions; † the latter must, at least, be revised

* *Leviathan*, chap. i.

† Mill, *Logic*, pp. 55-62 (8th People's edit.).

to the extent of admitting those generic images which Dr. Romanes has so appropriately christened Recepts.* The clearness and honesty of Hobbes' thought endear him to the reader. But here we must perforce leave him. Most acute as a psychologist, in a metaphysical regard he is barren.

The burden of Locke's (1632-1704) great work, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, is the derivation of knowledge from experience. "Looking into his own understanding and seeing how it wrought," to use his own words, he sought to indicate the genesis of his ideas, and of their relationing as knowledge. Like Hobbes, he will not hear of any of the scholastic genera and species, but would appear to incline to conceptualism: alluding to universals, "*whether ideas or terms.*" Like Hobbes, again, he holds to what is really a relic of realism, the belief in an independent external world. He draws, however, a distinction, subsequently refined by Hamilton, between the primary and secondary qualities of matter. The primary, which have a real objective standing and resemble our "ideas of sense," are modes of Extension and Impenetrability (resistance). The secondary — taste, smell, colour, smoothness, heat, cold, etc. — are relative to us, subjective affections only, the external causes of which are discoverable in the bulk, figure, texture, and insensible motions of bodies. Locke is not only an atomist, but suggests that, for all we know, "mind" may be a quality of matter.

Locke is so far a Cartesian as to assume his own existence, the "thinking thing," as an intuitive datum, and with this the necessary subordination of known objects to the knower. But here the resemblance ends. Having posited the organism acted on by surrounding objects, the next thing is to derive our mental possessions, ideas, from the sensations thence arising. There is no shuffling. "The senses let in *particular ideas* and furnish the yet empty cabinet."† Understanding must be viewed as primarily a blank tablet with two sides—an external side filled in by sense-deliverances, and an internal side or "Reflection," on which the faint copies of these deliverances are

* Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Man*, "Ideas," 20-37.

† *Essay*, bk. i. ch. ii. § 15.

compounded, separated, and combined. "In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call *ideas of reflection*. These impressions that are made on our senses by external objects, that are extrinsic to the mind; and its own operations, proceeding from *powers intrinsic and proper to itself*, which, when reflected on by itself, become also objects of its contemplation are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge."* Of simple ideas there are four sorts—those yielded by one sense, such as "colour;" those of combined senses, such as "dimension" and "movement;" those of reflection, such as "thought;" and those of sense and reflection, such as "power" and "unity." The complex ideas elaborated out of these are those of Modes, simple and mixed, Substances, and RELATIONS.† From these children of experience and their interplay thought draws all its nutriment. Belief in innate ideas is arbitrary and uncalled for. Thus the trumpeted laws of Identity and Contradiction are confined to disputationists in schools and academies. They are unknown to the illiterate. Surely it is not with reference to the law of Contradiction that a child judges that an apple is not fire. The concrete experience precedes the abstract formula. Moreover, innate principles would involve innate elements of sense.‡ Locke further points out that in the region of ethics the alleged universality of special moral intuitions is contrary to the results of observation. If Kant had but properly assimilated this fact, we should probably have heard less of the Categorical Imperative.

The inference to a God is based chiefly on the need of

* Book II. i. §§ 23, 24.

† These divisions are arbitrary. You must have the idea of *substance* to have that of a *mode* and *vice versâ*, both therefore equally involving *relation*. Substance, strangely enough, is the only complex idea alleged to point to a correspondent objective reality beyond consciousness.

‡ Locke's onslaught on "innate" principles does not always plumb the required depths, as we shall see hereafter. Even as against Descartes his remarks are often irrelevant. Many of the Cartesian "innate ideas" are not present in the mind at the outset, but flow from *pre-dispositions* to conceive in a certain way. They are not all ready-made concepts. We may here remark that Predispositions, if not of the Cartesian, at least of *some sort*, must in the existing state of information be freely conceded. This has been well worked out by Spencer.

accounting for our existence as conscious units; the resulting conception being grounded on that of a finite mind only with all limitations abolished. Descartes' contention was for an innate idea of an *infinite* Being, that of Locke's for an acquired notion of an *indefinite* one. The belief in a material world is justified by its need as cause of our lively unwilld sensations, an inference to account for the *manner* in which our perceptions arise. This vindication of objectivity is, however, an after thought, for the exposition assumes material reality throughout. Such is all that is to be gleaned from Locke relevant to our fundamental inquiry—Theory of Knowledge.

Locke is usually sun-clear when he confines himself to pure psychology; where he impinges on metaphysic he is less happy. Thus the exact nature of the "tablet" is the subject of conflicting statements in the *Essay*. It figures as bodily organ, brain, perceptive mind, and reflective mind, in turn. There is further observable a materialist eddy in his thinking. He suggests that mind (consciousness) may possibly be a quality of matter, but this view, however defensible in itself, is fatal to his belief in the Ego as elsewhere upheld. Of the elaboration of simple ideas into the complexly related structures met with in the adult mind, Locke speaks more as a descriptive than an explanatory writer. He saw, however, that derivation of the raw material of ideas from sensations, however amply proved, was not enough for his science. Sensations may leave their echoes behind them, but the manner in which these derivative echoes are dealt with has to be allowed for: he, consequently, did not deny the existence of certain native faculties.* With respect to Laws of association Locke had little to say. What grip he had on association was confined to special spheres of investigation, such as the treatment of prejudices and prepossessions. Nor, again, did he concern himself with any physiological aspects of psychology, though if consciousness is possibly a "quality" of matter, recourse to nervous physiology seems naturally enough suggested as a clue to

* Another departure from experience. The faculties are not present themselves to consciousness, but are presupposed to account for the observed ongoing of its content.

the "faculties." Such physiological psychology was as yet unborn. The Faculties remain in fact, for Locke, primitive and inexplicable. Hence we note some ground for Shaftesbury's criticism, to the effect that the mind, though devoid of definite ideas prior to experience, is nevertheless so constituted as to evolve results which experience of itself cannot explain. And given primitive inexplicable faculties, Leibnitz may well enter a plea. May not these faculties inhere in a primitive "intellect," or monad, which cannot itself have been derived from sense and reflection, but of which sense and reflection are both alike aspects?

Note, again, to what Locke's view of the genesis of outer experience conducts us. To the primary qualities of matter—bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of the solid parts of bodies—he assigns independent objective reality.* It is they that cause the stimuli yielding sensations; they that, generating more or less adequate copies of themselves in consciousness, generate also a crop of affections (the secondary qualities) that are copies of nothing at all. But what really are these wonderful primary qualities? Simply certain elements drawn from our complex consciousness and hypostatized. Yet it is of these abstract elements that consciousness itself may possibly be a "quality." On what grounds is consciousness to arrive at so strange a conclusion? Surely Locke is here in a sad quandary. If "substance" is a complex idea based only on *custom*—the custom of referring simple ideas to a substrate from *inability* otherwise to think them—he makes a wondrously odd use of it. The mind seems to strangle itself with a noose of its own making. Some very relevant remarks are to be culled from Green's introduction to Hume's *Treatise*.† He indicates "two inconsistent views," which undeniably pervade the *Essay*. "According to one, *momentary sensation is the sole conveyance to us of reality*; according to the other, the real is constituted by qualities of bodies which not only "are in them whether we perceive them or not," but *which only complex ideas of relation can represent*. The unconscious device which covered

* Descartes, it will be remembered, reduced body in itself to modes of Extension alone.

† Vol. i. p. 189, edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose.

this inconsistency lay . . . in the conversion of the mere feeling of touch into the touch of a body, and thus into an experience of solidity. By this conversion, since solidity, according to Locke's account, carries with it all the other primary qualities, these, too, become data of sensation, while yet, by the retention of the opposition between them and ideas, the advantage is gained of apparently avoiding that identification of what is real with simple feeling which science and common sense alike repel." And, again, "Over against the *world of knowledge*, which is the work of the mind, stands a *real world* of which we can say nothing but that it is there, that it makes us aware of its presence in every sensation, while our *interpretation of what it is, the system of relations that we read into it, is our own invention*. The interpretation is not even to be called a shadow, for a shadow, however dim, still reflects the reality; it is an arbitrary fiction."* It will suffice to advert briefly to these objections, as they indicate lines of development subsequently to be fully exploited. Meanwhile, let us hear what Berkeley has to say of the primary qualities and other issues of the philosophy of external perception.

In contravention of the descent of Berkeley (1685-1753) from Locke, certain of his points of agreement with Malebranche have been cited. To this subject we have already had occasion to allude. Apart, however, from the divergence then emphasized, there are clues which render his Lockean inspiration indubitable. Cross-lights from Malebranche may be conceded, but scarcely more. Locke, it will be remembered, had urged that knowledge is always conversant directly with "ideas" and only indirectly with an independent external world. Nay, when pressed, he had posited this world not on the ground of our receiving sensations, but on that of the mere *mode* in which these are received. The primary qualities stuck in a substance were pitchforked outside consciousness to account for this selfsame mode. Now, for this extended solid Noumenon † Berkeley simply

* *Ibid.*, p. 93.

† As this term frequently recurs, it may be explained at once. Noumenon originally stood for the *reality* seized or "thought" by reason; a reality opposed to the *unreal* phantasmal object of sense-perception. Noumenon and thing *per*

substitutes Deity. "Substance" was, for Locke a complex idea (elaborated, however, out of unknown elements, for judgments of substance and attribute do not on his lines arise with simple ideas),* and as interpreted by him, an excrescence on empirical thinking. If all knowledge flows from experience, and experience yields no external material substance, he is clearly declared guilty of transcending his data. Berkeley, the *destroyer*, is keenly alive to this objection; but Berkeley, the *ontologist*, discards the substance "Matter" only to introduce the other substance—God. He, too, transcends his data, though in a more spiritual direction. He disestablishes Locke's rude hypothesis, but he fails, as we shall see, to produce a valid hypothesis of his own.

It is in the *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* that the maturing thought of Berkeley begins clearly to manifest. This charmingly lucid work is designed to show that body as outward reality and the space-relations of bodies and their parts are not *seen*, but ideally or actually "touched." Locke had already declared that many so-called simple ideas involve inferences of an automatic sort, and had instanced the visual perception of a round globe as a case in point.† But he had further said that it is "as needless to go to prove that men perceive by their sight a distance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the same body, as that they see colours themselves."‡ This view is now traversed. It should be noted, however, that Berkeley never ventures so far as some of our modern associationists. Though holding that the "proper and immediate object of sight is colour," he concedes also a margin of visual extension: lights and

se came thus to be interchangeable terms. Later still Noumenon, as positive respondent to the given, whether knower or known, came to indicate pure reality—"material," "spiritual," and even "unknowable"—as obtaining *independent of and apart from human cognition*. With Locke and Berkeley such Noumena are partially knowable; with Kant they are unknowable. Kant further uses Noumena in the sense of a "limitative conception of the understanding." It is, however, his positing of *unknowable surds* behind appearances that rendered him open to the criticisms of Fichte and Hegel.

* Locke alludes, in a letter to Stillingfleet, to the idea of substance, and remarks that the "general indetermined idea of *something* is by the abstraction of the mind derived from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection." This is nonsense, unless the "simple" ideas originally contain it, and yet, according to Lockeian empiricism, they cannot (see Green, intro., p. 31).

† *Essay*, bk. ii. ch. ix. § 8.

‡ *Essay*, bk. ii. ch. xiii. § 2.

colours being given, not only "in degrees of faintness and clearness, confusion and distinctness," but as variously sized and placed. Native co-existence of colour-points is admitted. But it is urged that such visual space or extension has of itself *no external reference*, is not the true adult extension we speak of at all, that it has, accordingly, to be interpreted through touch—touch, because in Berkeley's day the "muscular sense" had not received overt recognition. Now, Berkeley with Locke reduces space to distance between bodies or parts of the same body. He has to show, therefore, that perception of distance outward in the line of vision, of distance between bodies, and the parts of bodies, really grounds on touch. The raw material is a colour-field, with lights and shades, visible place, sizes and figures; the interpretation of it touch-born. Thus when Smith "sees" a distant gate, "what he sees suggests to his understanding that, after having passed a certain distance, *to be measured by the motion of his body which is perceivable by touch*, he shall come to perceive such and such tangible ideas which have been usually connected with such and such visible ideas."* With touch Berkeley should have explicitly included muscular sensations, but this by the way. The central point is the acquired character of our adult spectacular consciousness. There is to be observed a continual uprising of ideal or possible tactual (and muscular) sensations, together with the present sensations yielded by the eye. Visual *signs* recall their interpretative *significates*. In connecting the two, Berkeley appeals to "*custom*" and "*suggestion*;" surety of result founding on a veiled faith in the uniformity of events, on a rationality which so connects our ideas of sense as to insure their reliable combination with mental ideas. I may note, in passing, that for what we should term presentations or clusters of related sensations *versus* mental revivals and compounds, Berkeley employs the expression "ideas of sense." These he contrasts with the ideas formed by contemplation of passions and mental operations, and with those, again, which are due to the combination of the above two classes, in memory and imagination. It should be further noted

* *Theory of Vision*, § 45.

that he dissociates conscious inferences of intellect from the involuntary custom-bred inferences or associations of sense.

Despite deficient grasp of the psychology of sensation, Berkeley's *Theory of Vision* was an advance of great moment, and one of the most admirable pieces of analysis ever penned. Its value for *psychology* is undeniable, and, modernized by recognition of inherited predispositions, it commands wide though not unqualified or universal assent. It leaves, however, the problem of *interpretable coexisting colour-points* where it was before. If the colours have visible size ("quantities of coloured points") and place ("sundry situations") at the outset, we cannot consider the inquiry closed. What, too, of the primarily coexisting tactual sensations so often alleged to obtain? The consciousness of points as somehow coexisting is the consciousness of at least an undeveloped space. Space is dormant, it would seem, even if unmeasured. Of this, however, anon.

The metaphysical import of the doctrine shows up when we come to the later *Principles of Human Knowledge*. Hitherto it might be thought that Berkeley was only explaining how we come to "see" real distances, sizes, and places in a real, independent, permanent world. But it is now contended that the tangible and the visual object have no standing out of a percipient mind. "The ideas of sight . . . do not suggest or mark out to us things *actually existing at a distance*, but only admonish us what *ideas* will be imprinted on our minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such and such actions." This new standpoint swallows up its predecessor. Its aim is the resolution of the world in space and time—sun, star, sea, sky, earth in its multiform aspects—into states of finite minds, and, finally, in its groundwork, into states known in and produced by a primal infinite Divine Mind. Just as the visual object has been shown to be invested with associations, so now are all objects seen to be coated with like accretions. They rise "like an exhalation" out of primarily unlinked ideas of sense and mental ideas. An everyday object, such as a house or tree, is a small cluster of actual sensations interpreted by *associated ideal residues of former sensations*. Time as a

positive experience stands for no frame, no entity, but for the succession of sensations and ideas; space, for coexisting sensations as measured by successions of other sensations and ideas. And here supervenes the criticism of Locke's primary qualities, hypostatized, as we saw, to account for our sensations. It is asked, What call is there for positing a substance in which these material qualities inhere? Experience is of states of consciousness, of sensations, or "ideas of sense," but never of an independent material world. We know the world only as a series of *perceptions*, and philosophies based on experience must take this into account. We cannot think of perceptions existing unperceived without falling into absurd self-contradiction.

Some further criticisms may be noted. No one doubts that *mental ideas* exist only for consciousness. But it is customary, says Berkeley, to invest "ideas of sense" with a peculiar and inexplicable externality. In what features, he asks, are these ideas distinguished from mental ideas? In being unwilld, more lively and distinct, and in exhibiting that coherence, order, and steadiness whence are generalized the "laws of nature." * Not one, however, of these features hinders us from regarding their *esse* as their *percipi*; they are determinations of consciousness unlike other determinations, but that is all. And touching the special favouring of the primary qualities by Locke, he observes that these are found intimately interwoven with the secondary. Why, then, is the one set declared independent of us and the other not? Further, Locke had averred that these primary qualities produce copies of themselves in us, in our "ideas of sense," or perceptions. But how can an idea resemble that which is *ex hypothesi* its opposite, that which is said to be of a wholly alien nature. Berkeley strikes at the root of this confusion. He maintains that "existence is perceiving and willing, or else being perceived and willed . . . all things [*i.e.* objects] are our ideas"—facts, that is to say, for consciousness, and not separable from it as concretes. But it must

* Locke had emphasized liveliness and unwilld presentation. But let us note here that many of our trains of reverie are *wholly unwilld*. In one way, again, our sensations may be *willed*. If I go to the window, I know exactly what the landscape in its general outlines will be. If I pinch my arm, I know that I may expect a definite result.

not be inferred that the bishop is a subjective idealist. On the contrary, he ascribes a twofold reality to the world—that of its elaborated form in the consciousness of human and (presumably) animal percipients, and that of its *archetypal* form in the consciousness of Deity, in whom are suspended all the ideal activities which we recognize as change. From this Eternal Mind we derive those patches of sensations which are worked up by association into a fullblown and seemingly external world.

It will now be more clearly seen that this Divine Mind is Berkeley's substitute for the material noumenon—the "I know not what" holding the primary qualities—of Locke. There is here no subjective idealism such as that recording the acts of the Leibnitzian monad. Nor is there noticeable any close contact with the spiritual idealism of Hegel. Putting aside Theism, several points of difference stand prominently out. In Berkeley, *detached "thinking things"* are impressed *across a void* by a *detached Deity*, while *numerically different* worlds appear for these different spectators. Further, these worlds, resolvable into fleeting particular sensations, would be held by Hegelians to suggest a Deity who *sensates rather than knows*. Not mere sensations, but sensations *necessarily related by thought*, by "categories" objectivated as a slowly unfolded world-whole, are posited by Hegelians. It would also be very properly objected that the Berkeleyan detached Deity is got at by an illegitimate transcending of experience. The union of God, Man, and Nature, if any, is intimate.

And now we come to a later work. The positive core of Berkeley's metaphysic—reference of the source of sense-phenomena to God—is emphasized in the *Siris*, a work which begins with tar-water and ends with the Absolute. Demolition of the popular view of matter having been effected, a daring incursion into ontology is found seasonable. There are not wanting here passages of a guardedly pantheistic trend, but it is the exposition of the active Divine Ideas, and a certain dim foreshadowing of Kant which arrest one. The Ideas, "most real beings," strongly recall Plato's system of Cogitable Universals contrasting with the fleeting and phantasmal objects of sense.* Berkeley had been careful to state

* "Most real beings, intellectual and unchangeable, and therefore more real

that the world of sense is not merely felt by God, but *known*, difficult as it may be to reconcile this with his primary reduction of the real to particular experiences in time. The Ideas standing as archetypes of the *shadowy sensible ectypes* expand this view. With this advance goes that on the score of relations. Originally he had started with more or less irrelative sense-patches. But in the *Siris* irrelative patches are repudiated, and we have the truly Kantian afterthought, "Strictly the Sense knows nothing" (§ 253). "As Understanding perceiveth not, so Sense knoweth not" (§ 305). These features of the *Siris* show like heralds of a revolution in his thinking. But the revolution limned forth was only to be consummated by others.

It is the opinion of Bain, that "all the ingenuity of a century and a half has failed to see a way out of the contradictions exposed by Berkeley."* Bain would buttress psychological idealism with the Bishop's criticism of "Matter;" but this interpretation, we shall see, is arbitrary. Berkeley's great accomplishment I conceive to be this—the shattering of ordinary realism. He showed in sun-clear language that perception and its objects are inseparable; that the world is as truly suspended in consciousness as is the most subtle of thoughts or emotions. It is this emphatic preaching of Idealism which ennobles him. Others before him had been idealists, but none gave so luminous a defence of their faith.

than the fleeting, transient objects of sense, which, wanting stability, *cannot be subjects of science, much less of intellectual knowledge*," are Berkeley's words, (*Siris*, § 335). Berkeley in this section is explaining the views of Plato, but his sympathy with these views is obvious, cf. §§ 337, 338.

* *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 205.

CHAPTER IV.

HUME, REID, ETC., UP TO KANT.

THE theology of Berkeley is less happy. It founds on what Fichte termed the "transcendent" use of a notion. We employ a notion transcendently when we overstep by its aid the experience within which alone it is met with. The notion he holds so employed by Berkeley is Community, that of mutual action and reaction; we may here, however, consider it as the simpler one of Causality. Now, it may well be that Causality is of transcendently valid import;* but Berkeley, fettered by his empirical premises, assigns no vindication of this view. Observe his inference to Deity. Production of our (involuntary, lively, coherent, steady, and ordered) sensations or "ideas of sense" requires an *active power* or cause. This cannot be found in matter whose *esse* is *percipi*; nor in ideas, "for we are conscious that they are inert," and must, therefore, be sought in spirit, "since of that we are conscious as active,—yet not in the spirit of which we are conscious, *since then there would be no difference between real and imaginary ideas; therefore in a Divine Spirit.*" This transcending of experience rests on the uncritical use of a notion; nevertheless a grave theology springs from it. It crumbles before the critic who, unlike Berkeley, has no "mathematical atheists" to slay.

Berkeley had supposed that by disestablishing "matter," he would render atheism and scepticism impossible. Not innocent of the theological bias, he had predicted a "most cheap and easy triumph" over all the foes of religion. It is instructive, accordingly, to note the declaration of Hume

* Cf. Part II., "The Individual Subject as External Perception."

(1711-1776), that his works "form the best lessons in scepticism which are to be found among the ancient and modern philosophers." * In view of current prejudices, it will be preferable to allude to Hume as an agnostic idealist as opposed to a sceptic. In so far as concerns a speculative agnosticism he is in agreement with Kant. Certainly he is no nihilist. "Since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they *must necessarily appear in every particular what they are and be what they appear.*" And so far is he from being a blunt denier of any system of noumena beyond consciousness, that he admits that sensations may *possibly* be caused by objects. It is impracticable to decide whether they "arise immediately *from the object*, or are produced by the *creative power of the mind*, or are derived from *the Author of our being*"! † Elsewhere he assigns "unknown causes." In company with many later writers he rejects outright a substance of mind. Allowing for all this, we may regard him as the herald of British agnosticism, not always perhaps competent, and not always consistent, but resolved at any rate to show up what he held to be the rotten foundations of accepted dogma. He is the satirist of that cocksureness which believes without evidence, and bawls out its nonsense to mankind. And as result of his truly Kantian crusade against ontology, he would restrict "abstract" speculation to the provinces of number and quantity leaving insoluble metaphysical problems to those with time to waste. Barring occasional embroidery, this is all that his terrible scepticism amounts to. There exists no better discipline for metaphysicians than study of the *Inquiry* and the *Treatise*. The service that these admirable works have rendered to *clear, honest, and thorough-going* thinking merits the heartiest of eulogies. Even their errors serve as moments in the historic realization of the true.

* *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, vol. ii. note N.

† The weakness of the two latter suggestions is unworthy of Hume. For him there can be no "creative mind" or Leibnitzian Monad, consciousness being elsewhere resolved into a flux of impressions and ideas. Mind, on his showing, as posterior to, cannot originate sensations. Similarly, the bare expression, "Author of our being," is irreconcilable with Humian premises. If we are a flux of ideas and sensations, the "Author of our being" must be also the Author of our sensations. To speak of such an Author is to presume the inquiry closed.

The standpoint of Hume is that of empiricism pressed home. If all knowledge flows from experience*—all the stuff of thought from subjective impressions of sense—a “matter” of the traditional sort, independent of and not given in experience, must surely go. For establishing this result he warmly commends Berkeley, whose nominalism, by the way, he regards wrongly as a discovery. But he further indicates that a like iconoclasm dismantles that Ego, or Self, to which Locke (in the main) and Berkeley had clung. An experience-born knowledge is conversant only with successive *impressions and ideas*. Empiricism must not feign an entity barred out by its own recognized limitations. What has it to juggle with *outside the particular states of consciousness whence it starts?* From this centre radiate all Hume’s “sceptical” positions. Experience is *quâ* Experience real enough, but it is a closed circle of details whence there is no way of metaphysical escape.

By IMPRESSIONS, simple and complex, are to be understood sensations together with emotions and passions *at the time of first presentation*, “all our more lively perceptions when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.”† There are impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection, the first arising from a source unknown, the second (passions and emotions) themselves derivative from sensations, but generating a quite special class of ideas. Impressions of reflection are not copies of sensations but new productions. By IDEAS, also simple and complex, are indicated the less lively revivals and compounds of the impressions. These echoes are subdivided on Berkeley’s lines into the relatively faint echoes of the reproductive memory, and the still fainter of imagination, alone competent to “transpose and change its ideas.” The having of impressions is raw knowledge; of ideas, thinking: the radical elements of mind are deliverances of the senses, with derivative impressions of reflection. Complex ideas (as in Locke) are of three sorts, those of modes, substances, and relations. Perception is used by Hume as a term covering any and every state of consciousness.

* For the exemption of a simple idea of a colour *shade*, from need of a corresponding prior impression, cf. *Treatise*, i. § 1. The point is of interest.

† *Inquiry*, § 2.

Muscular sensations are overlooked by this classification. And touching the contrast of "lively" and "faint" perceptions an important objection must be entered. Lively and faint point to differences, not of kind but degree. But do impressions differ from ideas chiefly in being *vivid* heralds of the latter in time? Does the derivation of my idea of a table from experience mean only that once I had a lively perception and now have only a faint one? If so, fact and fancy, real and ideal run together in a way appropriate to a dream-world. There is no reliable standard of reality assignable. We may note here, too, how inconsistent with his idealism Hume's thinking often is. He inclines to reduce all perceptions alike to a *consequence of cerebral motion*, forgetting that phenomenalism of his sort is quite incompatible with such a view. If "cerebral motions" are only *possible perceptions* for my consciousness, they cannot, also, subsist independently as causes of my consciousness. Hume adverts to the belief in a "double existence of perceptions and objects" as the "monstrous offspring" of warring imagination and reflection.* But, unless the brain has an existence independent of its *percipi* his physiological psychology is nonsense. We may add that Hume's doctrine of Causality should forbid such gratuitous theorizing.

On the troublous issue of Relations, Hume breaks down completely. Even the friendly Huxley observes that "Hume failed, as completely as his predecessors had done, to recognize the elementary character of impressions of relation, and when he discusses relations he falls into a chaos of confusion and self-contradiction." † Not to dwell at undue length on this chaos, it will suffice to decipher its leading features. Relations fall into two classes, the natural and the philosophical. The "natural" are Resemblance, Contiguity in time and place, and Cause and Effect, serving as a "gentle force," whereby is effected the association of ideas in imagination. Of these *guides* to Imagination—for a margin of free activity is admitted—Cause and Effect is the most potent. The two former are "original qualities" of human nature to which no genesis can be assigned.‡ Tested by Hume's

* *Treatise*, pt. iv. § 2.

† *Hume*, p. 69.

‡ Cf., however, a characteristic lapse into physiology, pt. ii. § 5, *Treatise*.

empiricism, the ascription to "them" of a "gentle force" should disappear. On his lines, all we know is that ideas are found associated in certain ways, and here our knowledge ends. Turning to the ideas of Philosophical Relation acquired by "comparison of objects," we confront two subclasses, those which depend wholly on the compared things, *e.g.* Resemblance, and those which may be changed without any change in the things, *e.g.* relations of contiguity in place. "'Tis from the idea of a triangle, that we discover the relation of equality, which its three angles bear to two right ones; and this relation is invariable as long as our idea remains the same. On the contrary, the relations of contiguity and distance betwixt two objects may be changed merely by an alteration of their place, without any change on the objects themselves or on their ideas. . . . 'Tis the same case with identity and causation. Two objects tho' perfectly resembling each other, and even appearing in the same place at different times, may be numerically different."* The relations are seven in all—resemblance, identity, relations of time and place, proportion in quantity and number, degrees in quality, contrariety and causation,—some answering in a manner to the already-cited relations of the natural order. And now the question obviously arises: If ideas are ghosts of impressions, and impressions are either sensations or emotions, *what are the originals of these ideas of philosophical relation?* The crux is serious, but is dexterously met—"identity" and "causation" being resolved into association-spun "propensities to feign," while the remainder appear to be shuffled out of impressions. The Exposition of this in the *Treatise* is singularly obscure and wearisome, a thick mist hovering round the whole luckless department.

Into Hume's confused account of these several philosophical relations we need not enter in detail. His repudiation of a Subject or Ego is the source of serious and, indeed, insurmountable, difficulties. With atomistic "impressions," those *unreal abstractions* torn from a whole never broken, nothing can be done. The bankruptcy of this theory of Relations is well exhibited in his treatment of Space and Time. Alluding to the visual perception of a table, he remarks that the

* *Treatise*, iii. § 1.

“idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these coloured points and of the manner of their appearance”—a view open to the criticism that extension is being derived from itself. Not mere colour impressions, but colour impressions *related as coexisting* are here assumed. “Coloured points disposed in a certain manner,” “coloured and tangible objects, having parts so disposed as to convey the idea of extension” are utterances of like import. More directly, it is argued, that as every idea comes from an impression—and impressions of reflection are out of court—the idea of space must come from visual or tactual impressions of sense.* But if so, sense embodies *relations which the original theory deriving experience from irrelative impressions has not allowed for*. Similarly with Time, the idea of which is drawn from successive impressions, as, also, ideas.† Here, too, the “manner of appearance” is to be remarked. What Hume really seems to attack is the doctrine that Space and Time are frames or entities containing our impressions and ideas—a very widely held but baseless opinion. Space is no frame, no entity, he meant to argue, but the *order of states of consciousness*. No such states no Space, no Time; these become at once mere words, *flatus vocis*. But he seems to have merged this view in the quite distinct one that impressions, if not contained in Space, or in Time are, therefore, irrelative. He forgets that rejection of the *frame* theory leaves the *order* question as it was. “Manner of appearance” and “disposition” mean, if they mean anything, that something other than isolated sense-patches is in evidence. They are expressions which certainly describe space and time, but they do so at the cost of conceding relation.

Hume’s treatment of Causality must be now specially adverted to. Cause and effect was for Locke a *complex idea* of relation superinduced on successive events by the mind.‡ Locke, however, held to a real objective nexus linking the events, he considered that when fire burns wood there is present a productive power in the fire, necessitating this outcome. As to Power, “we obtain the notion from what our senses are

* *Treatise*, pt. ii. § 3.

† Like Leibnitz, Hume falls into the mistake of identifying time and succession. What of simultaneity? e.g. of a smell and a taste.

‡ *Essay*, bk. ii. ch. xii. §§ 1, 7; xxv. § 8.

able to discern in the operation of bodies on one another." Berkeley, again, had destroyed the conception of a *natural* causality, and reduced efficient power to the arbitrary will of a Deity that this particular sense-phenomenon shall always follow that.* Hume's course was clearly marked out. "Every event *must* have a cause" would never do for his sensationalism. He, be it understood, had neither an independent external world nor a Divine Noumenon to cater for. He had simply sequent states of his own consciousness to "loosen" and empty of necessary connection. "The efficacy or energy," he observes, "of causes is neither placed in the causes themselves nor in the Deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles, but belongs entirely to the soul."† Objects "causally" related are simply our perceptions, and these are in no sense indissolubly welded. Their "*necessary connection*" is a fiction read into constant conjunction. In order to the growth of this pseud-idea of necessity, not mere contiguity in time, but this *constant* contiguity is requisite. To take the case of impact of billiard balls. "The first time a man saw the communication by impulse," says Hume,‡ "he could not pronounce that the one event was *connected*, but only that it was *conjoined* with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be *connected*. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connection? Nothing but that he now feels those events to be connected in his imagination." That the billiard ball struck by this or that ball *must* move is the outcome of the easy transition between antecedent and consequent in thought—the outcome of custom-bred association. It will thus be apparent that the old definition of cause, "præsens facit, mutata mutat, sublata tollit," has been transformed into one positing invariable antecedence. It matters not that this definition has had to be modified by Mill (in deference to Reid) into one of unconditional and

* Cf. Algazzali, "Ce que les philosophes appellent la loi de la nature, ou le principe de causalité est une chose qui arrive habituellement parceque Dieu le veut" (Munk, *Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe*, p. 379; Paris, 1859).

† *Treatise*, pt. iii. § 14.

‡ *Inquiry*, § 7.

invariable antecedence.* Nor need it delay us, as against Hume and intuitionists alike, that there are cases of causation involving no succession at all. The historic interest of the belief is its subjectivation of the source of necessity and the correlated "loosening," as Hume would say, of states of consciousness. Observe one consequence of this teaching. If causality springs from imaginative association of particulars, is *wholly a subjective outgrowth*, what have we left whereby we can scale the empyrean of Berkeley's Divine Noumenon? No longer can we unhesitatingly point to God as *cause* of our sensations, no longer with Locke (or Kant) to multiple things-in-themselves as performing the same function. The transcendent use of causality, of an association-born notion, must henceforth receive a special vindication, if indeed it can be vindicated at all.

Following out the associationism of Berkeley,† though without Berkeley's faith in an underlying rationality, Hume points out how the cohering of ideas with impressions gives rise to our full-blown objects, among which uniformities of coexistence and succession are subsequently found to obtain. In Part IV. § 2 of the *Treatise*, he deals very fully with the question why we attribute to these objects a *continued* existence when unperceived, and an existence *distinct* from perception. Strictly speaking, the two issues are bound up together, but they are separated for convenience of exposition. One thing is clear—sense cannot yield the beliefs, for sense, though lively and involuntary, does not carry us beyond impressions themselves. *Liveliness* and *involuntariness* of presentation are exhibited by pains and pleasures which are never thought of as independent of consciousness. Reason is out of court, the convictions being made for, not by us. We must fall back on imagination, and in this manner. All those objects (extended and solid) conceived as continued existences manifest a **CONSTANCY** in mode of presentation and **COHERENCE** even in

* Mill regards cause as = "*sum total* of the conditions positive and negative taken together." And of these conditions it may, I think, be shown that we usually select arbitrarily one or two bearing most prominently on our interests.

† Berkeley, however, is no thoroughgoing associationist. He severs suggestion from intellectual inference. (See his *Vindication of Visual Language*.) With Hume "all reasonings are nothing but the effect of custom, and custom has no influence but by enlivening the imagination."

their changes—"a regular dependence on each other." These two qualities buttress the beliefs. To account for presentation of such *coherent* objects, we require to feign their continued existence when unperceived. Thus, I hear a noise as of a door opening, and see a porter entering with a letter from a distant friend, and this situation is only interpretable over against a background of supposed continued objects.* Objects sensibly coherent are endowed with still greater coherence by being thought as continued, and "as the mind is *once in the train of observing* an uniformity among objects, it naturally continues, till it renders the uniformity as complete as possible." † Further, the *constancy* of presented objects has to be exploited. The sun of to-day returns like in appearance to the sun of yesterday. Here we have two *interrupted*, though resembling perceptions. To save the supposed identical object we imaginatively interpolate a connecting but unperceived existence spanning intervals between our perceptions of it. The "smooth passage" of the imagination along a train of resembling things yields this spurious numerical identity. BELIEF—for we do not here feign—in the interpolated image is its vividness as attached to a lively impression. Continued existence believed in, distinct existence easily follows. In Hume's treatment of Coherence—the "present" sensations backed by all the uprising "possibilities" of sensation—there is much that recalls Mill. The section "Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses," which embodies these and other contentions, is one of a singularly interesting character.

Introspection reveals no Ego. "Setting aside some metaphysicians, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable

* "There is scarce a moment of my life wherein . . . I have not occasion to suppose the continued existence of objects, in order to connect their past and present appearances, and give them such an union with each other as I have found by experience to be suitable to their particular natures and circumstances. Here, then, I am naturally led to regard the world as something real and durable, and as preserving its existence even when it is no longer present to my perception."

† Hume points out that mere custom cannot lead us to infer a greater degree of regularity in unperceived objects than in those perceived. But Imagination once set going is apt to work of itself.

rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." * Personal identity is a notion arising wholly from the "smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas." In so far as he resolves the empirical mind into a flux, he is quite at one with Kant. Introspection "reveals no permanent entity, for the Ego is only the consciousness of thought" (Kant). Kant, however, regards an Ego as the necessary presupposition of the flux. No Ego, no unity in the changes, *and so no flux at all*. A standpoint such as this throws Hume's procedure into very clear relief. Hume's assumption is this: either introspection must seize the Ego, or the Ego must be rejected. But this assumption is arbitrary. The Ego may be an eye that sees everything but itself—the veiled unifier and witness of the shifting flux of knowledge. Even for Berkeley it stands for no definite state to be searched for, but is the "I" *which has* all states. The hunt for it among these is surely the sorriest of errors.

But though Hume will not hear of an Ego, his very explanations imply one. What is meant by progress of thought along a train of connected ideas, for instance? Can a mere train of ideas run along another train of ideas? Are we not being fed here with metaphor instead of argument? Substitute, however, an Ego for this deceptive word "thought" and the assertion becomes at least intelligible. The Ego may be held to realize its identity *through* the very manifold it embraces.

Hume has urged that "every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be considered as separately existent." But it is only in virtue of abstraction—an "abstraction *without a separation*," to turn one of Hume's phrases against him—that we can speak of isolated atomistic sensations at all. Sensations are aspects of a unity, not irrelative units on their own account. Hume's constant reference to "bundles," "heaps," and "collections" of perceptions is his practical recognition of the fact. And elsewhere, in Part II., I have endeavoured to proffer a ground for it. It is that the Ego or Subject projects the sensations, which are thus only a many-sided revelation of itself.

Hume's theory of Liberty is, like most of his work,

* *Treatise*, iv. § 6.

stimulating. Liberty he defines as a "power of acting or not acting, according to the determination of the will." This seems full of promise to believers in the doctrine of Freedom, but there is a rider which blights their merriment. Hume adds that this will is itself determined by motives. The original of this graceful statement is to be found in the *Leviathan* of Hobbes, who similarly remarks that "we have a liberty of doing or omitting, according to appetite or aversion."* Hume argues that we first read a causal nexus into natural sequences, and then, discovering no similar nexus in our own volitional sequences, express the contrast as Freedom. Such statements clear the air of this debate in right breezy fashion.

It was Hume's doctrine of Causality that moved Kant to delve into Theory of Knowledge. Those, however, who expect that sage to champion an "innate idea" of causality or a necessary union of events in an independent external world will be disappointed when they read the *Critique*. The import of Kant's Category of Causality is not that of an "innate idea"—of an intellectual notion imposed on a ready-made perceived world. It is one of the agencies that constitute the reality of this world. And though the tethering of events in this world is "necessary," it is only so for the consciousness of percipient Egos. It is not symbolic of necessity in an independent external world.

Hume is an agnostic, not a nihilist. In the main he is Berkeley *with the Ego and Divine Mind left out*. An imperfect but suggestive illustration presents itself. "Buddhism," remarks Gough, in his *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, "is the philosophy of the Upanishads with Brahman (the Universal Spirit) left out."† It was against these Buddhist idealists that Sankara ranged his battalions. According to Śūnyavāda, or theory of a metaphysical void held by his opponents, sensations and worked-up residues of sensations exhaust reality. The unconscious Spirit, on which, says the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, is woven the world Mâyā, is discarded, the "koshas," or envelopes of the soul, are

* Cf. also Locke: "Our being able to act or not to act according as we shall choose or will" (*Essay*, bk. ii. ch. xxi.) is his definition of Liberty.

† *Phil. of Upanishads*, p. 187.

resolved into unreal attribute-bundles, or "skhandhas," and thought, feeling, and nature reduced to a flux of baseless semblances,—not, be it observed, a real objective flux, such as that of Heracleitus, but such as a nihilistic idealism suspends in consciousness—a consciousness which is a name only for successive pageants and feelings linked together no one knows how.

Now, Thomas Reid (1710–1796), who, in his *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, so quaintly assails scepticism, is related to Hume after the fashion in which Sankara is related to these Buddhists. A curious parallel confronts us. Both thinkers argue that the independent reality of the object is given in the act of perception itself. Both fall back on the universal convictions of men—that is, on common sense. Listen to Sankara: "The consciousness itself certifies to us that the thing is external to the consciousness. No one is conscious of the post and the wall as forms of perception, and every plain man knows that the post and the wall are objects of perception. It is thus that all ordinary people perceive things."* And again, *quâ* the ego: "The witness or self, that irradiates the perception and the perception that it irradiates are essentially different, and may thus be held to stand to one another in the relation of thing knowing and thing known. The witness or self is self-positing, and cannot be repudiated" (*Gloss on the Vedânta Sûtras*).

But if the truth must be told, Reid does not gain by contrast with the Adwaiter doctor. Sankara is not driven like him into the arms of a crude Realism, but into a subtler metaphysic, here out of place to explain. Reid, indeed, educated as he was under the narrowing influence of the Scotch Church, could not be expected to soar very high. Nor, indeed, did he. His appeal to common sense to the prejudice of *reason* tends to declamation, not argument. "The learned and the unlearned, the philosopher and the day-labourer, are upon a level," when the fundamental doctrines of philosophy are mooted. His position is grounded on a bundle of assumptions, which he dignifies by the name of self-evident first principles. He takes for granted the

* Cf. Gough, *Phil. of Upanishads*, pp. 192–196, for the incisive criticism of Sankara.

ego, personal identity, the belief that those things do really exist that we distinctly perceive by our senses and are what we perceive them to be, efficient causation, freewill, and the reliability of our truth-finding faculties. A mob of "Principles of Necessary Truth," grammatical, logical, metaphysical, mathematical, æsthetic, moral, etc., are added to these. The metaphysical capacities of Reid (as also of Stewart and Brown) may be estimated by his astounding assertion that, had Berkeley believed in his doctrines, he ought in consistency to have run his head against a post! It would be absurd to look for a refutation of Hume from so crude and incompetent a source, a source which even the sympathetic Hamilton had to indicate as "often at fault, often confused, and sometimes even contradictory."* His plea for realism—that things exist beyond consciousness, and are what we perceive them to be—is unsatisfactory in the extreme. How can it be said that things exist as perceived, if they are in themselves bare of the secondary qualities? As such they are skeletons of objects, not the objects we know. If popular realism requires full recognition, let it appeal to that phase of idealism where Nature is allowed full swing, clad in all her varied "qualities." This harmony of realism and idealism is most carefully achieved by the German successors of Kant.

There are, however, some contentions of Reid which cannot be lightly dismissed. He had the good sense to recognize that the Lockeian appeal to particulars, worked out on purely empirical lines, meant ultimately a Hume. He saw, too, that there was something amiss with a classification that swept thought into the "Faint" perceptions, and world or nature into the "Vivid,"—saw that the terms "ideal" and "real" indicate differences of more moment than those of mere intensity; and, after the fashion of Kant, he contended strongly against the view that we start with simple apprehension of isolated and irrelative sense-patches. Contrariwise, he asserts that we begin with judgment and belief, and dissect out the sensations in the ripe maturity of our reflective consciousness. Knowledge is not merely the Lockeian "agreement and disagreement of

* Edition of *Reid*, note C, p. 820.

ideas ;" it involves natural or primitive judgments, *e.g.*, Existence and Cause, over which conscious logic has no sway, —judgments, "not got by comparing ideas and perceiving agreements and disagreements, but *immediately inspired by our constitution.*" There is no mistaking this ring. It is the clang of the *Critique*, the definite championship of Relations as somehow informing sense. Dealing with visual space, Reid again doubly recalls Kant. "The position of the coloured thing is no sensation ; but it is by the very laws of my constitution presented to the mind along with the colour without any additional sensation." The further parallel is his finding in this space the ground of certain necessities: *e.g.*, all bodies consist of divisible parts ; two bodies cannot occupy the same space (*Works*, 323, 324). Beyond these contentions there is nothing more in Reid that need delay us.

THE SITUATION AS PRESENTED TO KANT.

All this time, in France, the empirical movement had been taking a very decided turn. About the same time as the publication of the developed associationism of Hartley's *Observations on Man*, Condillac (1715–1780) had issued his *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge*, a work inspired by Locke, but demolishing any shred of "intellectualism" which that thinker had contrived to retain. Condillac's formula, expounded in this and other volumes, is "*Penser c'est sentir,*" Locke's "reflection" being resolved into transformed sensations. This line of thought found a still more radical expression in the writings of Helvetius (1715–1771), in Lamettrie (1709–1751), Voltaire's *Court Atheist*, in the polished, but thoroughgoing iconoclasm of Diderot (1713–1784), and in the manly and outspoken convictions which saw the light in D'Holbach's famous *Système de la Nature*. The outcome at this stage was the establishment of an influential materialist school, which reduced consciousness to brain-function, and the ultimate reality of things to physical matter in motion. The nerveless deism of Voltaire and Rousseau now went by the board, and a swarm of able writers arose to spread far and wide the dawning creed of Enlightenment. The labours

of Gassendi and Hobbes, the mechanicalism of Descartes, were now coming to fruition. The Democritan atom rocked to sleep by the Church in the Dark Ages was awaking and bellowing for recognition with the voice of a myriad-mouthed Stentor.

To sum up, then, the results of pre-Kantian thought, we have seen the dogmatic ontologists positing the validity of the clear conception, and uprearing on this basis more or less unstable systems. We have also traced the triple outcome of Empiricism in the directions of idealism, so-called scepticism, and, lastly, a mechanical materialism. Such is the intellectual invironment to which Kant had to adjust himself. Materialism, indeed, had but a blunt edge for that keen analyst of experience. But dogmatism with its teleology, sufficient reason, subjective groping, and markedly scholastic trend was to exercise him severely. Even more so the "scepticism" of Hume. That thinker's treatment of Causation, his denial of the ego, his psychological idealism, his tilt at the definitions of geometry, and his general treatment of relations, with its one-sided advocacy of the particular sensation and idea, all clamoured for analysis. The whole problem of Experience, in fact, seemed to require a further opening up. Kant saw clearly that Hume had left external perception an unravelled skein. Hume, indeed, gets no farther forward than a phenomenalism which converts "mind" and "world" into bundles of "loosened" states classed as faint and vivid. Mind and world are not explained, but appear as scarcely distinguishable components of an unreal dream. Such a result is somehow *felt* to be unsound, and was so felt by Reid; and it was for Kant to *pave the way* for its full intellectual revision. That Kant has completely *answered* Hume, it is futile, however, to contend, for the Königsberg thinker, "moral" presuppositions apart, is himself a rigid agnostic. Hume's answerer must be no relativist, but a dauntless stormer of the Absolute.

CHAPTER V.

SYSTEM OF KANT.

KANT disliked the Leibnitz - Wolffian dogmatism, and, admirer though he was of Hume, deemed his "scepticism" menacing to the stability of human thinking. But it was more especially Hume's view of Causality which set him seriously reflecting. With Hume Causality is a growth from experience of uniformities of succession, the so-called "constant conjunctions." And these successions are themselves only successions of our states of consciousness—of the fugitive "impressions." Now, Kant, also, denied that such successions have reality beyond consciousness, but he further posited a Category or "pure concept" of Causality, failing which they would not be given at all. This view naturally mediated developments. Animated by a wish to rethink Hume completely, he penned his famous work designed to constitute "A critical inquiry into the foundations and limits of the soul's faculty of knowledge." The enthusiasm which greeted it was remarkable. The Danish poet Baggesen hailed Kant as a second Messiah, and Reinhold prophesied for him a future repute equal to that of Jesus. Within a few years hundreds of attacks on and defences of the *Critique* issued from the press, and current phenomenalism and ontology were both brought successfully to bay.

Analyzing Experience, Kant starts with the innocent-looking query—How are synthetic propositions *a priori* possible? The purport of this question is not, however, far to seek. A synthetic, as opposed to an analytic, proposition, asserts an attribute of its subject not comprised in the conception of

that subject.* Now, all analytic propositions are universal, *i.e.* always valid and necessary or involving a "must." Their negation is impossible. "Man is rational" would be a case in point, if rationality had been previously included in the connotation of the concept or class-name Man. They are also *a priori*, the concept once formed being explicable as a judgment without further experience. Most synthetic propositions, on the other hand, are *a posteriori*, or derived from specific experiences. Among such would rank the induction "Volcanic eruptions are due to compressed steam," in which there is conveyed an extension of our knowledge of the subject, novel association of attributes with the concept answering to "volcanic eruptions." But Kant also held that there are certain synthetic propositions to which attach a universality and necessity *not capable of being yielded by experience*, hence arising from their *a priori* character. This test had been previously employed by Leibnitz. Among these propositions are mathematical assertions, such as " $7 + 5 = 12$,"† "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space," "A straight line is the shortest way between two points;" and others—"Every event has a cause," "The quantity of matter in nature is constant," "All coexisting substances undergo thoroughgoing mutual action and reaction," and so forth. Discovery of the *conditions* of such judgments was his manner of grappling with the inner philosophy of knowledge. Later on we shall see that even the synthetic *a posteriori* judgments imply an *a priori* synthesis; but for the moment attention may be usefully concentrated on the other class.

Kant, be it noted, fully accepts the empirical doctrine that all concrete knowledge originates in experience. "That all our knowledge," he writes, "begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise, otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers

* Buffier also distinguished the classes of *identique* and *conjonctif* judgment. Locke's verbal and real propositions also demand mention.

† It is the *actual process* of adding seven units to five, and the consequent emergence of a *new fact* not given in the sums separately viewed, that Kant emphasizes. Similarly, it is the act of drawing a straight line joining two points which is of moment.

of understanding into activity to compare, connect, and to separate these?" But he by no means identifies that experience with the isolated units of sensation into which Hume had so unsatisfactorily resolved it. True that sensation constitutes the matter, filling, or content of experience; the Ego, however, contributes its very important quota. In the manifold or multiplicity of beats of sense there are latent *potential* differences that require a background over against which they may be unrolled and so made *actual*. What background? That of Space and Time. We confront here one phase of the new treatment of relations. In Hume we start nominally from irrelative sensations, and ascend thence to relations or semblances of relations. In Kant we start from initially related elements of sense. Space and Time first arrest us; these relations (simultaneity, succession, and coexistence) being regarded as *neither implicit in sense-patches as such, nor yet as post-facto mental superinductions*. Sensations, unless presented in Space and Time, are not even *individuated* or discriminated, are not for consciousness real sensations at all.* Space and Time are the arena in which they receive their *primal* ordering, and are thus rescued from chaos. All phenomena may be stated in terms of Time—those of the "external intuition," however, indirectly so by way of their reference to self—but only those of the "external intuition" as having size, figure, distance, direction or situation in Space. Neither Time nor Space is a "concept" abstracted from particular times or spaces—the latter being possible only as parts of the single Time and Space Forms rendering sensibility a fact. The Leibnitzian derivation of Time from the succession of our states of consciousness is faulty, for succession is itself a time-determination. Simultaneity, equally a time-determination, is here overlooked. Even Leibnitz' Law of Contradiction, says Kant, involves the time-determination of simultaneity to hold valid. Things shift attributes in a time-succession. Similarly the Law of Continuity, failing an infinitely divisible Time, is illusory. As regards Space, the empirical pedigree is attacked as assuming coexistences as its starting-point. This view of

* Schopenhauer terms Space and Time "*principia individuationis*" partly on this account.

Kant is forcibly emphasized by Kuno Fischer: "The empirical explanation of space and time says merely this: we perceive things as they are in space and time, and from that we abstract space and time. In other words, from space and time we abstract space and time. This is a perfect example of an explanation as it should *not* be. It explains the thing by itself. It presupposes, instead of explaining, what is to be explained."* The *a priori* status of the Forms of Sense is further guaranteed by our inability to abstract from them in thought. Originating in the Ego (not the *mind* or memory-fed synthesis in time), whence they are elicited on the *occasion* of having sensations, these forms have no real objectivity predicable of the world of "Things-in-Themselves," of reality independent of our perceptions. "Time," says Kant, "is not something which subsists of itself or inheres in things as an objective determination. . . . Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense." "Space," again, "does not represent any property of objects as things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations to each other. . . . Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the external sense." A fourth or fifth dimension is possible on these lines; the only thing is to establish it.

The mere having of spaced and timed sensations would not, for Kant, yield a world. A *ground* for an *immature perception* might be laid, but this would certainly be all. A caution here is requisite. The *Æsthetic* speaks of objects as if these were already given, but the advance to the *Analytic* shows that they could not be. Caird has suggested that the order of the *Critique* follows the order of growth of Kant's thought, and remarks that in the *Analytic* "we have to consider *in the doing* that which the *Æsthetic* regards as *done*." Caird's interpretation of Kant is perhaps on the whole too Hegelian, but the above suggestion must be noted. This sharp isolation of Space and Time may otherwise confuse our thinking.

Enough, however, has been done to enable an important inference to be drawn. The subjectivity of sensations and the sense-forms means Idealism. If sensations are only *our* sensations, and space and time only *our* sense-forms, the

* *Commentary on Kant's "Critick,"* Mahaffy's trans., p. 37 (1866).

world they help to constitute must arise and lapse with consciousness. Perfected knowledge of this world would not carry us beyond states of consciousness. Still from the standpoint of *empirical realism* we may assert that we directly confront objects. Objects are not inferred, but are themselves the immediate perception. On the other hand, from the standpoint of *transcendental idealism*, we must deny them any standing beyond consciousness—their *esse* is *percipi*. Nevertheless, Kant believes that a system of unknown correlative realities does really obtain beyond consciousness. How unceremoniously his successors brushed away these surds we shall see later on.

SPACE AND TIME AS THE FOUNDATION OF MATHEMATICS.

An important department of the Transcendental *Æsthetic* now demands notice. Space and Time have to be considered as conditions of the cognitions of Pure Mathematics. Now space-determinations constitute the subject-matter of Geometry which deals with spatial configurations; time-determinations that of Arithmetic and the mathematical sciences founded on it. Numbers, as formed by counting, imply successive addition of units in time. Lastly, motion, the stay of mechanics, presupposes Time and Space. Space thus yields the possibility of Geometry, Time that of Arithmetic, Space and Time that of Mechanics—all three departments, presupposing, of course, the “matter” of sensation necessary to elicit the “Form.” If, however, argues Kant, Space and Time are *a priori* uniform conditions of consciousness-in-general, the determinations of space and time phenomena must be universal and necessary. To take concrete illustrations, it must always be certain that every straight line will, when observed, be found to be the shortest way between two points, and that $2 + 2$ will always under any circumstances = 4. Hence in the *a priori* source of Space and Time the ground of the *a priori* synthetic judgments of Mathematics is detected. But these, important as they are, do not exhaust the list of such synthetic judgments. Indeed, but for other judgments shortly to be surveyed they could not possibly be made. Here, again, the isolation of the *Æsthetic* must be remembered.

Forms of *sensibility* recall that Kant favours three great departments, or tributaries rather, of knowledge—Passive Sensibility, Active Understanding, and Reason; by Understanding being meant the Judging, and by Reason the inferring faculty. The Understanding has its categories, and fixes things and ideas as separate; the Reason its “*Ideas*” whereby Unity is read into the discrete results of Understanding. Plato, we may note, makes Reason converse with the Ideas, and Understanding stand midway between it and sense; though Plato’s Ideas, of course, have no resemblance to Kant’s. Proclus contrasts Plato the philosopher of Reason with Aristotle the philosopher of Understanding. Algazzali, the Arabian mystic, refers to Sense, Understanding, Reason, and indicates a fourth sphere of Prophetism. Kant’s own treatment of the distinctions is terribly confused, and rigid distinctions, indeed, are hopelessly untenable. Schopenhauer has ruthlessly exposed the confusion in his *World as Will and Idea*. Still it is needful to remember these distinctions to be sure of the steps of our advance.

Now, in order that the timed and spaced sensations above noted may pass into ripe experience of objects, the factor so glibly taken over by the psychology of Hobbes and others, a further series of processes is necessary. We are now on the threshold of the “*Transcendental Analytic*,”* the central problem of which is the investigation of the *a priori* conditions of Judgment. First and foremost we have to note the “*Pure Understanding*” with her brood of categories or Thought-forms whose agency is requisite to relate the sensations as yet only loosely unified in space and time. What is meant by this? According to Kant, when we assert of appearance that it is a Unity, a Whole, a Multiplicity, a substance having attributes or attribute of a substance, an efficient cause of an event, etc., the “*matter*” of our intuitions is subsumed under certain Categories or pure concepts constituting the native furniture of the Ego in its aspect as pure understanding. These Categories must not be

* “*Analytic*,” a term based on the title of the third treatise of Aristotle’s *Organon*, that deals with the theory of the syllogism and demonstrative reasoning. Just as the “*Analytic*” books resolve syllogism into its elements, “*Transcendental Analytic*” resolves knowing: searching for the conceptions and principles that underlie it.

confused with Aristotle's, whose table was intended to stand for a classification of Predicates inductively generalized, with the view of analyzing the import of propositions. Directed against Platonism, they stand for "*universal*" predicates of reality in an objective system of things, and ought not to have namesakes in the thought-forms of the German metaphysician. Kant's Categories are not *Universalia* merely abstracted from things, but are brought forward to exhibit the *a priori* machinery of the process of thing-making itself. In no sense, again, are they to be identified with Innate Ideas, for they are not superimposed on a given world of experience, but they make that "given" world. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that the whole Kantian mechanism, whereby experience of objects comes to exist, transcends the domain of empirical consciousness, of the bundles of varying states revealed to psychology.

Perception of objects implies reference of sensations to points in space. But that is not all. In order to constitute *Nature* or a world, sensations have to be further ranged under universal and necessary forms of relation, termed Categories. Now, it is the PURE Understanding which spontaneously effects the subsumption in question. A contingent judgment valid only for an individual is what Kant dubs a Judgment of Perception. A Judgment of Experience is requisite to render phenomena *objective*, *i.e.* parts of a system of events and states given universally and necessarily to all percipients with similar sensations. "I feel hot," "The sun is rising," are instances of the two sorts of judgments, one contingent and, perhaps, peculiar to myself, the other with its terms *connected or related by the pure Ego*, and so forced on Smith, Jones, Brown, and myself alike. And now arises the question, How does Kant get at these objectivating pure concepts or categories? how, also, is their precise number ascertained?

The answer runs as follows: By abstracting from the contingent matter of judgments so as to lay bare their basic conditions. In the old logic, Kant's type of a perfect science,* judgments were made to fall under four main heads, expressive of connections of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and

* What an insight into his procedure this gives us!

Modality. To the anatomy of these four types of proposition Kant accordingly addresses himself. In his ingenious if somewhat forced fashion he dissects out three pure concepts of Quantity—*Unity, Plurality, and Totality*, answering to Singular, Particular, and Universal Judgments; three of Quality—*Reality, Negation, and Limitation*, answering to Affirmative, Negative, and Infinite judgments; three of Relation—*Substance and Attribute, Causality, and Reciprocity* or Community, answering to Categorical, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive Judgments; and three of Modality—*Possibility (Impossibility), Existence (non-Existence), Necessity (Contingency)*, answering to Problematic, Assertory, and Apodeictic Judgments.* All these are “judging,” not empirically culled concepts, and yield only modes of linking or unlinking phenomena. They are not drawn from or superimposed on experience, but experience, *i.e.* the real world in space and time, is made by them. The Quality-Quantity concepts are mathematical, and concern the *existence* of objects; those of Relation fix their *mutual connections*; those of Modality yield their relation *to us* or our knowledge. As forms constitutive of experience, they have no validity *beyond* experience, no applicability to Noumena.

In order to clear these lofty tablelands of mist, it will be useful to consider the difficult cases of the Categories of Relation, and note how these can be said to render phenomena—*i.e.* the spaced and indirectly timed sensations—objective. “Objective” are those phenomena which are dealt with in a universal and necessary manner, being *projected into outwardness as objects by the transcendental judgment*. In their aggregate these objects are Nature, the world of science and common sense, a system of things *external to the mind* yet embraced by the *Ego*. The Ego suspends in itself both this Nature and the memory-fed mind of the psychologist. Grasp this situation and a sun-clear insight into the sequel is attainable.

According to Kant, sensations are marshalled as coexisting, as simultaneous, and successive. Thus ordered, they

* “Apodeictic,” a term adapted from Aristotle, who contrasts apodeictic syllogisms making for accurately reasoned and *necessarily certain* truth with these of the dialectical and fallacious sorts.

constitute phenomena or appearances, but not objectively perceivable things, in an objective world. His view is that these phenomena have to be "subsumed" under concepts, and the concepts now under survey are the three of Relation.* How is the subsumption mediated? Roughly speaking, as follows. Having got a sense-field spread out before us, *understanding* of it comes thus: First, its treatment by imagination has to be provided for. This Imagination (as will be seen) is the link between Sense and Understanding, "the blind but indispensable function of the soul" binding portions of the sense-field into lesser syntheses, or groupings, which go to feed the Transcendental Judgment. It is a metaphysical go-between, which renders possible a more complete tethering of phenomena. This point being grasped, note Kant's further argument. He contends that our apprehension or ingathering of phenomena is always in an order of *contingent succession*. If, however, all such apprehension is successive, in what manner comes it about that we contrast the coexistence of parts of a landscape with the moving of a billiard-ball on being struck? How, in short, are *necessary coexistence* and *necessary succession* (felt as such by all men) differenced from a stream of *contingent succession*? By means of the Categories of Causality and Reciprocity, which, in virtue of their analogies or correspondences with the *real time order* of the phenomena, pigeon-hole the latter with unerring precision. These Categories have, indeed, their own schemata, or time-determinations, which fit them to embrace the phenomena; but of that peculiarity anon. We must here content ourselves with indicating their general mode of working.

The real time-order in phenomena affords, then, the clue for the treatment of a given case by the Transcendental Judgment. Now, the criterion between simultaneity and succession is something permanent; the permanent being present along with the changing as the pre-requisite of experience itself. In other words, change implies a comitant permanence, shifting *attributes* involve a *substance*.

* Subsumption of the phenomena under concepts is an admission that the phenomena are *already present* to be subsumed. I note this as against any forced Hegelian interpretation of Kant's meaning.

Kant does not prove the permanent by experience, as do the modern Lavoisiers, but seeks to show that there can be no intelligible experience unless the permanent is given. This is the keynote of the transcendental method.

It is the Category of Causality which converts a portion of our subjective successions into objective causal changes. It thus determines the moment of a phenomenon in time, presenting it as *necessarily* preceding or succeeding another. It is, therefore, pre-supposed by experience. And now mark the corollary. Kant points out at this juncture that the derivation of Causality from experience of successions is illusory, because but for Causality such successions could not obtain.* In so far, moreover, as concerns our object-consciousness these successions are determined as necessary, though to idealism mere appearance.

Now every effect presupposes an efficient cause, but this cause, again, is the effect of a preceding one. "Action," therefore, comes to be regarded as an attribute of substance; and the *permanent* amid changes as the efficient substrate of the perceived successions. It is thus always subject, never predicate. Hence the second Category of Relation reacts on the first, and there arises the further notion of *substance as efficient basis in which attributes objectively inhere*. The object identical with itself in its varying states is the fruit of this Category of Substance.

And lastly, Reciprocity. Just as Causality determines *necessary successions*, so Reciprocity determines *necessary coexistences*. Our gathering up of coexistent sense-patches is successive; consequently the parts of a landscape are given serially. Owing, however, to this *a priori* concept of thorough-going mutual dependence they are fused into a whole, and stamped as necessarily coexisting. It is, therefore, evident that the Category fills a leading part in the Kantian system, and is something far more weighty than the mere "innate idea" of the third law of motion, for which some have mistaken it.

As with these Categories, so with the rest. Experience is the objectivation of phenomena according to relations supplied

* The poverty of the Kantian position on this head will be duly exhibited hereafter.

by the category-sprung forms of judgment. "Experience consists in the synthetic connection of phenomena in a consciousness, in so far as this is necessary. Hence pure conceptions of the understanding are those under which all phenomena must be previously subsumed before they can serve as judgments of experience, in which the synthetic unity of perceptions is presented as necessary and universal."* Only thus does the *concrete world* of perception come to exist. Only thus is constructed that *varied universe* which materialism had swallowed as a fact wanting no analysis.

Whence, however, these instruments of Synthesis, the unifying categories? whence the Forms of Sensibility themselves? From the Pure Ego or Transcendental Subject, the "Synthetic unity of Apperception" or consciousness, as it is termed. Kant is careful to observe that this Ego is unknown in itself, and that what is popularly entitled as "mind" is a mere flux of related states. This pure Ego for which and in which Categories and Forms of Sensibility alone obtain is the bottom foundation of the structure of knowledge. Psychology may derive the "mind" from worked up experience, but in the absence of the witness and constructive Ego no such experience would be possible. It is here that the speculative deduction or vindication of the Categories may be pointed out. Categories are *forms of the Ego's unity imposed on phenomena*. Were they not *a priori* and their objective application valid, there could be no experience at all. But experience is actually in the field; hence they are *a priori* and their application valid. Experience presupposes them as its conditions. Similarly the recognition of identity of features in two time-severed states is alone held to establish an Ego; but this Ego, again, is only the consciousness of thought, not a thought itself. Some very important issues are involved in this positing of a transcendental Subject and contrast of it with the derivative "self" or "mind," of ordinary consciousness. With these we shall deal in detail fashion hereafter.

Such, then, in essentials are the principles of Kant's speculative theory of Experience. There remain, however, interstices in the exposition which we must mortar up. For

* *Prolegomena*, Bohm's edit., § 22.

instance, due working of the categories presupposes three further important unifying processes: (1) the "synthesis of apprehension in intuition," (2) the "synthesis of reproduction in imagination" and (3) "recognition in the conception." No. 1 gathers up the fleeting patches of sensation grasped in any intuition, culling from the sense-field minor totals for the Transcendental Judgment to operate upon. Unity of presentation would otherwise be impossible; even the unity of space and time must be given in this way. But this combining of patches presupposes the reproductive faculty of imagination.* When I apprehend one part of a room, the others are filled in by reproductive imagination, and the picture "room" completed. When I follow the sides of a triangle a similar process must obtain.† But how am I to be aware that the ideas evoked correspond to past sensations of *mine*? How am I to know that both these ideas and the present sensations are events in one consciousness? By "recognition in the conception," by reason of the Subject which is common ground of connection for all events. "If in counting I forget," observes Kant, "that the unities which now present themselves to my mind have been added gradually one to the other, I should not know the production of a quantity by the successive addition of one to one, I should know nothing of number, this being a concept consisting entirely in the consciousness of that unity of synthesis." The Ego running back in idea must realize the serially linked terms as linked by itself. These three prerequisites of the functioning of Categories are obviously *a priori*, being the gateway by which phenomena approach the thought-forms. Clumsy as the two leading "processes" appear, they indicate that Associationists cannot dispense with some machinery *directing* the line of growth of experience. Hume would refer us to Imagination, Laws of Association, etc., and dismiss the matter. But "Imagination," "Laws," etc., are verbal abstractions, not agencies. And

* The *reproductive* imagination, working by association, must be carefully contrasted with the *productive* imagination which sensualizes categories on universal and necessary lines, etc. This latter meets us again in Fichte.

† Cf. Stewart, *Elements*, i. ch. ii.: "Without the faculty of memory we could have no perception of visible figure."

Kant sought, accordingly, to discuss, not association of sensations and ideas in this way or that way, but rather the *ground of associability itself*.* He exhibits his processes as a vital and seemingly purposive portion of the mechanism rendering coherent experience possible. Knowledge was for him an output of the inner workshop of the *Ego*. And it should be observed that, in positing a pre-experiential machinery directing conscious growths, Kant is not so very far out of touch with Spencer. Spencer, too, holds that such machinery is overlooked by the older Associationists, and that but for its recognition it would be impossible to say why a horse is not as susceptible of education as a man. His machinery, however, is biological.

In addition to this it remains to consider how the Categories dress for marriage with phenomena. Here Kant's terrible departments have to be provided for. Like Plato's Ideas, the Categories soar in the empyrean, and must be duly weighted to descend into the shades of Sensibility. Technically speaking, they must be schematized. Kant was no doubt impressed with the ancient opposition of form and matter, and supposed that it would not do to put Categories and sensations on too democratic a footing. Schopenhauer proffers another explanation. He remarks that in abstract thinking we are apt to fall back ever and anon on shadowily concrete pictures, lest symbol outrun fact. And he concludes that Kant, intent on transcendental parallels, has extended this tendency to run into concretes from abstract empirical to the quite alien pure concepts. If Kant supported his theory by introspective searching, he may certainly have found the facts of symbol-thinking suggestive.

The schema is a rarefied ideal embodiment of a category, and is a product of "productive imagination," not of the empirical "mind" but of the Subject. Its function is to mediate the embrace of phenomena and categories. These unlike things are not primarily in touch. What shall bridge the gulf? What but the pure form of Time, conterminous alike with both, being at the same time *a priori* and embracing

* Kant alludes only incidentally to the "empirical law" by which presentations given as coexisting and successive tend to cohere "even in the absence of the object." His standpoint is not the empirical one.

all phenomena. Categories, accordingly, are schematized by being determined in time. Is this determination or time-quality a picturable mental image? It is not. No such image corresponds even to a very general empirical concept. Nevertheless the Schemata have vague outlines of a sort, and clad thus in muslin robes are ready to confront the well-robed phenomena. Now, there are four types of time-quality or determination in time, that of the *time-series*, *time content*, *time order*, and *comprehension in time*. Phenomena are all in time, and, being so, last awhile—hence, considered *quâ* duration, are made up of a series of numerable points of time. They all *fill time* intensively, while they so last, and may further stand to one another in time-order as the *permanent* to the *changing*, or in relations of *succession* or *simultaneity*. Lastly, as they occur at some time, at a definite moment or always they may be said to be *comprehended in time* or connected with time as a whole. To these time determinations in the phenomena the Imagination adapts Categories. All is now clear. The schemata groups will be (1) “number;” (2) “filled,” “filling” and “empty” time; (3) “change” and “permanence,” “succession,” “simultaneity;” (4) “some-time,” “now,” “always.” Chief importance is assigned to the mathematical or Quantity and Quality groups (1), (2). It seems odd to conceive of schemata of “always,” “filling time,” and others, but Kant, nevertheless, will take no denial.

Yet another pedigree, that of the *a priori* principles of Science, must be traced. These, also, run parallel with the four classes of schematized categories. Springing from the schema of number are the “axioms of perception” resting on the law, All objects must be extensive quantities composed of divisible parts. The indivisible atom of archaic chemistry is, therefore, a myth. The “anticipations of perception” flow from the law that sensations as such, though lacking spatial attributes, possess all alike intensive degree. Hence perception of a pure vacuum is illusory. The “anticipations” are not axiomatic, because the *contingent* character of sensations forbids prediction of their *whatness*, though their manner of presentation is certain enough. Number as involved in successive degrees of intensity has a footing here also. In

the "Analogies of Experience" * born from the relation schemata we have the principles. Amid all changes of phenomena substance abides the same, Every change happens according to the law of cause and effect, and Substances in so far as they co-exist act and re-act on one another. Lastly, the Modality group yields the *three postulates* of all empirical thinking, which lay down what is physically possible, actual, or necessary: 1. That which accords with the formal conditions of experience is possible. 2. What is connected with the material conditions of experience is actual. 3. That which in its connection with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary. Principles other than these must be obtained by inductive generalization proper in the conscious exercise of the empirical reason. The assertion of the categories for all phenomena can yield only the very limited number of *a priori* laws above given.

Now, Analogies and Postulates are dynamical, that is to say, they determine the behaviour of things (as interrelated in the time-order among themselves, and as bearing on our knowledge), whereas the axioms and anticipations of perception are mathematical as determinative of quantities. To cite Professor Fischer's lucid abstract, "The two mathematical principles in conjunction form the law of *continuity*; the two dynamical, the law of *causality or necessity*. When summed up in a single formula: *All objects of possible experience are, as to form, continuous quantities; as to existence, necessary effects*. Each principle declares its contradictory to be impossible. The negative expression of them is an immediate obvious consequence. The law of continuity expressed negatively is this: *There are no gaps in nature—non datur saltus*; the law of causality or necessity, when negatively expressed, is this: *Neither is there in nature no necessity, nor blind necessity; neither chance nor fate—non datur casus, non datur fatum*. From the continuity of extensive quantities follows the *impossibility of atoms*; from the *continuity of intensive the impossibility of a vacuum—non datur hiatus*." In such wise,

* An analogy is a rule whereby "a certain unity of experience may arise from perceptions (but not how perception itself, as an empirical intuition, may arise); it may serve as a principle for objects (as phenomena) not in a constitutive, but only in a regulative capacity" (*Critique*, Max Müller's trans.).

then, is justified our previous remark as to the Kantian derivation of knowledge from the inmost depths of the Ego. Experience now clearly appears as a preponderantly subjective product. The Materialism of the contemporary French School has lost its very foundation.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.*

Passing over the subsidiary discussions appended to the *Analytic of Principles*, let us now glance at the problems treated of in the *Transcendental Dialectic* of the Reason, a department the logical function of which is the drawing of inferences as opposed to the judging function of the understanding and the intuiting of sense. The problem here propounded for solution may be phrased—Is a dogmatic ontology possible? Now, according to Kant, there are two ways in which the Reason may work—it may ascend from the particular judgment to the most general propositions, or *vice versa*. Regressive syllogistic inference from the “conditioned” particular fact to “unconditioned” universal First Principles is the aim of ontology, the quarry of which is universal truths valid beyond experience. Reason is equipped with three *a priori* Ideas (as Understanding is with Categories), but these Ideas are not “constitutive” of experience or knowledge, only “regulative” of its elaboration. Reason as faculty of principles does not add new matter, but unifies old. Thus Psychology has its idea of self, or soul, as an immaterial, simple, and indestructible thinking substance, Cosmology its world as a connected system of phenomena, and Theology its god as supreme source of all beings and things. These “Ideas” are valuable as nuclei or rallying-points for complete generalization of our experiences,† but just because they are “Ideas” they do not present or mediate the Absolute and Unconditioned. The common principle on which ontological reasonings found is that, given the conditioned facts, their

* The Sophistic Dialectic crushed a debater by exposing his contradictions and framing fallacies. Reason here will be convicted of making a spurious show of knowledge of what cannot be known. For some observations on Dialectic cf. under Hegel.

† They are useful, also, in helping us to grasp the postulates of the Practical Reason more competently.

unconditioned ground is also given. This is the assumption of the Dialectic "syllogism," which is open to criticism as a "quaternio terminorum," confounding as it does facts or mere *phenomena* with the noumena which are wanted. The verdict is: speculatively at least we must remain agnostics. In pursuance of his theme Kant proceeds to expound the Paralogisms, Antinomies, and Ideal of the pure Reason. In respect of the soul he argues that the Ego can never know itself as pure form; the empirical consciousness being alone revealed. The veiled Ego for which categories are, cannot peer into itself by means of these. Dealing with cosmology he takes four metaphysical theses, "The world has a beginning in time and space," "Everything in the world consists of simple parts," etc., and opposes them to their antitheses. It is contended that the two sets of mutually destructive views rest alike on universally admitted principles. Reason is divided against herself; arguments relating to *phenomena*, actual or possible, being loosely applied to Noumena or realities beyond consciousness.* In assailing the proofs of a Personal God, that "sum-total of all perfection and reality," Kant lays the axe in turn to the three historic lines of proof—the ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological arguments. We shall survey these three in the second part of this volume. Suffice it here to say that Kant finds the reality and unreality of such a being to be equally undemonstrable.

So much for Kant's speculative agnosticism. A rational ontology, whether it concerns soul, nature, God, is impossible. But a strange surprise is in store for us. The tenets of a God, immortality and free will (cf. 3rd Antinomy) have no theoretic ground in the critical philosophy. But are they absolutely mere figments? questions our philosopher, harking back to the dreams of the Leibnitz-Wolffian dogmatists. In

* On these Antinomies—too elaborate to give—see Schopenhauer, "Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy," in his *World as Will and Idea*. Kant's solution of the first antinomy is of interest. The thesis and antithesis are not *contradictories* (of which one must be true), but *contraries* (of which both may be false), standing in "dialectic" not "analytic" opposition. Thus the pleas for an "infinite" and "finite" space seem to call for decision one way or the other, but are in truth mere contraries. There exists a middle course. A noumenal space does not exist to be either finite or infinite. (Cp. a like argument against Hamilton, Mill, *Examination*, note p. 111, 5th edit.)

no sense. Their validity is guaranteed to us by a practical necessity attendant on the moral law, a view for which Kant may have well been indebted to a hint of Hume's.*

POSTULATES OF THE PRACTICAL REASON.

For Kant the supreme arbiter of morality is what he calls the Categorical Imperative of the Practical Reason. "Pragmatical" laws of morality subserve our happiness alone, and concern our empirical motives in the sphere of good sense and prudence. But the moral law urges action having for its object the elevation of character and virtue for its own sake, quite irrespective of our immediate well-being. Happiness is the natural good we seek; worth the moral goal, any joy attendant on which comes unsought. But this moral domain and moral end presuppose a moral government of the world—a God.† And not only this, but scope is required for full realization of the moral ideal in a "future life," where all balances will be adjusted. Freedom of the will is to be assumed because the "ought" of the Categorical Imperative implies a "can." These positions constitute true faith, a hope based on moral certitude. No real addition of knowledge is given. Apart from competing issues, it is important to note that the part thus assigned to the pure Ego or Transcendental Subject—the source of the moral law—in guiding the decisions of the empirical consciousness has opened up a theme of considerable suggestiveness. Nowadays, it is true, the tendency is to regard manifestations of this supposed moral law as inherited bias to conduct springing from organization of experiences of utility in the history of ancestral individuals. Morality shifts with racial stages, but on evolutionist lines is largely intuitive to the individual. The point, however, to note in the tentative

* *Treatise*, iv. § 5. The two concluding paragraphs are full of the Kantian spirit.

† Kant's Moral Law and its accompaniments have not infrequently been regarded as an excrescence on his system. However this may be, his hold on them was complete. *E.g.* he remarks in the *Critique of Judgment*, ii. § 86, that "Moral Laws . . . prescribe to Reason something as an end without condition; . . . the existence of rational beings under moral laws . . . can alone be thought as *final cause of the existence of a world.*" This is positively Fichtean, exalting abstract morality with a vengeance! "A God," Winwood Reade has remarked, "has no right to create individuals but for their own good."

Kantian scheme is the introduction into the empirical consciousness of a possible increment drawn from a Transcendental or Higher soul-life not explorable by psychology. Such incursions of the Subject or Ego into the empirical will subsequently be seen to be of the highest moment, quite apart from any ethic intuitive, hedonistic or other, that inquiry may compel us to adopt.

CHAPTER VI.

CRITICISM OF THE "CRITIQUE."

INTO Kant's notable contributions to the theory of History, Astronomy, and even Anthropology, it would be foreign to our purpose to digress. Touching other and more relevant issues, there are indications that he inclined more or less to a belief in Palingenesis, a belief clearly avowed by Schopenhauer. He also expresses himself as favouring the view that a world of supersensuous beings environs this planet, and that the establishment of communication with such beings may be only a matter of time. In other words, he is theoretically a spiritist, though removed by an immeasurable interval from the "double-materialism" for which the votary of the seance-room is too often conspicuous. Kant, indeed, was far too acute not to see that a speculative Agnosticism (while impugning absolute knowledge of things) *cannot possibly assert that there is no phase of relative or phenomenal experience beyond that dubbed "physical world."* "The day will come," he writes in the *Dreams of a Ghost Seer*, "when it will be shown that the human soul during its life on earth is already in intimate and indissoluble relation with a world of spirits; that *their world* affects and profoundly impresses ours, and that we often remain unconscious of it, so long as all goes well with us." It is also conceivable that there exist intelligences untrammelled by the conditions of our relative human perception and thinking. Possibilities such as these are fully discounted by Hindu Adwaitee Vedantism; but if we except the doctrines of Mill, Hamilton,*

* Both Mill and Hamilton concede that the *possible order of phenomena* (as opposed to *Noumena*) may be in no sense exhausted in the surveys of the scientific investigator. And all that Kant's spiritism requires is a larger concession of range over which our relative experience may extend.

the younger Fichte, Schopenhauer, Von Hartmann, and Carl du Prel, niches for their reception are not freely available in the systems of orthodox modern philosophy. So much for this ignored aspect of Kant. With regard to the general criticism of his labours, it is agreed on all sides that in the sage of Königsberg we confront one of the profoundest thinkers in history. Hater of priest and dogma, he asserted in unmistakable language the supremacy of the individual as thinker or moral agent. His influence has given an impetus of candour and thoroughness to all subsequent thinking worthy of the name, and it is essential for the student to first review his standpoint before running up a possibly ramshackle system of his own. Spots on this sun there are, and these, as was indeed necessary, are not few. Objection may well hover round his uncouth terminology, his obvious pursuit of symmetry, his clumsy mechanisms and stifling of ideas in an atmosphere of logical formulas. Defects are discernible in the arrangement of quasi-autonomous "faculties" and "processes," standing out like so many isolated stacks from the sea; in the forced extraction of categories, like Reciprocity, from the logical judgments; in the mediation between categories and the artificially alien sense-phenomena; in the derivation of the scholastic "Ideas" of the Reason from the Categorical, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive forms of syllogism; in the continuous oscillation between the psychological and speculative standpoints. Even the author of the *Secret of Hegel* loses patience at the "German tendency to ride an idea to death," and chides Kant for the "unreality of his Categories, the inconceivableness of their application, the unsatisfactoriness of his conclusions on Time and Space, the insufficiency of his schema of Time in regard to Causality." * And yet Stirling is, on the whole, one of the warmest of Kant's admirers! Probably it is a puzzle to most how all this creaking and disjointed machinery could be got to work. Happily it had not to work at all, except in the pages of the *Critique*; otherwise we should not now be discussing philosophic problems.

Having glanced at the mechanism as a whole, let us now inquire into the genesis and value of some of its component

* *Secret of Hegel*, vol. i. p. 65.

parts. And for the betterment of lucidity, it will be convenient to consider such parts in a determinate order, corresponding in the main with the arrangement of the *Critique*. Further criticism will have reference to the general historic significance of Kant. At the same time it is necessary to state that an adequate treatment of these several knotty issues is not immediately possible. An attempt of this character would involve forestalling of our alternative construction. But a preliminary breaking up of the ground will prove distinctly opportune.

The order of criticism will run as follows:—1. Starting-points of the Critique. 2. The Transcendental *Æsthetic*. 3. The Transcendental Analytic. 4. The Dialectic and the Practical Reason. 5. The advance of Kant on Hume, and the nature of his permanent contribution to the general advance of philosophy. We shall now proceed to take up the first.

1. STARTING-POINTS OF THE "CRITIQUE."

From what does the *Critique* professedly start? The answer has been already given. It endeavours to probe experience by way of inquiry into the conditions of the *a priori* synthetic judgments. Such judgments are sharply contrasted with synthetic ones of the empirical order.* Universality, or uniform validity, and Necessity, or the impossibility of negation, are their caste marks. Where these marks are, there are the judgments; where they are not, there, also, the judgments are not. Inasmuch, therefore, as the *Critique* starts from the judgments, it may not be amiss to examine one of the latter. But in doing so, we must be careful to steer clear of the glamour of words. Words, the sworn allies of thought, are often false to their

* Kant's maintenance of *a priori* analytic judgments as opposed to both these two classes appears to me most unsatisfactory. Where does the special *a priori* element supervene? Before I can *analyze* my concept there must have obtained its *synthesis*. Before I say "Man is rational" I have experienced the conjunction of the attributes connoted by "Man." All I do is to contemplate a special aspect of a whole already *in situ*, and for this no Law of Contradiction or anything else is required.

truth, and when of a highly abstract order frequently obscure inquiry. Bearing this in mind, let us look into the supposed *a priori* judgment, "Every event has a cause."

Kant inquires into the conditions of this judgment, as of a *given* problem to be solved. He would have done better to start otherwise. That he might have done so is perfectly clear and plain. In the Vindication of the Categories Causality as form of relation is held presupposed by objective determinations of change. Now, the doctrine of a category-woven Experience and the doctrine of *a priori* general judgments are by no means inseparable. It may well be that a Category knits the particulars *from which* the *causal judgment* is empirically derived. We may note that events always have causes, and generalize our experience as the judgment. But these events may be themselves pre-empirically ordered by the Subject. Derivation of this judgment from experience implies no necessary relinquishing of the Category. A further inquiry is requisite to decide that matter. Thus Schopenhauer attacks the "thought" theory of Experience of Kant. He holds that causality is not schematized and *thought into* phenomena, but *intuited in* them directly. But he still clings to the precious Category itself.

For the moment, then, the discussion may be narrowed—the judgment alone is in evidence. Now, it is urged that Experience could not yield it, as the universality obtaining there is only comparative. Nor, again, could it explain our inability to negate it in thought. In place of this view there has been proffered Inseparable Association, either in the ideation of the individual or in that of the individual backed by his ancestry. Experience that all phenomena looked into have or had other phenomena as antecedents, that there are no "absolute commencements,"—this would be the groundwork. Association of the ideas of such particular experiences, both with each other and with muscular feelings and mental nisus—strengthening of the compound idea thus generated by inheritance—final conscious polishing of the result into a formula positing *uniformity* of necessary connections,—these would be the stories. The extreme plausibility of this doctrine in itself is confirmed by workaday observation.

Thus the judgment, "Every event has a cause," is unknown to the yokel or ryot. And why? Simply because it is a *formula*, a word-fabric, confined to the learned and reflective. If the ryot hears a rustle in the hedge, it is association—constructive imagination—that vaguely or specifically suggests the cause, not resort to this formula. The psychological expectation is prior to the philosophical formula, as parent is to child. Nay, apart from blurred and particular experiences, we may urge that the formula answers to no mental deposits at all. Embrace all particulars it cannot; it only seeks to forestall them. Strictly speaking, therefore, it outruns its objective warrant; but so, too, do all inductions, "properly so called." Bain adverts to the overvaulting energy of the mind—the impatience prompting generalization—with excellent effect, and here the consideration in question is most relevant. It is true that Mansel charges empiricists with basing induction on induction when they deal thus with the Causal Judgment. But he falls into a trap baited by logicians. Induction is forced upon us by association and the "overvaulting tendency" just noted. The logical revision of it is an afterthought. Reid and Stewart, again, used to say that induction springs from the intuition that the "future will resemble the past,"—that events have not only *some* but *uniform* causes as well. This is *a-priorism* carried to extremes. I would object that this conviction is arrived at slowly, by reflection, and is then exploited as a principle. It is singular that these two defenders of Causality should stultify themselves by upholding *Freedom* of the Will, but such, nevertheless, is the case.

The universality of the Causal Judgment excludes empirical Freedom, and were the "can" corresponding to the "ought" of the Categorical Imperative worth the naming, even Kant would be ignoring his premises. We may urge here, too, that the "necessity" is a dubious factor. To think the judgment properly, resort to the concrete is needful; and what is the testimony here? "The necessity," says Bain, "is easily met by denial. There is nothing to prevent us from conceiving an isolated event."* Observes Huxley, supporting Hume, "Any man who lets his fancy run riot in

* *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 188.

a waking dream may experience the existence at one moment and the nonexistence at the next of phenomena that suggest no connection of cause and effect." * The drift to a cause on the happening of any event is chiefly conditional on strong association, glare of the sensation, or our *interests*. These latter especially may hark back to ancestral habit. Natural selection would favour response to *important* stimuli, but not to casual and unimportant ones.

Necessity has had various meanings. In Plato and Aristotle it stands for what *must be* in an objective "given." In Hume it becomes a purely *subjective* compulsion, due to association. In Kant it is defined as that of which the negation is impossible, still a *subjective* compulsion, though one of another sort.† We are now in a position to deal with one of its phases. In respect of the "necessity" of a principle, such as "Every event has a cause," we may urge that the formula, minus its content of blurred and particular successions, is a mere series of sounds. If anything consequently is necessary, it is *the original particular causal successions*. But in any succession of perceptions there is, association apart, presented nothing but the perceptions themselves in a time-order. *Whether this time-order itself is necessarily given* to us (though we as empirically conscious are unaware of the necessitation), is a distinct and very important inquiry. A may be pre-empirically related to B, and that necessarily even for an empiricist critic of our judgments. Knowledge may be thoroughly empirical, and yet wholly *a priori*, as Schelling himself suggested.

Some current phases of necessity may be glanced at. Some so-called necessary truths are generalizations, which prevent us from using names inconsistently. As an instance may be cited the loudly puffed Law of Contradiction. Black cannot be white, on account of this mystic law, dear to hair-splitter and pedant. The import is that names must not be used to imply that the state of consciousness "black" is the state of consciousness "white." To speak of this "law" as if regulating all trains of reasoning, is to make a formula

* *Hume*, pp. 121, 122.

† Inseparable associations were recognized, it seems, by Kant, but as of inferior validity.

antedate the particulars which breed it. Yet how often is this absurd mode of statement resorted to! Even as it stands the formula is only true of particulars when qualified by the law of Change or transition. Contrast is essential to consciousness, and particulars are what they are for us only through what they are not. With respect to the Laws of Contradiction, Identity, and Excluded Middle alike, we must never forget that they are not extraneous "principles," superimposed on and regulating primary states of consciousness, but rules securing consistency in the handling of abstract word-mediated concepts. Similarly, the "necessary" truth with which we inaugurated these chapters—States of consciousness appear—is only necessary in the sense that its denial is the verbal denial of consciousness, and so a misuse of names. Other so-called necessary truths have been ascribed to the *impossibility of negating* the more coherent of our mental associations. These recall the Judgment already criticized. Such associations may rest on a basis of ancestral as well as of individual experience, urges Spencer. We shall also discover at a later stage of our inquiry that a further factor besides "predisposing" cerebral inheritance may conduce to this association.

With regard to the axioms of mathematics we shall have something to say further on. It is as well, however, to grasp the main pleas of the associationist school in advance. Dwelling on the subjective necessity producible by inseparable association, they would contend that the experiences generalized as such axioms are coeval with the earliest conscious observations, are continually being borne home to the mind and thus wreak a cumulative effect, weakened by no competing associations. The *a priori* genesis of mathematical axioms is a superfluous assumption when the completeness of the process of association is taken into account.* Such is their plea in essentials. We might reasonably esteem it strange that the Sphinx should furnish *a priori* axioms whereby a few hole-and-corner intuitionists exult in unique certitude, when she has denied any obvious clues to the

* It is significant that Aristotle found in the very certitude of axioms a ground for their reference back to particulars. Bacon uses axiomata as equivalent to principles got by induction (*axiomata media, generalissima*, etc.).

riddle of the universe at large. There is too often a vexatious air of triviality about many of the intuitionist and *a-priorist* claims. These Philosophers are too ready to split hairs, while the world-problem presses for attention.

2. THE "TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC."

(a) *Doctrine of the Thing-in-Itself.*

There can be no question but that the Things-in-Themselves of the *Transcendental Æsthetic* constitute an excrescence on the *Critique*. Not only are they superfluous, but they are disallowed by the requirements of bare consistency. How is it possible to step outside experience if the categories and forms of sensibility are purely relative to the knowing subject. Kant's attitude betrays some oscillation of standpoint. Thus in one passage of the much-discussed second edition of the *Critique*, he appears to abjure the things-in-themselves for an agnostic attitude, observing that the source of the sensations subjected to Understanding is left undetermined. Elsewhere, he suggests that the Noumena of consciousness and of objects may, for all we can say, be identical; and when challenged by Fichte to reassert the "absurdity" of things-in-themselves, he did not hesitate to do so. Now, it is obvious enough that between the former agnostic attitude and the positing of a multiplicity of unknown things-in-themselves a great gulf is fixed. Waiving, however, this point, we must recognize Noumena as alien to the spirit of the Kantian teaching. When sensations are traced back to stimuli from a non-Ego, we are driven to inquire what this hypothesis of a non-Ego really implies. Not an external substance in space, for space-attributes spring merely from a subjective prerequisite of knowing. Stripped, however, of extension, resistance and every other known attribute, the non-Ego does not even merit the courtesy title of the "transcendental object;" it is akin to one of Berkeley's "ghosts of departed quantities." And if we follow

out the Kantian principles to their consequences, we shall discover that all call for such extra-subjective derivation of sensations is abolished. To posit a multiplicity of things-in-themselves *causing sensation* is, in the first place, to put behind perception a *nebulous duplicate* of the self-same external world which Kant had already demolished in theory. In the second place, *Causality* being a "pure concept," is irrelevant to inquiries after extra-experiential knowledge. Hence, consistency requires that sensations, if not derivable from the Ego, should be voted inexplicable.

One word more on this head. Kant has been charged by Schopenhauer with recanting his earlier idealism on the ground of ignoble motives. The "Refutation of [psychological] Idealism," in the second edition of the *Critique*, served as the chief occasion for this outcry. Well worthy of its misanthropic and carping propounder, this indictment is void of foundation, as utterly unwarranted by the text as it is by our knowledge of the character of Kant. Properly interpreted this Refutation is seen to embody a telling and accurate exposure of the fallacy of psychological idealism. Whereas idealists of this school would credit "mind" with a reality denied to the "external world," Kant points out that both are equally real as groups of phenomena, and that, if one is to be regarded as more real than the other, it is the world to which the preference in this respect should be assigned. For, as he elsewhere remarks, "mind" is only a flux of ideas and feelings in time, while "external experience" exhibits the permanent feature of "space with an appearance in it." Mind, moreover, is dependent for its content on what presentations have first brought—a fact of radical significance. *Internal experience is only rendered possible by external experience.* Strange that this position, which is implicit in the very ground-plan of Kant, should have given rise to so much empty controversy.

(b) *The Synthetic a priori Axioms of Number.**

The stress laid by Kant on mathematical axioms, as against the "sceptics" is notorious. What prompted his

* It deserves mention that in discussing the "Anticipations of perception"

peculiar mode of treating them? In reply, it will be of interest to cite the following passage from Hume:—

"All the objects of human reason or inquiry," he observes in the *Inquiry*, "may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, *relations of ideas* and *matters of fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic, and in short every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstrably certain. *That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides*, is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty*, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the *mere operation of thought* without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence." *

Verily this is a seeming oasis in the desert, and might well have suggested volumes to a thoughtful mind like Kant. If Hume, who had elsewhere drawn mathematical truth from analysis of experiences, who had impugned the geometrical definitions, who had started by referring all our ideas back to sensation, could fall back on this admission, the inference was that he had done so for very cogent reasons. Truths *independent of any existing object* and "discoverable by the *mere operation of thought*" came strangely from the lips of a man who had so proclaimed the supremacy of sensationalism. Doubtless to this and like passages is traceable much of what prompted the *Transcendental Æsthetic*. Certain it is that *a priori* forms of space and time are forcibly vindicated as conditions of the "ideal" *a priori* truths of mathematics.

Now the arithmetical axiom we may single out for dis-

Kant suggests that these should be termed numerical formulas *vice* axioms. They are, he contends, singular rather than universal propositions. But it is as well to let the expression stand in its customarily accepted garb.

* The inspiration of Hume is not far to seek. Locke ascribes an instructive character to mathematical generalities on the ground of their "*bare ideality*." He speaks of abstract ideas "removed in thought from particular existence," ideas whose agreement or disagreement is stated in propositions which *concern not existence*, and may hence be general without being uncertain or uninformative.

cussion is the already cited " $7 + 5 = 12$." The extreme nominalists (*i.e.* Hobbes) had regarded this proposition as exhibiting a mere substitution of names, holding that all the processes of Arithmetic and Algebra are reducible to transmutations of language. The standpoint of Kant was radically different. He held that in the *act of adding* a new fact emerged, that the judgment " $7 + 5 = 12$ " was, consequently, synthetic. Inasmuch, also, as it was intuitively certain, he raised it above ordinary synthesis. For Kant all such numerical constructions hailed from an *a priori* source. The objects of science were for him of two sorts—the ordinary sensuous objects borne into consciousness "from without," and the intuitively generated objects of mathematics (number and geometrical figure) borne into consciousness "from within," and rendered sensuous in the process. The activity generating number-synthesis and figures is the same that evolves the field of Æsthetic.

Independently of the extreme nominalists, the Intuitive philosophy of Number has to sustain its credit in other lists. There obtains a form of empiricism which concedes the reality of synthetic numerical judgments, but discards withal the Kantian explanation. Thus by Bain the pillars of Arithmetic are enumerated as the two axioms of equality: "Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another," "The sums of equals are equals" (with their contraries and derivatives), the notions of the cardinal processes Addition, Subtraction, etc., with their outgrowths and the so-called Definitions of the Numbers; the wealth of possible propositions of number being conceived as deductive interpretation of the Definitions and Axioms combined. In this statement of the case $7 + 5 = 12$ is proved by bringing the numbers 7 and 5 as defined $6 + 1$ and $4 + 1$ within the compass of the axiom "The sums of equals are equal," *itself regarded as a sweeping inductive generality*. Algebra, again, is conceived as developing the notions of arithmetic into more complex usage, dealing with symbols which may stand for all numbers alike, and substituting signs of operation for the actual processes of arithmetic, the axioms remaining the same. It should be noted that this standpoint ascribes a true "synthetic" or "real" character to propositions of number, and

is accordingly opposed in this respect to the theory of Hobbes and his extreme nominalist successors.*

An important issue now presents itself. Whence comes our idea of number? The contention of Kant's opponents is to the effect that it is an abstraction from experience. Among more recent writers Sigwart has stoutly contested this view.† Four things, he asserts, do not necessarily present themselves to consciousness as four things—they may be equally looked upon as one, and their detachment from each other implies a conscious activity of the Ego. Hence, though number is probably elicited on the occasion of our having impressions, it is not implicit in the impressions themselves, so as merely to await a name. In reply to this I would urge the following considerations.

Knowledge of anything involves the relation of contrast. To possess, accordingly, the idea of "one" object or unit, I must be able to compare it ideally or in the concrete with "two." To possess the idea of "three," "five," "seven," etc., I must acquire the notion of *such units* as aggregated, quantity as opposed to modes of aggregation being regarded. The radical issue at stake is, however, the manner in which the conceptions of unity and the lowest numbers are arrived at; given these, it is easy to climb up to the higher numbers by way of piecemeal. Contemplating the simpler kinds of "units," I cannot discover any further significant feature in their presentation than this—that they are clusters of variable sensations or attributes, with a core of permanent attributes so related as to *more or less resist disintegration*, space, of course, being presupposed. Such clusters, in virtue of their coherence, detach themselves both from the general sense-field and from each other. They constitute in this way the raw material of the idea of number.‡ Cohering cluster A is

* Bain observes, however, that $3 + 1 = 4$ is a verbal proposition as defining 4. But it is to all intents and purposes a real or synthetic one *as well*.

† As far back as Geulinx we note the definite assertion that "unity does not belong" to a table as such, but that *we unify* the table out of the object field.

‡ The starting-point must be *wholes*. The hypothesis that Number is abstracted from *mere beats of sensation* may, I think, be dismissed. Sensations are only dissected out of the continuum of experience on the advent of the reflective consciousness when the idea of number is already in the field. The discussion of the matter must go hand-in-hand with that of the evolution of the space-consciousness. Herbart urges that *movement* is chief cause of our breaking

not as such "one" object for consciousness, and were it the sole content of a consciousness no possible notion of unity could arise. But with transition from experience of cluster A to clusters B, B, the *implicit possibility* of number dormant in my object-consciousness becomes explicit actuality. Grasp of number once attained may be subsequently extended over an area coextensive with phenomena; all spatial objects having extended enumerable parts, and even pleasures and pains intensive enumerable degrees. In the course of this extension the Name "one" slowly receives broader connotations, until it is finally applied to the noumenal Ego itself, which is posited not as itself a single object, but as the *ground of coherence* of its phenomenal states. Into the tracing of this progression we cannot at present enter. I would here counsel expulsion from our minds of all haze touching "abstract unity" and "abstract numbers." Abstract numbers are *names* only, torn from their vivifying connections. Berkeley's "ghosts of departed quantities" are substantial in comparison with such figments of philosophic mysticism.

The standpoints of Kant and the empiricists may now be in part reconciled. But before attempting this task I must once more emphasize an important contrast. Bain gives the two great axioms of Arithmetic (as of mathematics in general) as "Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another," and the "Sums of equals are equal," opposites and derivatives being, of course, implicated. Mill concurs.* And according to Bain, a proposition, such as $6 \times 4 = 24$, "follows from the subject (6 times 4) by the medium of the two great axioms of equality." The predicate is a mediate inference "drawn by help of the highest generalities, exemplifying the true nature of the proprium."† Kant, on the other hand, so far at least as adding of small numbers is concerned, *denies the presence of any mediate inference at all*. His view would appear to be that, where the units are simultaneously represented in consciousness, the "synthetic act" of adding is intuitive and immediate. Now the partial reconciliation which we shall advance has a three-up of the sense-field into plural units. I would add the experience of *what resists disintegration* under stress of our muscular efforts.

* *Logic*, 8th edit. (People's edit.), p. 399.

† *Logic of Mathematics*, "Induction," pp. 202, 203.

fold aspect: (1) That the bulk of workaday adding, etc., is reducible, as Hobbes urged, to a substitution of names for other names of which they are the recognized equivalents. (2) That "mediate inferences" through axioms are only requisite when the reasoning is highly symbolic or involved. There is no necessary mediate inference in $2+2=4$, $3+1=4$, $\therefore 2+2=3+1$, for if $2+2$ and $3+1$ are represented pictorially as grouped dots or objects, the consciousness of their numerical agreement is immediate. With $2ab + xy = z$, $4nr^3 + p + q = z$, $\therefore 2ab + xy = 4nr^3 + p + q$, occurring in a complex calculation, the case may be different. (3) That in arguing for the immediateness and "intuitive" character of the judgments relating to two numbers, $2+2=4$, the Kantians champion an obscurely seized truth.

$2+2=4$ may fall, however, under heads Nos. (1) and (3), according to the mode of treatment. Knowing by custom the name "4" to be always predicable of $2+2$, I may well accomplish this addition without recourse to any process but the memorized facilities of language. Similarly, a clerk confronted with the array of figures—

3452

6789

1358

will probably arrive at the total 11599 without any reference to images of the objects thus symbolized. $8+9$ are contiguously associated in his experience with the sound or written symbol 17; 17 and 2, if not familiarly associated as such with 19, are riveted to it indirectly by the association of the 7 and 2 with 9. And so throughout all the vast variety of walks of life, a conventional agreement how to interchange symbols aright suffices for every practical purpose of computation. What is capable of being effected in this manner is well illustrated by the well-known "calculating machine" of Babbage. This marvellous piece of mechanism was designed to compute and print off a great variety and number of astronomical and other tables, which would otherwise have involved colossal toil. Such was the accuracy of the machine that it was self-corrective under stress of dust and derangements in its interior; such its capacity that it was

competent to work out logarithmic calculations, elaborate tables of the powers and products of numbers, approximate to the roots of equations, and even embody in cogs the method of differences. Over such work human ingenuity (*a priori* intuitions notwithstanding) would have here and there blundered.* Now, in so far as regards manipulation of symbols, my empty word formula " $2+2=4$," the tots of the clerk and the clicks of the calculating machine are very much on the same level. Similarly, the algebraic additions, subtractions, equations, etc., of the schoolboy tend to become mere fabrics of associated symbols, which may be utterly meaningless to the writer, but nevertheless mathematically valid. Adverting to the extreme nominalist doctrine, Mill remarks: "In resolving an algebraic equation, by what rules do we proceed? By applying at each step to *a*, *b*, and *x* the proposition that equals added to equals make equals; that equals taken from equals leave equals; and other propositions founded on these two. They are not properties of language or of signs as such, but of magnitudes, which is as much as to say, of all things. The inferences therefore which are successively drawn are inferences concerning things not symbols."† Arithmetical inference is similarly viewed. Now, it is pretty clear that in highly symbolic work with an unfamiliar mode of statement, the axioms must be glanced at, or, at any rate, reposed on at a pinch. But the mode of statement, understand, must be unfamiliar. The ordinary man gets valid results by mere sign-shifting, in profound disregard of axioms and things signified. This process, blind to himself, is instinct with meaning to others. More serviceable results could not be educed by logicians out of their rigid definitions and axioms. To talk in this connection of Bain or Mill's "mediate inferences" or Kant's "intuitive judgment" is little short of fantastic.

In manipulation, then, of numbers, a man or machine may deal with mere signs and yet evolve a result valid for some third person, who reads his "things" into them at a subsequent date. In regard to such cases, it is erroneous for Mill to remark that "there is in every step of an arithmetical

* Cf. Babbage's interesting description in the *Economy of Manufactures*.

† *Logic*, p. 168.

or algebraical calculation a real induction, a real inference from facts to facts." The formulas of calculation once determined, routine can effect the rest.

And now as to immediate judgments in the Kantian sense. Let us take our simple $2 + 2 = 4$ again. Let it also embody the answer of a child to the question "To what do two apples added to two others amount?" Let it be further supposed that the child is not merely *memorizing with imageless symbols*, but clearly represents in consciousness the ideas of the apples. Unless this latter supposition is granted, we have merely a question of language to deal with; and in that case it is perfectly allowable to suppose that $2 + 2$ might on some mysterious planet equal five, the whole answer turning on the use of names. Supposing the *ideas* $\circ \quad \circ$ of the apples to be represented in thought, the "intuitive act" of addition negatives the possibility. The Idea of adding being here that of heaping things together, the ideally spatial positions occupied by the apples will be shifted so as to effect the configuration $\circ\circ$. As, however, the memory retains under the class-name "four," similar groups of units,* an immediate assimilation of the new group to the old ones ensues. It will now be apparent that immediate synthetic acts of addition are possible, which neither refer back directly or indirectly to verbal axioms, nor involve sensualized *a priori* concepts. The phenomenon may be described as ascription of the class-name "four" to units reshuffled as to ideal mode of aggregation.† Inasmuch as we *visualize* such a process, it may be termed Intuitive.

Such a judgment embodied in words is not an identical proposition, as the implication is that the ideal units stand for objects which are *regrouped* in imagination; but when we frame numerical propositions where the terms are internal

* Dots (:) play an important part as schemata. For some interesting associations of numbers with visualized "number-forms," cf. Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty*, p. 114.

† This process would relate only to *pure number*, to discrete units as discrete. Mill has well pointed out (*Logic*, 170) that in all numerical reasoning which professes to deal with quantity in the larger sense, the condition necessary to accuracy is that the numbers dealt with *are all numbers of EQUAL UNITS*. "How can we know that one pound and one pound make two pounds, if one of the pounds may be troy, and the other avoirdupois?" Nothing could better illustrate the extremely slender content of the generalized propositions of number. They deal simply with abstract magnitude.

pulses of pleasure or pain, it is not easy to understand how the extreme nominalist indictment is to be evaded. If I assert, "Twice I was vexed this morning, twice this afternoon, that is four times to-day," I am dealing with merely intensive facts of feeling.* In such a case, to assert $2 + 2 = 4$ would be to all appearance a purely verbal or analytic proposition of number. The predicate reasserts simply, it would seem, the four pulses of feeling which constitute the subject. We may, however, contend that the real predicate is assimilation of the experience to all emotional or other experiences where the element of like repetition obtains.

The upshot, then, of this inquiry is to the effect that in those numerical judgments where "things" are *sufficiently few* to be represented simultaneously in consciousness, the act of adding is truly "intuitive," synthetic, and immediate, involving no reference to an axiom. As such, however, it is no *a priori* product, but the process of naming an ideal regrouping of units. In the strangely overlooked case of pleasure and pain the verbal appearance of numerical propositions is sometimes justified by inquiry, sometimes illusory. Dealing with movable spatial objects, as well as with internal phenomena of the mental consciousness, Arithmetic demands, as its "conditions," space and time alike. In so far as concerns the arithmetical and even algebraic calculations of a large percentage of persons, the extreme nominalist doctrine of Hobbes is amply borne out by the facts. The scaffolding of word-symbols suffices; for, though it may be only by way of deduction from the axioms and definitions that such symbolism is logically or verbally justifiable, it is now so "set" with age that it stands stiffly on its pedestal without necessary underpropping from beneath.

Finally, it is to be observed that the *Critique*, in so far as resting on *a priori* axioms of number, has laid its foundations on sand.

* Viewing space as "form" of our mental as well as of our object consciousness, I hold personally that emotions are spatial. But propositions *such as the above* ignore this spatiality—imply no shifting of positions,—hence require a different handling. It may be noted that not all addition in respect even of objects implies re-groupings, actual or possible, of units. But space forbids detail here.

CHAPTER VII.

CRITICISM OF THE CRITIQUE—II.

(2) *The Transcendental Æsthetic* (continued).(c) *The Definitions and Axioms of Geometry*.

THE deductions of Geometry were regarded by many of the ancients as "necessary;" and if "necessary" here connotes consistency in following out principles, empiricists have no quarrel with the term. As, however, "necessary" consequences may flow from erroneous premises—e.g. the circularity of Mars' motion from "all celestial motions are circular,"—it becomes requisite to review the presuppositions of the Science. Now, theoretically speaking, the first principles of Geometry are the so-called Definitions and Axioms, mediate inference through the latter being held needful to secure real or synthetic results. The theory of the *Deductive character* of the science requires this. It may, however, be urged that this theory has been overdone; and the objection, I think, is valid. A great deal of Geometry need not be deductive at all, only that part of it of which the *complexity* calls for abstract, discursive thinking in symbols. The overrating of discursive proof is fostered by word-drugged pedants. Euclid, says Schopenhauer, constructed his system with reference to a contemporary rage for abstract proving. His method is a "brilliant piece of perversity;" and so in great measure it is, direct perceptive seizure being subordinated so tediously to words.* How this word-mania corrupts us is aptly illustrated by Aristotle. In his *Analytics* he observes that, if we could *perceive* that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, we should be forced to seek proof, or could not be said to have knowledge. Nonsense! Is a proof needed that I perceive these tables and chairs? And in this regard let

* Schleiermacher speaks even of *logical* and *mathematical* "feeling."

me adduce a possibly interesting theory. The pedant asserts that to know A equals B because they both equal C requires the aid of an axiom, and this axiom is often made intuitive. I refer to the geometrical Axiom of Equality. Now, this *formula* is assuredly generalized from experiences, but these experiences in their turn are of interest. The equality of A and B is given directly. Size is not an absolute, but a *relative* perception—A and B are only *so* big in respect of something else. Hence, the determination of A's and B's size by reference to C is *at the same time* determination of it in respect to each other. And as a *perceptive* deliverance also, it is presented directly with the object. The formula is this fact (supplemented by comparisons of *remotely* placed objects or images) generalized and made useful in discursive thinking. Still, primarily the perceptions are of importance, and the rest a mere crutch for thinking. A by-consideration here. Kant himself did not convert geometry from a deductive to an ostensive science; but his *a priorism* seems to make the change advisable. The *a priori*, however, in Kant is quite a useless embargo. - ?

In a survey of geometry the Definitions may be first disposed of. These, as all are aware, range from a simple incommunicable space experience up to the notion of so composite a figure as trapezium. The empirical view is that they are ultimately derived from experience by abstracting from the non-geometrical properties of complex objects. As such, they are not properly speaking definitions, *i.e.* explications of the meaning of names, but inductions generalizing certain spatial features of external things. But Kant will have none of the empirical theory. He contends that the figures and lines we construct are primary data of an *a priori* origin. Hume, in one of his moods, argued that dimensionless points, circles with equal radii, straight, equal, and parallel lines, etc., fail to obtain in nature, and that hence the exactitude of geometrical deductions must—to use a felicitous expression of Mill's—"relate to and express the properties of purely imaginary objects."* To save a situation which


* *E.g.* "Its [Geometry's] first principles are still drawn from the general appearance of the objects, and that appearance can never afford us any security when we examine the prodigious minuteness of which nature is susceptible" (*Treatise*, pt. iii., § 1).

looked grave for geometrical certitude, Kant appealed to the making sensuous of pure space forms from within. It was an undue concession to mathematicians, who, as Hume observes, favour all "refining" and "spiritualizing" of their ideas. The need for the *a priori* is not at all apparent. We may reject the view that "Definitions" are generalized from the *real world of objects*, and resort to the *ideal space* which we view mentally, *trimming it of all troublesome accessories*. But this space *represented* is not *a priori*, but the echo of space *presented* with the particulars blurred into vagueness. As such, however, it answers all our purposes.

Unlike the definitions, the Axioms are unconditionally true of all "hard facts" as well as of "imaginary objects." There are twelve of these native to Euclid's text, but the number admits of sweeping curtailment. Rejecting those that are derivative from wider axioms, implied in the definitions or constituting definitions themselves, we are left to cope with three of apparently fundamental character—the two great axioms of Equality, and the proposition especially relevant to our inquiry, "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space." The latter naturally presents itself as the crucial test of the worth of Kant's philosophy of Geometry.

Touching, however, the Axioms of Equality—the fundamental notion, be it noted, of mathematics—I would once more lay stress on a proposition of fundamental importance. It is to the effect that neophytes in geometrical reasoning (and for that matter probably most past masters of the science) do not attack a theorem under cover of these axioms. On the contrary, a non-verbal direct perception sways the youthful mind, which, unless specially guided, will tend to reject "axioms" as an encumbrance. What obtains primarily is no clumsy reference of particulars to an abstract principle, but an easy transition from particulars to particulars direct. The "axioms," in fine, are not *in situ* in the intellect of the budding mathematician, but are appanages of a maturer reflective thought. They are verbal embodiments of what particular experiences have always guaranteed in the concrete. Children of the marriage of reflection and general language, they must not be unduly extended to cover processes prior to their own origin.

The two axioms of Equality are, therefore, to be rejected when advanced as the foundations of our primary geometrical inferences. They are heralded by the flash of a non-verbal transition from particulars to particulars, a process which is originally self-sustained. And now, having proceeded thus far, it remains to consider the claim of Kant's favourite axiom to the dignity of a synthetic character. Is this claim justifiable? We must perforce answer in the negative. It is open to the same criticism which Kant himself meted out to the admittedly spurious axiom, "The whole is greater than the part."* Consider the two cases. The mental picture of a landscape with a house in it, manifests the greater spatial quantity of the former as inclusive of the less spatial quantity of the latter. Similarly, the mental picture of two intersecting lines manifests them as diverging continuously if *straight*, and converging again at some point if *curved* or *crooked*. Let the mind be cleared of the fog of formulas, and the images of such lines plainly represented. Excommuni-



cate, I say, scholastic jargon and stiff verbal accretions, and it will be apparent that the attribute of not enclosing a space is applied in the supposition that the lines are really straight. A certitude of this belief arises from the fact that the *isolated mental picture* declares its own meaning. The only reservation necessary is to the effect that, as all lines in nature are wavy and possess breadth, a certain area of space will actually be enclosed at the point of intersection. A magnifying glass would speedily illustrate this fact for ordinary lines. Those ruled by the German optician Nobert, as microscopic tests (112,000 to the inch) would be less amenable to observation.

Adverting to the remarks of Mill on this head, we may note his answer to the objection that the truth of this

* Spurious as it explicates only the meaning of "whole."

"axiom" is demonstrable by mere thinking. He points out that geometrical forms admit of being depicted in imagination with a distinctness equal to reality. It follows that an accurate testing of any given image is possible, and that howsoever far we may extend an ideal line, we cannot but observe that convergence at some indefinite point towards another previously intersected line would constitute it a "curve." Bain has added with his usual acumen, that *in the very process of acquiring the idea* of straight lines we assimilate the fact that two such lines cannot enclose space.

The axiom so relied upon by Kant is, accordingly, an analytic or verbal proposition. It is really implicit in the definition of straight lines. So far, then, as the *Critique* reposes on this basis, it is unsatisfactory.

(d) *General Criticism of the Kantian Doctrine of Space and Time.*

Now that we have disposed of the Thing-in-Itself and the axioms, it will be seasonable to consider some of the further leading points suggested by the *Transcendental Æsthetic*. They will, if nothing more, show us how multiform are the aspects which a subject such as this exhibits.

It is argued by Kant that the determinations of space and time phenomena are universal and necessary, because the "forms" space and time being *a priori* constitute uniform moulds for the sensations of every Ego. Thus, if I prove that the angles of triangle A are equal to two right angles, this proof will warrant the feature to obtain in triangles B, C, D, and throughout all experience of triangles. It has to be remarked in answer that the supposition is gratuitous, and for a very simple reason. I do not first prove this feature to obtain in



and then make a logically hazardous leap to all triangles grounded on this solitary case, but I prove the angles of all

triangles equal to two right angles in *the same breath* that I prove them to be so in the case of ABC. This is the great advantage enjoyed here by discursive thinking. When I am reasoning deductively with word-symbols I am considering the relations of magnitudes—*few, simple, and abstract*. The reasoning is general throughout, and the diagrammatic reference-figure ABC is merely a pictorial aid, a mere crutch to facilitate the march of intellect.*

Space, urges Kant, is a "form" in which all sensations are primarily arranged. The "all" here is of crucial import. Was Kant's judgment warped by undue attention to visual and tactual sensations? Is he taking over uncritically events peculiar to our adult experience? Herbert Spencer is strongly of this opinion, traversing any theory which would assign a primary space-reference to odours and sounds. The space-implications of these sensations *at any rate* are, he thinks, acquired, and, even as acquired, are of the rudest character. "Whoever thinks that sounds and odours have space for their form of intuition may convince himself to the contrary by trying to find the right and left sides of a sound, or to imagine an odour turned the other way upward."† Any one, I would add, who has read a tune into the clattering of railway wheels has by purposive *association* converted ideas into seemingly objective sensations radiating on him from space. So far, so good. The association here is the space-reference. But we must not confuse association of sounds with visual or tangible space with the *peculiar* space-quality which the associable sounds themselves possess. That sounds are "massive" (voluminous) and "acute" is admitted by all psychologists, and the admission carries much with it. Sounds thus differenced surely imply parts with some native, albeit very vague, and perhaps quite peculiar space-setting. A like contention applies to odours where, however, the space-setting is vaguer still. That association, etc., *measures* the *manifold* "space-potencies" of the different classes of sensations, and

* "There is this source of fallacy respecting propositions of arithmetic and geometry, that their terms being rigorously defined and the relations being simple, there is no possibility of a change not at once destroying the intuition" (Lewes, *Hist. of Philos.*, ii. 455).

† *Principles of Psychology*, note ii. 354.

‡ Cf. Part II., "External Perception."

then out of these evolves the composite *unitary* space of our adult perceptions, is approximately certain. Still, space is dormant in all classes of sensations, if not half-awake in some (*e.g.* touch and colour). Space, moreover, is a "form" of our inner or mental experience, of the mind as well as of the object. Emotions *fill* the Ego with varying degrees of bulk. The idea of a jar is just as much extended as is the percept of a jar. It is a mere prejudice that restricts space to the domain of "external intuition."

What, now, is meant by a "Form" of space or time? Kant does not leave us in doubt. It is "that *in which* our sensations are arranged," and hence cannot itself be a sensation or combination of sensations. Once more in the history of philosophy it is the opposition of Matter and Form which confronts us; in this case, the contrasting of undetermined sensation with the abstract moulds into which it runs. Now, the separating of "form" and "matter" is to the last degree questionable. All we know is a complex, a *σύνολον*, of which these are mere aspects separated reflectively for convenience. Caird would seem to excuse Kant, alleging that space, for instance, is "a form necessarily given to a certain relation *otherwise determined*," *i.e.* the possibility of juxtaposing, not a canvas ready made for its colouring. This would save the situation, but Kant's words are not to be exorcised. The Space and Time forms are referred to as capable of being represented *per se*, which scarcely bears out this view. Space is that "*in which*" sensations are arranged (not a relation merely), and "we never can imagine the non-existence of space, though we may *easily enough think that no objects are found in it*." Further, as already traced, the Categories are *thought into* intuitions which without them are "blind"—the intuited phenomena are already *THERE in situ* to be "subsumed."

Readers of the *Critique* will note that Kant asserts our ability to abstract from the content of space, while retaining grasp of the space-form itself. The alleged fact goes, indeed, to swell the arguments for an *a priori* form of space. "We never," he says, "can imagine . . . the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it." The evidence thus adduced is worthless; worthless

not only as ignoring what a really sweeping abstraction would involve, but as overlooking the really fundamental point at issue. Spencer has well exposed this fallacy. The Space said by Kant to survive its content is that in which objects are imagined, "the ideal Space in which they were *represented*, and not the real Space in which they were *presented*." * To think away from the content of the latter is palpably nonsense. The doctrine that we can think a pure Time void of all phenomena may be also shown to be illusory. Thus a subsidiary argument for these "Forms" goes by the board.

No explanation, I may point out, is afforded by Kant as to how sensations are sorted out in the detail. By what agency, for instance, are the vast plexuses of coexistences so arranged in the "Form" of Space as to yield the expanse of phenomena as we have them? Postulation of a mere "Form" is useless. It is the *ordering of sensations in the detail*, the assigning of each to its post, that constitutes so enormous a difficulty. I need not here emphasize the bewilderingly complex and varied character of the "manifold" actually referred to space. To take an illustration from sensations of sight, Helmholtz's observations go to show that there are no less than thirty thousand shades of colour in the Roman mosaics. Mark, then, the dilemma. Either the non-Ego or the Ego determines the order of the sensations, the blank Space-form being a tablet on which *any order* can be traced. Both alternatives shatter the *Transcendental Aesthetic*; for, in the first case, the non-Ego would *impart form*; and, in the second, Sensibility would be declared a *highly active faculty*, as opposed to an arena of passive "receptivity."

We had occasion to cite a criticism of associationists advanced by Kuno Fischer. The charge adduced was to the effect that space was derived by them from coexistences. Such a pedigree would involve a *petitio principii*. He should have remarked that our *mental conception* of space is held by them as so derived. A very little reflection will serve to show that coexistence cannot be represented without the thought of two or more points in space. Space, as *form of*

* *Psychology*, ii. 355. The opposite possibility of stripping our presentations of the "Space-form" is worth mooting. There can be no question that in very passive reverie artificially deepened by hashish the acquired part of the perception of Distance may be partially, if not wholly, eliminated from *presentations*.

perception, they would trace back, not, indeed, to coexistences, but to simultaneous (in time) patches of sensation (with or without "local characters") measured by other successive ideas and sensations. Of this inquiry anon. Here, however, I would again deprecate confusion of the provinces of psychology and metaphysic in weighing this disputed matter. It is for psychology to show how this form of perception may have arisen for us; *it is for metaphysic to rethink the results of that analysis.*

(3) THE "TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC."

Transcendental logic is sharply contrasted by Kant with that formal logic which exhibits the laws of "thought" in their application to known objects. It is, as we saw, an investigation into the possibility of knowing itself, dissecting pure concepts out of judgment forms and vindicating them, then noting the method and fruit of their fusion with the deliverances of sensibility. The Analytic of Conceptions is concerned with the first, the Analytic of Principles with the second, of these issues. Our present remarks will concern the Analytic of Conceptions, of which the other may be regarded as an appendage.

We have seen that Kant obtained his judgment forms from the classification of the old logic, which for him was a perfect science. His inspiration was a happy one. As judgments are expressions of the modes of relation of "subject" and "predicate," then by observing their most radical kinds, and noting the concepts underlying these kinds, it seems feasible to lay bare the basic *a priori* conditions of judgment itself. Here was an apparent master key. Out of the judgment forms furnished by the old logic, Kant succeeds in developing twelve main kinds, and proceeds to sink shafts in them for their embosomed concepts.* The design was, historically speaking, felicitous—albeit, marred in its initial treatment by some considerable defects. It would seem that

* "Main," because Kant by no means limits the *a priori* categories to twelve. Cf. *infra*, "Fichte and the Post-Kantian Idealism." Schopenhauer observes of the infinite judgment "that it is merely a crotchet of the old scholastics, an *ingeniously invented stopgap.*"

Kant's respect for the old logic blinded him to the slipshod character of some of the distinctions insisted upon. Not to press this point home too closely, it will here suffice to observe that "Relation" is not a special appanage of judgments of Substance and Accident, Causality and Reciprocity, but a form common to all the groups alike. "Unity," even, implicating at least "plurality" as its contrast, is a relation; so, likewise, is "Reality" as asserting the agreement of two presentations. Then, Kant's actual extraction of the Categories is sometimes forced. Who would venture to assert that all disjunctive judgments vehicle a conception of *reciprocal action*? The assumption would be grotesque. Disjunctive judgments, moreover, have scant claim to any independent standing, seeing that they are all resolvable into two or more conditional ones—the Chinese wall run up between these two sub-types being illusory. It is also clear that formally conditional judgments do not always embody a causal relation. "If a body gravitates, it is also inert," gravity and inertia being coinhering attributes. And, looking further, we shall discover that the difference between the categorical and conditional judgments is of so tenuous a character as to raise fresh difficulties. A conditional judgment asserts a predicate of a judgment as subject; the said predicate being that it is an inference from another judgment. But categorical judgments may equally assert predicates of judgments, though not, it is true, those of an *inferential* order.*

As was to be anticipated, the admirers of Kant have not failed to rebel against his list of Categories. According to Mansel, "the Kantian categories are not deduced from the act of thought, but generalized from the forms of the proposition, which latter are assumed without examination, as they are given in the ordinary logic. A psychological deduction or preliminary criticism of the forms themselves might have considerably reduced the number."† Kuno Fischer, a zealous advocate of Kant, assails the "architectonic fancies" of the Königsberg thinker, and contents himself with causality.

* As words are here implied, and a proposition is "a portion of discourse in which something is affirmed or denied of something," it would be ordinarily preferable to substitute "proposition" for "judgment." But the need of assimilating our terminology to the language hitherto used may be held to be imperative.

† *Metaphysics*, p. 193, note.

Schopenhauer, too, reduces the catalogue to causality, and upbraids Kant with confusing perception and thought. Cousin stops short at Substance and Causality; while Fries takes over the relation group as the basis of the rest. Fichte's attitude has yet to be described, as it places the whole discussion on a new footing. Similarly, that of Schelling and Hegel will not at this stage of our inquiry be intelligible. Suffice it here to say that the subjective categories of Kant become for them universal rational conditions of experience, not *thought into* objects by the *noumenal Egos* of individuals, but *immanent in* objects as thought by the *one Ego* of which individuals constitute only the collective mind or mental consciousness.

The Kantian categories are held up as pre-requisites of experience. What we call Nature, and seem to perceive in common, is made *objective* by them, Nature being those portions of the content of different Egos which are necessarily and universally connected for all individuals alike. But for such connection there would be no clear line of demarcation between "mind" and "world," mental-consciousness and object-consciousness; it would not be possible to draw a trenchant distinction between what Hume called "faint" and "vivid" perceptions; between what I call "my" ideas and objectivity proper. Such is the essence of the Kantian plea. It follows, accordingly, that if we are able to account for the object-consciousness in some other and less cumbrous manner, the call for the categories will lapse. And it is in this way that we might answer the plea when the question of External Perception comes to be handled. Meantime, however, there remains much to be said.

We may agree with Caird, that the simplest objective perception implies "thought," but we need not for that accept these Kantian concept-forms or categories. Association, resting on ancestral experience, may suffice for us—*results* only of its work pouring into consciousness. But here let us deal with the doctrine *as enounced by Kant*. There are other versions of Category-lore, but let us dispose of this first.

"The Categories," remarks Schopenhauer, "bring nothing to perception." Take Causality, for instance,—it knits the terms of a sequence and determines it thereby as objective.

But the sequence is already *there*—the necessity and universality imported by the category are delusive. May not the “subsumed” intuitions in space and time be *as contingent as Hume could desire*? Obviously they may, if objectivation is the sole work of the Category. But we must further ask, *are all objective sequences causal ones*? The answer must be that they are not. Add to these two objections the fact that Kant allows for “*judgments of perception*,” *i.e.* uncategorized intuitions, and the bankruptcy of his position is evident. We shall recur to this bankruptcy anon, when dealing with Fichte and Hegel.

That acceptance of these Categories will prove durable is a supposition of an extremely dubious character. Among the agencies slowly denuding this stratum may be included those of philology. So long as men possessed confused ideas as to the genesis of the structure of language, so long was it probable that mysticism would hover round the form of the proposition. “Blank forms” of predication would suggest themselves; and these, again, would favour speculation as to their intellectual counterparts; these, again, a philosophic theory, and so on. Thus, the Categories of Aristotle, designed, as against Plato, to indicate the varieties of “real being” predicable of things, came to suggest blank forms of predication on the lines of which all thinking had to run. But philology has long since sapped these foundations, and we may now remark, with Professor Sayce, that “had Aristotle been a Mexican, his system of logic would have assumed a wholly different form.” Aristotle little knew that beyond the grandly *developed tongue* in which he wrote lay languages the study of which would have resolved his artificialities into mist. “In the history of the race,” writes Romanes, “spoken language began in the form of sentence-words; . . . grammar is the child of gesture; . . . predication is but the adult form of the self-same faculty of sign-making which in its infancy we know as indication.”* Formal Logic institutes an unreal severance of “subject” and “predicate”—a severance unknown in the concrete,—and then the rush is for “links,” “judgment forms,” “categories” to tether them, inventions of modes of “uniting” and “separating” ideas in judgment,

* *Mental Evolution in Man.*

etc. Small wonder that the tyro in such logic often regards his study with surprise and disgust—it answers to no living processes in his own consciousness. When I judge the tree is green, there is no "uniting" of atomistic presentations by a faculty, for there is no sundering in the bare perception itself. In the "Chinese-spoken English" * of the British child, and the babbling of the Stagirite's younger friends, one word stands and stood for subject, copula, and predicate combined. Had Greek in Aristotle's days been in the sentence-word stage, his copula theory would not have arisen; the "tree is green" would not have been *in situ* to yield "the tree *exists* green." Here, again, this misconceived copula is a product of evolution, and, as now revealed, stands for an impression of a *relation* inseparable, however, from the terms related. This suggestive instance, coupled with knowledge of the point from which the old analysis of propositions started, is the key to much that is otherwise obscure. For while it is true that the Categories of Kant are not the Categories of Aristotle, it is equally true that they are based on an analysis of propositions which grew out of the Aristotelian logic. Heaping, therefore, one consideration on another, we may incline to agree with Herbart, that the categories coincide with the forms of language, and that a full treatment of them implicates the establishment of a universal grammar.

(4) THE DIALECTIC AND THE PRACTICAL REASON.

The agnosticism of the *Dialectic* flows obviously enough from the idealist premises of the *Æsthetic* and *Analytic* "What do I know?" is here finally disposed of by explicit shelving of the great metaphysical dogmas which seek to transcend experience. There are, however, two further questions to be dealt with, "What ought I to do?" and "For what may I hope?" The latter may be held as of chief moment, seeing that ON ITS SOLUTION HINGES THE REPLY TO PESSIMISM, and, consequently, all motive for our conscious co-operation with a possible cosmic "design." With Kant, on the contrary, the former weighed most heavily, his ideal of hard abstract morality savouring of the ascetic's cell. The

* *Science of Thought*, p. 242.

Moral Law is supreme, and demands unconditional devotion to duty, not even tempered by love, which from us passion-torn mortals is hardly to be expected. We may oppose to this view another, to wit that the sense of compulsion indicates *defect*, inadequacy of development of the sentiments, and that an ideally moral being is one to whom moral action is a happiness. But the old categories of Morality require pruning. Morality should concern only the *relations* of conscious units, hinging on their pleasures and pains. Its pillars are the sympathies, public opinion, inherited bias, legal penalty, and *our intellectual grasp of life's meaning*. Were individuals not susceptible of pleasures and pains to coexist, they could know no Morality. Were there only one individual in a universe of *phantom forms*, that individual, even if a Nero, could do no wrong—there would be no other individual to suffer at his hands. He might, however, very well be *imprudent*, might sink into debauchery, become jaded with voluptuousness, and sacrifice ulterior benefits. Understand clearly that this doctrine of Prudence is not a doctrine of the pigsty. Great misunderstanding has prevailed here. Even Epicurus protested against the hunt after life's fiery pleasures, recommending temperance as a means of securing happiness. Like Aristotle, he advises the sage to avoid the painful rather than seek the pleasurable. The thinker, however, must look farther than Epicurus—must *mould* himself with reference to a higher goal than this petty life we know. He must *extend the scope of Prudence*, visualize the destiny of man in a future life or lives, and (so far as he is able) shape the direction of SOUL-ACTUALIZATION accordingly. It is scope for this *higher Prudence* that those, freed from the illusions of dogma, now demand. If it is said that happiness is a vain quest, and that the "higher potentialities" of the soul ought to be actualized, the answer is ready. Complete actualization of the soul is, as we shall see, complete attainment of Happiness. Hedonism and its opposite coalesce.

In his solution of the Third Antinomy, Kant places Freedom in the noumenal Ego, and subjects the empirical throughout to necessity. No other course was possible, for a genuine Free Will doctrine would upset the "universality" of the Causal Judgment. Huxley adverts to this "noumenal

libertine" of Kant, and justly assails the emptiness of his concession. What Libertarians require is freedom in the thick of the empirical, and, failing this, all assertion of individual Liberty becomes meaningless. I will commend to our notice the bearing of this point on the question of the "postulates." It needs no commentary. If the "can," answering to the "ought," is illusory, what of the postulates?

There is one other aspect of this question which is well worth our attention. In contending for the inherence in the ego of a moral law superior to our empirical estimates of right and wrong, Kant was in a sense justified. The ordinary experience doctrine, as Spencer has shown, fails to explain the presence of certain sketchy moral intuitions in the individual as now born into the world. These intuitions are not simple, but of highly complex character, and only *a priori* in the sense that they hark back to the organized experiences of utility of the race—experiences slowly integrated and handed down, capital and interest, as birthright of existing individuals. On this supposition Kant's statical ethics yield to a developed physiological associationism. Without inquiring into the metaphysical implications of this latter—a highly important point—we may observe that it harmonizes very readily with the empirical researches of the day. Everything points to morality as dialectical evolution out of lowly and (to us) detestable antecedents.* "Language," observes Geiger the philologist, "dates from a period when a moral judgment, a knowledge of good and evil, had not yet dawned in the human mind." We know, too, that *varieties of conscience*—of the supposed "Moral Law"—are observable. What is a source of self-approbation to a head-hunter sends a cold shiver through the frame of the Rev. Septimus Longface. What shocks the susceptibilities even of our pornographers, was a religious rite in the temple of Mylitta. The acute remorse that stirred the Hindu widow, rescued from *suttee*, is a standing crux to the European. Viewed, indeed, in the light of descriptive sociology the Categorical Imperative represents

* The "Categorical Imperative" of man has not yet grown to such an extent as to debar him from massacring harmless animals for his pleasure, or even in many cases his fellow man. The "Categorical Imperative" of the ant wholly debars it from attacking a nest-mate, but organized utility seems as yet to have carried its morality no further.

what Schopenhauer termed it, an "infant school of morality." It stands for Kant's hapless reaction against the grim negations of his metaphysic. Drowsy the Cerberus whom such a sop can narcotize.

(5) THE ADVANCE OF KANT ON HUME, AND HIS PERMANENT CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

To what extent may an advance on Hume be credited to Kant? By what amount has the rolling snowball of thought gathered round itself accretions due to his genius? We will endeavour to offer a brief reply to each of these questions.

The common reference to Kant as the slaughterer of "scepticism" is based on insufficient data. It must be remembered that Kant fully agreed with Hume in emphasizing the enforced limitation of our *knowledge* to appearances. What show of hold on "things unseen" arises with the "postulates" fails, as we saw, to counteract the foregoing trend of the *Critique*. Rejecting as we do an abstract ethic, we are driven to regard the speculative agnosticism of the work as historically its true purport. If, then, we find Hume and Kant to agree in rejecting ontology,* in what does the supposed discomfiture of Hume consist? It is fictitious. His central citadel is simply regarrisoned after capture; his agnosticism gravely reaffirmed, and the upshot of the long assault is the spectacle of two great thinkers—

"Holding no form of creed,
But contemplating all,"

and disputing as to whether *within experience* there are traces of a "necessary" constitution of cognition or *vice versa*.

Eliminating the thing-in-itself lurking behind the phenomenon, an excrescence on Kant's thought, we confront a subjective idealism, though not, indeed, one of the psychological order so frequent in British writers. In elaborating this doctrine Kant accomplished a work which no pen can ever erase from the records of modern philosophy. It was he

* Hume's Theism, but for its shadowy character, might be held to render even this rejection dubious.

who in Europe first enunciated in terms of unmistakable import that the Ego is *presupposed* by the bare stream of consciousness, even though never itself revealed in consciousness. Correlated with this doctrine was the *reconciliation of empirical realism with transcendental idealism*, the view that perception of objects is immediate, though such objects, metaphysically speaking, are simply facts for consciousness. Surveying most of the expositions of British idealism, we shall trace a covert plea to the effect that the "world" is somehow less real than the "mind," that it stands in the relation of appendage to this supposed central fact. Such a plea may well furnish cause for a rebellion of common sense, for which our consciousness that the world is "outside mind" needs no vindication. It has, also, apparently misled Herbert Spencer into framing his irrelevant attacks on the Germans. It was, in earlier days, the cause of Reid's confused protestations and assumptions. Kant well points out, as against psychological idealism, that mind (or "internal experience") is rendered possible through external experience, and can only be accorded a reality co-ordinate with it. This position is pivotal. In working out this doctrine of perception, Kant effected the permanent philosophical collapse of the case for materialism.* Viewed from an educational platform, the study of the *Critique* is invaluable. Any student who has once really mastered Kant's message will avow the beneficial effect. The very contact with his candour is salubrious. With an iron logic, the Königsberg thinker drove every consequence of his *speculative* analysis home, recking nothing of theology or calumny. Ever thorough and honest, we may transfer to Kant the eulogy so honourably accorded by him to the "sceptic." "Such a man is a benefactor to the human intellect, inasmuch as he enforces our vigilance regarding even the most trivial stages of workaday experience, and debars us from appropriating anything wrongfully obtained." Apart from Kant's general services to philosophy, it is well to note that from him, more or less directly, sprang the great idealist thinkers of Germany. And should the *ground*

* In its crass old form of an independent external world of "moving matter" with consciousness as by-product. Materialism, *rethought*, enters into the idealism of many members even of the Hegelian Left, to say nothing of other competent standpoints.

principles of that idealism prove, as many are coming to think, valid for all time, posterity will have yet a further obligation to recognize.

The instrument of discovery bequeathed by Kant to his successors, was that of the transcendental or speculative Method. Its procedure we have already had cause to note. Briefly re-put, it is the analysis of a whole into its factors, mediating a reconstructive synthesis of these factors by way of abstract thought. Experience is explained by what it pre-supposes, by that given which it must obtain, and failing which it cannot. Here the analytic and synthetic methods work in combination. Much of Kant, despite compromises with empiricism, illustrates this Method; more of Fichte; Schelling falls away freely into "intellectual intuition;" while it is reserved for Hegel to carry through the combination with severity. Hegel's procedure has been defined by Hutchison Stirling as "exhaustive deduction from a single actually existent principle that has been inductively acquired." Adequate comprehension of this Method would, however, be impossible at this stage. Waiving it, therefore, for the present, let us hasten to the striking system of Fichte.

CHAPTER VIII.

FICHTE AND THE POST-KANTIAN IDEALISM—POST-KANTIAN TRANSFORMATION OF THE CATEGORIES—SYSTEM OF FICHTE.

THE well-known *Science of Knowledge*, Fichte's great work, constitutes a link in a chain with strangely diverse points of attachment. That chain swings over the river of German thought between two impressive columns, on one of which is graven *Relativity of Knowledge*, on the other *Absolutism*. In the culmination of the post-Kantian idealism there is, indeed, a savour of the irony of destiny. Kant began by asserting the relativity of knowledge, contrasting our phenomenal experience with the veiled actuality of the unknown things-in-themselves. But his teachings, while thus overtly championing belief in independent objective agencies, were properly interpretable as a revised subjective idealism; his premises confining the knowledge of egos to their mental and object experiences, and rendering all call for a "thing-in-itself" invalid. When, accordingly, Fichte set himself the task of "genuine criticism consistently carried out," the standpoint of transcendental philosophy was altered. Not only did the thing-in-itself wholly disappear, but the plural egos of Kant were merged in one universal Ego. Knowledge of things was no longer dubbed "relative" in allusion to veiled or masked noumena, for these surds were at last exposed as figments. Henceforward metaphysic had no concern with attempts to *transcend* experience, henceforward it was to be conceded that the known and the real were identical. All that remained was to "re-read" and re-interpret the *given facts* of our perceptual and mental experience. Ontology was

to be simply a theory of such experience, not of what the Scotch call the "back of Beyond." In surveys of this standpoint Relativist criticisms, such as dismantle a Descartes or a Leibnitz, are irrelevant. Obvious as is this inference, it is brushed over by many British critics. Of their errors, however, anon. Historically speaking it is hard to conceive of a more natural transition, than that from Kantian relativism to Hegelian Absolutism. Starting from the provisional solution of Fichte, it is most easy to exhibit the legitimacy and inevitableness of the advance. With this latter we have now to cope, ignoring, so far as possible, subordinate issues in an endeavour to throw its main movements into clear and unmistakable relief.

The standpoint of Fichte was sharply condemned by Kant. Nevertheless, there is a passage in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, on which it might well claim to found. Kant alludes there to the "expectation that we shall advance to realization of the unity of the entire business of pure Reason (speculative as well as practical), and be able to deduce all from a single principle which is the inevitable demand of human reason." * In pursuance of this suggested aim, Fichte submits the abstract deism, the incoherent categories, the gap between speculative and practical reason, the undeduced sensations, of the Kantian structures to a new process of rethinking, whence there emerges a system which, if not unassailable, presents at least the charm of unification. Properly to understand his method, we must recognize once and for all that it is quite other than the inductive method common to physical science and psychology alike. The mere study of nature and mind as *somehow given* contrasts, takes in the eyes of the metaphysician too much for granted. Even Psychology confines itself to generalizations, which, for the most part, concern *causal relations in time*. Metaphysic, on the contrary, must rise above phenomena in time, physical or mental; it must abstractly formulate the stages by which the process of knowing—the fabric of experience as a whole—

* Caird argues in his work on Kant, that the *Critique* is "regressive rather than progressive in thought"—the *Æsthetic* resting on the *Analytic*, that on the *Dialectic*, and that again on the *Practical Reason*, which alone vouches for an intelligible world. Fichte, we shall see, makes *Morality the end and aim of the world* also.

becomes possible.* I need hardly repeat that Fichte invokes no "external matter," or Kantian thing-in-itself as one necessary condition of such knowing. Nay, he regarded such a conception as grotesque. "Attributes synthetically united give substance, and substance analyzed gives attributes; a continued substratum or supporter of attributes is an impossible Conception." Annihilate the Ego and sky, sun, stars, seas, space and time are likewise annihilated; they are but a mirage, shimmering in its vastness. Blot out the Ego and the dream of the *Tempest* would come to pass—

"The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit shall dissolve,
And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind."

Further, he draws no draft on "innate concepts," those time-honoured allies, those friends in need of intellect proven impotent. Contrariwise, with Fichte, solid concrete experience is the pabulum on which reflective thought must feed. Not *a priori* thinking along the lines of a genial imagination, but a sober analytic reduction of experience to its most abstract elements, followed by a reconstructive synthesis or combination of these elements once again into experience (the speculative method proper), is the method adopted. Experience is explained by exhibiting the factors and stages which its present actuality presupposes. The analytic and synthetic ways of procedure are thus satisfactorily wedded.

Let us now endeavour to grasp the leading Conception of the later German idealism previous to confronting a more detailed survey of Fichte. Let us also obtain some insight into the transformation of Kant's categories in the hands of his revolutionary heirs.

A man, let us suppose, is walking with a friend along the shore. His private emotions, resolves, and affections may

* In his valuable work, *Mental Evolution in Man*, Romanes is careful to delimitate the frontier between historical psychology and a possible metaphysic: "In seeking to indicate the steps whereby self-consciousness [consciousness of our ideas as ideas] has arisen from the lower stages of mental structure, I am as far as any one can be from throwing light upon the *intrinsic nature* of that the probable genesis [from causal antecedents in time] of which I am endeavouring to trace" (p. 195).

not even be suspected by his comrade; but both will agree in seeing the waves fling their crests on the strand, the clouds scour along the sky, and in hearing the harsh grate of the shingle drawn back by the undertow. Allowing for marginal differences, a common world of objects *seems* shared in by the intuitions of both. They take it for granted that they confront the same natural vista—that, however diverse are their “inner” thoughts and feelings, they enjoy at any rate a community of “outer” experience. Now on what, for *idealism*, does this “outer” experience rest? According to the subjective idealism of a Leibnitz, it is an evolution of the individual monad. According to a numerous class of writers, it is an effect produced by co-operation of the Ego and “unknown objects.” According to the Indian nihilists, it is a stream of baseless appearances which along with other baseless appearances, called “mental,” suggest the fiction soul. Berkeley, again, though no half-hearted thinker, holds that objects are no mere states or creations of the Ego, that they exist “not by way of mental mode,” but by way of efflux from Deity,—a view seemingly acquiesced in by Ferrier, among recent thinkers.* He has, perforce, to assign numerically different worlds to the different plural percipients. Kant’s view we have discussed. And that of Fichte? Well, the answer to that is the point on which we have now embarked. Let us work up to it through the solution of Berkeley.

What Berkeley sought to show was that the world of objects, or “matter,” is reducible to a stream of states of consciousness of our Egos; its genesis, however, carrying us beyond human and animal Egos back to Deity. Thus the waving trees, the blue sky, the rippling river, all the wealth of space-hung objects which simultaneously and successively fill my consciousness as I look up from this reverie, are my perceptions, not independent external existences; “perceptions of matter” being a pleonastic expression duplicating, as Ferrier puts it, the facts. But they are also something more—their roots are planted in Deity. For though it is by Association that the world of my adult consciousness has settled into shape, it is, nevertheless, to Deity that I owe the

* Cf. his *Institutes of Metaphysic*, and *Lectures and Remains*.

presentations which afford scope for association, nay, the capacity of association itself. The corollary is obvious. Cessation of the ideation of Deity would strip all Egos of their perceptions, and at once annihilate the world. It will be observed that Berkeley starts with a concrete detached Divine Mind and ready-made individuals or free intelligences. So many individuals, so many worlds. How the Divine Mind can affect detached individuals, how it can pre-exist as a *conscious* entity to do so, how the ready-made individuals are to be held as antedating their own experiences; as "minds" when not even yet receptacles for "ideas for sense,"—how numerically different worlds can afford possibility for intercommunion, and hence come to possess one of the criteria of practical reality,—these and many other difficulties remain unsolved. For Fichte this theological idealism will never do. He detects in it at once the cloven hoof of the thing-in-itself; the Divine Mind of Berkeley standing proxy for Locke's Substance and Kant's Noumena. Such a conception of action and reaction is of a piece with Kant's transcendent use of causality. It involves the projection of the notion or category of Reciprocity out of experience, where it has alone meaning and validity, into a domain where it explains experience itself. Touching this hypothesis of "action and reaction," an able interpreter of Fichte, Professor Adamson, aptly remarks: "A conscious subject can only think the objects which make up his experience as mutually determining, for only so do they compose *one* experience. To transfer this notion to the possible relations of infinite and finite intelligences, which by supposition are not mere objects for mind, is to make an invalid, or, technically, a transcendent use of it. No ingenuity can render a finite and relative notion like that of causal action, or of mutual determination, adequate to express the possible connection between experience and the ground of all possible experience. . . . [Berkeley's view] is simply a translation into the language of idealism of the popular view that the experience of the conscious subject is due to some action from without. . . . Such a mere fashion of speech makes clear neither what the significance of 'coming from without' can be for an intelligence possessing only subjective states, nor

how the notion of 'without' can possibly arise in its consciousness, nor how it comes to regard itself as finite, and to refer for explanation to an Infinite Mind."* Fichte's answer to Berkeley may therefore be briefly summarized: Do not seek to explain the beginnings of experience by a notion which serves to connect objects in that experience, but has no validity beyond its pale.

But if Fichte rejects Berkeley, he is no subjective idealist, current interpretations to the contrary notwithstanding. An *imperfect idealism*, he says, regards the Ego as merely mind, and thinks to find self-consciousness in intelligence or mind with the world annexed as its appendage. His own idealism develops Kant, whose criticism of the theory which would suspend all in "Mind," or "inner sense," we have already adverted to. Mind is not prior but posterior to the first blur of presentation; the mind evolves *pari passu*, and in intimate cordiality with the object, but it is heralded by presentation, and derives from presentation its nutriment. Hence, asserts Fichte, the Ego is not to be regarded as mind, but as the root of both mind and object. And what is this Ego? "In the Ego," says Kant, "we have before us nothing but a transcendental subject of thought, an *x* or *unknown* quantity, which is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of which, if we separate it from its thoughts, we cannot form the slightest conception." For Kant this was an "inconvenience;" for Fichte it was the key to the higher idealism. For Kant there were many such Egos, for Fichte one,—and now the clue bursts upon us. It is in this absolute Ego, the "I as universal" that the world is suspended.† Bearing in mind the Kantian resolution of objectivity—as contrasted with contingent thoughts, feelings, and perceptions—into *connections made by the different pure Egos*, we discover Fichte's objectivity to stand for *connections made by the ONE pure Ego*. And this abstract self-consciousness is by him identified with the Absolute Spirit. "The Ego as commonly understood (*i.e.* individual *mind*) affirms neither the external world nor itself,

* Fichte, pp. 116, 117.

† This view, however, seems at times over-clouded, and Fichte to relapse into adhesion to finite egos. The complete fusion of these with the one Ego is only fully thought out in his later writings.

but both are affirmed by *universal absolute thinking*, whereby the external world is given for the Ego as also the Ego for itself." We read in the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* that the Rishi Yagnavalkya, asked by Garji on what rests the world, replies that the Mâyâ, or the world-illusion, is woven warp and woof over the perduring Self, (Brahman,) cohering on which float the fleeting shows of sense. It was the extirpation of "the Self" that converted the Mâyâ doctrine of the Upanishads into the nihilistic psychological idealism of the Buddhists. Contrariwise it was its vindication in another regard, by Fichte, that enabled him to transcend subjective idealism, and (as against Hume's followers) to remove the enormous difficulty attending attempts to build up the world on so puny a ground as the individual mind.

The identification of Fichte's Idealism with the view that the paltry experience-born mind spontaneously creates its own world in and for itself is not confined to popular writers alone. Thus we find even Dr. Tyndall averring that "Fichte . . . having first proved himself to be a mere link in that chain of eternal causation which holds so rigidly in Nature, violently broke the chain, making Nature and all it inherits an apparition of his own *mind!*"* This error possibly derived its origin from a misunderstanding of Fichte's doctrine: The "I" is all." Now, the "I" referred to is neither Fichte's mind, nor any mind whatever, but the Absolute Spirit or universal I which, to the aggregate of conscious individuals, presents the world of objects. Again, a German thinker, Kirchner, is found to remark, "It is true that universality and reality belong to the Ego in a sense in which they do not belong to any other thing, but still it is and remains human, *i.e.* circumscribed, *i.e.* not creating Nature, but only *re-creating it in consciousness.*"† A good point is here brought out which enables us to throw the truth sharply into relief. Kirchner's error lies in confusing the two provinces of metaphysic and psychology. Fichte would equally have asserted that the "mind" or Ego "as commonly understood" is not "creative" but *recreates, reproduces, and elaborates Nature in its concepts,—is, in fact, merely*

* *Belfast Address.*

† *Manual of Psychology*, p. 75. (Trans., Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.).

a memory-fed synthesis of ideas. He would swallow the whole contention at a gulp; his eye being not on the psychology of the furnishing of mind, but on the metaphysic of the experience it is furnished with. The mind, he would admit, is only recreative, nay, if looked into, only a name for a bundle of reproduced and rewoven shreds of experience. The "I as universal," on the contrary, is *creative*. It is this "I" which directly confronts individuals with objects, not illuminating them, as with Berkeley, through the "void immense," but knit with them in organic union as immediate ground of their being. *The aggregate of minds or individuals constitutes in fact the mental side of this "I;" the world its objective.* There are thus no numerically separate worlds for separate individuals, but one and the same perceptive nucleus round various aspects of which their varieties of cognition rally. Before this objective datum the distinctions of "yours," "mine," etc., vanish. In so far as it assumes one and the same world as common to all percipients, the idealism of Fichte is far more closely in accord with the popular view than the carefully pruned and "transfigured" realism of Spencer. The world exists as perceived, secondary qualities and all. The supersession of this idealism by that of Schelling and Hegel will be dealt with hereafter. Meanwhile it is requisite to take a preliminary glance at the post-Kantian development of the categories.

By the merging of Kant's multiple Egos into the I as universal, the categories were forthwith transmuted into the rational foundations of REALITY in general. Kant had already raised the status of Logic by deciphering the categories in the forms of judgment. He did not, however, press the inquiry home, and it remained for his successors to cultivate the area roughly cleared by him. Fichte was the first to carry this project into execution, greatly to the dismay of his veteran inspirer, who like most thinkers, seemed to cling to some hope of finality for his results. But what sort of finality was possible? Here were twelve chief categories mysteriously latent in a multiplicity of Egos with the ground for their origin, number, and order of importance wholly obscure. It was necessary, therefore, for some philosophic mind to rethink the whole question, and, if possible, to deduce

the bunch from some fundamental principle. Categories are by Fichte derived from this fundamental principle: the self-affirmation of itself by the absolute Ego; and when so derived are exhibited as the universalized rational conditions of REALITY-in-general; the bunch being contained in the vase of his transcendental idealism. Hegel, again,—for Schelling we may here ignore—rounds off Kant in truly workmanlike fashion. According to Stirling, “Kant’s categories form really the substance of Hegel,”*—a statement which, with important reservations, may be accepted as valid. The reservations concern the nature philosophy and the major part of the dialectic, which are prominently Hegelian, but indubitably not of Kant’s making. The handling of the categories by Hegel is noteworthy. Unlike Fichte, he does not derive them from any sudden gush of self-affirmation by a ready-made Absolute, but deducing them from the barest of notions (Being) views them only when made concrete through nature and individuals as the Absolute. In tracing the passage of one category into another in the dialectic, in exhibiting them as the living spirit of Nature and mind, in augmenting their number and multiplying their interconnections, in equipping *pure* thought with a *synthetic* as well as an *analytic* power, finally in identifying logic and ontology, Hegel, as many still hold, lifted Kant from the Styx into Olympus, from the gropings of subjective idealism into the bosom of the Absolute. Yet Kant had thrown out stray clues to the path trodden by his famous successor. Thus touching the number and interconnections of the categories, he alludes in the *Critique* to other categories beyond those tabulated, to a great number of equally pure derivatives which can by no means be omitted in a complete system of transcendental philosophy.† He further indicates the fusion or collapse of the two first categories under each head into the third, *e.g.* Reality and Negation into Limitation, a triplicity answering to the three moments of synthetic judgment. And he also suggests the possibility of a common root for sensibility and

* *Secret of Hegel*, ii. 401.

† If we associate the categories among themselves, or with the modes of pure sensibility, they yield us a large number of derivative concepts *a priori*, which it would be useful . . . to bring to a certain completeness (*Critique*, Max Müller’s trans.).

understanding—a “*perceptive understanding*” providing its own manifold, catering both for space and time phenomena and the categories binding them,—a view which must have played its part in the Hegelian theory of Perception. For Hegel, we shall see, the logical forms are the very basis and superstructure of the concrete, whether of physical nature or the subjective individual consciousness. They permeate, too, the flow of history. Thus the course of philosophic thought, stripped of its contingent accessories, and contemplated in abstract purity, presents the dialectic of the categories, the passing on from pure Being as pondered over by the Ionic thinkers of Greece, through the long series of intermediate categories, down to the maturity of the Idea, or the category of categories as voiced by Hegel.

Observe one very weighty innovation which this Hegelian standpoint foreshadows. In the course of my critique of Kant I had occasion to point out that the categories operated only on ready-made relations. Kant, as against Hume, clamoured for necessity in experience, and to unite Hume’s “loosened perceptions” he advanced the categories. The Ego must project necessity into sensations, and then have its product reflected back on it. But he involved himself in a colossal difficulty. In the first place, he *had* to concede possible “judgments of perception” or intuition—that is to say, perceptions *without binding categories*. Perception of phenomena is not, then, after all, always “blind” failing categories! In the second place, he made the categories operate, as I remarked, on ready-made sensible relations. An event takes place after another event—a fire after the lighting of a match—and into this *given connection* in time the Category of Causality *reads necessity*. Egos A, B, and C intuite sensations in time and space, but *apprehending* all phenomena successively need Categories of Substance and Accident, Causality and Reciprocity, to sort them out once more aright and objectivate them in a universal necessary manner. This is Kant’s view as I understand it, and the objection is damaging. The Categories do not determine the order of phenomena at all, but merely effect its *conservation*. The order is already there, before the phenomena are “subsumed.”

The Hegelian advance here is important. Categories are

immanent in the phenomena, and not superimposed on them. And the phenomena themselves are but *Nature*, which in the process of becoming conscious reveals her true essence as thought.

SYSTEM OF FICHTE.

Transcendental philosophy has to trace the conditions of our empirical consciousness. But our empirical consciousness is founded on the contrast of mind and object—on the sundering of “ideal” and “real.” How, then, do this mind and this Nature come to exist? How, in the first place, does a world arise over against the cloudless skies of the Absolute Ego? In other words, how is experience possible?

The first step on the road to Experience Fichte discovers in the positing or affirmation by the Ego of its own being. “I am I” is the primal unconditioned and undemonstrable groundwork of the coming structure. It is a first without fore-runner to be seized by way of intellectual intuition, and thus seized is no thing or idea, but *activity*—activity superior to specific experiences as their underlier and so incapable of definition. In *formal* logic its proxy is the Law of Identity, “A = A,” the validity of which presupposes the original self-positing. All phenomena, physical and mental, flow from this spiritual activity.

The second basic Axiom of Fichte concerns the further arising within the Absolute Ego of a non-Ego as opposed correlate to itself. “I am I” confronts the apparition of the “Not I.” Let there be a non-Ego, and there was a non-Ego—though the non-Ego thus generated is only ideally real within the all-embracing compass of the Ego. This is the primal antithesis. Formally expressed, it answers to the second Law of thought, “A is not B.” In this non-Ego is decipherable the skeleton of that Experience which is shortly to “rise like an exhalation” under the magic wand of Fichte. While the first axiom is unconditioned in “form” and “matter,” the second is conditioned as to its matter, inasmuch as its positing as *non-Ego* presupposes Ego. Next, as the

necessary outcome of the above contrast, we have the limitation of the Absolute Ego by the Absolute non-Ego, and *vice versa*; the two millstones grinding each other fine.* Thesis and antithesis yield a synthesis, for the Ego now becomes finite or limited by the non-Ego, and the non-Ego finite or limited by the Ego. The Ego, in short, posits itself both as determined by and determining the non-Ego; the synthesis being clearly conditioned in "form" while the "matter" is unconditioned. In this synthesis Fichte detects the common watershed down which flow the diverging streams of Kant's speculative and practical reasons, the one being the Ego as cognitive and as such passively *dependent for its content on objects*, and the other the Ego as *morally causative* or active in the world of objects so given. The cognitive aspect of the problem will first concern us.

And here as to the deduction of the categories. Kant, as we saw, failed among other things to weld these together, to give a reason for their number, to assign to them a hierarchy in order of logical evolution. They appear in his system like so many stray curios found in a dark cupboard. But Fichte changes all this. He exhibits the categories as necessary stages in the self-conditioning of itself by the Absolute Ego. Thus the original thesis, antithesis, and synthesis yield the abstract categories of Quality and Quantity — abstract, indeed, because without the superadded element or padding of sensations, they are nothing for experience. Fusing with this factor they constitute, in Hegelian language, "souls of all reality."† It is necessary that the principle of this deduction should be clearly grasped. Understand that for the Absolute Ego, which is *ex hypothesi* the unity holding all contradictions within itself, unreconciled opposites cannot as such exist. Opposites there are and as ground for consciousness there must be, but strictly speaking, urges Fichte, it is only the Ego which has absolute and exclusive reality. As such, working unions of contradictories must result within it. Hence the

* "By as much as the Ego opposes to itself a non-Ego it creates limits and places itself in those limits. It distributes the totality of the existence posited generally, between the Ego and non-Ego, and so far posits itself as necessarily finite" (Fichte).

† Of course in actual working the sensations and the categories are held to arise *together*, but the exposition may deal with the two factors *abstractly* for convenience.

first synthesis or combination-notion, as we may term it. But it is now found that one of the members of the synthesis, viz. Ego asserts itself as *limited* by *Non-Ego*; breeds fresh contradictions. Out of the successive syntheses of the theses and antitheses affiliable on this member, spring the remaining categories which it is the main business of the speculative side of Fichte's system to trace.

Proceeding onwards, Fichte shows that the formula, "Ego affirms itself limited by non-Ego," involves two statements, or minor members which are found contradictory of each other. The Ego as affirming is active, as determined or limited it is passive. The synthesis of these two momenta yields a developed form of "Limitation," or *Reciprocity*, viz. the Ego is in part determined and in part determines itself. Now the component members of this synthesis are found self-contradictory. If the non-Ego determines the Ego, surely, to effect this, it must be *real*; but in actual verity it is only the negation of the Ego which alone is absolutely real. Hence the non-Ego is only given as real when the Ego is negatively active, when it is determined by the Frankenstein's monster which it has by its own activity called into being. Note well that the Ego *first** posits non-Ego and is then limited by its own creation. Bearing this in mind, we shall grasp Fichte's dictum that it is this order of logical determination which yields the abstract form of *Causality*. Similarly the analysis of the second member, "Ego in part determines itself" into its opposed contradictory members, paves the way for the synthesis *Substance* and *Accident*. The Ego as active is all reality, but in so far as it affirms any given aspect or phase of reality, it is rendered passive through this activity. Mutual determination is thus still more definitely developed.

So far so good, but the end is not yet. Fichte now shows that the relation of Ego to non-Ego interpreted through *Causality* yields realism (*i.e.* the belief in an independent external world as cause of our sensations), and through *Substance* dogmatic idealism (*i.e.* the belief that the world is merely an output of the activity of the Ego). Neither view covers the phenomena of experience; and they cannot by any possibility be both accepted as valid. Hence the

* In *logical*, not *time* order, it is contended.

necessity for a novel synthesis, in which the aspect of truth embodied in each shall find a place. This working combination is found in "Ideal Realism," wherein we have at once the determination of the Ego by non-Ego and the determination of the Ego by its own activity. What we may term the completed mutual determination of Ego and non-Ego is here attained, a state perhaps best understood by reference to the Kantian category of reciprocal action and reaction. It is now easy to follow Fichte in his explanation as to how the empirical distinction of mind and object comes to exist.

Mind and object are for Fichte the realization of this stage of Ideal Realism. A condition has to be given where Ego shall be affirmed as controlled by non-Ego, while non-Ego is given only as an affection, limitation, or state of Ego. Furthermore, this limit can only be realized as a fact so long as Ego is receptive or passive; and Ego, on its side, can only be affirmed concurrently with the affirmation of the limit. Mind and object must be given as mutually interdependent contrasts.* The objectivity thus indissolubly welded with intelligence in our experience is aptly dubbed the handiwork of "Productive Imagination," a term which is not to be interpreted by any reference to psychology. It does not signify what is there treated of as construction of mental imagery. It is a pre-empirical activity that is in question. Productive Imagination is the process which *produces objects*, a process not inductively knowable, no possession, but the feeder, of consciousness—it is the very self-determining activity of the Ego whence flowed the first synthesis, and the interplay of its opposed aspects. Delving into this interplay, Fichte speaks of two antagonizing directions of the activity of the Ego, its pageantry being first thrown on to the passive canvas of the non-Ego, then reflected back on to itself, then back again on the non-Ego, and so on. The opposed directions in this interplay are seen to be reconciled in the establishment of *Ideal Realism*. And perceived objects, always instinctively referred to an *external source*, while *at the same time* states of consciousness constitute just the expression of such Ideal Realism.

* This interdependence is curiously illustrated in the manner in which mental and spiritual facts are denoted by names embodying *physical metaphors*. E.g. "soul," "spirit," "emotion," "intellect," "reflection," "anima," ψυχή, "nephesh," "Manas," "impulse," etc.

But a very important consideration has now to be added. Productive Imagination must also somehow account for the "given" element of Kant, that is to say, for sensations. Fichte points out in this connection that the sensations required to inflate the categories are fully accounted for in his system without any call for the things-in-themselves or sensigenous noumena of Kant. They are products of the activity of the Absolute Ego reflected back on itself, so many waves of its energy recoiling from the breakwater of the non-Ego. This *obstructed activity*, rolling back on the Ego as sensations, limiting, arbitrary, and intrusive, presents itself to the individual as if hailing from a real independent world.* I am of opinion that this explanation of sensation, or the "manifest," is the best which the post-Kantian transcendentalism has been able to afford, and immeasurably more satisfactory than the cloudy theory of Hegel yet to be propounded. Hegel is at bottom a *logical realist*; Fichte at any rate is not.

I had occasion some way back to allude to the original opposition of the non-Ego as the background on which the future world of objects was to rest. It will be now evident that this construction of objects is nothing more than a subjective *mâyâ* within the bosom of spirit. The non-Ego is only ideally real. Even considered in this light it is but the abstract ground for objectivity, a skeleton for which it was requisite to provide the flesh and blood of categories and sensations. We have traced, accordingly, the categories which spring from its original opposition as correlate to the Ego. We have also seen how sensations—sounds, colours, odours, muscular feelings, etc.—are begotten. In fine, the constituents of Experience have now been abstractly deduced; it remains only to view them *in combination*. Philosophy must reinstate the factors in the solidarity whence abstraction drew them. Fichte has progressed without appeal to any activity beyond the pale of the self-determining Ego. He has educes Nature from a purely subjective source, made it output of the latent wisdom of Spirit. Nature is the projection of

* Note well, "to the individual" sensations are mere *limits* for the Absolute Ego. But passing in categorized forms through the filter of the empirical consciousness, they acquire "*for-itselfness*," i.e. a standing of their own, which makes us regard them as somehow alien to ourselves.

Spirit on to the canvas of the non-Ego evoked within its bosom. And we, in our turn, are the collective mind of this spirit which has its conscious life in individuals.

A further portion of the speculative side of the system proffers a phenomenology of consciousness, of the passage of sensation into experience and experience into the individual mind. The start is made from complete passivity, that of bare blind sensation not as yet sundered into the empirical divisions of mind and object. This is on all-fours with the "neutral" stage commented on by Mill among psychological idealists. It is Kant's chaotic Sense-world. Next we confront the process which ensues on the *reflective* consciousness of its Sensation by the Ego.* Mind and object now dimly begin to dawn. Sensation is thrown into relief against the horizon of the Ego—it is now split up into distinguishable patches locally Co-existing (space), Simultaneous and Successive (time). Internal echoes of sensation, the "faint" states which are the stuff of our mental thinking, ground on the Ideal Realism by which Ego regards appearances *as states of itself*—after previously referring them to a non-Ego. Sensations timed and spaced are further given as connected by the categories already traced. The world of objects slowly settles into shape. Science, again, takes over the world so formed as raw material for its inductions. Reason in its highest expression becomes abstract, and tops the pyramid by instituting an analysis of the process of thinking and of the origin of experience itself. This is the highest level of the completed intellectual consciousness.

From the pure "Ego as intuition," *i.e.* the primal "I," we have now journeyed on to the human individual rich with worked-up experience. From the individual surrogate of spirit, consciously realizing the stream of events in which it lives, moves, and has its being, we have now to pass to the Practical side of Fichte's system—the side which stirred him more deeply than any mere intellectual triumph could have done.

On the "practical" side of the system, dealing with the Ego as active moral cause in the world, as *determining* the *non-Ego*, Fichte answers the question as to the why of the primal

* "Reflection" here = the Ego aware of sensations as somehow foreign to it.

antithesis. It is clear that for experience and individuality to obtain, positing of a non-Ego is requisite; but this does not solve the problem as to why any experience—a sorrow-burdened world and discrete individuals—should be striven after. The method of evolution of experience and the end involved in it raise two distinct inquiries.

According to Fichte, the world exists as an arena for moral causality. It is a thing to be abolished by the very Ego which as cognitive is its container. This intensely abstract ethic, this inarticulate pessimism, is in part an inheritance from Kant, for whom a barren freedom and an ascetic morality overshadowed the whole philosophical landscape. It is in part, a by-product of Fichte's notoriously energetic temperament. Looking at the avalanches of misery while hurtle down daily on man and animal, this campaign of the Ego might well be greeted with curses. Nothing would be gained were the process of "abolition" rendered complete, while oceans of blood and æons of anguish would have contributed to chequer the farce. Had the world-process no better justification than this, it were best to forego progress, eat, drink, and be merry. The morrow is nothing to us, the Ego a word. Enthusiasts have depicted their God as creating the world for his own glory. Is this divine egotist so many degrees below the vainly struggling Moloch of Fichte? It would appear not, but for one weighty fact—the enthusiast's God immolates others, that of Fichte itself.

To be morally causative involves clear consciousness, the battling of discrete individuals against a seemingly foreign power. Hence, in working out its development, the Ego has to manifest in a plurality of individuals whose concurring testimonies clench belief in an external world as material for conquest, and whose relations yield the concept of a *separate struggling consciousness* in all its vividness. Objects, indeed, are only possible just so long as the native infinite activity of the Ego meets with check or resistance. From this activity against an obstacle they draw the breath of their ideal life, and before that activity they *ought* also eventually to lie down and die.* Outer experience and its negation are thus

* Hence the pull of the practical over the speculative Reason. Fichte, in his earlier writings, narrowly steered clear of identifying the activity of the Ego with pure will, a bias which Schopenhauer subsequently exploited. He

at bottom fruits of one and the same activity; the complete synthesis of the speculative and practical aspects of the Ego is established. The world-panorama is no mere purposeless phantasm, but a link in the evolution of Deity, of the *Ego viewed as "moral order of the universe."* In the pure primal activity of the Ego, no contrasts enabling it to be actual could by supposition obtain. Now, the world-process yields just these contrasts, and thereby from virtuality the Absolute Ego attains to actuality and consciousness of its freedom. There is a curious but incomplete parallel in the Sankhya philosophy of Kapila: "All external things were formed that the soul might know itself and be free." In Fichte's ethical or practical idealism it is the Absolute Ego which, recognizing all determination of things as its own thought—its own actualized essence—is to become free. For individuals freedom, which implies a distinct spontaneous Ego for each conscious unit, is by Fichte virtually denied. The Absolute Ego would seem to work down on minds otherwise bound in the chains of necessity. It might be objected that moral causality such as is, customarily, held to be "free," does not always make for righteousness. Is moral causality of this type to be affiliated on the Absolute Ego?

The Vedantins say "Brahm exists truly, the world falsely, the soul is no other than Brahm." The later developments of Fichte bear out this maxim even more fully than those we have just surveyed.

Fichte originally began with the "Ego as intuition" and ended with God or the moral order of the universe as *result* of conflict with obstacle. God is the Ego as idea or pure thought, always to be neared, never to be fully confronted, because the complete negation of the non-Ego would, by abolishing opposition, abolish also consciousness. But in his later writings Fichte assumes God *not only as result but as starting-point*. Faith, startled at Nihilism, colours his views with ever-increasing vividness, and, of course, speaks to him as it never spoke to his immediate predecessors. He feels more and more the immanent rationality of Nature and History, and the barrenness of a mere "moral order," and

speaks, for instance, of will as "in a special sense the essence of reason," and it is only reference to other passages which serves to mend the remark.

finally indicates morality as only a stage culminating in true religion and completed truth. He merges his individuals more and more in the Absolute, and inclines to an objective idealism, such as Schelling so ably preached. We shall see later that idealism, as he first taught it, cannot rethink *reality*—it is valuable as a transition rather than for itself. It would seem that the later views of this thinker have wrought but little effect on the general history of philosophy. It is the Fichte of the *Science of Knowledge* who sits in the Temple of Fame.

The Absolute of Fichte is not a personal God, but an infinite spiritual activity in which personalities in general are mere points. Still the original thesis sounds oddly. It involves an indubitable abstraction, for "I" is never bare affirmation, but always "I am conscious of *this* or *that*," be it a presentation or idea. No "other" of some sort, no Ego. The Thesis cannot, therefore, be advanced as an absolutely primal principle. For even a bare self-consciousness to obtain, *some limitation must be presupposed*. But how is this limitation possible if Spirit on Fichtean lines is the only absolute reality? By supposing that Spirit is primarily neither pure self-consciousness nor unconsciousness, but that it is *Metaconscious*. By supposing, further, that it develops within itself a limit, an "other," by opposing and at the same time transcending which it becomes conscious. Accepting this view, Fichte would have had to re-arrange his original premises in this fashion:—

(1) Metaconsciously posited limit or "otherness."

(2) "I am I," the resultant bare self-consciousness.

(3) The *mere limit* by virtue of opposition to the Ego further passes into a *vaguely felt non-Ego*, etc.

The amended doctrine would be in brief this. Ego implies non-Ego as its condition, hence Ego cannot *logically precede* non-Ego. Neither can non-Ego logically precede Ego. What does precede Ego is a *limit* uprising within the Metaconscious. This limit gives birth to Ego, and then by contrast with its child becomes non-Ego. I proffer this amendment to those who think with Fichte. The defects of his theory of knowledge are not, however, to be held exhausted by our present remarks.

Fichte's system gave a grand impetus to Idealism. With the problems of perception and Deity it dealt in a manner as suggestive as it was audacious. But it is too academic. It leaves too many workaday riddles unsolved. Why a world with the *details* of phenomena constituted such as we find them? Why, indeed, a world at all? The moral victories of the Absolute Ego are nothing to the individual suffering man. They do not tell us why bestiality and retrogression co-exist with progress; why myriads of diseases, discomforts, and disasters prey on humanity; why the hosts of suffering animals were evolved; why the lion devours the antelope and the cat tortures the mouse. They ignore the strange fact that more animals are conscious than men, and that these lowly creatures cannot be consigned as rubble to the heap by any teleologic system. They do not reveal to us perplexed individuals why we are severally born into varying pleasures and pains, varying intellectual environments, varying areas of progress, stagnation and retrogression, nor finally what we have to hope for as compensation for the bloody pages of History and physical Nature. Lacking prospective compensation for the world-misery, Humanity may well abandon itself to despair. It is weaving ropes out of sand. On all these and many more like heads we shall glean no ray of enlightenment from Fichte.

CHAPTER IX.

IDEALISM IN SCHELLING AND HEGEL.

FICHTE'S treatment of External Perception was not destined to round off that aspect of German Transcendentalism. It was to be superseded by the suggestive doctrine advanced in the Absolute-Identity system of Schelling. The case against Fichte was of a threefold character. In the first place, his idealism was *one-sided*. The non-Ego reflected only glories of the Ego, and was, indeed, when looked into, no other than the Ego itself. Knowledge for him was bare knowledge, not knowledge of anything. Secondly, his drift was to nihilism; for the Ego could be thought only dialectically through the non-Ego, while yet the latter was unreal. Thirdly, he had not provided for a world prior in time to the consciousness of individuals. Hence his view of External Perception, though not, properly speaking, a subjective idealism, shared in this respect the customary obloquy lavished on that theory. It was for Schelling to propound a doctrine which should abolish these three indubitable defects.

Schelling, however, is hard on the vulgar realist, and will not hear of sensigenous noumena, or an independent external world. "It is a mere delusion," he observes, "that something, we know not what, remains after denuding an object of all the predicates attaching to it." There is, for instance, no "tree in itself," beyond a bundle of attributes known or knowable as "tree," the popular doctrine being but a natural prejudice. So far he is in perfect accord with the idealism of Fichte. But now comes the contemplated advance. According to Schelling, Reason holds sway in no partial fashion; it is decipherable in the domains of mind

and object alike. Mind and object are of *co-ordinate standing, equally real, equally rational*. He posits, by way of "intellectual intuition," an Absolute Unity or Indifference of Mind and Object, Knowing and Being, as ground of all manifestation. Of this Absolute, Nature is the rationality "projected into the unconscious." * As such it had a being of its own prior in time to the dawn of percipient individuals. On these lines objects are unripe *unconscious* intelligence. Nature, as Bruno had it, is an "incarnation of Divine Activity," though not of a Personal Deity. Time and space are not inexplicable forms, but mere modes in which the Absolute unfolds itself. Space is the expansive moment—activity running into the infinite. Time limits this activity; failing it, the object would lose itself in the infinite. As limit and measure of space it stands as something negative to a positive. Matter which pulsates with life is the union of attractive and repulsive forces. Even it is seen to strive after regular shape, and with the stars is born the most wondrous number and geometry. Passing into organisms, Matter runs through higher and higher phases, each of these being the passage of the potential and dormant into the actual, *δύναμις* ever becoming *ἐνέργεια*, the essence of the Absolute revealing itself ever more fully in the appearance. It is in the brain of animals that Nature first becomes conscious, in that of Man reflectively so. "It is here," says Schelling, "that Nature first fully returns on herself, whence it is clear that Nature is primarily identical with that which is realized as consciousness and intelligence." In this way it is that he reconciles idealism with assertion of a world-order prior to consciousness. To put the matter in another light—Nature, the objective real, is unconscious reason or thought. Becoming conscious in man, this Nature is revealed in her *true inner essence*. No need henceforth to talk of noumena as of dark mysteries defying the thinker. Consciousness is reality, reality lit up with a lantern. The Noumenon can be only the phenomenon *conceived as fully*

* This neat expression I borrow from Emerson, whose idealism recalls, however, Berkeley rather than the Germans, with the rider, however, that the world is not impressed on us from moment to moment, but confronts us by virtue of the manner of our creation.

known—known, that is, as it obtains in full gorgeousness of detail in this already half-seized Nature. I cannot perceive the inside of this stone or that tree; but what I do perceive of these objects is valid and only needs *supplementing*. Fichte's formula, "The Ego is all," has become "All is the Ego"—Ideal-Realism gives way to Real-Idealism. It is to be observed that these doctrines may be reconciled with two leading hypotheses of modern thought—that of mind and brain as subjective and objective faces of a unity, and that of matter as containing "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life."* Unfortunately, in the working out of his system, Schelling's language too often degenerated into jargon, a genetic deduction of Nature from abstractions being, indeed, beyond man's skill to accomplish. But the fundamental doctrines possess a high interest, and ought properly to swallow up many of the loose monisms now rife.

Into the detail of Schelling's thinking it is needless here to enter. He has five periods of shifting in his doctrines, and it is his mediation of Hegel that most interests. His method strays far from the speculative path. Its reliance on seizure of the Absolute by intellectual intuition, on the surprising of the activity whence consciousness—on lapse into the "indifference" of real and ideal within ourselves,—leads to dogmatism, and accounts, doubtless, for the five periods. Like Plato, he kept his insight for philosophers and left common sense out in the cold. How happy are such thinkers! Hegel required the whole *Phenomenology* to exhibit the soul arriving at the Absolute which Schelling starts with.

One interesting development, however, must be noted—the doctrine of the *Immemorial Being*. In his later works, Schelling abandons his former *rationalism*. Reason, he urges, is no ultimate—the ground of reality is *extra-logical*. In place of the Absolute Reason we get a dark mysterious Power more akin to will working with the certitude of instinct, and standing behind God, now conceded as personal. The old Nature-philosophy is superseded and reality, as output of freedom, held to admit of no logically necessary deduction. The old abstract scheme of "potences" becomes

* Tyndall. Provided the Unity is *rationalized*, and not left an "Unknownable."

unreal, and of value only as propædeutic. This standpoint has a permanent interest. The *Immemorial Being* is a reaction against formalism, against the view of the concept as ultimate. The opposites, Idealism and Realism, may yet find in it their complete solvent.

Now, the old Nature-philosophy appealed strongly to Hegel, who was an intimate friend of Schelling. It did for him in one department—the treatment of the object—very much what Kant with his categories and “perceptive understanding” and Fichte with his deduction of the categories did in others. It gave him material for his comprehensive embrace of thought. Still, Hegel does not hold to mind and object, ideal and real, as of co-ordinate standing in an Absolute; he recognized that Schelling had invested a mere *psychological distinction* with undue worth. Hegel starts with no double-faced Absolute, but with the Idea (pure thought). This Idea externalized is Nature or the real, and, in its regress out of Nature back into itself, mind, or the ideal.

An initial criticism of this theory may be ventured, so far as it concerns the “object.” Valuable as such idealism is, it requires an important supplement—a supplement which the second part of this work will seek to proffer. As it stands, it is sadly obnoxious to criticism. Let me explain. We are assured that Nature returns on herself as consciousness. But empirically we know that not the whole organism but only part of the grey matter of the brain is *directly* “allied” with consciousness.* If, then, consciousness is “ripe” nature, the part of nature so ripened is a part only of the brain. Why, then, are we conscious of an objective world *instead of the cerebral processes*? Idealism cannot help us. The organism is held prior in space and time to the individual consciousness it passes into. It is itself an object among objects in the thought of the externalized Idea. How, then, in becoming conscious does it mirror outer objects, and not what consistency should lead us to expect—itself?

And now we must pass to Hegel, and some additional remarks may usefully mediate the transition. Hegel’s advance on Schelling is this. Protesting against the degeneration

* Supernormal phenomena, such as alleged by spiritists, etc., need not here delay us. The normal workaday phenomena are enough for us.

of Schelling's Absolute, he asserts that the Absolute is not indeterminate substance but subject, *i.e.* spirit, and that spirit, properly speaking, only emerges as *Result*. The ideal is not of coequal standing with the real, but its "truth" which embraces and transcends it. The Idea passing into exteriority or its "otherness" as Nature, returns into itself as spirit, as flower of intellectual and moral development in individuals. The Absolute is thus no empty barren identity or indifference—it is the Idea actualized *through differences* in a process.* Schelling had soared to it by way of intuition; Hegel demands a science—a science with its system of stages of consciousness, the higher rising like high mountain ranges over the lower, and commanding the areas they occupy. And the Method? It is the form of the Speculative Method rounded off by a thoroughgoing rigorous Dialectic, where the labour of the notion counts for everything, and "genial imagination" for nothing. A pure rationalism permeating all departments of Experience does battle with Schelling's lazy mysticism.

The *Phenomenology* is a practical reply to Schelling. Its aim is to narrate how the soul (individual consciousness) passes on from sense-knowledge to the full philosophical consciousness—the consciousness of identity of the real and ideal and of knowledge as absolute. As such a narrative, it assumes reality present; the soul as already emergent from Nature and freely conversant with the actual. What is the spur which determines the soul's advance, and what the stages traversed? Here comes the much-dreaded Dialectical Method, of which a prefatory notice is requisite. In Schelling's scheme of the potences † a triply articulated *rhythmical movement* had been mooted—a continuous passage from one potence to another, and from this to their indifference—as ground of development, of actualizing of the potential. Fichte's movement of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis will

* Böhm, I believe, is to be credited with the first glimpse of this view. God, he says, is actual spirit only so far as he opposes himself to an otherness and transcends the contrast.

† Potences have not been explained, owing to our ignoring of the detail of Schelling. A potence is a definite quantitative difference in the amounts of real and ideal (mind and object) in things. Thus on the side of Nature the potence of Gravity contains more real than ideal and that of Light more ideal than real.

be recalled, and its *subjective* character, perhaps, noted. Now, Hegel perfects what he finds in these writers, Plato and others. Seeking for the core, the dynamic principle of Thought, he lights on a triple articulation, the moments of which are affirmation, negation and reaffirmation with enriched content. The kernel he finds in an "immanent negativity" or contradiction which is the ground of advance, the very soul of the world-march. Hegel sees in the IDEA or CONCEPT the prius of all reality, and holding, too, that the concept moves by way of contradiction or dialectically—by negation of its "other" and return into itself enriched—he draws the natural inference. The CONCEPT, REASON, or IDEA (hence the world and the individual), is *actualized by dialectical process*. Thus the "*flux*" of the ancient sceptics shows as the Universal Reason itself. As for the *Dialectic Method*, it is really the actualizing process in its direct logical march. This march is sensed by Hegel, not as an *outside spectator*, or mere *subjective dreamer*—a Schelling eyeing an abstract Absolute or a Fichte spinning dreams,—but as one immersed in the very becoming of the Reason.

For the soul, also, dialectic shapes the route. All stages from the sensuous immediateness of fact onward develop their contradictions, driving the soul on to others, and these again drive it to others till the grand finale is reached. These stages cannot be traversed by each individual; but then Hegel is discussing not contingent Smiths or Joneses, but the "universal individual" that stands for Humanity—the thought of the self-thinking Concept—itself. The chief are those of *consciousness*, *self-consciousness*, and *absolute consciousness*. Each stage and sub-stage carries forward the lower stage it transcends, and lives through the very contrast. It is a far cry to the Absolute. The first glance at the object does not even seize a manifold, but is mere blurred immediateness of sense. Thence lies the way through the standpoints of direct sensuous immediateness, the full perceptive consciousness, science, art, religion, to the goal where knowledge knows itself as absolute, and the IDEA or CONCEPT consciously clasps reality as the dialectically mediated revelation of itself. Thus the Absolute is crown of a system of stages—a completed synthesis of successive contradictory standpoints.

To term it, as ordinarily done, *this* or *that* hypostatized aspect of reality, "force," "matter in motion," "abstract mind," "absolute motion," etc., is ridiculous. To be *this* alone is not to be the *that*, which equally demands explanation, and cannot be exorcised. As completed truth, the Absolute must contain everything, make abstraction of nothing. On the plane of the World-Mind as of the individual, *Reason* has to weld all the antitheses which *Understanding* fixes and isolates. "The Truth lies in the whole," proclaims Hegel—in a universal relativity of standpoints subsisting through each other. The specific stages of Art, Science, History, Philosophy, etc., are all alike abstract and unreal *per se*. It is only as interlocked moments of the regress of the Idea into itself that they possess true significance. The Concept is prius, and the Absolute simply the Totality of what the Concept reveals itself to be.

CHAPTER X.

HEGEL.

HAVING noticed the prelude, let us glance at the system itself. A summary, and especially a succinct one, of its doctrines is no promising task. According, indeed, to Stirling, Hegelianism is "not a mere theory or intellectual view, or a collection of theories or intellectual views, but an organon . . . through which passed, the individual soul finds itself on a new elevation and with new powers."* Now, this is undoubtedly true, and no one admits it more fully than I do. There is a savour of the Hierophant about the Master. We may reject the formalist idealism, the abstract notional dialectic—nay, the *logical* IDEA itself; but for all that Hegel once understood works a revolution. The celebrated distinction between the Literature of *Power* and the Literature of *Knowledge* holds here if anywhere. Not the specific thoughts, but the reach, attitude, force, and thoroughness of the thinker most transform us. The attempt to pass beyond him in this work proceeds through the door he opened. Any criticisms here advanced are overshadowed by the indebtedness in question.

The *Phenomenology* plunges into ready-made reality; this reality the System has to retrace in the forms of abstract thinking. By way of Dialectic it will deduce this from its beginnings and conduct it to its goal—the Idea as actual and absolute. Now, the triple movement of Dialectic determines the divisions of the system and the subdivisions of the divisions in their turn. As dynamic *principle of actualizing*, Dialectic is all-pervasive. Reality is unfolding synthesis of relatives. All that is real is rational; the Logical is basement,

* *Secret of Hegel*, i. 10.

stories, and roof of the vast whole of Experience. To the first moment of Dialectic (affirmation, in-itselfness, thesis, bare position) answers the Hegelian Logic; to the second (negation, for-itselfness, antithesis), the Philosophy of Nature; to the third (re-affirmation by negation of the last, but through it, in and for itselfness, synthesis), the Philosophy of Spirit or Mind. Logic has as subject-matter the dialectically knit forms of thought as implicit in the Idea ere time and finite individuals come to be. This Logic must be distinguished from that known as "formal" and that of the empirical school of Mill. Formal logic, as founded by Aristotle, stands for Hegel as a mere natural history of the finite thinking of individuals. It is empirical, and its watchword is ever *Consistency*—the formulas of Identity, Contradiction, and excluded Middle are sacrosanct for it. Similarly in regard to Mill; his Logic is a science of the attainment of *inferred truth*, more especially directed to proof. It, too, is obviously empirical, at once the crutch and record of finite individual thinking. For Hegel Logic is Ontology; it probes the very heart of the universe. Its forms are the souls of reality, while from contradiction, the "immanent negativity" of Reason, flows the movement whereby this said reality *becomes*. Taken no doubt by itself, Logic is a shadowland; for what are empty forms? Still, these forms are to be viewed abstractly, so that their immanent connections may stand out the clearer. So much for a prefatory glance at Logic. *Philosophy of Nature*, again, deals with the Idea passing from in-itselfness into externality to itself—into the *θάτερον*, or "other," of the original *self-identical* system of forms.* Here, again, we meet the categories under changed names adapted to their now concrete embodiment (though the order of discussion is not quite the same). In nature we have the complete break-up of the Idea into the "many" of space and time—into the wilderness of contingent indefinitely varied particularity. Here no uniform logical connections of categories are traceable; often, indeed, no logical order at all seems to obtain. Hearing this, we may ask, And how, then, is this many-

* This doctrine of the "other" which has confused so many, finds on the dialectic of *notions* as expounded by Plato. If this is borne in mind all will be clear.

sided intractable Nature to be educed from categories at all? The answer is, that there lies latent in the categories an inner multiplicity which in their "otherness" as Nature somehow becomes manifest. Empirical objects would be thus a concretion of bare thought. This is the only explanation of the sense manifold, of the "matter" or stuff determined by thought, that Hegel was able to advance. Now, we can indicate two remote sources of this view—Plato and Kant. Plato's Supreme Idea contained subordinate archetypal Unitary ideas which, it was said, appeared as if *broken into a manifold* in their shadowy copies in the sense-world. No doubt Plato's Ideas were mere hypostatized qualities and class-names, and so far the analogy fails us. But the suggestiveness of the position is evident. Kant, again, had spoken of a *perceptive understanding* as possible ground of categories and sense-manifold alike. Light, then, at last! Hegel's *Logical Realism* has proposed to itself the task of making all rational, and in the accomplishment of this aim the alogical or "blind" elements of reality are tucked away cosily into the categories. That the categories of Quality, Quantity, and so on crystallize into the detailed multiplicity of Nature is a strange, a very strange contention, but the road to it seems decipherable. Kant's category-doctrine, it may be said, has been pushed to absurdity; but, if so, the absurdity was latent in the original structure.

Nature, in the higher organisms, passes into consciousness, and with this emergence deals the Philosophy of Mind. It must be observed that Hegel derives the time-content of any given personality from Experience. The primal sense-field has been described as "bare mind which we may compare to the chaos that contains the world, in that it contains in wild confusion the elements of the cosmos as yet untouched by the Demiurge."* In the individual, or rather the aggregate of individuals or the world-mind, the order of the categories, tumbled out of shape in Nature, is restored, under, however, the richer forms which the transition has mediated. It is held that direct outer and inner Experience are the sources of all concrete knowledge,—the said Experience being thrust on us by the category-churning Idea,—and that once lodged in our

* Rosenkraz.

ideas this raw concrete knowledge gets dialectically transmuted till absolute knowledge reveals itself. No friend of science need necessarily prescribe Hegelianism. Duly guarded it would seek to re-read the given, the phenomenon, not to dictate to it—certain aberrations of the Master notwithstanding. It may even be urged that the vehemently “positive” followers of Comte are not so far removed from the system as some of us are apt to think. Shadworth Hodgson has pointed out some notable analogies between Hegel and the French thinker. “There is, first, the similarity of Hegel’s Absolute Mind and Comte’s *Vrai Grand Etre*, or Humanity, each of which is the concomitant result, if I may so speak, of the evolution of the world-history; each of which is personified as a single individual; and each of which is the object of divine honours; and these three points of similarity suppose several minor ones. Then, again, there is the *progression* by triplets in Hegel, in which the first member is the *an sich*, the last the *an und für sich*, and the middle the transition between them; while the last stage, when reached, throws back light upon the nature of both the previous stages, not understood before they had produced their results. To this answers Comte’s doctrine of a triple stage in the actual history of all development, the middle of which is but a transitional state which cannot be judged of till the last stage has been reached, for which it was a preparation. For instance, in the fields of the intellectual, the active, and the affective functions of man, three stages may be observed. In the first, the fictive, the abstract, and the positive stage; in the second, the conquering, the defensive, and the industrial; and in the third, the domestic, the civil, and the universal.”* I would add, however, that in preaching a coarse materialistic theory of consciousness as function of “brain,” Comte masquerades, with many others of his empiricist kith and kin, as an *unconscious metaphysician*, one of the type which has to be told what it is doing.

Before tracing category-connections in the Logic, we must say something more of the Dialectic, which gives Logic its movement and concreteness. And first as to the Law of Contradiction. Elsewhere I have treated this as a formula

* *Time and Space*, p. 339.

securing consistency in name-using. But what of the experience whence this useful rule is generalized? Here the opposition will be warmer. Any given particular subject of judgment A is not, it is urged, B. Such distinction is necessary for judgment—there cannot be two indistinguishable concepts, this is the core of the Leibnitzian “Principle of Indiscernibles.” To this it may be replied that abstract contradiction is nonsense, that Judgment is a *relation*, and that but for this relation, this synthesis of antitheses, no distinction whatever could exist for consciousness. Treating of the combination and contrast of concepts, Plato points out that every concept thought antithetically may be termed existent in respect of itself, *i.e.* the *self-identical* term of the antithesis as ordinarily singled out, non-existent in respect of the implicated “*other*” concept. These concepts, at once existent and non-existent, are an essential presupposition of his Dialectic. By Plato, too, as by Hegel, Non-Being, as a *determinate concept* is viewed as having as good a claim to reality as Being—the two all-embracing concepts are mutually constitutive, and the search for and resolution of antitheses thus inspired becomes the method of philosophy. Quitting this speculative empyrean, we note that Bain himself, prince of empirical thinkers, is on this count within easy hail of the Hegelians. Thus the two sides of consciousness “mutually constitute *each other*” in quite dialectical fashion.* “When we think of heat we have tacit reference to cold: when we think of ‘up’ we have a tacit reference to ‘down.’ To pass into the contrary cognition in these cases is *merely to reverse the order* of the couple, to make cold the explicit and heat the implicit element.” Relativity rules thinking.† We come, then, to this. *An Unrelated identity* is an impossible conception.‡ Some may object that while such identity is impossible in the *concept*, it may be possible in the “facts”—that these latter as “things in themselves” may possess some sort of irrelative self-contained identity. Without examining this view, I may point out that at any rate in a Hegelian regard it is irrelevant.

* *Logic*, i. 255.

† *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 160.

‡ Even the anti-Hegelian Hamilton concedes that the relation of Identity $A=A$ “involves the discrimination and opposition of the two terms” (*Lectures*, ii. 536).

Hegel is absolute *idealist*, and, furthermore, his idealism hinges solely on a notional or *conceptual* dialectic.

In rejecting the onesidedness of the mere formal-logical law of contradiction, we may add two necessary riders: (1) that this rejection by no means commits us to the procedure adopted by Hegel, who assigns an immanent movement to concepts by way of self-negation into opposites, and, indeed, like Plato, rides the unfortunate concept to death; (2) that any show of *complete* reversal of the law of contradiction must be illusory. *A is only B, so far as B makes it A*—that is the point I stop at. As a rule attention, working by interest, singles out one term in such a relation and invests it with an unreal isolatedness, which latter the “law” takes over uncritically. That is all. The statement that the law of contradiction is through and through invalid would obviously refute itself.

The Dialectical Method in its perfected form does not confront us before the time of Hegel. But of foretastes and sidegleams of the dialectical *attitude* there are many, while in Plato the approximation to the great German abstractionist is striking. The flux which the Method feeds on was at an early date emphasized by the Hindus in their doctrine of the shifting *Mâyâ*. It was also adverted to by the Buddhist reformers, who, for the most part at any rate, viewed the universe as a series of fleeting moments or appearances. The reported utterance of Gautama himself is noteworthy. Hear him on Being and Becoming: “This world, O Kaccana, generally proceeds on a duality; on the ‘It is’ and the ‘It is not.’ But, O Kaccana, whoever perceives in truth and wisdom how things originate in the world, in his eyes there is no ‘It is not’ in this world. Whoever, Kaccana, perceives in truth and wisdom how things pass away in this world, in his eyes there is no ‘It is’ in this world. . . . ‘Everything is,’ this is the one extreme, O Kaccana; ‘Everything is not,’ this is the other extreme. The perfect one, O Kaccana, remaining far from these extremes proclaims the truth in the middle.”* The *πάντα ῥεῖ*, the “No man can twice enter the same river” of Heracleitus, proclaim that reality is a coming and going, a continuous passing into new forms of things which apart

* Cited from Oldenberg’s *Buddha*.

from the passing are not. For Heraclitus the world is a contradictory unity of being and non-being as becoming. On a lower cosmological level he most interestingly heralds Hegel on several counts—Hegel, indeed, having acknowledged the absorption of Heraclitus' main positions into his system. The symbolic "Fire" and the Idea have marked analogies; while the views that strife is father of all things, that becoming is always born of warring tendencies, that cosmic unity proper only consists in the fusion of the opposites into which unity has split, etc., have each their later counterparts. With Zeno the Eleatic (Aristotle's "father of Dialectic"), Dialectic such as ordinarily receives the name took its rise. Dialectic as here used means the art of conversation or debate directed to truth, and more especially philosophical truth. Aristotle speaks of it as the "art of disputation,"* and observes that the older dogmatic Greek thinkers knew nothing of it. Zeno's dialectic had for its aim positive truth, the vindication of Eleatic thinking by refutation of opposing theories and objections. But this prosecution of positive truth was no essential of its practice. Thus the later Sophistic Dialectic was negative, and, where it impinged on philosophy, attacked all pretensions to a grasp of "objective" truth, destroying, we might say, almost for destructions' sake. Certitude paled before it. The Socratic Dialectic, again, made for a revival of certitude mainly with an ethical end, rescuing concepts or notions from the confusion of vulgar thinking by way of the famous "irony" and rigid definition. "Universals" thus attained were proffered as the core of particulars, the heart of presented reality. With Plato Dialectic is a Logic which, like that of Hegel, is also a Metaphysic or Ontology, or, at any rate, frequently regarded as such. It is the Science of Eternal and Immutable Noumena. This may seem a strange outcome of an art of fostering knowledge by way of disputation; the transition, however, is this. Competent conduct of disputation meant for Plato competent thinking, and competent thinking concerns the "uniting" and "separating" of determinate concepts or notions—of the Universals that he had taken from Socrates, extended and hypostatized as Unitary Archetypal Ideas. By

instructing us in the art of "uniting" and "separating" these notions, and of subordinating the lower to the higher, Dialectic finally reduces the manifold to the unity of pure thought—of that Supreme Idea, which, eternal and immutable, contrasts so forcibly with the unreal and contradictory shows of sense. Seeing that Dialectic conducts to this goal it is Ontology, or at the lowest estimate the indispensable method of Ontology. So much for Plato, whose treatment of Concepts has proved the bane of succeeding metaphysicians, and the foe, while nominally the friend, of those who strive for Reality. Platonism is the apotheosis of the abstract reason, the direst source of abstraction-philosophies that the world ever knew. From the notional-dialectical standpoint Aristotle is, perhaps, not so noteworthy. His bias is analytical on the whole rather than synthetical—it is the plump particular fact, not the rarefied notion that first arrests his thought. His system, however, is a spiritual *Becoming* quite Hegelian in type—"matter" as in-itselfness or potentiality passing continually into "form" or actuality, each form being matter for a new form, and so on up to pure spirit. The intrusion of an awkward dualism mars, however, this fabric. The Neoplatonists, again, though they recognize Plato's Dialectic, seem aware of the sterility of notions, for they duly subordinate it to Ecstasy. Of Dialectic in Kant, Fichte, and Schelling we have previously seen traces, its emergence in the two last-named being prominent. Hegel's treatment of it will now be appreciated with facility. *He accepts the Universal Flux*—it is Reason's own progress, not as with Plato an unreal show, but the very real manifestation of Spirit itself in time. And of this Spirit, which for him is pure *thought*, a *conceptual, notional prius*, his Method is the movement formulated in abstract symbols. The movement is dialectical, thought dynamic; every notion in the process of its development gives birth to its opposite, and on fusion with the latter re-emerges on a higher and more concrete level. No negation is complete, the stage transcended being carried on always, however, with a novel determination or import. The search for antitheses and their resolution—notional analytic-synthetic procedure—is upheld as the grand all-revelatory Method. In the Platonic

Dialogues Dialectic appears as reducer of the manifold to unity; here it produces the manifold as well, while, unlike Plato, whose reduction gets more and more abstract and barren as it proceeds, Hegel professes to lead up in this way to the concrete actuality of the Absolute as emergent here and now. In pursuance of this task all the great epochal problems of philosophy stand for him as appeals to reconcile: *i.e.* unite in a higher unity, antitheses or differences. The Absolute Idea itself is fruit only of the reconciling of nature and mind. The Idea is articulated as Abstract Self-identical Unity, negation of this by advent of a plural "other," and finally as concrete unity-in-plurality and identity-in-difference, wherein it reaffirms itself with a richer content. The march in question must not, however, be misconceived. Theory of knowledge views it not as a time-process but *sub specie æternitatis*. Moments discrete for us are for it together. The tail of the serpent is in the serpent's mouth.

A glance at the Logic. The method of searching for and transcending antitheses is applied with striking effect to the Categories; the result being the presentment of a logically knit system of *pure thought*, self-propulsion of the Category being the master clue. Answering to the triply articulated Dialectic are three divisions of the Logic, and these, again, have three subdivisions. The three former answer to the Idea, the externalized Idea, and the Idea as Absolute, and comprise the doctrines of Being, Essence, and Notion. The first categories treated of in the Doctrine of Being are those of Quality, *Being, Becoming, Independent Being or State*. Being as such is wholly indeterminate, and passes forthwith into its opposite Nothing. Being and Nothing, indeed, as equally indeterminate *per se*, are "the same" and as such *pass into* one another at once. The becoming which ensues is doublefaced. Passage of Nothing into Being is origination, of Being into Nothing disappearance,—the "coming and going" pervasive of Reality—and the *synthesis or indifference* of origination and disappearance is Independent State, the rudely definite immediateness of the *that* or limited quality. This rudely *individuated or independent State* is, however, only what it is *by reference to what it is not*—is One only so far as it is *not* Many other *implicated* Ones. These,

again, in respect of their one-ness are One, a One *dialectically implicative* of Many. This *identity* overriding all qualitative *differences* is Quantity. Quantity, again, has two aspects—it is viewable as discrete and continuous, and these aspects, again, are *identical in difference* as they cannot be thought save by way of one another. Not to pursue this dialectic in detail, we may indicate the categories as pure Quantity, definite quantity and (intensive) degree. Degree, when we unfold its meaning, brings us back to Quality, and Quality and Quantity duly collapse as *Measure*. Thus closes the Doctrine of Being or Consciousness in its immediateness.

In the second division of the Logic—the doctrine of Essence—Being is carried forward from its vague primal immediateness to ever more *concrete* determinations. Here it is made clear how the old Thing-in-Itself is to be treated—it is not alien to thought, but the product of thought in its necessary dialectical development. It is impracticable to summarize this portion of the Logic with any hope of intelligibility. The Categories of “essence” and “phenomenon,” together with the familiar ones of substance and accident, causality and reciprocity, fall within it. Their domain answers in the notional system of pure thought to that of the concrete world with its *fully related* and externally posited objects. In the third division, or the Doctrine of the Notion, are deduced by the same one analytic-synthetic method the Categories of the Subjective Notion, apprehension, or the ordinary concept, judgment, and syllogism, those mediating a richer interpretation of objects; “Mechanism,” binding these in an external mechanical manner; “Chemism,” giving to these seemingly indifferent objects an inner relatedness, and “Design,” unveiling a purpose realizing itself in the objective aggregate itself; and, lastly, those mediating the Idea in its completeness—to wit, viewed successively as life, knowledge, and unity of mind and object. Here at last the Idea is revealed as an ideal whole, embracing in itself and as itself the multiplicity of antagonisms, and yet only revealed through these transcended antagonisms. The categories of mechanism, chemism, design, etc., recall the regulative “Ideas” by which Kant’s Reason unifies the loose mental experiences supplied to it, save that here as

elsewhere everything with Hegel is deduced by a frigid logic. Inasmuch as the "Doctrine of the Notion" transcends, while including the two previous divisions—being these and something more—it is termed by him their "truth."

In *Nature* the notional dialectical whole just traced negates its abstractness. The Idea opposes a crass "other" to itself,* the arena of contingency, disjunction, inarticulateness, but still moving ever on to a goal—the emergence of conscious individuals. Hegel is here seen at his worst. He rejects, it would seem, Evolution, not merely the modern form of the doctrine, but the notion of *any* development by gradations out of this crass "other" itself. All such development is grounded in the Idea which still maintains itself in the background. The *irrational* factor troubles him, and is not to be exorcised by resort to a category of the Contingent. Panlogism is in a quandary, as Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Von Hartmann alike have indicated. The main moments, however, are these. Of the categories, the Quantity group comes first. In *Mechanics* the out-of-itselfness of Nature is most vividly expressed, though in gravity matter swings back even here to unity, and the ordering of stellar motions, etc., shows the *Logical*. All here is quantitative. In these more indeterminate forms (which answer to Doctrine of Being) we have mathematical and mechanical categories, "time," "space," "matter, and motion," and Absolute Mechanics as revealed in construction of the stellar and planetary cosmos. In *Physics* the qualitative aspects are treated of—the general forms of matter, earth, air, etc., the relative, elasticity, cohesion, etc., and the special, metals, etc.—while the swing back to unity manifests in these more or less definite forms. In *Organics* the inorganic negates while preserving itself,† running through three stages—that of the geological organism, that of the vegetable organism, and that of the animal organism. In the last, in animals proper, the Idea awakes; and in man comes more and more fully to itself, providing Philosophy of Mind or Spirit with its true provender. And

* Observe throughout the Platonic labour of the *Notion*. Intellectualism dominates every phase of the system.

† The dialectical flux finds vivid expression in the animal body, the protoplasm of which, as an eminent savant has said, *must die continuously that it may live*.

here, of necessity, our old friend the *Phenomenology* finds its niche as a stage among other stages. Into this vast discussion it is needless to enter at length, as the "secret" of Hegel has been grasped, so far as is requisite for our purpose. Suffice it to say that we are here carried through the full rounding-off of the World-Mind in all its wondrous departments. The chief moments are Subjective Mind, with the divisions, Anthropology, Phenomenology, Psychology; Objective Mind, *i.e.* Spirit actualized in rights, morals, and social polity, culminating in the concrete Ethical Idea or State, and Absolute Mind, their truth, articulated as Art, Religion, and the self-seizing thought of the Idea. The treatment of the Liberty problem must be noticed. Here also a triplicity of articulation obtains. Hegel contends that in the sphere of the Subjective Mind we have the Abstractly free; in that of the individual controlled by Objective Mind, necessity; while in the synthesis Absolute Mind we have freedom realized consciously in a higher unity. It is there seen that the objective mind giving the content of morality is no other than the manifestation of the free Idea, which spontaneously originates limitations, and by their mediation attains to a higher level, along with which freedom also reappears transmuted. Kant placed Freedom in a mystic sphere beyond experience; Hegel realizes Freedom through experience. But in neither case does a true *individual* freedom emerge: for in Kant the noumenal ego is alone free; in Hegel the "Idea" hurries along individuals just as a wind does sandgrains, with the difference that here the sandgrains come at last to see that they and the wind are identical. If we can posit no numerically different Egos, no spontaneity of initiative *within* the empirical, there is no Freedom worth the trouble of moral psychology to waste words upon. Determinism backed by noumenal Egos or a self-realizing "pure thought" is no more significant to the Libertarian than it is as explained by a Büchner.

Hegelianism when its founder died was at the zenith of its repute, and must still be held the most imposing system in history. But the dialectic it preached was illustrated in its own disruption. Hegel himself professed Theism—nay, adhered to the Christian faith which for him was "Absolute

Religion."* True his Theism sounds strange, and his Christianity even stranger; but, as against a shallow enlightenment, they served as a useful protest. This conservatism was defended by the so-called Hegelian Right, for which Theism, Freewill, persistence of the individual after death were essentials. The revolt against these beliefs generated the Hegelian Left, and the history of this movement is one of commanding interest. It extended into politics, economics, as well as the biblical and general philosophical domains. Marx and Lassalle the socialists, Herzen and Bakunin the protagonists of Anarchism, the nihilist Tchernyschewsky, the Tübingen biblical critics, Bruno Bauer, Ruge, Feuerbach, and many others are of interest in these regards. Hegel, indeed, was a veiled prophet, a portent of wondrous significance. A mild-mannered man may unwittingly drop a match and consign a city to flames. Hegel, the conservative, set a mighty conflagration agoing, and the effects of his thinking have yet to fully declare themselves.

Our concern here lies with philosophy. What, then, of the Hegelian Theism to start with? Has the IDEA a consciousness apart from individuals or not? That it has, our neo-Hegelians in England will probably for the most part assert. But a god who is "pure" thought, the unity of "intelligible" categories — a "matterless" actuality — is a very hard doctrine to recognize. Categories unembodied in Nature are formal and utterly unreal, a realm, as Hegel tells us, of "shadows." No filling, no particularity, no "other," where are the conditions of the concrete synthesis demanded? Reference to the possibility of Experience is futile, for an "Unconscious" such as Von Hartmann's will serve just as well as this deity. Nay, it will serve far better, for that *an alien* consciousness reveals himself as "me" is the oddest of odd conceptions.

Professor Green has urged that self-consciousness "never began, because it never was not. It is the condition of there being such a thing as beginning or end." † Here the Experience argument is in evidence. In answer to such a standpoint,

* Hegel upholds Jesus as the reformer who first revealed that God is man and man is God—Is it historically true that any such doctrine was taught by him? And, if it were, are the lessons of the grand old *Upanishads* to be overlooked?

† *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 119.

one of the ablest of the radicals bred by Hegel, Belfort Bax, puts the query: "Is this thought-unity from which Kant [and Hegel] starts really ultimate? . . . Is pure thought subject? *Does not consciousness presuppose that which becomes conscious?* . . . Is not this ultimate *I* distinguishable from its *thinking*? We believe it is. . . . The synthetic unity of the consciousness, the logical element, presupposes the alogical element, the *I* or the principle which *becomes* unified." * And in the revolt against mere formalism, he deciphers the significance of the original Hegelian Left. Chalybäus is also of this opinion. In a work on the *Problem of Reality*, Belfort Bax strengthens his position. I do not profess to accept his advance on Hegel in full—his doctrines of categories and feeling, of the Logical and Alogical, his absorption of scientific materialism,—but in this regard he has fairly made out his case. Not *consciousness*, but a *Subject* which becomes consciousness, is the requisite of philosophy. This doctrine, however, is of old standing in Hindu philosophy, is poetically championed by Schopenhauer, and definitely advanced in the *Immemorial Being* of Schelling. It is worked out provisionally in this work. Reality will be here exhibited as the *Metaconscious* in its becoming, and an attempt made to plumb the main enigmas of life on this basis.

Then comes the question as to whether the individual persists—to my thinking one of far greater importance. It matters nothing to us whether Theism is true or not, supposing we perish helplessly with our organisms. Now Hutchison Stirling, that grand old champion of Hegel, will have it that his master was for the persistence. True, Hegel could not "compete with Swedenborg, nor introduce us into actual experience of a future state," but still he was loyal to the larger hope. Why, then, did he not speak out—nay, shout so momentous a belief from the housetops? Why is there need for hunting up stray passages from his works which seem to favour it? I suspect that Hegel knew better than to speak out; his system cannot stand this load. It is a popular mistake to believe that idealists are all for the "soul" and materialists all against it—many idealists, e.g. Belfort Bax, deny that the individual persists, many

* *Handbook to the History of Philosophy*, pp. 345, 346.

materialists—and the cruder among spiritists are often this, regarding “soul” or “consciousness” as an object—affirm the contrary. Hegelians are in this fix. *If individual consciousness is organism aware of itself, and this consciousness comes into being with the organism, waxing and waning with it, the case for persistence is desperate.* The organism, hence the individual, is mere point in a flux coming and going in time. It is as necessitating this view that the Hegelian idealism is disastrous. Elsewhere, in proffering my subjective-objective idealism, I have endeavoured to rethink this problem, and rescue the individual from the universal.

As sacrificing the individual, Hegelianism is implicitly pessimist. The terrible drama of history, the bloodstained pages of Nature “red in tooth and claw,” the martyrdom of conscious creatures—all is lost sight of in the face of the ruthless *Idea*. For Hegel the universal is everything, the individual nothing—he is worse even than Fichte, who held at least to a future life. There seems only one hope for Hegelians, viz. that the *Idea* may yet gather up all creatures into its bosom, rock them in delirious blessedness, and atone with Nirvanic joys for the crime of this gory universe. It is the idea of Renan: “We imagine a state in which everything would terminate alike in a sole conscious centre . . . in which the idea of a personal deity would be a truth. A Being omniscient and omnipotent might be the last term of the deific evolution, whether we conceive him as rejoicing in all (all also rejoicing in him), according to the dream of the Christian mysticism, or as an individuality acquiring a supreme strength, *or as the outcome of tens of thousands of beings*, as the harmony, the total voice of the universe. The universe would be thus consummated in a single organized being, in whose infinity would be gathered up millions and millions of lives, past and present at the same time.”* A majestic and sublime vista! But, granted this Nirvanic bliss, could the miseries of man be retrospectively blotted out? could the writhing of the crushed worm, the struggles of the snake-seized deer be annulled? Would this unit survive as a frog-consciousness and that as a Shakespeare; or, if developed into angels, would they solve the problem of their respective

* *Dialogues Philosophiques*, p. 125, et seq.

allotments of experience? Would the ghastly mockery of the "contingency" of the individual be flung to them—outcome both of a trivial lust of sex. Scarce could the rider of Renan secure Hegel for optimism.

Hegel's own optimism is a poor thing. Good is reached through the negative moment of evil; each stage developing its own pessimism, another transcending it, and so on. This, so far as it goes, is true insight, but the worst of it is that the optimist stages are themselves shockingly sad. Pain exceeds pleasure in amount even in these, however satisfactory they are in relation to darker forerunners. No—the only hope for man is an eudæmonism *beyond, but embracing, his present experiences*. The question is, Can metaphysic in all honesty concede it? Can it? I believe the concession to be practicable.

And now for the Dialectic and Categories. The Dialectic must be partially recognized—it is Hegel's most impressive achievement. But his form of stating it must be altered. The situation to be faced is this. Reality we know as a flux, a flux of aspects of a whole given piece-meal in time. The whole alone is the truth—whose timeless entirety is broken in a *becoming*. Dialectic should be abstract notional seizure of the stages of this becoming, and as such a synthesis of related differences. *But* this seizure must be (in its inception at least), inductive and *a posteriori*. The positing of the stages leans not on the dialectical self-movement of the Notion, but contrariwise the movement of the Notion rests on the positing. It is this positing, the very real flux of "mind" and "nature," which is the *crux*, and to explain this Hegel is impotent.* Given this positing, the rest is easy. Herbert Spencer has shown beautifully that mind is essentially a continuous *differentiation and integration of states of consciousness*. Why, then, not hold that the Subject is continuously *mediating its explicit unity and self-knowledge* in this manner, and reject the Hegelian Formalism? Why not get rid of the Categories altogether, or preserve them merely as *names for the main standpoints attained in the process*. Shall we be told

* The "otherness" within itself of the Notion or Concept is certainly *there* when conscious reflection comes to survey it. What I contend for is—that the Notion is not *before its moments*, but synthesizes moments *otherwise posited*.

that the ground of this process is ignored, that our answer is far too empirical? Perhaps so. Let me say, then, that the positing and its treatment will receive their handling hereafter. For the present we may continue our survey of Hegel's weaknesses.

Hegel's vice is a Platonic harping on Notions. For him their dialectic is ultimate, not merely valid for *reflective intellect*, but valid as ground of the process whence arises this intellect itself. A Panlogist, he would *rationalize* reality from basement to roof. Note the initial assumption—that the world-prius, the all-wise one, must be *Reason*. May not this prius as much transcend Reason as Reason transcends a toothache? Must supreme wisdom necessarily be like our faculty of abstract concepts? Nay, may not "reason" be a mere provisional phase even of the developing human consciousness?

Hegel is what the Eleatic in the *Sophistes* would have dubbed a "friend of forms." Indeed, he seems friendly to nothing else. Schopenhauer observes that the *abuse of notions* is the standing curse of philosophy, and his disgust with Hegel is boundless. Schelling, *who himself started as a formalist*, threw up his task in despair, pleading in his view of the *Immemorial Being* that the ground of reality was beyond logical grasp. Even Hutchison Stirling observes that Hegel's Logic is principally formal, and its start of most dubious value. Belfort Bax, in his work on the *Problem of Reality*, adds the dot to the *i* of Schelling. The whence of the formalist stimulus we have already traced, we have since seen its outcome in the system. Hegel never gets near a fact. The system is a picture-gallery where one sees frames but no pictures. Its author is like a man who, having mapped a country, goes to sleep and on awaking worships his maps as the "living souls" of the original. Categories, torn from the real, are pitchforked in Platonic fashion into the Idea. They are viewed, not as names for *abstract aspects of a whole*, a *σύνολον*, but the whole is beggared into a mere incrassation of them—the complex infinitely varied spheres of "mind" and "world" into their output. Sometimes we note Hegel's artifice. Told to strip the history of thought of its "contingent accessories," and then to find the categories, we grow wary.

Abstractions are seen in the making. In another way the stripping is suggestive. The *order* of the categories (as deduced in the Logic) fails us. Stirling admits that "only partially and interruptedly" can the category-chain be shown to "underlie the phenomenal *contingency*, whether of nature or history."* How wondrously useful this "contingency," when Nature and History protest against Hegel's Logic!

Why retain Categories at all?—was the question we put just now. Ignoring them in the sphere of "mind," the answer may be that they serve to constitute *the object*. Belfort Bax, who fiercely assails Panlogism, is still for retaining these "concept-forms." "The universal and necessary element which all Reality involves is clearly thought into the object. Yet although thought into the object, it is clearly not thought into it by the individual mind, since the latter finds it already given in the object"† These *Logical Categories* for him convert "feeling" into objects, and with their flight Reality would perish. He holds the Hegelian view *plus* a free addition of the *Alogical* as sensation. The answer is that empiricism does not teach that mere sensations yield objects. Given sensations simply related in time, or it may be time and space, it calls in Association of their echoes with new incoming sensations, and invokes, also, predispositions and intuitions which ancestral experience has generated—these latter either wonderfully quickening or superseding association in the individual. Some leading causes of *objectivation* have been most ably discussed by Spencer on this basis.‡ Empiricism may be unable to account for the genesis of sensations, the time and (where not made derivative) space-order, and even association itself, but it is here speaking psychologically, and it performs that business well. And, even conceding that it has not completed its task, it has done enough to show where the clue lies. If objects and ideas can be differenced in the manner it indicates, the call for these Categories or Concept-Forms is clearly rendered superfluous.

I should have wished to discuss two further issues—the

* Notes to trans. of Schwegler, *Hist. of Philos.*, 348.

† *Problem of Reality*, p. 17.

‡ Cf. his *Principles of Psychology*, "Differentiation of Subject and Object."

half truth of the Platonic-Hegelian view that Reason rules the world, and the likenesses between the Plato-Aristotle, Kant-Hegel historic sequences. Space forbids. The first-named subject will, however, interest us anon.

And now we must bid adieu to the successive developments of Kant, limned forth so boldly by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Part of the Hegelian fabric we shall merge in a new structure; part again a frigid logic will compel us to dismantle. But to the grandeur of the message itself what earnest mind can be wholly indifferent? It is surely a sublime doctrine which sees in the starset heavens, in the cloud-belted earth, in the waste of tossing billows, in the complex of thought and feeling, the wondrous page whereon is writ the revelation of Spirit to itself. Nay, the very fascination of that standpoint renders an initial scepticism indispensable. Tempering a bias to enthusiasm with this caution, we will now quit the peaks of Hegelianism for fresh fields and pastures new in the plains. Prominent among those who assailed the Hegelian system stands Schopenhauer, and it is to this interesting thinker that I would now direct attention.

CHAPTER XI.

SCHOPENHAUER.

Πάντα γέλωσ καὶ πάντα κόμωσ καὶ πάντα τὸ μηδέν
Πάντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀλόγων ἐστί τὰ γιγνόμενα.

THE system of Schopenhauer is perhaps the most sparkling product of German philosophy. Uncompromisingly outspoken and brilliantly cynical, it presents a charming contrast with the laborious if more methodic writing of Kant and Hegel. Able as a critic than a constructive metaphysician, Schopenhauer's interest hinges mainly on his slashing critiques of his predecessors and his brilliant pessimist insights into life.* His speculative labours neither exhibit uniformly consistent thinking nor even marked originality. Nominally, Schopenhauer's inspirer was Kant; but beyond acceptance of the Space and Time doctrine of the *Transcendental Æsthetic*, his adherence to the master is superficial. It was not to be expected that the livery of discipleship could ever be comfortably worn by Schopenhauer. Of an independent and acrid character, he held most of his contemporaries in contempt. Schelling was a humbug; Fichte, his quondam teacher, a word-spinner; while Hegel was an "intellectual Caliban." Such a man could not be expected to take over the *Critique* just as the Königsberg recluse had left it. Nor, in truth, was that venerable volume spared.† We have previously referred to Schopenhauer's reduction of the categories to causality, to his criticism of the schemata and condemnation of the vague frontier delimited between

* On the count of palingenesis he must, however, be held to have said much of great historic interest. But of this anon.

† Cf. the *Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy in the World as Will and Idea* (Haldane and Kemp's translation).

Perception and Thought. But revision was not to end here. Schopenhauer's loans from Schelling*—the all-explanatory Will; from Fichte—the primal "infinite striving," the Ego as activity, and a world which is and ought to be abolished—had to be accommodated. So also had his candid and sweeping liberalism, his own boundless private dissatisfaction with life, and last, but not least, his dearly-prized studies of the Upanishads. These hoary scriptures had filtered into his consciousness through the charcoal of a double translation (from the original into Persian and Persian into Latin); but conveyed even in this form, they stirred him deeply. The Upanishads are the "sacred primitive wisdom," the antidotes to theology and Hegelianism. "How the mind is here washed clean of its early engrafted Jewish superstition and all philosophy servile to that superstition."† Nevertheless the fundamental conception of the Upanishads is missing in the system of Schopenhauer. Brahman there is not WILL, but "unconscious" KNOWLEDGE. It adumbrates not Schopenhauer but Hegel.

In his earliest work, a *Philosophical Treatise on the Four-fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, Schopenhauer deals with the four forms of this higher Causality permeating and making possible experience.‡ Sufficient Reason—nothing exists without a reason why it should be rather than not be—has two often-confused aspects, that relating to the logical ground of judgments, and that relating to the cause of actual states and changes. Wolff, therefore, did well in instituting three principles—of becoming, of being, and knowing. For Schopenhauer there is an additional one, of acting. The *ratio essendi*, or principle of being, is the individuating space and time forms, without which discrete entities cannot obtain; the *ratio fiendi* (becoming) is ordinary cause and effect, which pervades "mind" and "nature," and renders the latter properly *objective* to us. Appearances, however, are not THOUGHT by understanding by way of a

* Thus speaks Schelling the later: "Will is the proper spiritual substance of man, the *ground of everything*." Still Schelling's Will is not irrational in the sense of being blind, but rather in that of transcending reason.

† *Parerga*, ii. § 185.

‡ The "principle of the Sufficient Reason is the general expression for all those forms of the object of which we are *a priori* conscious."

schematized concept and so made objects, but are INTUITED as causally related both to one another and ourselves. The *ratio cognoscendi*, or knowing, is the Sufficient Reason as necessity of logical ground for judgments, whence the play of abstract discursive thinking; and the *ratio agendi*, individual will working in time from within. It will thus be seen that Sufficient Reason, as understood by Schopenhauer, regulates and shapes the two great orders of phenomena—those of the so-called external world, and those of the inner subjective mind alike. The upshot is idealism. Kant had treated matter in one aspect as that which is movable in space. Now matter, urges Schopenhauer, is the *union of time and space*. “Matter is the possibility of coexistence, and through that of permanence; through permanence, again, matter is the possibility of the persistence of substance in the change of its states.” Causality determines only *what fills this time and that space*. And, space, time, and causality are alike only forms and conditions of knowing. Taken by itself this position would confine us to the domain of phenomenal knowledge, to the world as a stream of appearances. We should confront only the “World as *Idea*,” i.e. as phenomenal presentation in consciousness, as *Mâyâ* or “subjective illusion,” as Schopenhauer sees fit to interpret that term. But Schopenhauer seeks also to unroll before us the “World as *Will*.” Let us, therefore, pass on from his idealism to his metaphenomenal researches.

Here it is that Schopenhauer bids Kant definitely adieu. Kant had denied us any possible knowledge of things as they “are” beyond percipience. For him any such metaphysic resembled the “always fleeting Italy,” which mocked storm-tossed Æneas; it was a Friar Rush leaving thinkers hopelessly bogged in the morasses of verbiage. But Schopenhauer does not heed Kant’s reserve; behind the phenomena—for Schopenhauer, with Kant and against Fichte and his successors, held stoutly to the thing in itself—he must and will penetrate. And what a Cacus he drags forth to light from those gloomy arcana. WILL, an irrational, blind WILL, is the Power behind the universe, the fountain-head and background of all manifestation. It is this essence, this Fichtean “infinite striving,” which, lava-like, glows and

heaves beneath the crust of appearances. Devoid of knowledge, this mighty power rushes forth into life, individuating itself in myriad transient guises, and writhing like a bruised serpent in the consciousness of sentient units. How hostile this view is to Hegel is sufficiently obvious. It grounds the world-process on an *alogical* principle, blindly emerging into being only, like a fire-girt scorpion, to sting itself back into nothingness. It is a metaphysic of materialism which destroys "matter" while conserving its alleged irrationality as attribute of the Will.

The "Will" of Schopenhauer is the reality of which the empirical motive-guided will is only an adumbration. Leibnitz and his modern interpreters have derived all forms of conscious activity from knowledge; Schopenhauer, on the other hand, claims to have resolved knowledge into a by-product of Will. The manner in which he effects the severance of will from knowledge is noteworthy. Schopenhauer is so far in sympathy with materialism as to regard knowledge as a function of the brain and self-consciousness merely as the focus of cerebral activities. There is no scope, he urges, for psychology, for there is no psyche; and so far does he carry this contention, that he speaks of the phenomenal world as a "cerebral phantasmagoria." This last view seems to clash with an idealism for which brain is only a phenomenal object in an illusory phenomenal world. The cart seems here to be put before the horse. If brain exists only for percipience, how can it manifest percipience as its function? The anomaly is, however, to a certain extent smoothed over in the sequel. For, warmly as Schopenhauer admires the iconoclasm and cerebral physiology of materialists, for materialism as "absolute physics," as embodying the Secret of the universe, he has the most supreme contempt. As such it is "the creed of the barber's man and the druggist's apprentice." It is the philosophy of the Subject which has forgotten to consider itself.

The solution is as follows. Knowing is the function of brain; but brain, again, is nothing more than a phase in the objectivation of Will. Cerebral physiology deals with the objective aspect of what subjectively viewed is knowledge—knowledge from a metaphysical standpoint directly affiliable

on a manifestation of will. Let us look more closely into this will. As what is it symbolically definable? In what manner also is it seized, knowledge being *ex hypothesi* its transformation—and so unable to grasp it? It may be best viewed as irrational activity, as the blind universal Nisus. Rushing tumultuously into being, it evokes numberless sentiencies, builds up through these phenomenal worlds, and, thus metamorphosed into presentation, passes at last into consciousness. Force it is not; for Force, if not a figment, is a mechanical conception, and mechanical conceptions have as such no standing in metaphysic. It is pure *subjective nisus* of the order adumbrated in the empirical Will—the spontaneous energy that moves in our appetitive and emotional nature. Close approach to it is possible, but not, however, by way of intellect. Intellect splits up things, holds them piecemeal before us, and dallies in shambling fashion with mere aspects of a world scattered bewilderingly through space and voyaging tediously through time. But when intellect has been hushed and we lapse into *indeterminate feeling*, a truer light may be shed on the recesses of our being. Relations, spaces, times, the whole plexus of discretets, give way to a consciousness of an all-pervasive unity—a consciousness such as moved the fervour of the authors of the Upanishads. Reality then swims before us in its immediateness, an inner sympathy is felt to permeate things. Such an *intuition* springs not from intellect but from the inner individual Will, and it is to this sympathy that supernormal facts such as clairvoyance, premonitions, second-sight, etc., ever and anon testify. Will, then, to borrow a term of Schelling's, is the ground of the *Absolute-Identity* system of Schopenhauer. It is no unconscious knowledge, no Brahman, no Hegelian Idea that is in question.* Hegel indeed had claimed that "Reason" is not so powerless as to be incapable of producing anything but a mere ideal.† But Schopenhauer concedes reason no dynamic power, and relegates it to a very subordinate place as faculty of discursive thinking. Will

* Max Muller has, however, pointed out that the earlier conception of Brahman was that of "will," "force," "propulsive power" of evolution, rather than unconscious knowledge.

† *Philosophy of History* (Bohn's trans., p. 9).

alone can be the motor power, the *δύναμις* of the universe. And he further contends that the fundamental Identity of things in Will furnishes the real clue to the appearance of design in the world—all phenomena exhibiting orderliness in their very conflict, a “sympathy” due to the unity of the one primitive timeless Will.

The core of our own being is Will; so too is that of Nature—or rather of the noumena behind Nature.* All objective activities, the molar and molecular motions and space-occupying forces of science are this Will. Causation itself is akin to volition in us. Will, in short, together with the “Ideas,” about which anon, is all pervasive. The inference drawn is gloomy. All personality is illusory; separate “selves” are but extreme terms of the Will as causally conditioned in space and time. Annihilation awaits humanity; the boisterousness of this fleeting life must finally give place to the eternal silence. And what of this fleeting life? It is a “useless interrupting episode in the blissful repose of Nothing; . . . a gross bewilderment, not to say a cheat.”† In Shakespearian language it is as a tale told by an idiot, “full of sound and fury,” signifying little or nothing beyond a round of sufferings.

Conscious Existence is the ordeal ensuing on the plunge of the Will into manifestation. It is wretched from the bare necessity of its conditions. All willing arises from desires, and desires are so many forms of pain, only a few of which can be removed, and most of which obstinately return. Driven on by the lash of desire—the devouring “tanha” of Buddhism—we are as men paying a continual Dane-gelt to an insatiable foe. In the course of a splendid passage in the *World as Will and Idea*, Schopenhauer compares the desire-goaded being to an Ixion bound on an eternally revolving wheel, or a Danaid trying vainly to fill a sieve with water. Though survey of the facts is decisive, we may predicate wretchedness of life on *a priori* grounds. Willing itself rests upon pain, and as consciousness is normally honeycombed with willing,

* Schopenhauer oscillates so markedly between pure subjective idealism and recognition of manifold determinations of the Will as independent objectively posited phenomena, that his meaning is often obscure. He speaks at times of ideas arising by way of brain function after sense stimulation.

† *Parergu*, bk. ii. § 156.

consciousness is a perennial source of torment. Pain, avers Schopenhauer, after Plato and Kant,* is alone positive; pleasure is but the rebound from a previous state of suffering. Pain for him is an ever-present skeleton at the Barmecide feast of life. If men glibly reject this impeachment, it is, urges Schopenhauer, because they speak with the fervour of the moment or fail to sum up their experiences in the requisite dry light. Such men are slaves to will and fruitlessly struggle towards its satisfaction. Their ideals are chimerical. Who are really content save those in a torpor? We learn from Voltaire that Micromegas, a denizen of one of the planets of the Dog-star, had a thousand senses and millions of years of life, but was not he too tormented with "listless uneasiness and vague desire"?

What, then, of the Service of Humanity, and other loudly trumpeted ideals? They must be held as of only secondary worth. Palliation of misery is all that can be accomplished. Life oscillates between pain and ennui, and philanthropic enthusiasms conceived as positive ideals must all end in smoke. "The basis of man's being is want, defect, and pain; since he is the most objective form of will, he is by that fact the most defective of all beings. His life is only a continual struggle for existence, with the certainty of being beaten." Our aim, accordingly, should be not to mend, but to end the manifestations of Will, to rouse Humanity to a sense of the drama in which it figures, and which, if it so chooses, it can reduce once again to nothingness. Now the victor of Will, the destroyer of the world-process, must be clearly sought for in intellect.

Intellect takes its rise, as the lowly servitor of the Will, as directly ministering to its needs. In the animal and the savage this subjection is complete. Maturing into Science, intellect acquires an independence which has only indirect reference to the Will. From the abstractions and barren generalizations of Science, there is a further ascent into the intuitive sphere of genius, and the gorgeous contemplations of Art. In Art-contemplation the universal is seized through

* *Anthropology.* Kant holds pleasure to be the feeling of furtherance, pain of hindrance of life. And pleasure "is always a consequent of pain. . . . Man finds himself in a never-ceasing pain . . . pleasure is nothing positive; it is only a liberation from pain."

the particular, and will is for the while lulled into blessed quiescence.* We are lost in the realm of Ideas. Not the Ideas of Kant—those products of “dogmatizing scholastic reason”—but Ideas such as those Plato championed. Their place in the system is this: Midway between the Will *per se* and the Will sundered in time and space stand the Archetypal Ideas—the exemplars of the multiple finite things we know. Now, Plato has advanced ugly and unanswered objections to his own views in the *Parmenides*, and Aristotle has played havoc with them in the thirteenth and fourteenth books of the *Metaphysic*. Is it these hypostatized abstractions that Schopenhauer wishes to revive? Barring some inconsiderable reservations, it is.† *Every quality of matter not yet accounted for is to be held phenomenon of an Idea*—a view that fills in the vague theory of perception previously sketched. A species, *e.g.* Man, is an Idea sundered in time and space. The body, again, while the *visible expression* of the Will manifested as desires, expresses at the same time dimly and inadequately Ideas, the higher of these stepping in and moulding the lower as the grade of objectivation ascends.

These ideas, then, back the shadowy manifold of sense. Our world is “nothing but the appearance of the Ideas in plurality” as determined in the Will-sprung forms of perception. In passive communing with these is to be sought the inspiration of the Fine Arts, and so long as absorption endures, so long is the clamour of the Will hushed into silence. It is *on them* that the genius of architect, sculptor, painter, poet, musician draws for its nutriment. It is *to them* that the presentation of some concrete embodiment of Art diverts the cultured spectator. Schopenhauer inveighs fiercely against the empirical theory of the beautiful, but he appears to proceed on the assumption that pleasurable emotions attach to like objects among all sorts and conditions of men. Art, then, is the great haven of the empirical consciousness.

* “But Fine Art also contains and glories in ways of stimulating *unbounded desire under the name of the ideal*” (Bain, *Mental and Moral Science* “On Happiness”). This is a far truer view, to my thinking.

† Schopenhauer rejects “Ideas” of manufactured articles, saying they only express the Idea of their material. But so did the early Platonists. Schopenhauer would further carefully distinguish between the *mere concept* or *unitas post rem abstracted* from the manifold of experience and the *rich, full Idea* revealed by Art to the worthy.

Considered, however, in the light of the general pessimist indictment, it is but as a sop thrown to Cerberus—an interlude only between the acts of a drama of pain.

It remains, then, for intellect to effect the complete subjugation of Will, for the evolved to suppress its evolver! This heroic effort, in so far as it implies *education* of humanity, implies also Altruism, support for which must be found in the belief in the *fundamental unity* of all manifested being. As the ages roll on their course, there will arise the slowly but surely awaking conviction that our aim should be no mere tinkering with evil, but deliberate renunciation of desire, of the torturing Will-to-live. Suicide is both selfish and useless—selfish because it ignores humanity, useless because the terrors of palingenesis will have once more to be confronted. “Death shows itself clearly as the end of the individual [better, “knowing consciousness”], but in this individual lies the germ of a new being. . . . The dying man perishes, but a germ remains out of which a new being goes forth, which steps into existence without knowing whence it comes or wherefore it is just such as it is.”* It is not clear how far Schopenhauer admitted a colouring of the new intellectual consciousness by the content of the last, but the advocacy of Palingenesis—the growth by the noumenal individual Will of a fresh knowing consciousness or personality—is a point of considerable historic interest.

To conquer the Will it is necessary to extirpate desire, and in view of this goal the adoption of an ethic of Asceticism is imperative. Only thus is mediated the transition to “that nothingness which looms as final goal behind all virtue and sanctity.” Only thus is to be rung down the curtain at the close of the ghastly drama.

The defects of Schopenhauer as a metaphysician are not far to seek. On the lines of his view of Causality the above-given passage to noumena is impracticable. No more than Kant should he speak of such veiled causes of sensation. He starts a subjective idealist, as Von Hartmann also observes, but he cannot maintain his position—is always reaching out to a Nature beyond perception. Thus he speaks of “ideas which on the occasion of *external stimuli* of the *organs* of sense

* *Parerga*, ii. 292.

arise by means of *the function of brain.*"* This is not subjective idealism, but implies a system of things posited independently of the subject. What, again, has subjective idealism to do with Platonic "Ideas"—Ideas struggling to manifest themselves and only *recognized* to do so by us?

The Will is a figment of poesy—a distortion of Fichte and Schelling. As mere blind activity, it is an abstract of ordinary willing, with the *ideas* that inform it dropped. As protest against a Hegel, it possesses undoubted value; but rebellion against Hegelianism need not take this form. We, too, may say, *Reason* is not the prius; but resort to a blind spontaneity is not called for. There remains what I have elsewhere termed the *Metaconscious*—a *prius* such as the *Immemorial Being* of Schelling (regrettably in places dubbed Will).

The contrast between the alleged "blindness" of the Will and what the Will is actually able to effect is one of a singularly impressive character. The *ground of the Platonic Ideas*, the *seemingly purposive mediation of consciousness* by way of space and time forms, etc., the growth of consciousness, the *evolution of a coherent system of things*, are all alike inexplicable. If the power which forms the chicken in the egg carries through a task "complicated, well calculated, and designed beyond expression,"† does it do so only blindly? It may be an energy *super-rational* and without consciousness, but assuredly not a blind one. Finally, we have the revolt of consciousness against its evolver, the mighty, outrushing "Will." And consciousness being brain-function, and brain an objectivation of Will, it follows that Will stings itself into quiescence; that of which the *essence is activity* makes itself inactive. Incongruities such as these need no comment.

Pessimism itself is a creed of no mushroom growth; it underlies in one form or another the whole philosophy of India. Thus in the Sutras attributed to Kapila we are told that "the complete destruction of pain is the highest object of man,"‡ a view which in point of explicitness leaves nothing to be desired. Between the system of Kapila and that of Schopenhauer there are discoverable many points of community—the unconscious yet somehow purposive *Prakriti*,

* *World as W. and I.* ii. 473. Cf. also ii. 485 and i. 190. Careful study will reveal many other examples of the outreaching. † ii. 485. ‡ i. 1.

the necessary predominance of pain, the supreme importance of deliverance from the misery of life, etc., recalling similar doctrines in the *World as Will and Idea*. Kapila, however, it should be noted, contends for a plurality of individual egos, and a "blessedness" of immortality after their release from the meshes of Prakriti.

Though Schopenhauer's honourable outspokenness and brilliant genius constitute him the founder of modern pessimism in Europe, much of his position was already anticipated even here. Reference may be made to Kant,* and the German mysticism of Eckhart and his followers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This latter school, which had important bearings on the Reformation, held to the evil and illusory character of the world, and indicated the "Absolute Unity" as the true haven for the soul. Its pessimism was, however, guarded. It was the pessimism of India, for it looked askance at the world-process, but not at the possible consummation beyond it. The iconoclasm of Schopenhauer, on the contrary, leaves no ray of hope, no rift in the darkling cloud-rack. As such it bears the impress of over-accentuation. It is certain that some of the intellectual pursuits of life yield a keen and positive pleasure, that many of our workaday emotions and sensations are well worth the having; that mere *remission* of activity may fit us for pleasure without call for desires; and that a judicious blend of the "divine" and the "animal" may do much to lighten our burdens. It is certain also—and the fact is of great import—that all healthy functioning of nerve-tissue is accompanied with pleasure. Whether the aggregate of an individual's pleasures balances, or falls short of, the aggregate of his pains is another matter. For my part, I believe that Schopenhauer has made good his contention as to the unsatisfactoriness of life, in so far as such life is considered *as an end in itself*. But the problem so ably treated by him in this connection will, as we pursue our inquiries, be found to present other and more encouraging aspects.

* Pessimism, though not prominently introduced, is clearly to be unearthed from the *Anthropology*, and may have helped to give Schopenhauer his cue. "We find ourselves constantly immersed, as it were, in an ocean of nameless pains, which we style disquietudes or desires; and the greater the vigour of life an individual is endowed with, the more keenly is he sensible to the pain."

CHAPTER XII.

MILL AND BAIN.

ONCE more in our search for landmarks we have to cross the silver streak that gleams between Britain and the continent. Previously to confronting Kant we had dropped British philosophy where it had passed into Reid's protest against Berkeley, Hume, and the Locke-Descartes "Theory of Ideas" in general. The remarkable off-set to Hume discoverable in Kant, and the further development of Kant effected by Hegel and others, have been carefully traced. It is now time to turn our thoughts to the white cliffs of Albion. I do not, however, propose to touch on the transition thinkers who mediate the line of development between Reid and the later Intuitionism; their metaphysical import is not sufficiently impressive. We miss the grand coherent systems of German thought—the sweeping ontologies, the comprehensive standpoints, the reaching out to depth and solidity of utterance, and we confront far too much tinkering with detail and concession to vulgar dogma; and we detect, too, a warping theological bias which should properly put much of the literature out of court—the bias against which Mill so angrily bent his bow. That all the speculations in question are invalidated by this bias I do not, of course, mean to assert. Still, the incubus verges on ubiquity. Even championship of innate ideas wears too often the air of arguing for a soul to locate the ideas in. Now we need have no objection to a Soul—nay, it will be one of our aims to establish the fact of its "existence;" but we should have a very distinct objection to evidence unsatisfactorily manipulated in its favour. We ask for no underpropping of tacitly begged positions, but thoroughgoing inquiry based on

a *sincere* "methodic doubt." Our conditions are not complied with. Even where such doubt is mooted it is usually a mere shield to be pushed forward in front of an insidious orthodoxy already *in situ* behind it. Of course, instances of unbiased thinkers are ever and anon discoverable, but the main stream of thought is vitiated. Let us pass on to a clearer fount.

It is only with the empirical side of the nineteenth century movement that I now propose to deal. And invidious as it is to select any special names out of the galaxy of acute thinkers who have adorned and still adorn this aspect, we may for purposes of landmarks single out John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, and Herbert Spencer, all thinkers of the highest integrity and unimpeachable liberalism. Side by side with the renaissance of empirical psychology towards the 'forties, we have the Intuitionalist movement, prominent among whose exponents were Sir W. Hamilton and Dr. Mansel. It may be urged that the labours of Hamilton require explicit treatment. Such may be the case, but it is not the view of the matter here adopted. Hamilton's erudition and influence, his contributions to psychology and that word-spinning "science," formal logic, his popularization of the Germans (albeit with inadequate assimilation of their message) are points not to be overlooked. But, from the standpoint of metaphysic, Hamilton did little more than set up ninepins for more accurate analysts to knock over. His stirring of oil and water in the attempted union of Reid and an expurgated Kant is not happy; while his theory of External Perception has been sorely battered on the reefs of Mill and Hutchison Stirling. His famous law of the Conditioned, "All that is conceivable in thought lies between two [unthinkable] extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which as mutual contradictories one must" was suggested by Kant's Dialectic, though he discountenances the "critical" solutions to which Kant's form of idealism led. An example: "Space is either bounded or not bounded," are alternatives to which the Law of the Conditioned would apply. Hamilton points out (after Kant) that an infinite and a finite space are equally unthinkable, but assumes, nevertheless, that one alternative must hold. Kant, however, rejects both, and dubs them mere contraries. Much emphasis is laid on "Natural

Realism," an odd doctrine which professes to substantiate the common-sense belief in an outer world, yet strips that world of the vitalizing secondary qualities popularly and justly assigned to it! His belittling of ontology and appeal to natural belief,* where Reason shows her impotence, have probably generated ten agnostics to every new believer. It is not Hamilton's faith but his iconoclasm that Herbert Spencer absorbs, and what a power Spencer has been needs no telling. The deliverances of such belief are arbitrary. Thus, had Hamilton been born in India, he would have doubtless seen fit to pedestal pantheism instead of theism on a plinth of faith. As destiny allotted him a sphere of activity in Britain he discovered a practical necessity for Theism. Faith is ubiquitous; the determinations of the object of faith vary with the geographical area. I have heard Hindus when pressed buttress pantheism with intuitive belief. Since faith thus speaks with two voices, it cannot be trusted.

The empirical movement in Britain reasserted in its cradle Aristotle's dictum that all knowledge flows from experience. Nothing enters the mind of man but through the medium of the Senses, urged the Stagirite. So far it proclaims nothing new, but it professes to reaffirm the old contention in an improved form. We have run over the situation already. Dating from Hobbes, the endeavour has its roots in an attempt to show the natural, as opposed to the supernatural, growth of mind. Hobbes combines this effort with Materialism, Locke maintains it in his polemic against "innate ideas;" and his views, which smack of the pioneer, are gracefully trimmed by Berkeley, and yet further developed by Hume. Now, if we look carefully into the matter, we shall find that modern emendators have only made two vital advances on Hume, namely, in the way of amending his clumsy theory of relations, and in giving empiricism a broader basis in the doctrine of organic evolution, the latter step being mainly affiliable on Spencer. In the thought of inherited predispositions a striking advance has undoubtedly been effected.† Turning to an allied issue, we find that Hume's

* Stirling insists that Hamilton is here heavily indebted to Jacobi, the "faith" opponent of Kant (*Notes*, Schwegler's *Hist. of Philos.*, 426).

† We shall show at a later stage how this admirable hypothesis has been deck-loaded with a wholly untenable superstructure.

crusade against ontology has been similarly productive. All discounts allowed for, the fact remains that the British agnosticism of to-day must see in it its ancestor. Mill reeks of Hume; Bain is Hume without Hume's jaunty parade of scepticism. Hume, in short, is the founder of British agnosticism; his influence being backed by Kant, and, as the irony of history would have it, by Hamilton. The positivism of Comte is neither original* nor so tersely put. Its votaries, like the fabled frogs in the marsh, raise a terrible croaking, but the throats are by no means numerous.

The key-note of Mill's philosophic *credo* is found in his statement "there is not any idea, feeling, or power in the human mind which, in order to account for it, requires that its origin should be referred to any other source than experience." The instrument with which he unravels the skein of consciousness is, of course, Association. It is instructive to glance at the history of this now so potent weapon. Far from taking shape on the anvil of modern thought, its pedigree runs back as far as Aristotle, perhaps the master-mind of ancient philosophy. The Stagirite explicitly mentions the laws of "Similarity," "Contrariety," and "Contiguity" as expressive of the modes of Association of mental states. Harking back across the centuries to the times of the Stuarts, we find "Contiguity" once again enunciated by Hobbes. Following on him Locke also takes up Association, but more as explanatory of special mental conjunctions than expressive of a general law. Hume adopts "Resemblance," "Contiguity," and "Cause and effect," though his "Cause and effect" is subsequently made derivative. Hartley, and James Mill, the very acute author of the *Analysis of the Human Mind*, will only have "Contiguity." Stewart, again, not only patronizes "Resemblance," "Contrariety," "Vicinity" (in time and place), and "Cause and effect," but, with some sloppiness of thought, "Means and ends," "Premises and conclusions." Bain and Mill are content with "Contiguity," and "Similarity." Hamilton in one place tries to resolve all subordinate laws into that of "Redintegration." "Those

* In a letter dated December 10, 1824, Comte remarks that he merely systematized the conception sketched by Kant. Cf. Littré, *Comte*, p. 153. Poor Categorical Imperative!

thoughts suggest each other which have previously formed part of the same or total act of cognition." * Finally, he resorts to two, "Repetition" or Direct Remembrance, and "Redintegration" or Reminiscence (thoughts coincidental in modification, but differing in time, suggest each other, and thoughts once coincidental in time are, however different as mental modes, suggestive of each other and that in the mutual order which they originally held—these two breeding more special laws). Herbert Spencer relies on "Similarity," and assigns its psycho-physiological grounds. Ward, again, merges all others in Contiguity, viewed in connection with the Herbartian theory of the "Threshold of Consciousness." Bradley's emendation calls for prominent note. Sympathizing with the main drift of this Associationism, he seeks to remodel its mode of statement. Very properly he attacks *atomism*—that is to say, the view that consciousness is a bundle of fleeting units cohering in some mysterious manner by way of mystic "relations." The associated and associable elements are elements always of a continuous unbroken whole. Atomism must consequently go by the board, and with it the law of Similarity, as, indeed, also the current statement of Contiguity. The connections, he urges, are connections of content, not conjunctions of existence, *i.e.* isolated units. Similarity must give place to the law of Coalescence, according to which different elements or relations of elements which have any feature the same † unite wholly or partially. Contiguity, also, hinges on *identity of content*. "Every element when present tends to reinstate those elements ‡ with which it has been presented." The *law of individuation* behind both is expressible as follows. Each mental element struggles for making itself a whole, or losing itself in one; identity being the means of accession of strength by coalescence and enlargement by recall. I have given the modification almost in Bradley's own words. His rejection of "atomism" may be accepted as valid beyond question. And the recognition of

* *Lectures*, ii, p. 238.

† Bradley remarks that the importance of "Similarity" rests on the objection to "sameness," but that psychology has a right to class phenomena with the *same content* as identical.

‡ He defines: "The 'element' means any distinguishable aspect of the 'what' as against the mere 'that.'"

a yet more fundamental law behind those of Coalescence and Contiguity seems a probable outcome of the future.

The material for those associative processes which, like coral insects, so slowly yet surely rear the fabric of mind, are found by Mill in sensations, simultaneous and successive, ordered in constant combinations.* It is possible that succession *may be an attribute annexed by the mind to sensations.* † This might be interpreted as an echo of the Kantian doctrine of Time but for Mill's explicit statement—a statement which recalls Berkeley before him—that Time is a name for “an indefinite succession of successions unequal in rapidity,” ‡ not for a huge frame or form in which successions are. Derivative from time is space, which is reducible to simultaneity measured by succession. This measurement founds on our discrimination of *durations* of effort in muscular contractions. Though such discrimination is less exact than discrimination of *degrees of expended energy* in the case of the dead tension of resistance, it is, nevertheless, a fact. And this estimate of definite durations of our movements (where effort remains constant or approximately so) is the parent of space. Thus the spatial interval between this ink-bottle touched by my right hand and the glass touched by my left is equivalent to the series of muscular sensations accompanying the passage of my right hand to the glass. “An *intervening series of muscular sensations* before the one object can be reached from the other, is the only peculiarity which (according to this theory) distinguishes simultaneity in space from the simultaneity which may exist between a taste and colour, or a taste and a smell.” § It is, however, only an imperfect extension that this fusion of touch and muscular sensibility can generate. The full blossoming of simultaneity into coexistence is only arrived at when the myriad-hued simultaneous manifold of sight gathers up into itself *at a sweep* a whole plexus of ideas of tactual and muscular sensations. Such is the rush that the latter, though originally

* Otherwise, of course, our workaday discovery of “empirical laws”—to say nothing of the basic prerequisites of Association—would be impossible.

† Note how confusing again is this word “mind.” If mind is derived from experience, how can it impart time to the beginnings of experience?

‡ *Examination*, p. 253.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

received in succession, merge into an apparent simultaneity in thought, and so yield a colour-expanse made of *coexisting* points. Omitting accessory detail, we have here the theory in a nutshell. In exhibiting the full importance of these muscular sensations, Mill and Bain* have fortified the position of Berkeley, and have further grappled with the question of the *coexistence of points* in a rudimentary visual space, a crux which in his absorption in "Distance" he left unsolved, which Hume appears to shun and Brown inadequately handles. But that Mill and Bain have reached finality few would now care to maintain. Their derivation of space, even when affiliated on the theory of organic inheritance, leaves much to be desired. It is now held by most critics that the simultaneity of colours or sensations of touch is *not* quite so simple an affair as Mill, Bain, and their allies would have it. Recent writers have noted additional elements, "local signs," "unknown original differences," as present in the visual and tactual fields, and fusing these with the muscular and other sensations and ideas, have proceeded to build up space.† It need hardly be observed that the sensations must in this inquiry be considered simply as sensations and nothing more. Physiology is most welcome, but must not be obtrusively handled, the issue being primarily for pure subjective psychology. Obvious as this reservation seems, it would be well if physiological psychologists bore it more constantly in mind.

Mill holds that mind (proper) and object are not given at the start; the differencing of "inner" and "outer" being preceded by a neutral stage, and the idea of personal identity clearly presupposing memory. On the question, however, of the Ego, Mill is practically at one with Kant. Having resolved the *objects* of our adult consciousness into permanent possibilities of sensation, he proceeds to analyze the "thinker." The belief that the mind continues to exist when it has neither sensations, nor thoughts, is a belief in a Permanent Pos-

* Cf. especially *Of the Senses and the Intellect*, pp. 113-117 (1st edit.).

† I may recall here Mill's difficulty over the passage cited by Hamilton from D'Alembert, to the effect that the having of sensations of colour carries with it a perception of extension, and that sight is so far provably independent of touch and muscular associations (*Lectures*, ii. 172).

sibility of such states. But he has no hesitation in stating that the doctrine which would resolve consciousness into a mere flux of states is attended with insuperable difficulties. His Association splits on the reefs of Memory and Expectation. Touching the "inexplicable tie" linking a present experience with a past one evoked by memory, he remarks, "That there is something real in this tie, real as the sensations themselves, and not a mere product of the laws of thought, without any fact corresponding to it, I hold to be indubitable. The precise way in which we cognize it is open to much dispute. Whether we are directly conscious of it in the act of remembrance, as we are of succession in the fact of having successive sensations, or whether, according to the opinion of Kant, we are not conscious of a Self at all, but are compelled to assume it as a necessary condition of memory, I do not undertake to decide. But this original element, which has no community with any of the things answering to our names, to which we cannot give any name but its own peculiar one without implying some false or ungrounded theory, is the Ego, or Self. As such, I ascribe a reality to the Ego different from that real existence as a Permanent Possibility which is the only reality I acknowledge in Matter." He avers that the "feelings or states of consciousness which belong or have belonged to it, and its possibilities of having more, are the only facts there are to be asserted of self—the only positive attributes, except permanence, which we can ascribe to it."* But can we assert permanence with any meaning at all? Permanence is a determination in time. But the Ego is not *in time*, but time, for idealism, is *ex hypothesi in it*. The Ego *per se* cannot therefore be permanent. Again, are we confined to the alternatives: the Ego either *knows itself* or *does not know itself*? It appears to me that we are not, but for this assertion full grounds will be assigned in their proper place.

With the question of axioms, geometrical definitions, etc., we have already had occasion to deal, and I do not propose therefore to advert to Mill's Associationism on this head. It is to be noted that his exposition of how we come to believe

* *Examination*, p. 262.

in a permanent independent external world is often strongly suggestive of Hume.*

Mill (as also Hamilton) is careful to observe that the known order of nature and mind may by no means exhaust the possible range of *phenomena*. A like concession is the basis of Kant's so notable Spiritism, and is on many counts one of exceeding importance. Agnostics are often prone to push their relativism too far, not merely excluding us from knowing the Absolute and things-in-themselves, but also arbitrarily limiting the sweep of *phenomenal* experiences to the perceptual world of ordinary scientific research. Such an attitude betrays mere dogmatism.

Mill's contribution to the Theistic controversy has an interesting bearing upon pessimism. Contemplating the seemingly unmoral mode in which the world-process grinds out evil and suffering, contemplating, also, the supposed indications of a benevolent and rational design which modifies this turmoil, Mill moots a conditioned God to account for Evolution. Omnipotent *and* benevolent he cannot be—the testimony of fact is against this view. But it is a legitimate working hypothesis that there exists a Being confronted with conditions which he is unable to mould into complete conformity with his Will. All this and much more on the topics of theology, immortality, etc., will be found in his *Three Essays on Religion*. The subjoined citation from the "Essay on Theism" is of interest:—

"These, then, are the net results of Natural Theology on the question of the divine attributes. A being of great but limited power, how or by what limited we cannot even conjecture; of great and perhaps unlimited intelligence, but perhaps also more narrowly limited than his power: who desires, and pays some regard to, the happiness of his creatures, but who seems to have had other motives of action which he cares more for, and who can hardly be supposed to have created the universe for that purpose alone.† Such is the Deity whom Natural Religion points out; and any idea of God more captivating than this comes only from human

* *Treatise of Human Nature*, pt. iv. § 2.

† Unless this creation is limited to *Noumena*, Mill stands in the awkward position of rounding on his idealist "permanent possibilities of sensation."

wishes, or from the teaching of either real or imaginary Revelation."

Whence these *limits*? Whence, too, an *intelligence* which has not become intelligent *through experience*? And, if through experience *viâ* a "neutral stage," from what ontological abyss leapt the *pre-neutral appulse*? We cannot rest here even if we would.

Mill, as passages in the *Logic* clearly prove, was at bottom a believer in Noumena, in the Kantian things-in-themselves. In so far as concerns his doctrine of the Ego he cannot be called a strict empiricist, for he *inclines* to the view that the Ego is proved *by reference to the possibility of experience*,* a tentative adoption of the speculative method. Moreover, if memory implies an Ego, it follows that the Law of contiguous Association—that bulwark of his psychology—depends for its working on this Ego. All show of "Atomism," of association coupling unit-elements, goes by the board. Among the difficulties left unresolved by Mill are the following—the genesis of the variety and wealth of the manifold, i.e. *Sensations*; the *detail order of their simultaneity and succession* of presentation; the *ground of the associability* of the ideas of such sensations with other ideas or sensations; and lastly, the *approximate uniformity* of the sensations and the modes of association of ideas for all human percipients. How, for instance, if time and space are *merely in my Ego*, do I perceive a succession in space—say a stone falling from a hill into a river—just *when* and *where* other percipients do?

In fine, let me indicate some of the *implicit* if not *explicit* points of community between Mill and Kant, a community closer than that customarily conceived.

1. Mill suggested proof of the Ego by reference to the possibility of experience.

2. Mill suggested that the "mind" may possibly invest sensations with the attributes of succession and simultaneity (though he properly discards Time conceived as a hollow "form").

3. *Implied* dependence of the Laws of Association on the

* He leaves this issue undecided, as he thinks it may yet be urged that we are conscious of it as such in memory.

Ego (Kant's unity of apperception), thus wrecking associative "atomism."

4. An Agnostic theory of perception backed by unknowable surds, or noumena. Let me, also, add that, if Mill had definitely accepted the suggestion in No. 2 regarding time, the space derived by him from it *would possess* a borrowed *a priori* radiance.

5. A pessimistic vein runs through both. Kant holds life to be a round of suffering. Mill, impressed with the dark side of things, adopts a form of Manichæanism. His God, like the Demiurge of old Plato, confronted with the obstinate hyle, or indeterminate matter, is handicapped by obstacles. What these obstacles are, involves the issues as to what the Noumena are, and whether their co-existence alongside of a detached Personal Being can possibly be accepted as even an approximately ultimate solution of the world-problem. Not accepting a Personal Being as *præius*, and rejecting noumenal surds, we shall have to produce some other key to the riddle.

BAIN.

If Hegel is the prince of Formalists, Bain is foremost among those who champion what metaphysically speaking is "Matter," feeling or sensation. Although he is indisposed to commit himself overtly to metaphysic, the upshot of his researches is a modernized version of Hume. With the main doctrines of his friend and collaborator Mill, he is entirely in sympathy, but on one important point his Associationism is even more audacious than that of this eminent thinker. Bain, in fact, is an advocate of what Lange has termed "psychology without mind," or, as we ought more properly to style it, an Ego. Thus, for him, the hypothesis of an Ego distinct from fugitive states of consciousness is a "fiction coined from non-entity."* "The collective 'I' or 'self' can be nothing different from the Feelings, Actions, and Intelligence of the individual; unless, indeed, the threefold classifi-

* *Logic*, "Deduction," i. 262.

cation of the mind be incomplete. But so long as human conduct can be accounted for by assigning certain sensibilities to pleasure and pain, an active machinery, and an Intelligence, we need not assume anything else to make up the 'I' or 'self.'** The popular notion of an Independent External World he regards with Berkeley as self-contradictory, positing as it does a smuggled-in percipience, when percipience is *ex hypothesi* abstracted from. Still, though the mental and the object consciousness are thus mutually implicated, they exhibit, also, notable features of difference. Material Perception, or the Object-consciousness, is connected with the sensation of expended muscular effort, is made up of definite sensations uniformly related to definite outputs of such muscular effort, and is further marked off by experiences of Extension and Resistance (visible forms and magnitudes, tangible forms and magnitudes and degrees of force) which appear the same to all percipients alike. On these counts it is sharply separable from the pleasures and pains, the memory trains, reasoning, etc., which constitute the internal or Mental-consciousness. "What we call Sensation, Actuality, Objectivity, is an unlimited series of associations of definite movements with definite feelings; the Idea, Ideality, Subjectivity, is a flow of feelings without dependence on muscular or active energy." † In Bain's admirable works *The Senses and the Intellect*, and the *Emotions and the Will*, we confront a natural history of Mind which will remain a permanent psychological classic. Rich with apposite illustration, gorged with valuable detail, and instinct with an unwavering thoroughness and loyalty to fact, these works taken as a whole constitute the apex of that *non-evolutionist* psychology which dates from Hobbes. A prominent feature of Bain has been his insistence on the physiological concomitants of consciousness, and that, too, at a time when this branch of research was very inadequately recognized. Cautious to a degree, he seems studiously to avoid the tortuous mazes of metaphysic. Nevertheless, with all his care his results manifest a fundamental incoherence.

Emphasizing though he does the contrast of idea and

* *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 402.

† *Ibid.*, p. 200.

thing, "mind" and "matter," Bain does not hesitate to contend for their radical identity *per se*. They are for him not really irresolvable opposites, but the two aspects of a substance. But what substance, for there comes the rub? On what side does this alleged identity hold—on that of the consciousness, on that of the object (or its Noumena) conceived as absolute? Surely not on that of the object, which has been already shown to be nothing more than presentation for consciousness? Surely Bain will not desert his idealism at a pinch, and hypostatize the object as ground of the very consciousness in which it hangs? But what does he do in actual fact? Here comes the surprise.

Dealing with the mode of relation of "Mind" and Body, in the course of a well-known volume, Bain repudiates the dualistic theory with emphasis. The two substances of the dualist "are no longer compatible with ascertained science and clear thinking," he writes. "The one substance with two sides, the physical and the mental—a double-faced unity—would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case."* At the first glance, this dictum suggests Spinozism, in which system "mind" and body are held to be fundamentally modes of attributes of one and the same unknown substance. But Bain's reference to his theory as "*guarded materialism*" would indicate the "substance" he alludes to as matter—as the hypostatized object referred to. What is the meaning, then, of this peculiar side of his teaching?

Will it be urged that Bain is treating the difficulty empirically, that he is dealing with Body and "Mind" simply as facts connected in our workaday experience? This is a defence which might possibly be advanced. But I venture to assert that the unification of "mental" and physical attributes in one substance bears on its face something more than the form of an empirical working hypothesis—it is a distinctly *metaphysical solution*. And, if so, the materialism of Bain's physiological psychology and the idealism of his analysis of cognition are flagrantly incompatible results.

A similar confusion between metaphysic and psychology may be noted in the writings of Lewes. It may also be traced

* *Mind and Body*, p. 196.

in Hume's.* Thus Hume will not pledge himself to any of the three hypotheses which refer the genesis of "impressions" to the creative power of mind, to Deity, to external objects. But he subsequently maintains that "motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception." But how? The motion supposed to stir a man's brain and nerves is chimerical; it is merely *one of Hume's possible groups of sensations*. Let us reply, then, "By all means regard neuroses as causative of psychoses, *when you have once established an independent external world*. But do not start with idealism and then project outward *your perceptions* (or rather inferred possible perceptions) as the cause of an alien *consciousness*."

But suppose we adopt the working hypothesis defence, even then it must be pointed out that the standpoint of Bain conflicts with his own definitions. He has remarked that Mind and Body have nothing in common except "the most general attributes, degree and order in time."† Turning to the *Logic*, I come across the passage, "Substance is not the absence of all attributes, but the most fundamental, persisting, inerasible or essential attribute or attributes in each case."‡ According, therefore, to this definition it is logically necessary to constitute Mind and Body two substances. The attributes of Extension, Inertia, Gravity, Size, Form, Motion, Position, and a number of subsidiary derivatives from these are admitted by Bain to be all present in "Matter," all absent from Mind. Now, Resistance and Extension, as the "most fundamental" attributes of Matter, must, accordingly, stand for the substance of Matter. And the substance of Mind, as not comprising these two attributes, cannot, then, be identified with that of Matter.

Can the looseness of our British use of "mind" be accountable in part for the confusion? I am inclined to think that it is. The word now stands for consciousness as a whole,

* Nay, even in Mill, where he would replace a phrase of Hamilton's "unconscious mental modifications" with "unconscious cerebration." On the lines of Mill's psychological idealism, such cerebration is a pure figment, for he would scarcely contend that his or our *possible perceptions* are the cause of some one else's thoughts.

† *Mind and Body*, p. 135.

‡ *Logic*, pt. i. p. 262.

now only for our thoughts, emotions, and volitions as opposed to *things*. The popular use of it is confessedly the latter, but British philosophers tend to oscillate between both meanings, to the grave detriment of their thinking.

Bain's standpoint shows that psychology cannot get on without metaphysic whenever a leading question is put to it. Whenever we discuss the relation of brain and perception, brain and thought, empiricism begins to stammer. It has not fully thought out the presuppositions with which it starts. Unfamiliar vistas of metaphysic rush tumultuously on the view, mingling confusedly with its old ideas. The present inquiry into the union of "Mind" and "Body" is as metaphysical a one as can well be. How necessary, then, to fully rethink the meaning which we attach to these two terms, and to hold consistently to our definitions; otherwise, we shall simply plunge helplessly in a sea of contradictions!*

In conclusion, it may not be amiss to point out how wide the parting might be between the standpoints of Mill and Bain. Mill's veiled Ego might be made to support and buttress a highly stable system. But Bain's creed closely resembles a body with head and feet lost in rolling mists. For him neither Ego nor External World have any standing outside the flow of conscious states. And not even these conscious states are the "prius"—they emerge from time-ordered sensations which previous to association do not carry with them consciousness. Whence, however, these original time-ordered sensations? Here, indeed, we are lost.

* Cf. Kant's criticism of the "Mind and Body" theorizers, in the discussion of the *Paralogisms*.

CHAPTER XIII.

SPENCER.

SPENCER is often referred to as the Agnostic philosopher *par excellence*. But this appellation has a tendency to mislead its hearers. Agnosticism may be used to denote that school which refuses to go beyond phenomena at all. In this particular sense Spencer is not an agnostic, seeing that he claims to have established the existence of an "Unknowable" Absolute as ground of phenomena. It exists, but we are unable to affirm of it more than that it exists. How does he arrive at the existence of this "Unknowable"? He regards it as involved in the very assertion of the relativity of our knowledge. Unless the Absolute is posited, the Relative becomes Absolute, which lands us in a contradiction. "In the very denial of our power to learn *what* the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is, and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing but as a something." * There is indeterminate consciousness of It coexisting with determinate thought. "Besides that *definite* consciousness of which Logic formulates the laws, there is an *indefinite* consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the thoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still real in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect." †

Hamilton had urged that the Absolute is a negation of conceivability; Mansel, his disciple, had branded "Absolute" and "Infinite" as names not for objects of knowledge, but

* *First Principles*, p. 88.† *Ibid.*

for the absence of the conditions under which knowledge is possible. Spencer, on the contrary, holds that we have an "indefinite thought" of the Absolute born from a "coalescence of a series of thoughts," this said consciousness being irreducible to logical relations and hence not amenable to critical demolition. The Absolute, thus sensed, is inscrutable. In shaping this doctrine Spencer seeks to effect the reconciliation between the affirmations of Religion and the destructive negations of Science. He proclaims it as the soul of truth in theologic error, as well as the necessary presupposition of the iconoclast.

Believing that "in its ultimate essence nothing can be known," Spencer necessarily holds the basic data of Science, Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force as symbolic only of modes of the Unknowable. Were it feasible to resolve the attributes and relations of objects into manifestations of Force in Space and Time, the last-named trinity would still outstrip our comprehension.* Subsequently, he goes on to say, "We come down then finally to Force, as the *ultimate of ultimates*. . . . Space, Time, Matter, Motion, are apparently all necessary data of intelligence, yet a psychological analysis . . . shows us that these are either built up of, or abstracted from, experience. Matter and Motion, as we know them, are differently conditioned manifestations of Force. Space and Time, as we know them, are disclosed along with these different manifestations of Force as the conditions under which they are presented."† And, again, he suggests that "Space and Time may possibly possess only a "relative reality," implying, it is true, some corresponding modes of the "Unknowable," but modes which may be utterly alien to the symbols of them welling up in our consciousness.‡ Relativism dogs our footsteps; the postulates of philosophy being reducible to the Unknowable, the knowable likenesses and unlikenesses of its manifestations, and the resulting segregation of these into mind and object. In view of this relativism it is only a symbolic explanation of the world-process with which Spencer seeks to provide us. For it must ever be borne in mind that it is nothing more than a system of symbols which the protagonist of Evolutionism

* *First Principles*, p. 67.

† *Ibid.*, p. 169.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

has elaborated. When, for instance, he sketches the process of integration of a planet out of a nebula, he does not intend to portray the process as it might be supposed to have obtained beyond consciousness. With the ongoings of the "Thing in itself" he has no concern. He simply endeavours to describe what imaginary human percipients might have perceived. It is this doctrine of the relativity of perception implied in the foregoing reservation that Spencer has styled "Transfigured Realism." "The realism," he writes, "we are committed to is one which simply asserts objective existence as separate from, and independent of, subjective existence. But it affirms neither that any one mode of this objective reality is in reality that which it seems, nor that the connections among its modes are objectively what they seem. Thus it stands widely distinguished from Crude Realism."* It will prove of interest to compare with this attitude the allied doctrine of Helmholtz. †

It is, of course, as the protagonist of Evolutionism that Spencer has led the "best thought" of the later Victorian era. An evolutionist in the sphere of biology he was, long prior to the advent of Darwin's luminous *Origin of Species*. The concept of Natural Selection as a leading cause of biological advance served but to render more clear to him *how* Evolution had been brought about—it provided him with a factor supplementary to the old Lamarckian hypothesis on the matter. Thus, in the second edition of his *Principles of Psychology* (vol. i. p. 465), he overtly commits himself to the view that "life under all its forms has arisen by an unbroken evolution, and through the instrumentality of what are called natural causes"—an utterance anteceding the publication of the Darwin-Wallace hypothesis by three years. The contention, however, is obviously implicit in *First Principles*. So far so good. But for Spencer it is not to the narrow department of Biology that the Development doctrine has to be confined. Briareus-like, that doctrine must embrace all spheres of knowledge in its mighty grasp. Hence the Spencerian system has sought to generalize under one comprehensive formula the whole stream of known or inferable

* *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 494, 3rd edit.

† *Recent Progress in the Theory of Vision*.

coexistences and sequences, from the revelations of astronomical and geologic science to the complex of interwoven facts yielded by biological research and the survey of human society. The formula in question runs: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." It is intended to cover the ground of evolutionist psychology as well as that of objective science, but in what sense we shall see later on.

The steps leading up to this definition are briefly enumerable. Spencer's cardinal test of truth is the "Inconceivability of the opposite." On this basis he erects the doctrine of the Persistence of Force.* As underlying, it transcends experimental proof, being fundamentally equivalent to the persistence of the Unknowable itself. Deductive verification can at best illustrate it. Derivative from this fundamental truth are the "Indestructibility of Matter" and the "Continuity of Motion." † "Having previously seen that our experiences of Matter and Motion are resolvable into experiences of Force," the student will at once grasp the derivative origin contended for. Again, on the general truth of the "Persistence of Force," the belief in the *persistence of relations between specific modes of force* necessarily hinges. Every manifestation of Force has a relation quantitatively and qualitatively uniform with a given antecedent manifestation. In other words, given unvarying conditions, the amount and sort of the effect of a given amount and sort of force are always invariable. Thus the uniformity of causation in objective nature is reducible to the uniformity of the quantitative and

* Spencer's use of the term "Force" may be seen from his classification of its main divisions: (1) the forces intrinsic in objects producing space-occupancy by which a unit of matter is passive but independent; (2) the extrinsic forces producing change (Kinetic energy) or tendency to change (potential energy). By reason of these a unit is or will be active but dependent, *i.e.* on its relation to other units of matter. These forces include molar motions and the molecular motions, light, heat, etc.

† It must not be thought that Spencer acquiesces in the dogma of the continuity of motion as such. He points out in harmony with his other views that the *translation element* in motion is provably not always continuous, disappearing, for instance, in the case of a chandelier arrested in mid-swing to give place to *strain*. This "strain" is for him the objective correlate of our sense of effort.

qualitative relations obtaining between modes of Force and their equivalencies when transformed. A crucial instance in point is Joule's brilliant discovery that the fall of 772 lbs. one foot will always heat a pound of water one degree Fahrenheit. It will be seen here that the popular expression "the falling of the pound is the *cause* of the raised temperature" is simply indicative of an underlying persistence of a relation between two modes of force. Force, however, in itself remains utterly unknown. In addition to this principle, Spencer enumerates the *Direction of Motion* which, born from the conflict of co-existing repulsive and attractive forces, takes the line of least resistance, that of the greatest traction or their resultant, and the *Rhythm of Motion*, i.e. the undulatory or oscillating movements, molar and molecular, consequent on the conflict of forces not in equilibrium. All motion alternates.* The flapping of a sail in the breeze, the shiver of leaves in a blast, the oscillation of wind-lashed stalks in a cornfield, the phenomena of nebulæ, of prices, of magnetic variations, of the beating of the heart, of meteorologic rhythms and numerous natural cycles, are, with Spencer's usual profuseness of detail, cited in illustration. Both the *Direction and Rhythm of Motion* are deducible from the *Persistence of Force*. Considered in combination, these above-noted agencies result in a continuous redistribution of matter and motion in general and in detail throughout the Cosmos. All change is their outcome, and change is divisible into the two great divisions of *Evolution and Dissolution*. It is at this point that we can take up anew the thread of Spencer's justly celebrated formula.

Evolution is primarily an integration or coming together of material bodies. It involves loss of motion. Thus the primeval fire-mist could not have passed into a solar mass with its planetary children and satellite grandchildren unless it had been in large part divested of that vibratory motion which we call heat. "Alike," says Spencer, "during the evolution of a solar system, of a planet, of an organism, of a nation, there is progressive aggregation of the entire mass.

* So Tyndall, in his *Essay on the Constitution of Nature*, speaks of the "rhythmic play" of Nature's forces. "Throughout all her regions she oscillates from tension to *vis viva*, from *vis viva* to teusion."

This may be shown by the increasing density of the matter already contained in it ; or by the drawing into it of matter that was before separate, or by both. But, in any case, it implies a loss of relative motion. At the same time, the parts into which the mass has divided, severally consolidate in like manner. We see this in that formation of planets and satellites which has gone on along with the concentration of the nebula out of which the Solar system originated ; we see it in the growth of separate organs that advances, *pari passu*, with the growth of each organism ; we see it in that rise of special industrial centres and special masses of population which is associated with the rise of each society. Always more or less of local integration accompanies the general integration." *

The evolution thus initiated is simple or compound. It is simple if the forces are merely aggregative, if the aggregative forces are greatly in the ascendant, or "if, because of the smallness of the amount to be integrated, or because of the little motion the mass receives from without in return for the motion it loses, the integration proceeds rapidly." It is compound when slow integration admits of the modifying effects of other forces. With the deciphering of the secondary effects thus induced on primary integration, the subsequent Spencerian exposition is mainly concerned. In carrying out this task the *Principles of Psychology, of Biology, of Sociology*, develop in detail the several leading ideas outlined with such wealth of illustration in *First Principles*.

It is from this point onward easy to follow Spencer in his expansion of that part of the formula which exhibits Evolution as a change from homogeneity to heterogeneity, from unity to variety, from definiteness to indefiniteness, from incoherence to coherence. His profusion of examples strews our path with roses. The "Instability of the Homogeneous" owing to the incidence of different forces on different parts of any aggregate, the "Multiplication of Effects" by which a Force impinging on any aggregate, passes into numerous modes of manifestation corresponding to the differentiation of the mass—make for ever-increasing variety in inorganic and organic nature. The law of segregation, on the other hand,

* *First Principles*, p. 327.

yields definiteness by uniting like with like. The process so generalized is shown by Spencer to obtain from such astronomic phenomena as the formation and detachment of nebulous rings, down to the origination and conservation of species, and the sorting out of sand, shingle, and fine sediment on sea-shores by the water. The root of this matter as of the rest is to be found in the Persistence of Force. Unlikenesses in the material objects acted upon, where the incident forces are alike, must generate differences of effects and *vice versâ*. It is not, however, practicable to convey any adequate conception of the resource and versatility with which Spencer has illuminated his several positions. Direct reference to his work will richly reward research.

But now comes the inevitable question. Is this process of Evolution, manifest under so many phases—astronomic, geologic, biologic, psychologic, and sociologic,—eternal? In no sense, answers Spencer in his chapter on “Equilibration.” A due series of deductions from the law of the “Persistence of Force” will show that an ultimate Dissolution is inevitable. From this original law follow “not only the various direct and indirect equilibrations going on around, together with that cosmical equilibration which brings Evolution under all its forms to a close; but also those less manifest equilibrations shown in the readjustments of moving equilibria, that have been disturbed.”* Recognizing the gradual dissipation into space of the contained motion of the Solar system and in particular of the sun, we must regard all terrestrial changes whatever as incidents in the course of cosmical equilibration. Eventually, therefore, a time must come when the stream of sun-force, which is the ultimate reservoir of the activities of plant, animal, and man, as well cause of the bulk of other terrestrial changes, geologic, meteorologic, etc., will prove inadequate to the drain on it. It is from that time that the antagonist process Dissolution, always attendant on Evolution, will necessarily begin to assume the ascendant. The Solar system like its contained minor aggregates “must surely die;” that is, in Spencerian language, pass into that final equilibration which precedes an ultimate break-up. That break-up into the nebulosity of the primal fire-mist

* *First Principles*, p. 517.

will ensue on the clash of planet on sun and sun on star, which universal gravity co-operating with the resistance of the ether to motion must ultimately produce. But these resolutions of Solar systems back into their original homogeneity, whether partially or universally synchronous, will themselves lay the foundation of new Evolution-periods. "Motion as well as matter being fixed in quantity, it would seem that the change in the distribution of Matter which Motion effects, coming to a limit in whichever direction it is carried, the indestructible Motion thereupon necessitates a reverse distribution. Apparently, the universally coexistent forces of attraction and repulsion, which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm in all minor changes throughout the universe, also necessitate rhythm in the totality of its changes—produce now an immeasurable period during which the attractive forces predominating, cause universal concentration, and then an immeasurable period during which the repulsive forces predominating cause universal diffusion—alternate eras of Evolution and Dissolution." * Thus we are finally confronted by Spencer with a Heraclitan doctrine of endless cycles of world-building and destroying, stupendous vistas which dizzy the brain of the onlooker.

In matters psychological Spencer is an empiricist of a revised evolutionist type. Thus his doctrine of Space and Time as rough intuitions for the existing individual, but as experientially acquired by his remote animal ancestors, aims at reconciling the intuitionist with the experientialist view. † This line of thought is also interestingly exhibited in his theory that no small part of our emotions, sexual, æsthetic, religious, etc., harks back to obscure representations which once had place in ancestral experiences. ‡ Consciousness he

* *First Principles*, p. 537.

† Even the much-discussed axiom "A straight line is the shortest distance between two points" "lies latent in the structure of the eyes and the nervous centres which receive and co-ordinate visual impressions" (cf. *Psychology*, ii. 194, 195).

‡ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 472, et seq. This revision of the doctrine which restricts experience to the individual is in a sense incontrovertible. The older associationist theory cannot explain the original capacity of organizing sensations which is native to the individual, while the varying degrees of this capacity, observable in different *individuals of different* human and animal species, are really left unanalyzed. Spencer justly adverts to the congenital character of the musical faculties in the higher races, and the

regards as the subjective face of certain cerebral processes which have been evolved as links in the chain of adaptation of organic action to external relations. Still there is a conflict in his declarations to be noted. In his *Principles of Psychology*,* subjective states are regarded throughout as the *obverse* of special neural currents. But if we turn to *First Principles*, we shall find that this "obverse" theory common to Bain, Romanes, and Lewes is heralded by a very marked attempt to derive consciousness directly from molecular mechanics. There is no mistaking the import of such language as "the correlation and equivalence between external physical forces, and the mental forces generated by them in us under the form of sensations,"† and "that no idea arises, save as the result of some physical force expended in producing it, is fast becoming a commonplace of science."‡ It is needless to say that this is pure materialist psychology, and utterly inconsonant with the doctrine elsewhere taught by him to the effect that "Mind" and Body are "the subjective and objective faces of the same thing." The one involves the passage of motion into sensation, the other denies the assertion that any such causal relation is traceable.

The reconciliation of *a priorism* and empiricism already noted is of a piece with Spencer's rational Utilitarianism in Ethics. He holds that the Expediency theory is in its ordinary acceptation defective. Utility as measured by the individual is not capable of covering the whole ground. "I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which

contrast of Newton and Shakespeare with savages unable to count up to the number of their fingers and speaking a language consisting only of nouns and verbs, as corroborative of his view. Moreover, the very having of *sensations*, taken over by Hume, Locke, and others, *en bloc*, is now argued to exhibit an *a priorism* of the novel order. "The cause why vibrations of a given rapidity only produce the sensation of light, and other vibrations only the sensation of heat, lies in the *a priori* organization of the retina and skin nerves" (Lewes, *Hist. of Phil.*, ii. 477).

* *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 140.

† *First Principles*, p. 212.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility."* Conformably to his belief that human desires will ultimately acquire complete adaptation to surroundings, Spencer is an unfaltering optimist. "Pleasure being producible by the exercise of any structure which is adjusted to its special end, . . . the necessary implication [is] that, supposing it consistent with maintenance of life, there is no kind of activity which will not become a source of pleasure if continued; and that therefore pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action demanded by social conditions." And again, "The adaptation of man's nature to the conditions of his existence cannot cease until the internal forces which we know as feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter. And the establishment of this equilibrium is the arrival at a state of human nature and social organization, such that the individual has no desires but those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of action, while society maintains no restrictions but those which the individual voluntarily respects."

With the accuracy of the cosmology of Spencer we are not here directly concerned. What assured results flow from such inquiry metaphysic has simply to re-think, re-read, re-interpret. The sciences, including psychology, are so many tentacles whereby the central metaphysical sac obtains its nutriment, and in the absence of which its properly digestive function is impossible. Previous, however, to discussing the metaphysical import of Spencer, we shall do well to note his unique prowess as a generalizer of such sciences. Here, at least, he stands before us as a master. Exploiting their several quarries, he has reared a fabric of cosmological thought which, in point of industry, method, versatility and wealth of research combined, has no compeer. We have to recognize outright and without show of demur the grandeur of this work—"work," in Fiske's words, "of the calibre of that which Aristotle and Newton did—though, coming in this later age, it as far surpasses their work in its vastness of performance as the railway surpasses the sedan-chair, or as the telegraph surpasses the carrier-pigeon."

* Letter to Mill.

That Spencer's Cosmology is secure at every point, or that it is in any sense exhaustive, few, if any, of his warmest admirers would contend. Many of the stages limned forth by him may not have ruffled the hoary past; others, again, it may be, of colossal import, may not have yet unfolded themselves to the eye and imagination of science. But that nature and mind are the outcome of *some* evolutionary process is an hypothesis which he has done more than any other writer to consolidate. And the testimony to his insight is daily receiving reinforcement. Whether culled from the domains of astronomy, of geology, of the study of living organisms, of chemistry, of anthropology, of the pedigrees of reason, art, religion, morality, politics, legal systems, language, and writing, of industrial inventions and the thousand and one other aspects of scientific research, the data converge most remarkably. Altogether the view that there has obtained, and is now obtaining, SOME PROCESS of universal evolution, is not to be resisted; and it rests with the science of the future to grapple with the very obscure details in their completeness. And, in doing so, its assimilation of Spencer must take place on a scale of considerable magnitude.

There are two considerations bearing on the Spencerian Cosmology which demand brief comment. The first concerns the attitude, not indeed of the master, but of some of his disciples. Spencerians are apt to assume that, in generalizing some aspects of the process of the development of things, they are explaining the things and the process alike.* Such a view is radically defective. Even supposing it was demonstrable that the causes of evolution are immanent in the process itself, that what we call "natural forces" have without intermittent drafts on intelligence spun the existing cosmos, it would still remain to inquire into the ground of the "natural forces" themselves. If Agnosticism forbids any such inquiry, well and good; but in this event let it never invest its generalizations with a show of explanatory finality. In the texture of a sunset cloud, groupings of

* One source of the illusion is the habit of speaking of "concrete facts" and "derivative laws" as *dependent* on higher laws without the needful caution. The dependence is utterly illusory except in our concepts. The concrete facts are all perception yields us—the rest is generalization rendered possible by language only.

myriad hues pass into others in continuous and unbroken succession. The rustic perceives the flux, but he perceives, infers, and cares for nothing more. Similarly, in the cosmology of Spencerians, vast groupings of cosmic phenomena pass away into others in continuous and unbroken succession; but the ground of this panoramic flux remains "unknown," but often, for convenience' sake, *ignored*. The phenomena are most faithfully depicted as coming and going, but to generalize the modes *in which* they do so is not to reveal the *why*. Properly regarded, the celebrated formula of Evolution is a *generalized description* of the world-process, not an unveiling of its mainsprings. Spencer has merely indicated in very abstract language the most general points of community which he believes onrushing phenomena to present. The phenomena themselves rest on mystery. Spencer himself has most frequently emphasized this view. But he has, nevertheless, inspired many with the crassly mechanical bias. Not that *he* believes that his mechanical cosmology has "explained" this mysterious universe. It is the *appearance* of such explanation that leads so many astray.

The second consideration regards the tendency to view known phases of the objective real as more or less exhaustive. With this bias, however, I have previously had occasion to deal, and will therefore content myself with noting the dogmatism that so frequently identifies Nature with the known physical cosmos and its annexed "hypothetical" ether. Kant, Mill, and Hamilton, as we saw, made special reservations on this head. We shall have cause to find that these reservations are not only required by caution, but are pregnant with a living significance to philosophy.

I propose now to direct our attention to Spencer's doctrines of the Unknowable, of External Perception, and certain of the broader aspects of his psychology. And first dealing with the former, I shall show (1) that his mode of establishment of the Absolute is neither original nor (2) compatible with the tenor of his own thinking; (3) that the Unknowable is a misnomer; and, further, (4) that it is in any case a barren concession to religious philosophy. To these criticisms I shall append considerations bearing on the doctrine of "unknowable" surds in general—a doctrine

which is regarded in this volume as one of the outstanding superstitions of philosophy.

A theory that the reality of Spencer's Absolute is *implied* by the Relative would, standing by itself, involve a fallacy. "Relative" implies in its notion some correlative, and if knowledge is termed so by tacit reference to a Noumenon, the question is begged at the outset. The noumenal surd-like Absolute is conjured out of the hat into which it is first slipped. However, Spencer is beyond this scholar's mate. He does say that the notion "relative" implies an absolute, but this view does not stand alone. The notion depends on the fact that we have an *indefinite consciousness* of the Absolute. Granted this indefinite consciousness, all goes smoothly enough.

Spencer's argument for the Absolute is an echo of that of Schleiermacher. This thinker states clearly that there can be no definite knowledge of the Absolute—only a very real feeling or indefinite consciousness of it accompanying as their substrate all willing and knowing. Has Spencer advanced on this standpoint? Not an iota. On the contrary, he has receded from it. His Absolute is a *surd*—that of Schleiermacher is spiritual.

The vindication of Spencer's doctrine lends itself too easily to criticism. Turning to *First Principles*, we read: "The contrast between the Absolute and the Relative *in our minds* is really the contrast between the *mental element* which exists absolutely and those which exist relatively. . . . Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness, or *raw material of thought*, to which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence."* Of "real existence," but not of an Unknowable or neutral Absolute, comes the objection. By admission the "raw material" of thought is a spiritual one. How, then, can it stand for an Absolute *of a non-spiritual character*? How, further, can it yield that certitude of "*objective reality*," belief in which "*metaphysical criticism cannot shake*"? It is a raw material of thought—pure Ego, if you like—but it is not by definition anything else. A

* *First Principles*, p. 96.

nondescript surd-like Absolute and *independent objectivity* are not in it, and, if not, cannot be substantiated by it. Schelling claimed that he was able to seize the Absolute in a flash of intuition transcending mind or the definite thinking mentioned by Spencer. He, too, argued for an indefinite consciousness, but *his* Absolute as thus attested was *spiritual*. How consciousness can attest a non-spiritual Absolute is a contention I cannot fathom.

These objections in their turn mediate others. Turning to other pronouncements of Spencer, we discover what the genesis of this "raw material" is actually held to be. In *First Principles* it is the physical processes in the brain which generate consciousness out of motion. On the lines of this hypothesis, the "indefinite consciousness" of the *Absolute* is reducible to nerve-function,—is equivalent to no more than a *phase* in the *transmutations of motion*. If no state of consciousness arises in us "save as the result of some physical force expended in producing it," it results that our seizure of the Absolute is also thus generated. It may be said that these physical processes are themselves mere *symbols of noumena*, and such would no doubt be the Spencerian's answer. But belief in such noumena, belief in "objective reality," rests itself on the consciousness of the Absolute—on the very product that these said noumena generate. Had it been allowed that the Absolute is essentially spiritual and *reveals itself to be such in consciousness*, all these singular tangles might have been spared us.

The doctrine of Inscrutability, however, is one that fails Spencer in practice. The Absolute, says *First Principles*, is unknowable. Substantiality, however, is a predicate; the "Absolute" is the substance of phenomena—a very real judgment. But to judge is to know, and it follows accordingly that the Unknowable is knowable. In a qualifying passage adduced in the third volume of the *Essays* (p. 237), Spencer seems, indeed, to take note of this difficulty, and he remarks in consequence: "It seems to me that the 'learned ignorance' with which philosophy ends must be carried a step further; and, instead of positively saying that the Absolute is unknowable, we must say that we cannot tell whether it is knowable or not."

Note, however, that "IT" remains in position, that the Absolute is still somehow given; that it is, in consequence, a datum somehow seized and somehow made Substance of phenomena. Inscrutability can hold not of this bare reality, but only of its esoteric workings. But this is not all. In the course of his actual exposition Spencer whittles even this sort of inscrutability away. His statements render the Absolute more and more accessible. How reconcile inscrutability with the assertion that the "more or less coherent" of the relations among our states of consciousness answer in symbolical fashion to corresponding relations among Noumena? Such an affirmation rends the veil of Isis, and if we are still unable to seize the lineaments of the goddess, we can, at least, catch a glimpse of her dimples. Add to this the allusion to Force as the "ultimate of ultimates,"—this concept being itself based on muscular effort,—and to this again the far later revolutionary assertion that the First Cause may be essentially of the nature of consciousness (*Religion, a Retrospect and a Prospect*), and the nescience once battled for is seen to be slowly dispelled. The Unknowable, in short, belies its title.

But let us now for the moment dismiss all these difficulties. Let us assume that the Unknowable is established as what its title implies. The question then arises—Would such an Absolute be of any value to religion? It would not. The Cerberus of sentiment requires a far more soporific morsel. I pass over the issue as to whether a really religious philosophy can dispense with a satisfactory treatment of the Soul-problem. I will here simply record a conviction that it cannot. Assuming, then, that an Absolute is enough to feed religion, of what significance is this particular Absolute of Spencer? Of no more than is a surd to the interests of everyday life. Granted that religion must found on some sense of mystery, it must incorporate other elements also. There must be present not only the feeling of mystery, but the vague belief that the Absolute personal or impersonal is essentially akin to *consciousness*. Scant import, indeed, has an unknown *x* to the reveries of poet, mystic, or nature-worshipper. Materialism itself can yield us this. Even Büchner concedes that "what matter is in itself," "what force is in itself," is unknowable. But Büchner, unlike

Spencer, does not constitute this inscrutability—this term without answering fact—the haven of a religious instinct.

This barrenness of the Unknowable is still further exhibited when the import of Spencer's system as a whole is taken into account. It will be accurate to describe it as a complex of materialistic results backed by a repudiation of materialistic ontology. Two facts stand prominently out. Consciousness is accorded no reactive causality on the nerve-currents in correlation with which it wells up. On the contrary, it is dragged at the chariot-wheels of iron necessity; a necessity not springing from its own essence but one *to all intents and purposes* purely mechanical. And observe, also, that the endless redistributing of matter and motion which constitutes Evolution and Dissolution, implies an *eternal cosmic mechanism which cannot be other than what it is*. To insert this helpless *alogical mechanism* in the frame of the "Unknowable" may possibly be a legitimate procedure, but if so, it sounds the death-knell of religion and optimism. In an alogical mechanism there can be no special *provision* for perpetuity of conscious individuals, and, lacking some such finally blissful perpetuity, we poor wretches oscillate between the extremes of a drama and a farce. Men and animals struggling, suffering, tormented units mechanically evolved only to fade out of reality with a dying planet, such an outlook is one which only an academic philosopher can for a moment contemplate with satisfaction.

Against the whole doctrine of unknowable surds we must, however, enter a protest. It founds, as we shall hereafter see, on a baseless theory of External Perception and an equally baseless theory of internal thinking, theories which strip knowledge of the very presuppositions of knowing. Do not interpret my remarks as contesting the relational theory of thought. On the contrary, they will be found freely and unreservedly to admit it. Absolutism asserts in no doubtful fashion that empirical thinking founds on the antithesis of mind and object, that it implies continuous identifying and classification of *relations*, but it adds that the antithesis and the whole business of relationing are facts in and for knowledge and knowledge alone. It has no need of occult noumena, things-in-themselves, unreachable Absolutes, and

other such empty abstractions. It deprecates, on the contrary, the conclusions in which such suppositions debouch. To what enormities of result Relativism actually leads, is nowhere better illustrated than in the case of Hamilton. According to Hamilton, whose arguments so largely bulk Spencer, "All we know is . . . phenomenal—phenomenal of the unknown. The philosopher speculating on the world of matter and mind, is thus in a certain sort only an *ignorant admirer*." * Ignorance, on his showing, is the culmination of knowledge, and thought ripens only to survey itself as nescience. What a monstrous hypothesis is this! How it eviscerates the search for knowledge! Spencer, forced into a compromise with common sense, argues that *Reality* is "persistence in consciousness," a contention which may conciliate the man in the street, but which is, nevertheless, unmeaning from the standpoint of his general relativism.† The connection of this thinker with Hamilton illustrates a curious feature in philosophic history—the ignoring of the reservations of the less iconoclastic Relativists by their successors. Thus Kant ekes out nescience with crumbling "practical necessities," Hamilton with an equally arbitrary faith in God, soul, and the rest. But Lange and the neo-Kantians, Spencer and the agnostics, absorb the relativism and discard the "necessities," etc. And their shredding is justified, for the positing of two water-tight compartments, Knowledge and belief, constitutes a supposition tedious to contemplate. It postulates too deep-seated a rupture in the constitution of things.

The view to be maintained in this volume is to the effect that the universe is both ultimately knowable and thoroughly interpretable. Of Noumenal surds it knows not. And though the Absolutism here to be championed will not be that of Hegel, I have no hesitation in stating that but for the study of Hegel it would never have been advanced. I conceive Hegel's doctrine of the "Absolute as Result" to be one of the grandest lights in philosophy. Though much of his detail may be rejected, the crusade against Relativism

* *Metaphysics*, i. 153. Mill, however, has well shown that this Hamiltonian relativism belies its title when looked into.

† If reality = "persistence in consciousness," is Spencer's world prior to consciousness to be branded as unreal?

is at least worthy of most careful note. Hegel, at least, gave a true standing to knowledge, rescued it from the agnostic implication of being a bundle of illusions, and elevated it as that which, in itself, by itself, and through itself constitutes the heart and essence of Reality. The validity or invalidity of his mode of vindication of idealism becomes in this connection an affair of secondary moment.

Let us now consider the exposition of Transfigured Realism as elaborated at length in Part VII. of the *Principles of Psychology*.^{*} We shall not at present suggest an alternative hypothesis, but simply endeavour to point out its lack of comprehensiveness, and its numerous arbitrary and irrelevant contentions.

In his statement of the Final Question, Spencer contends that, "should the idealist be right, the doctrine of Evolution is a dream." † Here lies a preliminary error, for the acceptance of Evolution as natural process in time, and, as such, prior to individual consciousness, is not only consistent with idealism, but constitutes the idealist innovation of the Nature-philosophy of Schelling. Passing on to the chapter on the "Assumption of Metaphysicians," we are told that the superior trustworthiness of the deliverances of Reason compared with Perception is a fiction of idealism. Reason, as Spencer very justly observes, is but the "recoordinating of states of consciousness already coordinated in certain simpler ways," ‡ the inference being that perception as *immediate* must take precedence of inference as *mediate*. A like view of reason was adopted by Schopenhauer, who rated discursive thinking very low, but did not see in this estimate any ground for abandoning his own idealism. The answer to Spencer is simply this. In Perception there is, as immediate fact, the opposition of the states called the object-consciousness to the states called the mental-consciousness. No idealist need dispute this very patent psychological fact. Certainly if he were to contend that "mind," or the second group of states, possesses the object states as its appendage he would be talking nonsense. The true idealist says simply, "I admit the psychological distinction, but I have no need

^{*} *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. pp. 305-503.

† *Ibid.*, p. 311.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

to posit unknowable noumena as causes, remote or proximate, of these contrasted object states. There is no perception of anything beyond the perceptions themselves. All we confront are certain presentative vivid states interpreted by certain other faint states of the order called mental."

The chapter on the "Words of Metaphysicians" advances the plea that language is incompetent to convey the Sceptical and Idealist hypotheses—that its structure implies existence beyond consciousness. "Language has . . . been moulded to express all things under the fundamental relation of Subject and Object; just as much as the hand has been moulded into fitness for manipulating things presented under the same fundamental relation."* I repeat that, as against an idealism, for which "world" is a sort of appendage of "mind," this argument possesses unquestionable cogency. But as against idealism of the Fichtean or Hegelian type it is irrelevant. The irrelevancy is patent. Language does undoubtedly imply objects over against a mind, but it does not imply Spencer's realism. Idealism proper does not deny that objects and ideas or mental states are different. It adds, however, that the former are not things outside the system of experience, whether that system is considered as *actual* in consciousness or *virtual* in the Idea (Hegel), as simply an appearance in an individual Ego, or in a mere totality of states called Ego (two phases of subjective idealism).

The "Reasonings of Metaphysicians" is mainly devoted to a review of the less defensible positions of Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. Having thus cleared the ground, Spencer proceeds to advance the negative justification of Realism, *i.e.* the proof that at any rate it rests on evidence superior to that for the conflicting hypotheses.† In the "Argument from Priority" we have a telling index of Spencer's metaphysical poverty. He positively asserts that "the postulate with which metaphysical reasoning sets out is that we are primarily conscious only of our sensations"—anything

* *Principles of Psychology*, p. 335.

† The idealist may, however, rejoin that it is not for him to proffer evidence at all. He has simply to state, "I think, I will, I feel, I perceive; that is my experience summed up. You realists, however, want me to go *beyond this direct experience*. Why should I? *Show me.*"

beyond them being only inferred!* And he urges, accordingly, that—

“The existence of a sensation is an hypothesis that cannot be framed until external existence is known.”†

“Realism is the primary conception; . . . the Idealist conception, depending on the Realistic one, must vanish the instant the Realistic one is taken away.”‡

Whatever ground there may be for asserting the above “postulate” of certain British and other writers, there is none for asserting it of the main line of German idealists from Kant onwards. All these writers agree that sensations *per se* are abstractions, and only admit of being dissected out and recognized as such long after concrete objectivity has settled into shape. That Realism is the primary conception, and that Idealism is only reached through it and by it, is a fundamental position of Hegel. And had Spencer turned even to the pages of Emerson he would have read:—

“Culture inverts the vulgar views of Nature. . . . Children, it is true, believe in the external world. The belief that it appears only is an afterthought.”§

The nature of Hegel does not, like Emerson’s, only “appear;” it is, as we saw, virtual in the Idea before it is actual in consciousness.

Next comes the “Argument from Simplicity.” This maintains that the simple only once mediated deliverance of perception yielding realism must be accorded more weight than the complex highly mediated inferences of reason yielding idealism. The one is direct and at first sight seemingly undecomposable, the other is indirect, lengthy, and, not only decomposable, but demanding considerable ingenuity to compose. Again, it is clear that Spencer is off the trail. He observes that each of the words *idea*, *in*, *mind*, presupposes a synthesis; that the proposition, ‘Ideas exist in mind’ is a synthesis of syntheses. Undoubtedly it is, but the idealist does not need it, except on the absurd supposition which makes Nature = “ideas existing in mind.” The idealist says, “The psychological

* *Principles of Psychology*, p. 369.

† *Ibid.* p. 374.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 369.

§ *Essay on Nature*.

distinction of mind and world is obvious. But when the theory of a metaphysical distinction crops out I demur. Though mental and object states *differ* much, they *agree* in being states of my experience. And to sustain this idealism an *immediate consciousness of likeness and unlikeness* is alone necessary. I do not know what your experiences are, but I know that, contemplating a landscape, I find the idealist position borne in on me in this way by purely non-verbal processes of consciousness."

The "Argument from Distinctness" is designed to show that, while the deliverances of Realism are given in *vivid* terms, *i.e.* in perceptual states of consciousness, those of Idealism are given in faint terms or ideas, often only "representations of representations."* Hence, urges Spencer, "the Idealistic deliverance could not be accepted without asserting that things are most certainly known in proportion as they are faintly perceived."† The criticism of the "Argument from Simplicity" applies here also. It is not clear why the fact that presentations are more vivid than representations should, apart from the ruling misconception, be thus adduced.

Having now "negatively justified" Realism, Spencer seeks for a positive vindication of it as a *fundamental deliverance of consciousness working after its own laws*. The criterion of Truth in this as in other matters he unveils in the Universal Postulate or Inconceivability of the Opposite. Inconceivability, for Spencer, signifies mental inability to put together the terms of a given proposition in thought. The inconceivability of the opposite or negative is, consequently, our inability to *suppress or replace* the predicate of a subject when the proposition under survey has been clearly rendered into ideas. He holds this test to be the warrant for all our primary beliefs. The ground for those associations passing the test is thus exhibited:—"The intuitions of axiomatic truths are regarded by me as latent in the inherited brain, just as bodily reflex actions are latent in the inherited nervous centres of a lower order . . . such latent intuitions are made potentially more distinct by the greater definiteness of structure due to individual action and culture; and . . . thus,

* *Principles of Psychology*, p. 381. † *Ibid.*, p. 382.

axiomatic truths, having a warrant entirely *a posteriori* for the race, have for the individual a warrant which, substantially *a priori*, is made complete *a posteriori*. . . . Thought has been moulded into increasing correspondence with Things; and as such correspondence, tolerably complete in respect of the simple ever-present relations, as those of space, has made considerable advance in respect of the primary dynamical relations; the assertion that the resulting intuitions are authoritative, is the assertion that the simplest uniformities of nature, as experienced throughout an immeasurable past, are better known than they are as experienced during an individual life."* Among deliverances due to such nerve-registered inseparable association is that of Transfigured Realism, which, when tested by the Postulate, is found to resist all onslaught.

Take up a book and contemplate it. You will find, urges Spencer, that your consciousness is of the book as object—that you cannot disconnect from these resisting points, colour-patches, etc., the predicate of existence. But for the metaphysicians you would have no suspicion that its objectivity is inferred from your sensations.† Now, this automatic objective reference has the most emphatic sanction of the Universal Postulate; involving, in fact, its assumption only *once*. The mediacy consists of but one simple act. Composite, however, in origin, this reference, now so natural, has a long evolutionary history, running along the whole line of ancestral organisms which has you as its extreme term. The differentiation of mind and object cumulatively enhanced and transmitted has registered itself in the connections of your nervous structure, the separation being now automatic. But out of what elements did this differentiation arise? With this problem the chapters on the "Partial" and "Complete Differentiation of Subject and Object," and "Developed Conception of the Object" carefully proceed to deal. The data posited are states of consciousness, presentative and representative, vivid and faint, and the law of association (which in the earlier portion of the *Principles of Psychology* is held to result from laws of nervous structure).

* *Essays*, iii. 332, 333.

† The most advanced metaphysicians never having said so!

The essence of the reasoning is this. He first indicates how by way of association there come to be read into the general vivid aggregate our ideas of muscular effort, passive resistance and pressure. *He then shows that the resulting product is belief in real independent activities beyond consciousness.* "The general result is that the vivid aggregate, both as manifesting passive resistance and as manifesting active energy, inevitably comes to have *associated with it* in consciousness the idea of power, separate from, but in some way akin to, the power which the faint aggregate perpetually evolves within itself."* The investment of the vivid aggregate with power is thus due to association. And this belief is rendered definite "as experience makes coherent with it the consciousness of permanence, the consciousness of antagonism to our energies, and the consciousness of ability to initiate changes in us." Such in essentials is Spencer's attitude in regard of our involuntary belief in independent objectivity. Accepted *psychologically* as a *history of the genesis of the belief*, it is, as will be obvious, fraught with great value—the ancestral element being a conspicuously excellent innovation. But construed *metaphysically* as a proof of *independent objective agencies* it is misleading and fallacious. In all the foregoing there is no positive vindication of Realism as a deliverance of consciousness working after its own laws, if that vindication is intended to be other than psychological. The vindication merely goes to show why we must *think* the reality of something "out of consciousness," but it does not and cannot establish the something as a fact. If that is to be done, all a Spencerian could do would be to refer us back to "First Principles"—to the "objective reality" warranted by our indefinite consciousness of the Unknowable. And Spencer's attitude in that regard we have already been led to condemn as unsatisfactory.

Spencer, then, has not established his Transfigured Realism. He has misconceived many positions of idealism, and he has positively justified a metaphysical assertion by doling out psychology.

It may not be amiss to suggest that the Criterion of Truth should be carefully restricted to its proper domain—the circle

* *Essays*, pp. 477, 478.

of Experience. Whether Inconceivability of Negation is the test, whether any test is required at all, are issues I will not here open. I will simply urge that to maintain *independent* objectivity—objectivity real *beyond* experience—on the ground of cohesions in consciousness generated by experience, is to confuse psychology and metaphysic. Experience cannot directly validate any other object than what it presents, and the presented object is admittedly only a cluster of vivid states interpreted by faint states. Similarly in all like cases of inseparably cohering states of consciousness, the truth held so attested must be a truth, not beyond, but within the circle of experience.

I have already adverted to some peculiarities of Spencer's philosophy of psychology. He champions the old materialist and the single-substance doctrine in turns. Again, in *First Principles*, he remarks that the man of science "can give no account either of the sensations themselves or of that something which is conscious of sensations."* Nevertheless, Spencer has no hesitation in educing sensation from molecular motions, and in resolving the "something" into relatively permanent groups of nerve plexuses.† Treating of the genesis of the perception of space, he observes that "extension under its several modes is cognizable through a *wholly internal co-ordination* of impressions;" ‡ but he, nevertheless, remarks, that "if space be a universal form of the Non-ego it must produce some corresponding universal form in the Ego."§ How so, if the form is not produced from without but worked up within? How so, if there is further admitted the possibility that space may be only a "relative reality," not inherent as such in the "Non-Ego" at all? || And touching this same crux, it may be pertinently asked—Admitting inheritance of the organized motor, tactual, and visual experiences requisite to the space-intuition, how do these bequests *become my experiences*? Here is another problem for subsequent treatment. Having touched upon the chief points of note, I may now seasonably conclude, having imbued some, I trust,

* *First Principles*, p. 66.

† *Principles of Psychology*, ii. 484, 485.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

|| *First Principles*, p. 165.

with a suspicion that, grand as are Spencer's generalizations of science, as a critic of metaphysic he is far from having said the last word.

[P.S.—Some time after these critical passages had been written, I came across the late Professor Green's assault on Spencer's doctrine of Realism. That assault has been angrily handled by Spencerians. Professor Green's general plea seems, however, to me to have been clearly made good. As I made a detailed analysis of Spencer before penning my criticism, its independent origin is not without interest.]

CHAPTER XIV.

VON HARTMANN.

THE last landmark on our route is the *Philosophy of the Unconscious* of Edward von Hartmann, the successor and emendator of Schopenhauer. By sharp alternation we must take a plunge from the temperate optimism of Spencer into the darkly rolling tide of the doctrine of despair.

To understand the system of Von Hartmann it is necessary to bear in mind its relation to the ontologies of Hegel and Schopenhauer. With Hegel, as we have seen, the logical Idea—that is, the “infinite reason”—is ultimate; with Schopenhauer, on the contrary, Reality springs from the loins of a blind, alogical Will. Both these views have their apparently seamy side. Hegel has to urge that nature is unable to exhibit a universally rational order, and that a margin must accordingly be allowed for pure chance. In plain words, he is incompetent to deal with the hideous aspects of life. Schopenhauer, again, *nominally* abolishes design, but *practically* equips his “Will” with a rationality of working quite marvellous to contemplate. Into the arena of these contrasts descends Von Hartmann, seeking to show that the two knights have been only wrangling over diverse sides of the same shield.

The synthesis of the Hegel-Schopenhauer moments, the steering of a craft midway between Scylla and Charybdis, it has been Von Hartmann’s avowed aim to effect; but however good are his intentions, his craft hugs the eddies of Charybdis. The nominal optimism and the Dialectic method of Hegel are rejected; in their place are set up Pessimism and the

Inductive method of science. The IDEA itself takes a partner.* According to Hartmann, there is to be posited one Absolute Substance, which has two sides or attributes, the "Logical" Idea and the "Alogical" Will. By the former is to be understood a clairvoyant wisdom, one in essence with empirical perception and thinking, though of course immeasurably their superior; by the latter, the mere blind, irrational activity battled for by Schopenhauer. The proffering of this reconciliation seems to have been suggested by Schelling. Like the one Substance of Spinoza, this *Unconscious* Absolute is "exalted above the opposition of the subjective and objective."† It is to the interplay of its two sides, the Will and the Idea, that the genesis and maintenance of the world-order are traceable. The one yields the rationality observable in this order; while the other is a dark, blind power which, only in part controlled, makes for unrest, misery, and disaster.

The ontology of Hartmann recalls in a further regard that of Schelling, as enunciated in his later years, where the world is assigned only an "accidental being." Let us see how the great pessimist sets his ball rolling.

Place yourself, in thought, at a point ere the first cloud of prenebular mist had streaked the inane. All is lapped in peace: the Will and Idea slumber within the bosom of the Unconscious—the Will as potentially active, the Idea as not even this. Then from *pure potentiality* the Will emerges into a state of *empty willing*. How it emerged philosophy cannot say; it can only record and lament over the fact. Now the emerging Will is blind, irrational, indeterminate. Free to will to will, or will not to will, its spontaneity goes no farther. Unhappily it wills to will. But although it can furnish the initial impulse and the underpropping activity, the Will is not competent to conceive and conduct a world-process of itself; it is bare activity. The direction of its activity is wholly due to the Idea. It was a maxim with Schopenhauer that the true sphere of the Idea or knowledge is *passive* contemplation; while the characteristic of Will is a *dynamic* struggling or striving. Von Hartmann transfers this view

* The points made against Hegel are most effective; cf. *Philos. of the Unconscious*, iii. 143 (Coupland's trans.), "Ultimate Principles."

† *Philos. of the Unconscious*, vol. iii. p. 201 (Coupland's trans.).

of the Idea to his system. For him the Idea, albeit Charioteer of Will, is dragged irresistibly along in its Chariot. "Will and Idea," writes Hartmann, "are related to one another as male and female; for the truly feminine never goes beyond an unresisting passive devotion."* And elsewhere: "Were the divine intelligence at all concerned in the decision whether a world should be created or not, the actual result in the case of affirmation would be an inexcusable cruelty towards the created substances on the assumption of dualistic Theism; but on the assumption of Monism the frenzy of a divine asceticism, a divine self-laceration." It is, then, the masterful Will which sweeps Idea into "the whirlpool of being and the torment of the process." Note the expedients of the victim. *Evolution* (inorganic, organic, and mental) is the stage on which *the Idea subjugates its captor*. The "unblessedness" of the interruption of its peace must be abolished. A process of revolts is requisite; and that process consists of a series of stages arranged with such transcendent wisdom as to insure the ultimate triumph of the Idea.

The conquest of the Will implies developed consciousness, and it is this necessity which preserves the evolution of individuals from the impeachment of being an "unfathomable folly." Consciousness represents the partial emancipation of the Idea—in some of its manifestations or rays—from a previous complete servitude to the Will. Consciousness, however, as such, that is, apart from its ulterior utility, is a limitation and defect. A curious explanation is offered of its uprising. Previous to consciousness the Idea can have no presentations, except those called into being on the initiative of Will. It possesses only unconscious knowledge, completely conditioned as to its flow from within. When, however, in connection with organized matter, a presentation arises *from without*, the surprise of the Will at a modification not induced by itself—is *consciousness*. Consciousness, in short, is the "stupefaction of the Will at the existence of the idea not willed yet sensibly felt by it." This explanation ill accords with the view elsewhere expressed that the Will itself never becomes conscious.

The order of things is, as we saw, so directed by the Idea

* *Philos. of the Unconscious*, iii. 169.

as to most easily effect its disentanglement from the grip of Will. Hence the rationality of the process. "The idea of the world-process is the application of the Logical to empty volition." * What dualism there is immanent in the stream of cosmic sequences has no absolute standing. "Spirit and Nature are no longer different, for the original Unconscious Spirit is that . . . which in the actual combination of its moments is Nature, and, as a result of natural processes, Conscious Spirit." † In his treatment of External Perception, Hartmann avows himself a Transcendental Realist. "Matter," as thing-in-itself, he accepts as constituted of force-centres of attraction and repulsion. Boscovitch has said as much as this; but Hartmann goes further, and analyzes these centres into so many idea-willings in the Unconscious. In what we call an atom, he remarks, there exists *unconscious ideation*, and this, coupled with the principle of activity, *unconscious will*, constitutes its whole essence. More or less of a piece with this hypothesis are the kindred theories of Leibnitz, Herbart, Zöllner, Nägeli, Ernst Haeckel, and others.

Under the heads, "The Phenomenon of the Unconscious in Corporeality," and "The Unconscious in the Human Mind," Von Hartmann proceeds to exhibit the interplay of Will and "Idea" in the realms of Nature and consciousness, adducing as witnesses physiology, pathology, organic evolution, history, language, perception, thought, sexual love, etc. Some of his criticisms of the mechanical doctrines of evolution are of an exceedingly acute and suggestive character. The contrast also between the Unconscious or Absolute Spirit of Von Hartmann and the God of theology is certainly not to the disadvantage of pantheism.

Though our author disputes Schopenhauer's assertion that pain alone is positive, his pessimism is of an exceedingly uncompromising type. The ultimate aim of the world-order is not the rounding off of human happiness, but the liberation of the Idea from the Will. Experience shows that pain vastly outstrips pleasure in amount. With the advent of the reflective consciousness, of the capacity to measure the worth of life as a whole, unbiased by momentary impulse, the vanity of things must ever become more patent. With the increasing

* *Philos. of the Unconscious*, iii. 182.

† *Ibid.*, iii. 201.

culture, comforts, and luxuries of an advancing civilization will dawn a conviction that pleasures are all too dearly bought and are all alike illusory. Hence the uselessness of those alliances of egotism and altruism which work for the vaunted Society of the Future. Nevertheless, miserable as the world is, it is not in the quietism of a Schopenhauer that relief is to be sought. An iron destiny drives forward the races, wrecking our utopias, showing up the barrenness of our hopes, immolating myriads of beings in its march, but slowly working out the liberation of the Idea from its galling shackles. With this teleologic march, it is for Ethics to invite loyal and altruistic co-operation. The road to universal annihilation must be paved by a willing humanity. And then eventually a time will come when—by dint of ennoblement of human intellect and advanced modes of co-operation—the loathing of life will attain such an intense and general vividness, that the majority of men will resolve to hurl the tormenting Will back into nothingness. With the negated Will goes the whole underpropping of things, which must then vanish and “leave not a rack behind.” Assuming co-operation on this planet, it is not, however, evident how the inhabitants of the systems of the Suns in the Milky Way, how even the Martians and other possible denizens of the sister planets of Earth are to be affected. And what of the recalcitrant human minority and the huge total of animal sentiences which will constitute the opposition on the Earth? Hartmann indulges in some elaborate arguments to attest the improbability of another universe (assuming this destroyed); but, given the terrible Will *free to will or not-to-will*, I fail to see how any such forecast can possibly be reliable! Freedom is beyond the shackles of calculations.

Von Hartmann has given Pessimism a metaphysic incomparably superior to Schopenhauer's. Still his Will stands on a foundation as unstable as that of the ultimate of his master. The Will itself, we are told, *never* enters consciousness. “The will itself can never become conscious, because it can never contradict itself.” How then is its nature to be substantiated, how is the charge that it is an abstraction to be answered? Surely the admission is most damaging. The artificiality of this battle between the

strangely isolated Will and Idea cannot fail, I opine, to impress us. I do not, therefore, propose to submit this ontology to any detailed criticism. An alternative body of doctrine will be forthcoming in the progress of our constructive researches.

Hartmann's strictures on mechanical Atheism, his complete grasp of the world-problem, his spirited defence of Ontology, the brilliantly suggestive thoughts which splash his pages, render his writing of profound interest to the student. It is he too who has had the courage to champion the unpopular facts of the "spiritists." It is he also who has preached so truly that Ethics in the long run must look to Metaphysic. Though pleasure-hunting is illusory and man finds himself possessed by strong moral tendencies of a social and altruist character, the advance of culture and reflection tends to unsettle him. He would support consciously reflective morality with four pillars: (1) the essential identity of individuals as theoretically established; (2) the religious sentiment of Identity with the Absolute; (3) Absolute teleology as that of our own essence; (4) liberation of the Idea, or negative absolute eudæmonism. On these lines the highest duty of man must be prosecution of the end of the Idea. Hartmann maintains that the moralists must show how their exhortations are to have weight in the absence of ontology, and that, too, an ontology such as he presents. Now, the accuracy of Hartmann's special ontology raises one issue; the general contention involved another. We may reject the former, but should welcome the latter with vehemence. Humanity groping about in the darkness, aimlessly active in a painful and unfathomed universe, would be truly a spectacle to shock us. A blind man in an unknown country is less ludicrous.

Such, then, is our survey of the paladins of modern Western philosophy. Brief as that survey has been, it may serve to convey to us an appreciation of what the difficulties of metaphysic really are. And about the worth of such appreciation there can, I think, be no reasonable question. Let us remain agnostic rather than solve problems that we have not learned to state. Let us not think out metaphysic till the obstacles are thoroughly noted. A guarantee for

comprehensiveness will be secured, while the labours of the past are accorded that recognition which the barest modesty should desiderate.

Just now the interest in ontology is increasing, though scepticism regarding its foundations is general. Many would welcome a new philosophy of belief, who now despair of its possibility. They are startled at the chaotic conflict of onesided present-day systems; they feel too that, lacking an ontology, even physical science and psychology rest on nothing, and they ask for attempts in the way of the Platonic philosopher—the man who sees things together and sweeps them comprehensively into his mental net (*συνοπτικός*). But they also demand that before the builder seeks to pierce the clouds with his fabric, he shall lay its foundations in the humble depths of the plain. On these lines our own tentative researches must, as already indicated, proceed. With respect to specific methods, Regress from the given empirical to its grounds, then deductive exploiting of the inductively-gotten formulas with the concrete steadily in view, is the ideal combination to favour. With respect to initial expectations, we may cherish a hope that a philosophy of Absolutism is not necessarily impossible. Failing it, we are plunged into a Cimmerian gloom, and move like chattering phantoms through the darkness. And more than intellectual interests are at stake. “Theism,” writes Schopenhauer, “has been falsely held to be inseparable from morality, *this is really only true of metaphysic in general*. . . . Therefore we may set before us as the necessary *credo* of all just and good men, “I believe in metaphysic.”* And now renouncing the critical for the constructive portion of our labours, let us proceed to uprear such metaphysic.

* The World as Will and Idea, ii. 330 (Haldane and Kemp's trans.).

PART II.
CONSTRUCTIVE.

PROEM.

METAPHYSICAL finality is a dream, a cloud-castle that breaks up as we approach it. Survey of the flux of world-historic standpoints is decisive. The greatest masters can only advance thought a stage. For the philosophical intellect Truth is itself fluid, the "truth" of any given stage being abolished while absorbed by that of the next. Reason must move if it is to live; here, at any rate, must prevail a ceaseless re-coördinating of ideas grounded on the fresh likenesses and unlikenesses (in the old or a novel "given") that are ever forcing themselves on attention. A level may undoubtedly be reached where even Reason must grow wan before the blaze of Mystic Insight; and this level will be briefly noticed hereafter. There are no grounds, however, for supposing that even Mystic Insight can be stable; but with so speculative a theme we need not just now dally. For the present we must speak as rationalists. And, so long as we are vassals of Reason, we must acknowledge her limitations with modesty.

The ideal, then, of Absolutism can be no more than *progressive* unravelling of the world-secret. The upshot of the grandest system is only the mediation of a higher one; its most honourable success, to figure as a footprint in the *direct line* of the advance of human thought. Clipping thus the wings of Pegasus, we naturally turn to our method. Following what path are we to scale the peak of the Absolute? Though slavery to one method is unnecessary, I may indicate one very effective instrument, which may be dubbed the Concrete Metaphysical Method.* Regress from the empirical

* This work being essentially a Prelude, the Method cannot at present be thoroughly exploited. But some tentative illustrations of its working await the reader in the forthcoming chapters.

in general to its grounds, thoroughgoing deduction of the empirical *in detail* from these grounds with the concrete ever in view—these are its leading features. Obviously it is other than the abstract dialectical method of Plato; a too speculative device, the practical upshot of which is deduction of this so solid-seeming world from a mere *propositional* Unconditioned. Plato assumed that a hierarchy of independent Universals or “Ideas” headed by a Supreme Universal or Idea answers to the generality-grades of philosophical concepts, and so deck-loaded his craft with a vengeance. And with frank dogmatism, he remarked, “Always advancing the *reason* which I hold strongest, I affirm that which seems to me to agree with it to be true; those things not in agreement with it I deny to be true.”* Such procedure breeds deplorable diseases of language. A like objection, along with others, applies to the abstract notion-juggling method of Hegel, which, intent on verbal “Universals,” leaves poor *Reality* out in the cold. Krug, it is said, asked that his quill-pen should be deduced, but Hegel, fogged with abstractions, could not, of course, satisfy him. We, on the contrary, shall deduce quill-pens, stocks, and stones, as well as the general trend of the universe in its entirety. Peddling with empty notions will be ignored; concreteness, always concreteness, is the ideal we have to cherish. Reality lives only as concrete, and no orgies of word-weaving must ever blind us to this fact. Abstractions are often a hard necessity for our infirm human thinking; but let us at any rate avoid them as far as is possible.

Construction (escorted by illuminative criticism) is the object of this part of our work. Now, the formula “States of consciousness appear” was the original point of departure. Construction of metaphysic out of such materials may to some seem an utterly chimerical project. Nevertheless, successful or vanquished, we will allow no shred of faith or begged first principles to taint the fabric. We must concede, of course, that the range of our positive knowledge, perceptual and conceptual, is bounded; but while leaving room for indefinite enlargement of such knowledge, we will hold to the validity of what we have, and in no case eke out our alleged poverty

* Phædo.

with the arbitrary Hamiltonian faith. We will do our best to creep into a niche in the palace of Thought, our path lit up by the torch of intellect alone.

The subject which I shall first take up may appear somewhat misplaced in an inquiry which aims at method. But the contentions to be advanced have to perform a very important function, not indeed that of laying foundations, but that of clearing the tract which these foundations must occupy. They are mainly if not wholly negative and destructive. They constitute an attempt to dismantle the various theories which regard consciousness as affiliated either on Matter or on a nonspiritual noumenal "Substance." Theories of this kind appeal to minds to which Metaphysic proper may be, and ordinarily is, repugnant. Spread out at length before the world, they exact an excessive tribute of attention, sadly to the prejudice of more thorough, if more laborious thinking. In view of their prominence and influence, a special treatment is requisite. Accordingly, I have thought it advisable to deal with these would-be philosophies of psychology on their own merits, to show that, *apart from the deeper issues raised by Metaphysic*, they are all alike rotten, *at war with their own presuppositions*. But while thus exhibiting their fallacies, the indictment will also bring to the fore enigmas with which the popular spiritualist theory of consciousness and body is totally incompetent to grapple.

It is requisite that I should first indicate what is intended by the expression "Philosophy of Psychology." Let us, accordingly, first determine what is the ground covered by Psychology itself. The requisite qualification will then fall naturally into its place. — ^{red.}

Psychology may be accorded three principal departments; it may be subjective, ejective, and objective. By subjective is intended that fundamental portion of its domain which founds on contemplation of our own states of consciousness; by ejective, that which founds on inferences to the states of consciousness of creatures other than ourselves, of men, infants, animals, in their normal and abnormal phases; and by objective, that which founds on observation of the physical accompaniments of these said states of consciousness—a department which recent physiological psychology has

brought into great prominence. Its method may be inductive, *e.g.* when we note to how many heads *observed* modes of Association are reducible; or deductive, as when, starting from known laws of association and other data, we seek to account for the rise of complex happenings in the adult consciousness, —induction pure and simple being sometimes impracticable. All, however, we obtain in any case is a description in general language of certain ongoings of phenomena, observed or inferred. We confront, in fact, a generalized *narrative* phrased in the abstract terminology of science. When we inquire further into the meaning of this narrative—into the import of consciousness as a whole—we leap over the Rubicon that parts psychology from Metaphysic.

Psychology, then, deals primarily with determinations of consciousness and the laws, ultimate and secondary, of their happening. "Psychology is altogether or mainly a science of observation and experiment."* It reaches out to physiology, but only in empirical fashion. It has proved, for instance, that, normally, whenever I perceive and think, certain physical events of an approximately determinable character take place in something called "my" brain. But this proof merely indicates that a relation is found to obtain between two sets of facts of the empirically presented and represented orders, between states of my consciousness as primarily known by myself and states of "my" organism as known or inferred by others. If the question is put, "And what now of the ultimate import of this relation and the terms so related?" Psychology is unable to give an answer. It only professes to deal with the "related" terms as appearances or phenomena. Here, then, the Philosophy of Psychology, itself one province only of a larger metaphysic, must supervene, taking in hand the problems which psychology necessarily suggests.

I have spoken of *two* terms as if at any rate somehow *related*, but what if no relation obtains at all? Here arises a serious problem, which it is necessary to notice even at this stage of our progress. For the metaphysical thinker, the psychological assumption that consciousness is connected with body (viewed as portion of a supposed independent system of bodies) itself demands investigation. Not merely

* Mill, *Logic*, p. 568 (8th ed.).

the way in which the terms are related, but the actuality of the terms themselves is disputable. What of the idealist doctrines of cognition considered in Part I.? What if body is mere objective phenomenon of a subject, individual or universal?

In the course of his comments on the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology, Kant brings out the difficulty with his customary thoroughness of thinking. According to him the time-honoured "Mind-Body" controversy is misleading. The problem as stated by the disputants simply does not exist.

When we moot the problem as to the mode of alliance of consciousness and body, we assume that there really are two potentially separable activities (or grounds of these) so termed. But what if an idealist analysis of cognition robs body of its supposed independent objective actuality? Here comes the rub. All difficulties, contends Kant, touching the relations of consciousness and matter spring from the dualistic fallacy that matter is something more than a phenomenon of consciousness, that it stands for a reality existing in itself, whether we perceive it or not. Seeing that, viewed metaphysically, the external world, including of course the organism, has no independent reality, the speculations of the "Mind-Body" theorists are empty. The proper inquiry, he urges, concerns the relation of our external presentations to our internal ideas—shape, size, motion, resistance, etc., being only so many modes of consciousness.

Obvious, then, is the reflection that Idealism tends to empty the old "Mind-Body" controversy of meaning. If, indeed, idealism, subjective or objective, is valid, all attempts to exhibit consciousness as "diametrically in contrast"* to the order of a material world are wrecked. In view, then, of idealism, what ought our procedure to be? Obviously to postpone our own treatment of the problem till the *crux* of External Perception has been solved. Before probing the mode of the relation, we must decide whether there are two terms to be related, and, if so, what *in themselves* they are. But this necessary order of progression in no way debars us from first criticizing the leading materialist hypotheses *on the basis of their own assumptions*.

* Sir W. Hamilton.

Unquestionably these hypotheses will prove susceptible of an estimate in no wise involving a forestalling of our subsequent metaphysical positions. In fine, they may be considered from the standpoint of their own assumptions, though the legitimacy of the assumptions themselves remains an open question. A caution, however, is requisite. Primacy in importance is ascribed not to the critical objections now to be raised, but to the forthcoming alternative construction. The relation of consciousness and body, that "severest test of logical explanation,"* as Bain aptly terms it, will, then, be confronted from an altogether different standpoint, and a variety of outstanding difficulties tentatively surmounted. Among these the metaphysic of brain-function and the problem of the *Persistence of the Individual* will receive the illumination they so urgently crave. But for the present we must proceed warily.

Before proceeding to examine the materialist philosophies of psychology, we shall do well to avoid a pitfall of a somewhat dangerous character. There are writers, says Aristotle, in the *De Animâ*, who are content to discuss the soul without paying any regard to the body, as if any kind of soul might go along with any kind of body. To-day, the Stagirite's reproach would be a grave one, and would, indeed, justify a critic in ignoring the erring writers. Here it is not necessary that we should enter into the details of the physiology of the nervous system, but it is necessary, I think, that a brief survey of some of the more striking facts making for materialism should be presented. Not only will these facts serve to render it clear why materialists are so numerous, but they will further present problems which a thoroughgoing spiritual metaphysic must, perforce, honestly encounter. Many of these facts seem to eminent thinkers to uproot all hope of the persistence of the Individual after death. All alike reveal an "intimacy" between nerve-action and consciousness in the highest degree remarkable—an intimacy no modern theory can venture to ignore. Observes von Hartmann, "Only those unacquainted with these facts can remain outside their influence; . . . they declare their meaning with such naïve plainness that it is not at all necessary to look for

* *Logic*, "Induction," p. 284.

it."* He, indeed, thinks that Metaphysic has no word of consolation for the individual. Whether this is or is not the case only a patient inquiry can assure us. Without, therefore, indulging in premature hopes or fears, we may now proceed to dispose of the preliminary inquiry I have outlined. The Fallacies of the Materialist philosophies of psychology constitute our theme—we have first to notice some of the facts that have filled these philosophies with vigour.

* *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, ii. 62.

CHAPTER I.

THE MATERIALIST PHILOSOPHIES OF PSYCHOLOGY.

THE concurrence of sensations with determinate bodily changes has never been seriously questioned, and it has now been ascertained that along with our subjective experience of the sensations goes a rise of temperature in the brain. There obtain, moreover, relations between the vividness of sensations and the degree of disturbance in the allied nerve-structures. In order to the having of a sensation of liminal intensity there is requisite a certain intensity of stimulus, the amount of which varies with the condition of the afferent nerve or nerves and correlated centres.* The generalization known as Weber's Law is of interest in this regard. It goes to show that the increase of stimulus found to concur with appreciable increase in intensity of sensation bears a *constant ratio* to the total stimulus present, and that the figures expressing this ratio for the different senses are susceptible of approximately accurate determination. Much controversy has raged over the range of this law, but for us the important point is that any such numerical determinations should have proved feasible at all. Turn now to the emotions, and a like implication with physical activities will reveal itself. In the first place, Emotions may be invigorated or attenuated by varying the quantity of the blood-supply. A hearty circulation is a wondrous determinant of character. Along with the changes accompanying the varying amount of the blood-supply must be considered those due to variations in its quality. Notable

* A given luminous object appears only half as bright in the evening as it does in the morning, other things equal (C. F. Müller).

in this connection are the phenomena ensuing on the taking of opium, haschish, ether, alcohol, purgatives, tea, on access to pure or impure air, on good or bad feeding and on disease. Most of us have laughed at some case of a "bad liver," where the geniality of a once blithe temperament has succumbed to malign changes connected with the secretion of bile. Furthermore, the dependence of most of our emotions on bodily sensations, all of which have their definite physical conditions, has been remarked by many acute writers. The majority, also, have a definite physical expression, alliance with special nervous mechanisms, central and other, being thereby forcibly indicated. This law holds true of the feelings prompting the leer of the buffoon up to those prompting the "mute adoration" of the religious ecstatic and the romantic actions of the lover, and has, of course, received minute recognition at the hands of Art. So strong is the tie between such feelings and their expression, that, in Maudsley's words, "the special muscular action is not merely the exponent of the passion, but truly an *essential part of it*. If we try, while the features are fixed in the expression of one passion to call up in the mind a different one, we shall find it impossible to do so."* The relation of this Expression to organic evolution has been interestingly discussed by Darwin and Herbert Spencer.†

Intellect can claim no exemption from neural conditions or accompaniments. The evidence now to hand is overwhelming. Indeed, we have the cautious Romanes' word for it that "within a time less remote than the two centuries which now separate us from Hobbes, the course of ideas in any given train of thought will admit of having its footsteps tracked in the corresponding parts of the brain."‡ Nay, to cite Stanley Hall, "experiment and disease show that there are psycho-neural processes localized in fibres that can be approximately counted, . . . and dependent on the integrity of specific cell-groups, which no one who knows the facts, now easily shown, could think due only to an imponderable principle mediating freely between parts without necessitating

* *Body and Mind*, p. 30.

† Cf. Darwin, *Expression of the Emotions*, and Spencer, "Language of the Emotions," *Principles of Psychology*, ii. 539-557.

‡ *Rede Lecture*, 1885.

connection of tissue."* We can thus no longer seek to maintain the old favoured-nation clause that freed intellection from alliance with the organism.

It may confidently be affirmed that, other things equal, a larger brain concurs with increased intelligence. From the 64·5 oz. brain of a Cuvier, to the brains of the average European male and female, which have been estimated to weigh some 49·5 oz. and 44 oz. respectively, and thence to the far lighter brains of the lowest savages, and the 12 oz. brains of some idiots, is undoubtedly a far cry. It is found, too, that in respect of quality the brains of civilized men are better developed than those of savages; while among civilized men themselves the brains of great statesmen, poets, men of science, and other *savants*, exhibit a like qualitative superiority. And in a larger domain, "throughout the vertebrated series of animals the convolutions of the brain—which are the coarser expressions of more refined complexities of cerebral structure—furnish a wonderfully good general indication of the level of intelligence attained; while in the case of ants, Dujardin says that the degree of intelligence exhibited stands in an inverse proportion to the amount of cortical substance, or in direct proportion to the amount of the peduncular bodies and tubercles."† Observations of this sort cannot fail to impress the student. The Alliance of consciousness and organism is reported by them as most intimate.

The hard thinker draws heavily on the resources of his organism. Severe thinking may be attended with alterations in the amount of certain excreta of the kidneys, with neuralgia, disordered digestion, weakened action of the heart, fatigue, and a variety of similar effects, all obviously physical, and all somehow implicated with the flow of subjective ideas. How greedily the brain laps up energy may be inferred from a common occurrence; the manner in which deep thought often causes us to stop walking when out of doors. Expenditure of energy in outgoing nerve-currents is considerably diminished when the hemispheres demand a heavy supply of the commodity for themselves. Those who desire a delicate

* "New Psychology," *Andover Review*.

† Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, p. 46.

experimental proof of the absorption of energy by the brain when we think, should consult the elaborate researches of Mosso. By means of an ingenious apparatus this physiologist has shown that voluntary thinking concurs with an immediate accession of blood to the head, and a corresponding reduction of its amount in other parts of the body. Even the *degrees* of intellectual effort have their signs in degrees of disturbance in the circulation. In the case of a translator more familiar with Latin than with Greek, the contractions of the peripheral vessels attending the redistribution of blood were less obvious during renderings of the former tongue than during those of the latter.

The astonishing complexity of the brain carries with it a necessity for a good supply of blood, and hence to meet the demand a sixth to a fifth part of the entire circulation is exacted. And within the confines of the organ itself, the grey corpuscular matter allied with thought absorbs probably about five times as much of this supply as is required by the white fibrous tissue. Evidently, then, the part played by the brain is a leading one. And it cannot be supposed that so wondrously complex and well-nourished a part of it as the cortical portion of the hemispheres has been evolved merely as a parasite on the organism. If associated with thought, the cortex is no sleeping partner, but a thoroughly active ally. A competent operator might no doubt suppress the "faculties" of the empirically known mind piecemeal along with the portions of the grey matter he excised. And we know that by the application and relaxation of pressure upon an exposed brain we may remove and revive perception and thought at will. "The brain," writes Maudsley, "not only receives impressions unconsciously, registers impressions without the co-operation of consciousness, elaborates material unconsciously, calls latent residua again into activity without consciousness, but it responds also as an organ of internal life to the internal stimuli it receives from other parts of the body."* From the empirical standpoint we seem to be compelled rather to regard brain with its nervous offshoots in the senses, muscles, and viscera, as the indispensable vine-prop of consciousness.

* *Physiology and Pathology of Mind*, p. 35.

The verdict of alienists on this latter head is usually uncompromising. They possess, of course, unique facilities for appreciating the pathological aspects of physiological psychology. Probably, the vast majority would sanction Maudsley's definition of mental disorders, as simply "*nervous disorders in which mental symptoms predominate.*"* Vulgar dualism is in a quandary. Significant, again, are the modern researches touching Aphasia and the localization of the physical basis of the speech-faculty; significant also, the parallelism between contiguous association in psychology and co-ordination of habitually combined muscular actions in physiology; repetition in both cases fusing or integrating the implicated nervous activities.† Organic heredity, carrying with it *transmission* of mental disease, and the agreement of the pace of association with the pace of the concomitant nerve-currents,‡ are both worth a glance. Lastly, we may adduce a class of facts which appeal even to the most obtuse. A sailor, let us suppose, is stunned by a falling spar, while in the midst of giving vent to the utterance, "Shiver my——." It is found that his skull is fractured. For weeks he lies unconscious, until a surgeon, suspecting the cause, removes a piece of bone pressing on a portion of the brain. On recovering consciousness, the sailor is *immediately repossessed by the train of thought which directly preceded his mishap*, and he at once completes the utterance, "Shiver my—timbers." *Here a reawakening of brain function carries with it a non-voluntary re-awakening of thought.* Here perhaps, more obviously than in any other class of cases, does the dependence of thought-activity on brain-activity appear to be borne out by facts. Cases of this type, surveyed from the standpoint of vulgar dualism, are destructive thereto. Dualism may, indeed, stand for a truth, but it is assuredly not its accepted form that does so.

I may now advert to some generalizations, partly covering

* *Body and Mind*, p. 41. Bain aptly remarks in the course of his *Mind and Body*, when any derangement operates on the brain, directly or indirectly, the physician looks for definite corresponding mental symptoms. *The state of the mind is dictated by the state of the brain* " (p. 41).

† Cf. Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, p. 42 et seq.

‡ The variations of the pace of thinking with the taking of stimulants, changes in the bodily condition, etc., should also be noted.

ground already trodden, but of an importance amply sufficient to atone for that fact. First in order is Bain's well-known Law of Relativity, a principle with two aspects. On the one side it asserts that change of state is necessary to support consciousness. On the other, it exhibits the physical ground of this necessity in the speedy fatigue of the nerves and nerve-centres, under the stress of unvarying stimuli. The only apparent exception to this law is that phenomenon of "ecstasy" termed by Ribot "monoideism," a state in which perfect fixation of consciousness on one idea is temporarily effected. In this supreme effort, ordinary attention is transcended. Not, however, for long. Uniformity of state such as this is too serious an affair for the nervous structure, and Pegasus soon falls to earth. With this dubious exception, we may accept Hobbes' dictum—"Idem semper sentire, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt"—as pervasive of empirical psychology. And it is to be noted that here again, the law of healthy nervous function runs parallel with a great law of subjective psychology. Not only the happening of the event, but the degree of its intensity is involved in it. Its applications to sensations, emotions, and thoughts are equally fertile in results.

Under the name of the "Law of Diffusion," Dr. Bain has illustrated with great fulness the concurrence of all impressions accompanied with feeling with a radiation of nerve-currents to the viscera and muscles. It must suffice simply to mention it. Lastly comes that most significant generalization known as the Law of Self-conservation; pleasurable states are allied with an increase, painful with a diminution of some one or more organic functions. It must be held to apply equally to such contrasts as hunger, religious enthusiasm, the tempests of love, and the pangs of a torturing conscience.

I have now said enough to indicate how intimate is the "alliance" of consciousness and organism. Let me add, however, that for due appreciation of this evidence, now so varied in kind and extensive in scope, appeal to the rich detail of physiological psychology is imperative. Properly to grasp its import, systematic absorption of writers such as Spencer, Bain, Romanes, Huxley, Maudsley, Lewes, and the

sturdy common sense of Büchner is requisite.* Reference to evolutionist thought will prove of special value, as the observed "alliance" of consciousness and organic process there receives its definite historical *rationale*.

Such, then, is the nature of the evidence which moves the honest materialist of to-day. The ~~so~~ brief survey of it given will have this effect if no other—it will force us to be thorough in our thinking when we get to deeper issues, it will present grave problems which every candid votary of optimism must face. But with these problems, as bearing on our own metaphysic, we have not at present to cope. Our immediate work is destructive. It is only the materialist solution of them that concerns us. And that solution is to be considered with the materialist presuppositions thrown in. It is believed that these latter themselves—an independent external material world, etc.—demand revision by Theory of Knowledge, but this consideration is here chivalrously waived. Materialism will be met on its own platform.

A Materialist philosophy of psychology is not always held to imply a materialist theory of origins. Huxley would no doubt resent the name of materialistic Atheist. But the dissociation of the standpoints is questionable. If consciousness, as we know it, is a function of organized matter, what ground remains for a theistic, pantheistic, or other *spiritual* theory of origins. Matter is suggested as always the background of spirit, not spirit as the background of matter. Is it urged that Matter is mere phenomenon, that perception cannot penetrate the Noumenon? If so, matter must not be admitted into the philosophy of psychology at all, for states of consciousness cannot possibly be held a function of a part of themselves. Playing with idealism in this manner, is preposterous, though useful when ugly "consequences" have to be avoided.

The Materialist philosophy of psychology has three phases. The two first regard consciousness as nerve-motion and transmuted nerve-motion respectively. The third hypothesis regards consciousness and nerve-motion as "subjective" and "objective" faces of the same thing—either of

* Cf. for some telling facts the very lucid summary given in his chapter "Brain and Mind," *Force and Matter*, 4th Eng. ed. [Asher & Co.]

matter or its *non-spiritual* "substance." Easily confounded with this latter is a theory foreign to this survey, that namely which posits consciousness and brain-process as dual aspects of a *spiritual* substance, Will, Reason, etc. This is not materialism at all, but is at one with the standpoint of Schelling, Schopenhauer, and many Hegelians. It exacts, also, a wholly different treatment to that now opportune, and will not, therefore, for the present concern us.

Distinctive names being requisite, these three phases of Materialism will be throughout referred to as *Extreme or Büchnerian materialism*—the well-known popular writer Büchner having so zealously espoused it,—ordinary *scientific materialism*—biologists and physiologists having specially favoured it,—and the *new or "guarded" materialism*. These three standpoints may now be stated, and it will then be seen how adequately they exhaust their province.

Extreme materialism cannot properly be said to deal with the relations of psychosis and neurosis, seeing that it identifies them off-hand. For it consciousness and certain mechanical processes held to obtain *beyond* consciousness are identical. Grotesque as this supposition appears, it is, nevertheless, a faithful echo of current theory. Hear its exponents. "Thinking," says Büchner, "can and must be regarded as a special mode of general natural motion." Vogt argues for the generic resemblance between thought and the secretion of bile. Moleschott, famous for his epigrammatic "Without phosphorus no thought," also holds thought to be a movement of matter. Like dicta are—"Thought is assuredly only a property of the nerve-cell" (Letourneau). "The organism is the man himself" (Lefevre). "The soul is brain in activity and nothing more" (Broussais). "Mind and the totality of the living active nerve-centres of an animal or human existence are perfectly identical notions" (Brühl). With these dicta Erasmus Darwin's definition of an idea as "an animal motion of the organ of sense" ("Zoonomia") may be appropriately classed. Even Schopenhauer skirts this standpoint when he affirms that the intellect is "physical, not metaphysical." His metaphysic debouches here into the semblance of materialism—semblance, indeed, because for

Schopenhauer idealism is in truth the watchword, and matter has no absolute reality.

Scientific materialism rejects the above-mentioned view, and contends for the radical unlikeness of psychosis to its cerebral causes. Nevertheless, it regards neurosis as the *cause* of psychosis; states of consciousness representing so much transmuted molecular motion. Thus Strauss asks, "If under certain conditions motion is transformed into heat, why may it not under other conditions be transformed into sensation?" (*Confessions*).* Turning to *First Principles* (pp. 211-218), we may note that this was the original, though silently evacuated, position of Herbert Spencer. Huxley, also, is to be ranged with upholders of this view.† One feature of this phase of materialism is the attempt to bring subjective as well as physical changes within reach of the hungry generalization known as the Persistence of Force.

Guarded Materialism—the term is Professor Bain's—denies both the immediate identity of, and the existence of any causal relation between, neurosis and psychosis. States of consciousness cannot produce molecular motion, nor molecular motion states of consciousness. The two sets of changes run on parallel rails without interaction. Spencer registers it as his maturer inference that "mind and *nervous motion* are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing"—of an unknowable substance.‡ This is, also, the view of Bain, Lewes, and many others, and may be said to manifest a growing vigour.

The consequences of neo-materialism are formidable. They involve suppression of the individual *Ego or Subject*. And they place states of consciousness at the mercy of their physical basis. On the lines above traced the profoundest reasoning of a Kant, the grandest imaginative constructions of a Shakespeare, are the "obverse only" of what are

* An acute friend observes, on reading the manuscript, "The word 'heat' denotes a sensation already. How, then, can a sane man ask such a question?" How indeed!

† And, strange to say, Plato also, on one side of his thinking—the derivation of the "matter" as contrasted with the "forms" of Experience. In the *Timæus* movements of minute organic particles cause sensation.

‡ *Principles of Psychology*, i. 146.

phenomenally masterful currents in the brain, currents which subserve the life of the organism, and have this ministration as their sole primary business. The rise of consciousness has been traced by Spencer to the "quick succession of changes in a ganglion, implying as it does perpetual experience of differences and likenesses." * And the elaboration of the masterful physical basis of the complex processes of our present thoughts and emotions has been traced by him with great ability in the same work from which this citation is taken. This theory of the rise of consciousness shadows forth I believe an aspect, though a very inadequate aspect, of the truth. Taken by itself I believe it to be empty of meaning; a chimerical attempt to build consciousness out of primarily irrelative bits of sentiency. But, given a Subject, it may possibly claim a niche in a philosophical fabric: of this possibility anon. The physiological psychology as a whole is less plausible, for the difficulties of accounting for the higher processes of *thought* on a basis of mere cerebral initiative will be seen to be truly appalling.

Besides avoiding the causation and other difficulties of scientific materialism, the theory under survey claims to have solved the *crux* so cleverly stated by Ueberweg. The citation is taken from an English author whose name I have omitted to append to my notes. Ueberweg says: "Whatever happens in our brains, would not, in my view, be possible, unless the same process, which here appears most powerfully, or in the greatest concentration, in a like way, only in a much slighter degree, took place quite universally. A pair of mice and a meal-tub—you know I have often used this illustration. If well-fed, these creatures multiply, and *with them sensations and feelings*; the few of which the first pair were capable cannot simply have been diluted, for then their descendants must feel less strongly; *therefore, the sensations and feelings must be present in the meal, even though feebly and weakly, not concentrated as in the brain.*" It is surmised that if all matter has a subjective side, organization simply serves to educe it into actuality. But we may possibly have cause to unearth a more radical explanation than that of Ueberweg. Meanwhile, we stand under no small obligation

* *Principles of Psychology*, i. 435.

to this thinker for treating the problem in so exceedingly suggestive a manner.

One further point is worth momentary remark. I refer to the practice of dubbing as Monism what Bain has far better called "guarded materialism." Assuredly this is no triumph of nomenclature. So far as expression is given to the fundamental distinction between a single-substance doctrine and popular dualism, its utility is obvious. But in this particular sense the extreme and the ordinary materialism, which guarded materialism supersedes, are equally Monisms. Idealist systems, again, may justifiably resent any appropriation of the term for so narrow a signification. Doubtless there clings to the term some charm. Its vague connotation favours a semblance of non-committal. But in discussions of this sort we require the sharpest possible contrasts of terminology.

Waiving this subsidiary point, it remains to determine the manner in which the three theories are to be treated. The procedure adopted is as follows. Each of the phases of materialism will be considered separately with regard to the leading objections which the features peculiar to it seem to warrant. Subsequently the three theories will be reviewed collectively with regard to the objections relevant to them all. The close of this second assault will be also the close of the chapter. It must not, however, be thought that with the indictment now to be drawn up the case against materialism ends. The upshot of every ensuing construction will incidentally proclaim its rottenness.

CHAPTER II.

CRITICISM OF THE MATERIALIST PHILOSOPHIES OF PSYCHOLOGY.

(1) FALLACIES OF THE EXTREME OR BÜCHNERIAN MATERIALISM.

THE phase of materialism now under survey has no standing whatever on the higher levels of thought. It is a curio for the museum of philosophy, rather than a formidable object of inquiry; a by-way rather than a highway in the history of modern thought. More, none but physiologists of an abnormally objective bent will care to concede. Students of philosophy are apt, indeed, to regard it with contempt. That this sentiment is justifiable I propose briefly to show.

Thought is a movement of matter. Emotion is a movement of matter. Let us look more closely into these statements. And first in regard to thought.

From the standpoint of psychology our conscious experience has been divided into two great orders of states, the mental aggregate and the object aggregate. Now, the materialists under survey regard the object aggregate as evidencing an independent material world made up of extended, resisting, and for all practical purposes ultimate material units, which they term atoms. If we think of some billiard-balls as stripped of their "secondary qualities" and considerably reduced in size, we have the sort of mental schema, whereby materialists try to conceive their atoms.* If we think of them as banging together, and separating, or,

* I am unable myself to imagine any bodies as devoid of "secondary" qualities, but for the sake of argument, I am pretending to be able to so. Possibly some of my readers may be more competent *abstractionists* in this regard than I can ever hope to be. But I suspect that on testing the possibility for themselves they will come to agree with Hume, that getting rid of the secondary qualities is, in all but words, getting rid of the primary also.

if preferred, as merely changing their relative positions in space—as gyrating, dancing, curving round and about one another—we have the schema of the *neurosis* which is supposed to take place in the brain. Let us now imagine a rainbow as vividly as possible. On the lines of extreme materialism the rich resulting picture, the gaily hued thought, is the redistribution in space of these absurd little billiard-balls we have been imagining. Identity is predicated where not even a close similarity obtains. Every one will admit that *colourless* naked atoms, resisting and moving bits of extension, however real they may be, are *ex hypothesi* quite unlike the richly coloured mental picture of the rainbow. If so, materialism of this kind is nonsense.

To put the case differently, consider an Emotion—say Anger. Recurring to our billiard-balls, we note that they manifest the attribute of Resistance, the fundamental (or so-called “essential”) quality of what we call Matter, the hallmark which anything we term “material” must bear. But it is clear enough that the Emotion has no such attribute, no one ever pushed against the subjective feeling of anger, or arrested it when moving through space. Revive, then, your atoms, those diminutive resisting and moving bits of extension of whose combinations and separations materialism holds brain-action to consist, and you will once more confront an absurdity. These barren resisting units are what they are not, a non-resisting feeling of anger, with its *indescribable speciality* so wholly unlike themselves. It is needless to press this confutation further. A contradiction in terms will suffice for us.

It remains to indicate an indictment which covers all possible phases of this materialism alike, an indictment which enables us to dispense with all detailed criticism. It is to the effect that this materialism saws away the branch on which it sits. In reducing “thought,” the higher, to “matter,” the supposed lower manifestation, *it at the same time transforms the latter, spiritualizes that very material brain which it desires to conceive mechanically*. Here is the exposure of this fiasco. Thought cannot obviously by mere verbal jugglery be degraded from thought as we know it, from *what in its actual having it reveals itself to be*. However *classed*—and all generali-

zation implies classing—it remains Thought. So far, so good. It is urged, however, by extreme materialism that Thought is a series of atomic changes, a condition of force-centres, etc., variations on this theme being plentiful. Note, then, the result. Identification of “thought” with atomic changes, force-centre disturbances, etc., implies the ANTI-MATERIALIST VIEW THAT THE SAID ATOMIC CHANGES, OR THE FORCE-CENTRES, ARE THOUGHT. MATERIALISM HAS, THEREFORE, DESTROYED ITSELF. I have dwelt more particularly on the case of Thought, as iconoclasts of this school seem to regard it as the chief butt for their missiles. Obviously, however, exactly the same contention would apply to the domain of consciousness as a whole. If consciousness is what we immediately know it to be, and *also identical* with “movements of matter” in the brain, it is sun-clear that these so-called “movements of matter,” *are* the very higher reality which they were invoked to destroy. You cannot degrade consciousness without equally elevating the level to which you degrade it. Materialism of this kind is a satire on human intelligence. It is only intelligible as a muddled system of Absolute Identity in which subjectivity is stealthily posited at the outset.

Max Müller cleverly taxes Materialism with committing a grammatical blunder. “It is the substitution of a nominative for an accusative or of an active for a passive verb. At first we mean by matter what is perceived, not indeed by itself, but by its qualities; but in the end it is made to mean the very opposite, namely, what perceives, and is thus supposed to lay hold of and strangle itself.”* But he also regards, and with perfect justice, the vulgar dualist theory as untenable. Since body and mind, though not “interchangeable” are “correlative” terms, there can be no mind proper without an implicated object. Consequently, he urges that “Materialism and Spiritualism have no sense by themselves, but will have to be merged in the higher system of idealism.”† We shall have a great deal to say on this head in the sequel. So abandoning the alluring theme, let us proceed to examine the credentials of ordinary scientific materialism.

* *Three Introductory Lectures to the Science of Thought*, p. 85.

† *Ibid.*, p. 89.

(2) FALLACIES OF THE ORDINARY SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM.

It is easy to establish the *extravagance* of the views of an Erasmus Darwin or a Vogt. They assume at the outset that our perceptions constitute evidence for the belief in an independent external world. They then proceed to exploit this inferentially established world, and finally constitute it supreme, dubbing both the mental and object sides of consciousness a portion of its processes. Consciousness is the movement of a part of an hypostatized aspect of *itself*, this is the result to which Theory of Knowledge would conduct us. But quite independently of Metaphysic, the standpoint of those writers was shown to generate absurdities in its very statement. Let us pass on. The two other forms of materialism now merit attention. Though avoiding the scholars' mate invited by their predecessor, they will be found in their turn radically unsatisfactory.

What I have termed ordinary materialism holds that states of consciousness are unlike independent "material" objects. They constitute a *transformation* of the motion of certain of these objects—an effect which once *in situ* is not to be confused with its causes. It is true that, as thinking and perceiving creatures, we cannot be identified with the rotatory or other movements of small pieces of matter, but it is arguable, nevertheless, that these movements have somehow or other generated us, losing their old features and developing novel ones in the process. Molecular motions, in fine, *are not*, but produce, states of consciousness.

Will this view pass muster? It will not. To begin with, this materialism is unable to assign any grounds for the *genesis* of sensation, much less for the development of its echoes into intellect, complex emotions, and will. Natural Selection, that kindly solver of riddles, has no surprise in store for us here. If organisms are self-adjusting automata, if the physical machinery of their structure is complete in itself, the culture of consciousness could be of no possible *utility* to them in the struggle for existence. To apply Darwin's words touching Instinct to the sphere of consciousness as a whole, "if really of no importance for the struggle for life, it could not be formed or modified by Natural Selec-

tion." Even Natural Selection, however, must find the variations it "operates upon" *there*, and the genesis of the particular variation sensation is confessedly beyond its ken. Still, *given* the sensations and their due renascence as ideas, it might be conceived to effect much, were the results of its working of any possible *utility*. But the utility of complex ideation and feeling to organic automata would, biologically speaking, be *nil*. Strange, then, that intellect and emotion have grown into the wondrous fabric that we know. Strange that to some philosophers, "the elevation of consciousness appears as *direct end* of animal organization."* Why even this semblance of purposiveness in a bye-product useless to the organism?

Materialism, then, cannot tell us why motion should uselessly generate sensation and ideas, much less why it should do so obstinately, much less why the ideas thus evoked should produce a mind like that of Shakespeare. But this is not all. The problem of the mode of passage of motion into sensation raises difficulties. We may indicate two embarrassing considerations—the inconceivability of any such passage as fact, and the conflict of it as belief with the presuppositions of materialism itself.

The inclusion of the phenomena of consciousness in the list of mechanically produced effects has naturally a charm for the biologist. It seems to gag vociferous and unruly intruders who might upset all his cherished systems. But it is necessary to point out that any attempt to bridge the gulf between an *independent objective* motion and consciousness is, and must necessarily be, purely verbal. Experience has absolutely nothing on which it can build. The motions *we know* are states of consciousness; elements only of a concrete whole. *They, at any rate, are sterile*. It is, however, on a set of motions *we do not know*—motions alleged to obtain in an independent external world—that materialism is forced to rely. A more wildly "metaphysical" procedure in the worst sense of that term it would be hard to cite. To conceive *unknown* motions as producing the consciousness of which *known* motions are at best mere aspects or modes—this invitation may well set the philosophers smiling.

* Von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious*.

This *crux* of conceivability has puzzled many writers, few, however, of whom adequately realize its full import. Even Büchner (deserting awhile his customary identification of consciousness and motion) has in one passage declared that the mode of connection of the two may be inexplicable.* But he contends, nevertheless, that solution of the *crux* is "quite unimportant for the purposes of our investigation" †—an opinion which we shall hardly, I think, share. Dropping, however, this writer, let me now quote the words in which Tyndall summed up the difficulty in the course of his justly famous *Belfast Address*:—

"Given the nature of a disturbance in water, or ether, or air, and from the physical properties of the medium we can infer how its particles will be affected. The mind runs along the chain of thought that connects the phenomena, and from beginning to end finds no break in the chain. But when we endeavour to pass by a similar process from the physics of the brain to the phenomena of consciousness, we meet a problem which transcends any conceivable expansion of the powers we now possess. We may think over the subject again and again—it eludes all mental presentation."

The testimony of Du Bois Reymond is even more explicit: "What could be more interesting . . . than to direct our intellectual vision inwards, and to see the cerebral mechanism in motion corresponding with an operation of arithmetic, as we can watch that of a calculating machine; or to perceive what rhythmical movements of the atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, and phosphorus, etc., correspond with the pleasure we experience from musical harmony, what eddying currents of the same atoms attend the acme of delight? . . . The most intimate knowledge of these to which we could aspire would only leave us matter in motion, . . . no motion of material particles can form a bridge to carry us into the domain of intelligence. . . . These [subjective] phenomena remain outside of the physical laws and causality, and that is enough to render them inexplicable."

Similar admissions are made by Fiske, Lewes, Taine, and many other writers. Taine sums up the phenomenon of neurosis with his usual terseness: "A particle has a certain

* *Matter and Force*, p. 400. [Asher & Co.]

† *Ibid.*, p. 319.

situation with respect to others, the situation changes, that is all." Leibnitz remarks, somewhat after the fashion of Taine, that in the most complex mechanism there are discoverable only pieces of matter apparently moving one another, but nothing explanatory of consciousness. To multiply citations on so simple, though important, a point is unnecessary. Every one can test the derivability of consciousness from motion for himself. If he can screw his sensations and ideas out of *unknown* motions he has fairly surpassed his predecessors. But enterprises of this kind evoke, perhaps, more discretion than valour.

I have now further to urge that a belief in the conversion of nerve-motion into consciousness implies rejection of the accepted form of the doctrine of the Persistence of Force. Observe that I advert to this doctrine, not as a conviction of my own, but as a belief with which Materialists avowedly support their thinking. Ordinary Materialists, however, cannot wed this belief to their mechanical theory of consciousness. They are driven into a contradiction which no skill can palliate. The predicament is this. The Motion which passes into consciousness annuls itself, commits philosophical suicide in the process. Motion transformed into consciousness has taken flight from the supposed independent external world—has expatriated itself from the domain of mechanics. Reduce this contention to the concrete. Suppose that an ideally endowed observer could watch the inmost workings of the cosmos. Well, whenever we perceive, feel, or think, he would notice a mysterious diminution of the amount of cosmic work-power, would be in a position to repudiate belief in the necessary "continuity" of motion either as new motion or tension. It might possibly be contended that every state of consciousness generated by motion ends by rebecoming motion and so refunding the loan. But a rider of this sort, even if established, would be embarrassing. It would concede, at any rate, that motion may temporarily evaporate off objects. It would imply, also, that causation of neurosis by psychosis which materialism has declared unthinkable. And it would further imply the various untenable suppositions which we have already discussed.

A dynamical theory of matter which posits forces and

forces alone as the noumena of objects has been mooted. It is built out of that emptiest of empty abstractions—our feeling of muscular effort torn from its known accompaniments and hypostatized. Barren at the outset, it would present no difficulty were a theory of consciousness such as we have just discussed affiliated on it. All the arguments adduced, along with many more not here adduced, would be available. It is, therefore, unnecessary to allot it a separate treatment.

3. FALLACIES OF THE GUARDED MATERIALISM.

Guarded materialism is open to none of the more obvious objections levelled at the foregoing theories—it is a device of subtle, yet mechanically-minded thinkers, who wish to recognize to the full the masterful character of matter, while saving subjectivity a humble but secure philosophical standing. Subjectivity for these thinkers is virtually present in all matter or its noumenal “substance,” but is evoked in the form of consciousness only along with the functioning of certain highly organized nerve-structures subserving highly complex organisms. Rejecting a causality from motion to consciousness and assigning a subjective side to all objective agencies, guarded materialism has been widely welcomed as a successful compromise between vulgar dualism and the older materialism. But, curiously enough, while it repudiates the old materialistic causality, it proffers in its place another sort of causality quite its own. This substitute, in company with various other peculiarities, will now be discussed.

An initial confusion is created by the inconsistency of some of the writers who have marked this hypothesis for their own. In advocating it openly as “guarded or qualified” *materialism*, Bain nails his colours honourably to the mast. But the very statement of his attitude creates perplexity. The suitability of this neo-materialism to round off a mechanical system of evolution such as that of Herbert Spencer is apparent at the first glance. The independent reality of organism and environment once admitted, consciousness may, with some plausibility, be regarded as the “subjective side” of nerve-processes. No doubt organism and environment are assumed with an agnostic reservation touching the symbolic character of their surrogates in our perceptions.

But Spencer makes it clear that his extra-subjective objects are in every sense independent external things, albeit by us "seen as through a glass darkly." What, however, of the standpoint of Bain, before whose onset independent objectivity fades like some unsubstantial dream? Are we not at our wits' end to know where to look? What, again, of Taine, who seems to regard organism as an appearance in consciousness and consciousness as dependent on the organism? An extreme case of this physico-metaphysical muddle is to be noted in the works of Lewins, the founder of hylo-idealism. Lewins terms consciousness an "anatomical problem," "vesiculo-neurosis in activity," but at the same time regards all known objects as mere subjective "thinks." * Truly the discipline of Kant is needed to dispel such clouded thinking. Inconsistency is so rife in this quarter that one can only account for it by allowing for the difficulty of apprehending any metaphysical proposition in all its bearings. It is, however, needless to cite further instances in point. They crowd upon the searcher.

Let us waive, however, the criticisms. Let us assume that this neo-materialism is always what its name implies. Let us accept the theory as meaning that consciousness and nerve-motion are two sets of attributes co-inhering either in matter or some occult noumenal "substance." At first sight the theory recalls the Leibnitzian pre-established harmony, but the identification would be wholly illusory. Guarded materialism posits a parallelism not of two independent groups of phenomena, but one of aspects or sides of a *single* process. It declares that neurosis is the convex side of the same curve of which psychosis is the concave side. Now, it may be objected to this explanation that it is merely verbal. If the contrast of consciousness and body is for knowledge a fact which cannot be transcended; what is the justification for merging this contrast, this opposition, in a "fundamental identity"? We are not, all will observe, dealing with an idealist doctrine which regards "inner" and "outer" as merely contrasted aspects of a subject, individual

* "Psychosis," gravely urges Lewins, "is diagnosed by medico-psychological symptomatology as vesiculo-neurosis in activity." This sesquipedalian piece of twaddle is a plank in the platform of a creed that is to shake the world!

or universal. Were we thus employed, an identity-indifference would be at once admitted. We are dealing with a view which takes over both an "outer" *in* consciousness, and an "outer" independent of consciousness; the latter being slyly elevated into a *prius*. Consciousness is here consigned as obverse to an alien something which it serves merely to symbolize for us.

According to Bain, the old dualism is doomed. Still, consciousness and body are in no way to be confounded. Unless we bear this in mind we shall merely restate the errors of the old school of materialists. Recognition of the contrast must be candidly and clearly put. Two sets of attributes are in evidence, attributes, however, which are unified, or co-inhere, *in a common matter or "substance."* Dualism must bow its head submissively—the physiological evidence of the dependence of perception, thought, and emotion on changes in the body is overwhelming. It must console itself as best it can with the place allotted to subjectivity in the common basis or substance. Let us subject this view to analysis.

Consider a feeling of regret accompanied by definite neural motions. On the lines of this theory, the psychosis and the neurosis are not to be identified off-hand. As we find them, they are radically different. To assert, therefore, that one is the other, would be to assert unreservedly the contradiction that A is not-A, that psychosis, though different from, yet *is* neurosis! Still, neurosis and psychosis have somehow to be unified; consequently, an underlying substance manifesting them as its phenomenal attributes must be posited. Contradiction would seem to be thus evaded: that haven of Agnosticism, the Noumenal Unknown X, being placarded on two sides with the intractable sets of phenomena! Unhappily, the device is faulty; noumena are *already in the field*. No ingenuity can exorcise the fact that the feeling of regret is—well nothing but what it is for consciousness. Its actual inmost nature is its being a determination in consciousness. As such it is *unclouded reality*—is, in short, *itself* a Noumenon. Such being the case, it would be nothing short of monstrous to assert that "noumenally" it may be other than what it is felt to be. True, we may not know

it fully, nay, as we shall subsequently see, we cannot adequately analyze any feeling, but, in so far as we have and analyze it at all, we know it through and through. Instead, therefore, of being referable to a Noumenon, a mode of a veiled Unknowable, it is itself a Noumenon. Recognition of this truth carries much with it. It involves the bankruptcy of the single-substance doctrine—of guarded materialism. For, psychosis being no other than what it is felt to be, and neurosis by admission differing from psychosis, the single-substance theory is seen to explain nothing. It merely adds a useless surd to an already embarrassing problem. Unable to identify neurosis and psychosis outright, it *dualistically* regards them as *two*, while it compromises with monism by *saying* that they are fundamentally one. The result, however, is mere saying, because the banishing of the two opposites to the dominion of the Unknown X is just to abandon the hope of unification. *Two* sets of activities are covered over with one cloth, a cloth, however, as fictitious as the Emperor's new clothes in Andersen's tale. Let us have an *Absolute Identity*, if necessary, but not "two aspects" stuck on a neutral substance like a couple of posters on opposite sides of a hoarding. Only in this case the subjective state *must be the reality* of which nerve-motion is but the objectively thrown shadow. No system of Absolute Identity can extrude the immediately known and the immediately felt. It must found directly on these. It by no means follows, however, that even an Absolute Identity of this sort is tenable, and it is certain that for purposes of iconoclasm it is fully as effective as its predecessor. Still, it yields some semblance of explanation which the latter most patently does not. Such a *spiritual* yet destructive doctrine does not come up for discussion here. But its supersession will be easy when our positive constructions are mooted.

A curious question of causation next demands notice. Guarded materialism expressly denies the existence of any causal relation between neurosis and psychosis. It dismisses as unsatisfactory both the dualist and the old materialist theories on this head, and, in virtue of this repudiation, believes itself freed from the implication of teaching ANY causal sway of motion over consciousness. But how

is this consonant with the psycho-physiological detail of exposition? Let us see. It is clear, to begin with, that the hypothesis places consciousness at the mercy of its physical basis. The concave side of the curve is not on an equal footing with the convex, seeing that all stimuli to the occurrence of psycho-neural processes have to come *from the side of the physical*. If, then, the sequences in consciousness merely dance attendance on sequences physically initiated and controlled, the need of expressing the relation in some terms of cause and effect forcibly suggests itself. "But," the guarded materialist will urge, "in postulating a parallelism of neurosis and psychosis, simultaneity of the two is assumed." Does not causation imply succession, and, if so, can we be fairly asked to avow it? To such a plea a ready reply is forthcoming. It would adopt Herschel's suggestion that cases may occur in which effects are coincident in time with their causes. It is true that the instances hitherto adduced are in large part unsatisfactory. For instance, the raising of one end of a lever cannot now be held as synchronous with the depression of the other—the molecular physicist would object. Putting aside all disputable cases, we may, however, adduce the guarded materialist view of the parallelism ^{Consciousness} _{Body} as at least one theoretic illustration of the theory. For, on the lines of that view, changes in consciousness, though synchronous with, manifest a strikingly subservient dependence on, cerebral changes. Given certain molecular disturbances, of a certain degree of intensity, certain states of consciousness must accompany them as their "subjective face;" the double-sided activity thus manifest being always controlled from the side of the physical. This subjection of psychosis to neurosis is markedly characteristic of the Spencerian evolutionist history of consciousness. In the *Principles of Psychology* the supremacy of the physical basis is continually being emphasized. Consciousness is exhibited as a parasite allied with an organism which does all the work. Its relation to neurosis turns out to be one of cause and effect, though only of the hypothetical type suggested by the genius of a Herschel. Guarded materialism may accordingly be called upon to recast its triumphant proem.

The hypothesis of Clifford may here be briefly noticed.

In so far as it bears on the doctrine of latent sentiency it is seasonable ; in so far, however, as it may be held to depart from the strictly materialist standpoint it fails to fall within the scope of this chapter. In essentials it runs as follows :—

Clifford appears to have realized the weakness of superimposing two sets of attributes, subjective and physical, on an occult noumenal substance. We find him accordingly resorting to the hypothesis of “mind-stuff.” There is to be posited a universally diffused “mind-stuff” which answers to the notorious thing-in-itself. This mind-stuff is manufactured into sensation, perception, thought, etc., with grades of excellence answering to the grades of elaboration of the mind-stuff simples constitutive of brain and nerves. The Ego, so-called, is a myth. Consciousness, being a synthesis of specks of mind-stuff, perishes along with vital function. We have here a revival in polished guise of the views of Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, and others, who saw in the soul only a very subtle form of matter.

The possibility of building consciousness out of sentiency-specks will concern us anon. Here the materialist drift of Clifford’s teaching need alone delay us. The sublimated animism here taught reads oddly alongside of his dictum enouncing the difficulty of extracting consciousness out of ordinary physical matter. For, soberly regarded, his mind-stuff is no other than an imaginary matter, such, for instance, as a theorist about the phases of ether might treat of. It is, in fact, just such a matter as was held to obtain in the smooth, subtle, fire-like atoms of the Democritan soul ; it is a matter existing in “pieces,” and subject in its integration and disintegration to counterparts of our familiar physical laws. We may criticize it after the fashion of Aristotle, who dismissed the Democritan soul-atoms as an expedient in no way helping us to understand what the “*larger and coarser parts*” of the body fail to explain. If it is impracticable to conceive consciousness as emerging from ordinary physical matter, the supposition that it emerges from a mere tenuous medium is not a whit the more reasonable. If a gas, a fourth or fifth state matter, can become conscious, why not a physical human brain ? Mere thinning or etherealizing of matter will not help us in the least.

(4) FALLACIES COMMON TO ALL THREE FORMS OF MATERIALISM.

Having now traversed the indictment of the three forms of the materialist philosophy of psychology taken separately, it will be seasonable for us to append some objections which appear to undermine them collectively. But it must be understood that it is not so directly upon these that the antagonist case need be rested. It is fairly complete as it stands. And, moreover, the subjoined considerations will lack the technical rigidity of those hitherto cited. They present, in fine, a more or less popular expression of anomalies which later chapters must render more precise. They are not intended to be ultimate, but simply to limn forth exploitable aspects of treatment.

From what has been already said, it is clear that all the three forms of materialism place consciousness at the mercy of the physical organism. Thus the cruder type identifies consciousness with brain function, while scientific and guarded materialism regard it respectively as transmutation and subjective *face* of neural motion (or its occult substrate). On these lines it is evident that the association of ideas can be no more than a *sign* of associated nerve-currents; that the laws of association to which thought-structures and other ideal processes conform, are, properly speaking, derivative. We discover that in the neuro-psychical activity treated of by materialism, it is the neurosis on which falls the full brunt of the causal strain. Hence, there naturally arises the remark of Letourneau: "The facts of consciousness are phenomena which interpose between the afferent and efferent currents of the reflex action."* Herbert Spencer, after defining Life as continual adjustment of internal to external relations, extends this definition to cover the field of thought or intelligence. Intelligence is made to dawn when the external relations to be conformed to become numerous, complex, and remote in time or space. And "every advance in Intelligence consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments, . . . even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so co-ordinated as exactly to tally

* *Biology*, Eng. trans., p. 439.

with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally."* In the *Principles of Psychology* the upshot of Spencer's standpoint is affiliation of the highest subjective activities on certain nervous processes which have no interest in their evolution at all. The determinant of this evolution is an indifferent physical machinery with the higher nerve-centres as its furnace. Neomaterialists must put up with this situation as best they can. But we at least may rebel. We may urge that this physical piecing of our thought-mosaics is inadequate to cope with the facts. And in indicating the more prominent of these latter we may continue to waive the fundamental issues of Theory of Knowledge, and present simply the anomalies with which even popular thinking is more or less vaguely perturbed.

The noblest outputs of intellect are referable to the domains of the reflective reason and the constructive imagination; these, of course, being names only for vaguely bounded aggregates of processes, not for abstract faculties. A frequent and notable feature of their activity in its higher aspects is absence of utilitarian reference either to our own practical needs or those of the social environment. That the "raw material" for this activity is given by "outer" experience (Spencer's "relations of coexistence and sequence that occur externally"), may, subject to certain forthcoming reservations, be freely admitted. But the ordinary man regards this contribution very much as the builder does his bricks—as *occasion* only for the self-impelled activity of his Ego or Subject. He cannot believe this activity to be derivative and secondary, but holds that it wells up from the depths of his own essence itself; that the higher products of thought are made not for but by the Ego, and are in no sense dragged in bye-product fashion at the chariot wheels of nerve-motion. Fashioned without his conscious co-operation they often are, but spiritual activity need by no means always be conscious. He notes, too, the significant absence of practical reference in these processes, that they often possess simply an *ideal value* for consciousness retiring from externals into its hermitage.

And is the ordinary man so wrong after all? Remember

* *First Principles*, p. 84.

that the genuine thinker, poet, painter, musician, lives not for utilitarian externals, but for the inner solitude of his genius. Depths such as these the causality of nerve-motion cannot plumb. Are the disinterested profound labours of a Kant or a Newton the outcome of ganglionic friction in *indifferent* nerve-centres. Consider the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Here the very conditions of consciousness itself are mooted. And what moots them? A seriality of atomistic ideas wirepulled by alogical nerve-motion? Surely the breaking strain of materialism has been reached. How suggestive here Sir Thomas Browne: "Whilst I study to find how I am a microcosm or little world I find myself something more than the great. There is surely a piece of divinity in us; something that was before the elements, and owes not homage unto the sun."* But to press the matter home still more strongly—Suppose nerve-motion had never been "attended" with consciousness, would everything have gone on as it does now? Would paper have been covered with metaphysical, scientific, and poetic writings by way of neural response to stimuli after due ganglionic ferment? On materialist lines it might conceivably have been adorned in this manner. For if consciousness does not react on the nerve-centres, its entire absence could make no possible physical difference.

Genius in the poet, thinker, artist cannot be wholly explained by environment. "Adaptive adjustments" to this seldom require it, or require it only in a very indirect manner. Genius proper is a world unto itself, and hopelessly, desperately "unpractical," *i.e.* unsuited for adjusting the organism to surroundings. And in beings such as Mozart inspiration *pours into* consciousness ideation superior to all conscious fashioning? Strange that the nerve-centres should work such veritable wonders—strange, too, that for a Kant they should piece the thinking that holds themselves in review. And they are indifferent to these results, which makes the marvel greater!

Von Hartmann, who posits his Absolute as "bringing its essence to two-sided manifestation," argues for the purposive character of the physiological processes themselves. But

* *Religio Medici*, pt. ii. § 11.

with pantheism of this sort we are not yet concerned. We may note, however, that it recognizes the difficulty raised. It is something to have done this. To save the situation, some materialists and guarded materialists have endowed their mechanisms with a *pseudo-purposiveness* due to Natural Selection. In the cases, however, of the higher reflection and imagination, this factor has no play. Here the needs of bodily preservation and society are not necessarily in view. Here, too, the struggle for existence often warps the intellect, nips the young blossom rather than fosters it. Here, too, we must repeat that Natural Selection operates only on *given* variations, and that the genesis of the variations peculiar to genius and the loftier talents stands sorely in need of treatment. Finally, we may cite the philosopher of Evolution, Herbert Spencer himself, to the effect that "in the domain of psychology it is unable to account for the more numerous phenomena, including those of *any complexity*."* It is not, however, clear how Spencer's supplementary reliance on the inheritance of functionally produced modifications is to avail.† We might well suppose an Ego inducing variations in cerebral structure as result of *its own* development reacting, so to speak, outwards. But if, on the contrary, consciousness is dragged at the chariot wheels of neurosis, the whole brunt of causality falls on the latter. The actuality of the higher thought-processes and the cerebral structures which doubtless minister to them, remains still an insoluble enigma.

Again, should there be any niche *in the empirical* assignable to *Freedom*, the fabric of materialism must collapse. Freedom presupposes a soul, Ego, or Subject something more than specific states and trains of states of consciousness, and it may involve further a playing down of psychosis on to neurosis. Without doing more than indicating this Freedom as possible, let me now draw attention to a fact of considerable import. It is that consciousness, whether presupposing a subject or not, is most vivid when connected with some

* Preface to *Factors of Organic Evolution*.

† We hold, however, strongly to Spenser's insistence on the general importance of this factor, both in biology and psychology, and believe with Sir W. Turner that "to reject the influence which use or disuse of parts may have on the individual or its descendant is to look at an object with one eye" ("The Principle of Lamarck and the Inheritance of Somatic Modifications," *Nature*, Feb. 5, 1891).

complex and newly initiated mode of action, riding as it were on the crest of adaptive adjustment. But with the gradual lapse of this action into the phase of *second nature*, consciousness progressively *weakens* in intensity. Is not some play of psychosis on to neurosis here rendered probable? There are remarks of Wundt which are valuable in this regard. Wundt, foremost among exponents of physiological psychology, concedes in his *Logic* that "it is not the subjective life which is the outcome of the physical structure; it is rather the physical structure, which *in all those purposive adjustments distinguishing it from organic compounds is itself a subjective product.*" I need scarcely point out that a single instance of modification of cerebral structure by psychosis would destroy all three materialistic theories collectively.

Having got thus far, we may now advance to an argument of far more comprehensive import, an import which tells not only against these three already (I trust) discredited theories, but against other iconoclastic speculations which have not as yet admitted of treatment. In fine, the work of reconstruction will now proceed apace, the ground having been suitably cleared of timbering. The doctrine we are now to examine is the key to the philosophy of Absolutism. It is the doctrine of a Subject distinct from states of consciousness, though distinct in a way needing most careful treatment.

CHAPTER III.

THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT, OR EGO.

THE ensuing constructions fall under the following heads, each of which mediates its successor, till the final goal is attained.

1. The Individual Subject, or Ego.
2. The Individual Subject as External Perception.
3. The Individual Subject as Mind.
4. The Universal Subject.
5. The Standpoint of Pessimism.
6. On Persistence of the Individual.
7. On the Mode of Persistence of the Individual.
8. On the Immanent End of the Persistence of the Individual.

Under the first head the doctrine of a Subject, or Ego, in its various aspects will concern us. Having established such a Subject and rendered the establishment precise, we shall pass to External Perception—to the problem of the concrete objective real, of the plump, solid, substantial world of sense—and endeavour to penetrate completely into its meaning. Here such inquiries as the origin and import of Sensations, of Space, Time, and so forth, will absorb us. From External Perception, thus conveniently isolated, we shall pass to the Subject emergent from its own self-positing objects as Mind—as thought, emotion, and will; and deal with such questions as Freedom, the relations of neurosis and psychosis, the standing of logic and reason, and the final supersession and absorption of reason by mystic insight. Under “the Universal Subject” the ground of individual Subjects will be discussed, and a variety of issues bound up with the doctrines of Theism,

design, a monadology, etc., will arrest us. The close of this chapter will usher in a brief survey of Pessimism, and Pessimism in its turn will drive us into the problem of the standing of the conscious individual, human or animal—whether it arises and perishes in time with its organism or has a deeper metaphysical import. “On the Mode of Persistence of the Individual” will conduct to the doctrine of Palingenesis and some leading correlated problems. Finally, we shall endeavour to limn forth, albeit very inadequately, the *telos* of the processes of development previously surveyed. In other words, we shall endeavour to decipher the immanent end or purpose of the universe.

THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT, OR EGO.

“What am I, the thing that can say ‘I’?”—CARLYLE.

The inquiry before us must be clearly stated; its importance being fundamental, affecting every domain of research that we shall subsequently enter. Bear, then, in mind that it has two leading aspects—the establishment of a Subject as ground and sustainer of our fugitive states of consciousness, and the determination of what can be predicated of it when once established. “States of Consciousness appear” must debouch into “States of consciousness appear as content and revelation of a Subject”—an *individual*, be it noted, not a universal Subject. Should a bedrock of certitude be discoverable its value will be simply inestimable. Establishment of a Subject is the true “*articulus stantis vel cadentis philosophiæ* ;” it will conduct to a metaphysic of sensation, time, and space, to an insight into “First Causes” and the trend of universal evolution in its entirety. And it will deal the deathblow to all atomistic and mechanical theories of consciousness. Not only the materialisms already noted, but those pseudo-spiritual idealisms which regard consciousness as a mere flux of states, or as harmony of primitively isolated psychical units, will bow before it. Mechanical theories will most obviously go by the board. If there obtains a Subject something more than the flux of

presentations and *re*-presentations, a stem on which they flower, an arena in which they are marshalled, an essence which reveals itself in them, there is no longer any dallying with such theories possible. The presentations and representations, if states or determinations of this Subject are by implication not states of anything else. States of consciousness will be seen to revolve round this *Sun*, and to possess no other possible orbits. Hence, the direction of all theories of perception will have to take on the appropriate curve. Hence, all empirical explanations of thought and emotion will in ultimate resort have to presuppose this Subject, and allow for it as pervasive of every nook and corner.

The procedure will be this. First we shall glance at some historic theories which moot a Subject (Individual or Universal). Secondly, we shall confront some theories which impugn it. Thirdly, we shall proceed to establish it independently as against these destructive theories, and the lines of argument will be these: no Subject, no flux of sensations in time; no Subject, no order of sensations in space; no Subject, no memory, no expectation; no Subject, no introspection; no Subject, no explicit I-reference. Lastly, we shall round off and exploit this Subject as established. Having accomplished this task, we shall pass on forthwith to External Perception.

First, then, of some notable historic attitudes in regard to the Self, or Subject. Beginning with India, we note that the Self of the Upanishads resembles the Absolute Ego of Fichte and the Logical Idea of Hegel, in that it stands behind all individuals alike as their common ground. In this poetic Indian monism, rarest gem that religion has ever cut, the "Self" is sharply sundered from the *Mâyâ*, from the shifting flux of mind and concrete objects. The monism, therefore, is too *abstract*; still, as primitive shaping of thought, of great philosophic interest, belittling the whole theology of the Jew, and reading even modern Christianity a lesson. Intensely intuitive and spiritual, it is an idealism as yet only half-conscious of itself, and loving more the dream-reveries of mysticism than the shackles of hard logic and system. The Self is declared to be no object of knowledge at all. "It

is other than the Known and above the Unknown," says the *Kena Upanishad*. "Wherewithal should a man know the knower," urges the *Brihadaranyaka*. And in the commentaries of the incisive Sankara it is averred that the "Witness" Self, though illumining consciousness, is never itself in consciousness, never a datum for conceptual thinking. It is said to be no object, for all objects are for it; not a thought, for all thoughts are for it; not a transient sight, but the principle of pure seeing. Turning to the Sankhya philosophy, we find that the *multiple* Sultan-like Purushas, or selves, are similarly cut off from nature and the empirical consciousness. In these theories the nescience side of the solution is, as we shall see, over-emphasized. In Plato the various *individual* souls partake of the nature of the universal soul. For him the divine part of his soul is the place of Forms, and these Forms, in alliance with *physically generated* sensations, combine to weave Experience. Abstract to a degree, this soul is, nevertheless, a genuine Subject standing behind and partly in states of consciousness. Its abstractness is duplicated on the macrocosmic scale by the Unitary Supreme Idea grasping the array of minor hypostatized "universals" or class and quality names. Aristotle, ever at war with Platonism, proffers a more concrete solution: with him the soul is the perfect actualization of a natural body, but owing to the dualism that colours all his thinking, this soul still retains some abstractness. Abstract, again, is his "Creative Intellect," divested of all matter (*ἐνέργεια ἢ καθ' αὐτήν*) and viewable as mere actuose form. Our modern Western standpoints were reached through Descartes, who, with an emphasis unknown before him, advanced the *individual singular* soul, Ego or "thinking substance," as the starting-point of philosophic thinking. The content of this Ego not only makes up inner experience, but responds, also, as sensations to changes in an independent extended world. So far so good. But now that this Ego is to the fore, what is its true metaphysical standing? Is it really individual at bottom? is it to be identified with our empirical consciousness or not? is it fully or only partially knowable?—these and like inquiries soon begin to thrive. For Leibnitz this Ego, or Subject, is an individual unconscious Monad which only *becomes* conscious

in its unfolding. Locke vacillates, at one time accepting an individual Ego unknown *per se*, and at another suggesting that consciousness may be a quality of matter. Berkeley wavers also, but in another regard. Note his earlier view that "the very existence of ideas [presentations and ideas proper] constitutes the soul." * Latterly, however, he held that the Subject as ground of consciousness is no notion or idea, that its being is not *percipi*, but rather *percipere*. Kant is for a Subject, and apparently an individual Subject, but contends that its inner nature is veiled. Owing to Kant's treatment of sensation, his Subject tends to resemble the Platonic Subject, or place of Forms, a bundle of meagre abstractions. Fichte's Ego, the Universal "I," has been fully dealt with in Part I. It is the Absolute Reason common to all individuals. Schelling's Ego was originally, to all intents and purposes, that of Fichte, but, on his abjuring Reason as Ultimate, it was developed into the *Immemorial Being* as extralogical, though spiritual, ground of reality. Hegel's Idea is *pure thought*, the Liebig's essence of the Categories, individuals are points in its return into itself through nature. The Ego of Herbart is an individual "real" or monad—its so-called states being reducible to modes of *self-preservation* due to its relations with other monads. He rejects the theory of preformed knowledge latent in germ in the monad, and derives all knowing and feeling whatever from these relations. Schopenhauer's Subject is *Will*, and not merely the *Universal Will*, but a Will somehow *individual*, since he speaks of palingenesis, and the ability of the individual noumenal Will to grow new "personalities" or "intellects." Schleiermacher's *individual* Subjects subsist as such in the Unity of the Absolute, which merely supports and connects them. Von Hartmann merges all individuals in his Unconscious or absolute unity of Will and Idea. Among British thinkers who contend for an individual Ego, or Subject, albeit of a veiled character, are Mill and Hamilton. Enough will now have been said of the historical forms of the assertion of a Subject, Universal or Individual. But reference to this aspect of the question would not be complete were we to omit reference to a modern neo-Kantian vindication of the Subject which has attracted

* *Works*, iv. 434.

considerable attention, but which constitutes, nevertheless, an *ignoratio elenchi* of a singularly instructive sort.

There are defenders of the individual Subject who serve to imperil their cause. With these (his admirable services to the cause of *psychology* notwithstanding) must be classed Carl du Prel. In his well-known *Philosophy of Mysticism* this thinker adduces a quantity of evidence with intent to show that between our waking consciousness and the Unconscious of Von Hartmann, the Pantheist, there is interposed a higher form of individual subjectivity, attested by the phenomena of somnambulist clairvoyance, dreams, memory, and so forth.* It deserves note, that in thus exploiting somnambulism Du Prel was anticipated by Hamilton.† “Consciousness and an *exalted* consciousness,” contends Hamilton, “must be allowed in somnambulism.” Hamilton does not, however, think he has here laid bare the Subject, and his caution reads us a lesson. In one regard, the facts collected by Du Prel are most precious: they go to establish the reality of higher and more intense grades of subjectivity than those we are normally aware of. But they do not establish the Subject of philosophy—the Transcendental Subject of Kant which Du Prel seeks for. They can only, as we shall see, confirm and render precise a belief in it established on other grounds. Experience of these higher grades might quite plausibly be regarded as a mere succession of appearances in no sense carrying us beyond themselves. If the “sceptic” professes himself able to disintegrate the supposed unity of our normal workaday experiences, there is no reason whatever why he should not extend the scope of his efforts and attack super-normal experiences also. Mere *multiplication* of experiences, lofty as these may be, has no necessary terrors for this worthy. And most assuredly it does not warrant the statement that “we, who know somnambulism, which Kant did not know, . . . could no longer rightly say that the Transcendental Subject is empirically unknown to us.” On Kant’s lines the Transcendental Subject would reveal itself, just as much and just as little, in experiences of the supernatural

* Cf. especially “Somnambulism,” pp. 144–161, and “Dream a Physician,” pp. 191–280, vol. i. (Ma-sey’s trans.).

† *Lectures on Metaphysics*, xviii.

order as it would in the construction of sensuous perceptions. He distinctly denies that it can ever intuit itself objectively or think itself by way of mere concepts—it is the condition of the “empirically known,” not the known itself. Waiving, however, this point we must reiterate our former objection. The main point to be emphasized is, that mere establishment of higher modes of subjectivity would not necessarily affect the position of the “sceptic.” It would not for him presuppose a Subject at all. Similarly, the “amphibian” life of the soul described by Plotinus,* Ammonius Sakkas, Marcus Aurelius, Van Helmont, Swedenborg, and others may quite conceivably admit of a “sceptical” re-reading. What if the *Augoeides*, for instance, is but a stream of states only awaiting a Hume to “loosen” them? Did not the Indian nihilists disintegrate in this way the higher soul-experiences associated with the more tenuous of the *koshas*, or soul-involucra, of the Vedantins? We require, it is clear, not mere additions to our stock of experiences so much as interpretation of the experiences we have. If there obtains a Subject it will be as much a presupposition of our feelings of indigestion as of the neo-platonic ecstasy.

Du Prel claims to be a disciple of Kant—of Kant, who asserted that “empirical psychology must be wholly banished from Metaphysic.”† Of his Transcendental Subject, vindicated by way of empirical psychology, we are told that it “forms and maintains” the organism according to an ideal plan in itself—a possibility which Kant’s criticism of the “rational” psychologists will be found rigorously to exclude. We are further assured that, “if force and substance are one thing, we cannot disclaim *materiality* for our Transcendental Subject, even if only in the sense of a fourth aggregate condition.”‡ This etherealized materialism is of a piece with that of the savage, and a portent which may well amaze a Kantian. Kant himself, if resuscitated, would class this assertion with the paralogisms of “rational”

* “Only a part of us is imprisoned by the body, as if one stood with his feet in water, the rest of the body being out of it”—the superior part not being present to our waking consciousness (*Enneads*, vi.).

† “Architectonic of Pure Reason,” *Critique*.

‡ *Phil. of Mysticism*, ii. p. 145 (C.C. Massey’s trans.). He has already (p. 131) stated that “the dualism of body and mind is only a special case of the dualism of matter and force.” Where is the Kantian philosophy here?

psychology, and point out that the Subject cannot conceive itself by way of furbishing up an imaginary object. Kant's Subject is a Witness, not the witnessed. "What I must presuppose in order to know an object, I cannot know as an object."* The Subject is no thing, but things are *for it*: "fourth-state"-matter organisms, ether-fashioned bodies, *koshas*, astral "doubles," or what not. Truly Kant, like many others, requires to be saved from his friends. Experimental proof of the existence of a hyper-physical *kosha* would in no sense affect his standpoint. It would merely add a new class of objects to the objects we ordinarily perceive. That a "disciple" of Kant should have overlooked this consideration is significant. It shows that the label of a great name is sometimes held more important than the doctrines actually associated with the label.

And now, quitting upholders of a Subject, we observe that rejection of it has not been infrequent. Mention may be made of the Buddhist antagonists of Sankara, of Hobbes, Hume, Bain, Lewes, and a crowd of the physiological psychologists of to-day. Materialism, implicitly or explicitly, repudiates it; Letourneau considers it as a "mental amalgam" child of cerebral physics.† Bain dubs it a "fiction coined from non-identity." Spencer, with a wondrous insight into the Unknowable, proffers as substitute "that portion of the Unknowable Power which is statically conditioned in special nervous structures pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of the Unknowable Power called energy."‡ Lewes thinks "consciousness has its synthesis in the continuity of the vital conditions."§ These vital conditions, however, are part of an alleged independent external world not yet philosophically in evidence. We shall, therefore, accord priority of importance to the attack on the Subject made by Hume, and consider the others as its appendages.

Hume's indictment runs: "There are some philosophers who imagine that we are every moment intimately conscious

* Kant.

† This "amalgam" has a standing *quâ* the *mental notion* of personal identity, as we shall see, but we should reply—No Subject, no such "amalgam."

‡ *Principles of Psychology*, ii. 504. The terms "portions," "statically," "conditioned," "special," "pervaded," etc., form an instructive commentary on our previous survey of this *Unknowable*.

§ *History of Philosophy*, ii. 316.

of what we call our *self*; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence. . . . For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call 'myself,' I always stumble on some particular perception or other. . . . I can never observe *anything but* the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long I am insensible of myself, and may be truly said not to exist. . . . Setting aside some metaphysicians, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions [presentations and ideas], which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." The pseud-idea of Self arises from the easy transition of thought along a train of ideas. To these psychological introspectively grounded objections we may add a further one adduced by Spencer. If Self or a Subject is known, what is it that knows—where is that *duality* which all consciousness involves? Is it not abolished in the very statement of the question? Is the subject its own knower, and, if so, how?

NO SUBJECT, NO FLUX OF SENSATIONS.—It was contended by Hume that our sensations follow one another as a number of separate balls might roll after one another down a slope. This is no caricature of his doctrine: "Since all our perceptions [the term with him comprised sensations and ideas] are different from each other, and from everything else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and *may be considered as separately existent and may exist separately*, and have no need of anything else to support their existence."* The mistake bottoming Hume's standpoint we shall confront later on; the present aspect of his iconoclasm admits, however, of a ready retort. The truth is that it is only the reflective consciousness that isolates and picks out sensations as data for psychology, and that but for the aid of language its abstractions could with difficulty be made, if at all. The sensations themselves in their first intention are never given unrelated; they are *aspects only of a many-hued continuum or whole*. When I am out for a walk, a clump of trees, a cottage, a red sandstone scarp, the blue ocean, may successively stand out from the sense-field and so

* *Treatise*, part iv. § 5.

fix my attention. Now, Attention is always abstract; even perception, in so far as it is *selective* of aspects of the sense-field, is abstract. I must be careful, accordingly, to remember that objects and *a fortiori* the aspects of objects which, psychologically speaking, I call sensations, have been abstracted from a whole, before they were *in situ* to be discussed as "distinct and separable" at all. This whole was there at the outset, and it was for association, etc., to dissociate and interpret the unlike phases of its content. If the clump of trees is vividly green, or faintly so but with extra potent associations, it will get dissociated from the sense-field, and occupy the throne of consciousness till perhaps a usurper with still stronger support despatches it to the obscurity whence it rose. But for its interest it would never have stood forth at all.

Old Spinoza treated the fallacy of abstraction—the regarding of elements or aspects of wholes as themselves wholes—as one of the chief sources of human error. The doctrine that sensations and ideas are discrete unit-entities somehow hanging together by "bonds" like the atoms of chemists is a good instance of the fallacy. Hume, as we saw, in Part I., not only accepted such entities, but was for abolishing most of their "bonds" also. In answer to Hume, Kant had simply to point out that even a *bare plurality of beats of sensation in time presupposes a subject*. Mere points altogether "loose" and separate would remain detached points and nothing more—would be discrete Herbartian atom "reals" but not a human consciousness. They could no more combine into this than two men, one in India and the other at the North Pole, could have a wrestling match. For Kant, a chaotic consciousness of pin-pricks meant elementary relating in a Subject which clasps the first and last beats of pain as their identical ground of reference. In a sense this contention is unanswerable, but I should prefer to put it otherwise. The sensations are not related *by* the Subject as data somehow alien to, and thrust upon, it, but *are* the *Subject itself* in revelation, their primal confused "wholeness" being merely the expression of this origin. In other words, they are not given and then put together or "related," but *projected together* into actuality as a *σύνολον* or composite at

the outset. Nor is there any call for belief in a Kantian "I think" or formal "unity of apperception" accompanying all perception and ideation. In dream-reverie, æsthetic contemplation of nature, and many other conditions, this formal I-reference may for a time vanish completely. Not so the underlying Subject of whose unity such experiences are the embodiment.

Our original statement, "States of consciousness appear," was open, as I observed, to misapprehension. Really there are no "states" at all, but aspects of a mobile whole now raised into prominence, now relegated to obscurity. Strictly speaking, indeed, there are no sensations *in time*—"sensations" are abstractions, "time" is an abstraction. Time is merely the streaming of a many-hued whole, aspects of which attention grasps piece-meal as "before," "after," "together." Once grasping the abstractness of the unrevised distinctions of intellect we speedily see how the Humian assertion collapses. The much-talked-of flux of sensations = merely the way in which *a whole*, the debated despised Subject itself, is presented!

NO SUBJECT, NO ORDER OF SENSATIONS IN SPACE.—Whether space is derivative or not is here immaterial. If a primary form of perception, it = sensations given as related in the place-order; if derivative, it = sensations given as related in the time-order and interpreted as in the place-order by way of association. In either case, the Subject is the *continuum* wherein the mutually determining sensations reveal their differences. Neither space nor Time is a frame holding sensations; the *σύνολον* or composite of *related* sensations is all that is given, and from this the notions "sensations" "time" and "space" are abstracted. The blurring of echoes of our perceptions of coexistences yields the mental schema "space" whence are struck the *ideal* figures of geometry. But more important is the fact that *in every glass bottle or landscape view, as in every succession of heart-beats, is revealed the all-pervasive unity of the Subject.* Failing it, not even a *plurality* of coexistences would obtain. The "wholeness" in which the particulars lodge is the Subject.

The connotations of the terms employed by iconoclasts are instructive. What means Hume's "collection" or "bundle"

of impressions, if the impressions are *really* discrete? The expression is simply nonsense when looked into. Again, what mean sensations, impressions, ideas, etc., in the plural? Take sensations. The term covers tones, colours, neuralgic and cramp pains, indifferent muscular sensations, etc. What is the bond of identity that enables us to *class* such diverse experiences? I answer primarily, that of being experiences for the Subject in the ocean of whose dialectically related aspects they swim. Bain, dealing psychologically with "effects common to the senses generally," remarks: "Although there is a generic and fundamental difference of feeling between one sense and another, as between touch and smell, hearing and sight, yet we identify many common effects. Thus the characteristic called 'pungency' applies to tastes and to smells alike, and is not inappropriate when describing Touch, Hearing, or Sight. In all the senses, we identify the pleasing and the painful, and the different modes of acute and massive. The feeling of warmth is identified with effects of vision; mention is made of *warm* colours. By a farther stretch, we speak of warm emotions, a cold nature, a bitter repentance, a sweet disposition. These last, however, pass into the region of metaphor and poetry, where resemblances are sought for emotional effect."* We may note, however, that it is not on account of common feelings of "pungency," etc., that we classify sensations as "*mine*." This would be an unfaithful rendering of the facts. It is contended that the bond of suspension in a Subject, whether explicitly recognized or not, *underlies* the classification. If such be the case, it would result that the terms used by Hume and other sensationists invalidate by implication the sensationism in the framework of which they are adduced. To sustain a theory the Heraclitan Cratylus never spoke affirmatively; sensationists of Hume's type should be chary of the plural number.

NO SUBJECT NO MEMORY, NO EXPECTATION.—Viewing these in isolation, we must urge that they, too, presuppose the subject. Sceptical readers of Mill may unearth an instructive lesson from his writings. Had he been able to do so he would have gladly rejected a Subject, and, as it

* *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 137.

was, only retained one as a useless sort of curio in his system. Mill goes with the extreme associationists as far as he can: he points out (as did St. Augustine before him)* that, failing Memory, the *notion* of an identical self is impossible,—that along with the object, the “mind” or memory-synthesis is evolved out of a primal *undifferenced neutrum*; † but he can get no forwarder. Personal identity implies a succession of memorized experiences caught up into unity, but on what background does this unification, this mysterious synthesis rest? True, the empirical mind is nothing more than a bundle of “feelings” and possibilities of “feelings,” but by what magic does this seriality of “feelings” turn round and project itself now back into the recesses of the past, now into the dim future? The belief always is that *I* experienced the past event or events, and that *I* will experience the future ones anticipated, and this implication is by no dexterity to be screwed out of the bare “feelings” themselves. This much Mill had to accept and account for as best he might. And although the concession is grudging—any reader can see this—it is granted with Mill’s customary candour. He will not say whether we know the Ego directly or have merely to presuppose it to explain memory and expectation, yet for all that the Ego is there. Still it remains a curio rather than the font of the deepest explanations of consciousness, and this hiding of it away in his system is of a piece with the reluctance of the original admission. It is of interest to note that Mill’s insistence on Memory was powerfully anticipated by Sankara, ‡ who holds that the Subject appears therein self-positing. Recognition, he observes, clearly presupposes this Subject? Can modern iconoclasm traverse this? Only by way of its new physiological machinery. In Spencer’s view “the act of recognition and the act of association are two aspects of the same act,” § and the act is mediated by the nerve-mechanism. Assuredly from the psychological standpoint he is right—in the very process of association the identity becomes manifest. It is the physical

* *Confessions*.

† The Subject in its early stages of self-externalizing.—E. D. F.

‡ *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxxiv., “Thibaut,” pp. 413-415.

§ *Principles of Psychology*, i. 270.

explanations we demur to.* Supposition of nerve-currents associating their "subjective faces," is the absurdity. What are these "faces" but *detached vanishing points*, "faces" which may be cut out piecemeal along with their physical basis by the anatomist's scalpel. This theory of organic synthesis betters no whit the position of Hume. What is the mental picture underlying this theory? It is the familiar one of groups and streams of little masses of matter which manage somehow to combine their sentiencies into a common consciousness. Now, at best this picture would offer us only *separate* masses with a merely external and mechanical sort of union, a union which would have to be *read into* similar masses, supposing such obtained in nature. This being so, why in the name of goodness should the subjective "faces" run together—in a jumble of discrete brain elements no points of interpenetration could obtain? Why should they not remain "windowless" specks of sentiency, each in its closed sphere? And why should the "faces" in *this* brain of mine combine with one another rather than with "faces" in *that* of a mole or rabbit? We need have no quarrel with the general doctrine of the "faces," a doctrine which we shall discuss at some length in a Monadological reference hereafter. But what at this juncture must be observed is this: *Failing a Subject or central monad that mirrors these "faces" (or, shall we say, subordinate monads) in itself, the most elaborate cerebral machinery could never yield anything but discrete atomistic sentiencies.* The actual solution I hold to be this. The "faces" in question shadow forth a truth—that of the doctrine of monads. What is termed my soul, Subject, or Ego is merely a monad, having its place in a monadology along with countless other monads, some of which go to make up the brain. But I anticipate.

The view that nerve-process and consciousness are two sides of one and the same thing may, however, take on the *Absolute Identity* form in which it appears in Schelling, and more precisely still in Hegel. This view is not open to the objections advanced in our criticism of neo-materialism and just supplemented above. Here is posited no mechanically

* Only, however, in one regard. The fullest acceptance of psychological induction in its proper domain is indicated in the latter part of this work.

conceived substance with two faces, but consciousness is just the reality of which nerve-process is the objectively thrown shadow. And *complete unity* is provided by the *Unitary Spiritual Absolute or Idea* in the background. What we know as the "wholeness" of consciousness is the concrete embodiment of this Unity. We shall urge, however, anon that both Schelling and Hegel *override the individuality of the individual* which demands not a Universal but an individual monad or Subject as its background. And the consequences of the concession, if made, are considerable.

NO SUBJECT NO INTROSPECTION.—Introspective psychology presupposes a Subject. Failing it, how is Comte to be answered? Says Comte: "It is out of the question to make an intellectual observation of intellectual processes, for the observed and observing organ being the same, its action cannot be pure and natural. In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; yet it is the very activity that you want to observe." Now, the empirical answer would be of the *solvitur ambulando* sort, and no doubt for all practical purposes of psychology the answer is sufficient. Metaphysic, however, must look deeper and inquire into the precise conditions of this solution. And thus looking, it must reply that the "observing organ" is *not intellect at all*, but the subject for which intellect is itself a sort of object. Much loose language is current on this head. Thus Romanes alludes to self-consciousness "whereby the mind is able, as it were, to render one of its states objective to others, and thus to contemplate its own ideas as such." But in reality one "state" never is or can be objective to another "state"—this is merely a more subtle phase of the atomist doctrine of consciousness. My idea of a book is not objective to my ideas of a tree or a touch, but is suspended *along with* these in the Subject which, centre and circumference alike, enwraps all mental experience. What thoughts rise up and how they behave on any given occasion is a question for psychology to answer, but the arena in which the performance must ensue is always this witness Subject.

À propos to Introspection, Hume's basic fallacy may now be exposed. Recurring to the quotation, you will note that his standpoint is that of an introspective searcher who seeks

to find a *thing*. He burrows in his impressions and ideas to seize the Subject which he thinks may be hiding there. Strange illusion! As if that which presumably is ground of all consciousness was to be looked for in odd corners or pinned down to definiteness. A lingering bias of this sort colours Mill, whose Ego is a mere curio attested only by stray and especially puzzling facts. But in Hume the bias was excessive. Not finding the Subject anywhere in particular amid a flux of varied experiences, he ascribed sole reality to the flux, and subsequently to the *items* only which it seemed to contain. Surely, he declared, accurate introspection upsets belief in a Subject, and *a fortiori* that in a permanently *self-identical* subject. Impressions and Ideas *a, b, c, d, etc.*, in their coming and going constitute the soul, and these differ numerically and qualitatively. We have to reply that Hume, intent on the *content* of introspection, overlooked the Subject that makes introspection possible. In so far as he assailed the popular idea of a changeless *mental* self, revealing this as really an unstable show, varying from moment to moment, he did yeoman service to philosophy. But disestablishment of this fiction, so far from conflicting with the doctrine of a Subject, might be more fitly regarded as a corollary of it. The mind is a flux (though a flux of *related* states), the objective world is a flux likewise, but behind both stands this Subject, as the *in-itself* whence they arise and in which they hang. Not blank identity, an impossible conception, but an identity revealed in and through differences in a process, is the mode of self-realization of this Subject.

NO SUBJECT, NO EXPLICIT I-REFERENCE.—The Subject is not to be merely presupposed as condition of empirical consciousness, but as immediate revelation in this consciousness also. In so far as the Subject is *virtual*, it is of course concealed; in so far, again, as it is *actual* in and as consciousness, it is known through and through.

Now, along with the objects and ideas known in consciousness goes an I-reference, sometimes indeed absent as in reverie, normally however, shining with a vivid and sometimes with a very intense light. It is impossible to regard this I-reference as other than an intuitively certain reality. Hence to the *arguments* for a Subject by reference to the

“possibility” of *Experience* must be added the FACT that *as revealed in experience* it is an immediate intuition. It is useless to enlarge on this intuition—we can do no more than refer men to their own consciousness and urge them to shake off the fetters of words. Immersed in the sunlight of the I-reference, we may perhaps wonder that psychologists and metaphysicians have been found bold enough to impugn it. But the solution of the puzzle is this. Ordinarily assailants of a Subject recur to analysis of our *mental states*, and ignore the great truth that *the true place to look for the intuition is not in these meagre mental states, but in the blaze of perceptual or outer experience*. Personally, I realize the Self a thousand times more vividly in the presence of the object, than in that of mere ideas. “The world of ideas is like a dry treatise; the world of sense . . . a poem of fancy,” observes Geulinx. It is in this “poem of fancy” that the Subject reveals itself in its most gorgeous colours. Never cognizable as naked form, it emerges with the greater lustre along with its richer manifestation. The feeling of this Self—whether it is an Universal or an Individual one is a point that will concern us anon—may be overwhelming in contemplation of natural vistas, the rolling ocean, landscapes, and the starry heavens, where it is *felt* as the architect, as centre and circumference of the spectacle. Observe that here not the mediately KNOWN memory-fed *mental self*, but the immediately FELT I is in question. Here Walt Whitman’s words hold good: “Objects gross and the unseen soul are one.” I should be at a loss to surmise how even theory could blind sceptics, were not fallacies of abstraction ubiquitous.

History has its ironies even for philosophers, but what will be said when I class Herbert Spencer with unwitting champions of this Subject. Yet it is on the “indefinite consciousness” of such a Subject—the true “*raw material of consciousness*”—that Spencer’s philosophy hinges. So far from seizing an “Unknowable,” a standpoint that stultifies itself, he has seized the unity of the Subject, which is so far from being unknowable that all we know is its output. This Subject it is which is the true “unconditioned consciousness, or raw material of thinking, to which we give definite forms;” this is ‘the ever-present sense of real existence [which] is

the very basis of our intelligence." * Agnosticism has invented the guillotine that has to end it.

The Subject is, then, established. Is it spiritual as thus established? Previously, in criticizing Spencer, we urged that his mechanically conceived monism was incompetent to furnish unity. True Unity is only for what is spiritual; all other unity can be conceived as merely external and mechanical. But the spirituality of the Subject may be reached by quite another route.

THE SUBJECT AS ESTABLISHED IS SPIRITUAL.—States of Consciousness are not attributes of the Subject, if attribute is held to imply a substance alien in nature to itself. It was argued by certain critics against Spinoza that an attribute must be essentially one with its substance. The criticism applies here. The "states" in question are the Subject and the Subject revealed in them is spiritual. This momentous point is easily to be settled. Consider a sunset. In surveying these glorious colours, you are surveying *noumenal reality*—reality of which the inmost nature is what it is known to be in consciousness. Similarly, with all states of consciousness—they are known through and through. At the same time, you are aware that the colours were given in time, and in time will pass away. Whence do they come and whither will they go? From and into the Subject? The Subject can only know its own states, and it can only know these in the *interval* between projection of them from, and subsequent reabsorption of them into, itself. It follows, consequently, that the subject, also, is spiritual. Spiritual are states of consciousness, and spiritual likewise is the essence that in them reveals its nature. Why? Because the inmost reality of states of consciousness is *already known, and that reality is spirituality*. But the Subject, you may say, is not conscious, it is *prius* of consciousness, reason, will, emotion, etc. Certainly it is not. As *prius* it is METACONSIOUS virtuality or potentiality of consciousness, pure spontaneous spirituality that knows not itself, and what we name consciousness is merely its self-explicitation to itself through the dualism of "mind" and "object," a distinction it shapes while transcending it. The feeling some persons have that they could

* *First Principles*, p. 96.

not die without the universe collapsing with them rests on a solid basis. The Subject is their universe both "mental" and "physical," and an unrevealed infinity besides.

It is the Subject which Schopenhauer exalted, but misconceived, in his polemic against the Hegelian "reason." His error is to identify it with impulse or activity of a blind alogical character, and this is the more strange seeing that its work is "infinitely better and more perfectly done than what takes place with the assistance of the intellect." Schopenhauer was right in assailing the abstract "reason," probably in itself a mere phase of the development of the conscious individual. But the spontaneity of the Subject, if not rational, is certainly not irrational; it is rather an intuitive *concrete* wisdom transcending reason by more, perhaps, than reason transcends the feelings of a jellyfish. It may weld a limitless richness of *detail*, such as sense shows, with the fullest grasp of *relations* such as the abstract intellect shows. Mere "reason" could no more evolve a concrete world of perception than spur the Subject to action. Reason is the poorer in concrete content the more it grows (the greater the "extent" of a notion the less its "comprehension," say the logicians), while of itself it is almost, if not wholly, inert. Later on we shall assign Reason its standing in universal evolution. For the present we may regard it as, at any rate, of subordinate standing.

What is sensation? Pending a closer survey of this question, we must say that Sensation is the Metaconscious Subject in its stage of emergence from latency and opposition of itself to itself. Sensations fully projected and related are the concrete world of objects, which, however, in order to definiteness, implies the contrast of "mind." What, then, is mind? Mind is a name for a bundle of ideas, feelings, and volitions associated with the idea or perception of a body, and dialectically thought through contrast to objects. World and Mind, outer and inner experience, thus mutually constitute each other, and the Subject stands behind and in both. It will be remembered that Kant dethrones mind, the internal sense or experience, from its proud position in most of the idealistic systems he knew; for him its variegated content is only a unity in virtue of the Subject that thinks it.

Since the content of this mind comes, directly or indirectly, from experience of the outer sort, to make mind the *prius* of reality is impracticable. Still, we must remember that mind is a stage *nearer* the Subject than is the world of objects, as through it the Subject comes slowly to know a circle of wondrous experiences *as itself*. The customary identification of the Subject and "mind" rests thus on a natural basis, but it must not be pressed too far. Though the mind has its peculiar wealth of thought and feeling, the objective real is far richer in point of concreteness, and though transmuted at length by the mind, supplies it with the means for doing so. Mind itself is probably only a low stage of the indrawal of the Subject into itself.

The *notion* of personal identity must be carefully distinguished from the Subject as only a subordinate memory-spun product. Five different lives would yield five different notions, though the I-feeling bottoming the entire series would be one. Psychology may here be appealed to. "Since the consciousness or knowledge of self," writes that most exact of psychologists Sully, ". . . presupposes a considerable development of representative power, it is attained much later than a knowledge of external things."* The infant does not even at first recognize his body as connected with his pleasurable and painful experiences. And when he gets thus far, he simply classifies himself as a body with other bodies—is, in fact, sunk in the immediateness of the object, and his internal mental representations. The initial idea of an internal thinker, clearly sundered from the object, is demonstrably a slow output. And the further completed notion of a *Permanent Self* must, I believe, be traced to the conscious contemplation of the blurred memory synthesis, wherein the "I" shines forth in the flux of mobile appearances.† Hypnotism substantiates this contention. Thus Binet, writing in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, observes that experiment shows that "*several moral personalities, each having consciousness of itself, may rise side by side, without mixing in the same organism.*" And such a second personality,

* *Outlines*, p. 266.

† Wundt thinks the most important spur to self-consciousness is the sense of muscular tension in voluntary movement.

coexisting independently with the waking one, need be no barren field. "The acts of this consciousness may be very complex; they suppose perception, memory, reason, imagination," while it preserves a distinct continuity. It is to be added by us that any such continuity presupposes a fontal subject, though not a fontal "I am." "The personalities" are wheels within a larger wheel. *Were we really and fully conscious of this larger wheel, the fontal Subject, we should be consciously aware of how sensations arise.* And this is just what we are not.

The "neutral" stage of dawning infancy is the nascent manifestation of the Subject, but the experiences then originating are not consciousness, only its forerunners. A blurred whole, with simply related, qualitatively and quantitatively different parts, coming and going, rising and sinking in intensity, etc., but not *known* as such, is all we seem able to posit at even a relatively advanced stage, while for the infant yet in the womb, a dull subconscious succession of pressures and resistances may alone obtain. A cosmos has to evolve out of a chaos. Perhaps a remote glimpse of this jellyfish sort of subjectivity may be afforded us in some cases of the shearing of consciousness under anæsthetics. Consciousness seems, then, in a fitful condition made up of vague patches of sensations and ideas passing slowly into the neutral stage, and stripping it of reality in the passage. As naked form, a "pure" I, consciousness is impossible. Like the sun through ether, the Subject shines only through a content.

THE SUBJECT IS REAL ONLY IN ITS RESULT.—The Subject as *prius* of consciousness is to all intents and purposes—nothing. It is not in time, for time is for it, and only in relation to its fleeting output can it be alleged by us to persist. It is permanent here as the "I"—the stable *in-itself* shining through the appearances chasing one another across the threshold of consciousness. And it is in these appearances that it attains existence or actuality. As *prius* it may be termed *essentia*, but not *existentia*; "I exist" = my Subject is determined as conscious of *x*, *y*, and *z*, which in their turn are determined by *a*, *b*, *c*. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστι τε καὶ εἶναι.* "The tree *exists*" is simply a determination

* Plato.

of this Subject. Existence is the thought—of something out of thought, says Hegel. Completed actuality of the Subject would be its complete manifestation of its essence as appearance. But here a strange view obtrudes itself. The Subject not being in time, but time being for it, must perforce be held as *self-productive Result*.

The Law of Contradiction applied here is a half-truth. Blank identity and unity must go—for consciousness which is the Subject in manifestation is identity *in* diversity, unity *in* variety. Simplicity goes also—it is simple I-feeling with a complex filling, and neither aspect is to be had apart. Further, the mind *is* only in relation to what it is not—the object—and *vice versa*, while within the “mind” and the “object” streams of opposed differences start forth. Every object is a process—reality an organic synthesis of relatives unreal by themselves. The Subject is both known and unknown—known so far as conscious, unknown so far as unmanifest. *Ex nihilo fiunt omnia*.

THIS SUBJECT IS INDIVIDUAL, but only in experience is declared so. Here I part abruptly with Hegelians, pantheists, and others. The grounds for this view will be demanded. I reply that my method starts from the given, that *it is not the individual but the “Universal” Subject which is problematical*. Belfort Bax takes the Hegelian view—the Subject for him is beyond numerical differences. “It is plain that the ‘I’ as pure Subject, as the potentiality of Consciousness and its forms, is prior in nature to these forms, and therefore to Time, and to that which arises out of Time, namely number.”* While, therefore, he posits one Subject common to all individual “minds” or memory-syntheses and source of the objective Nature whence, as “chance products,” they arise in time, I posit as many Subjects as there are different individuals, regarding Nature not as the *joint* platform of all, but as *separately given for every separate Subject, and arising or collapsing with its consciousness*. This is the subjectively idealist side of this system, for the present alone in evidence. As to numerical diversity of Subjects I have to say that they are quite independent of any time-considerations at all. Time is a principium individuationis only of aspects of the Subjects

* *Problem of Reality*, pp. 153, 154.

as externalized; a way in which they unfold themselves, and not a condition of the timeless Subjects themselves. And I urge with emphasis that the leap to a Universal Subject is a most violent mode of procedure, flagrantly in conflict with consciousness. The more fully the Subject unfolds, the more real this central luminous *I-feeling* becomes, and in the process of becoming it proclaims the individuality of the individual as complete. Kant, who allotted, it would seem, a special Subject to each individual, and viewed perception as radically "of no more [independent] objective reality than a dream," is with us. So, too, Schopenhauer with his noumenal individual will. The post-Kantian merging of individuals *directly* in a Universal Subject, is merely one phase of the ridiculous scramble for Universals of all kinds, in defiance of concreteness and reality. Against this illusion we must raise a vigorous protest, refuse any longer to be gulled with abstractions, and reassert the individual as sole and only reality. Consciousness is the witness—the only foe is word-spinning. As matter of workaday, and still more of abnormal experience, the I-feeling is radically individual. It is *We* who *are* reality; a Universal Subject *may* somehow live through us (though not as unbroken Unity), but that stands as problem to fact. For my part I find this I-feeling no possession of the mere "memory synthesis" of Bax, but pervasive of perception also. Universalism for me splits irretrievably on this rock, and a like feeling moved Leibnitz and Schopenhauer, and made Wordsworth kick the walls of his room. The world, the objective real, is a grand insight into our own souls. Indeed at times this objective real becomes almost oppressively "ours," so much so that one literally *feels* the perceived world rushing into one. MY Subject (not a Subject common to Brown, Jones, and myself) becomes almost too dazzlingly manifest. The "mind" and its contrast "world" lie rocked in it as twin babes in a cradle. When a child, I used to think that, were I to die, everything would somehow collapse, and many persons have acquainted me with a similar experience of their own. Now, this primitive intuition rests on a metaphysical basis. The world *is* suspended in our *individual* Subjects, waxes and wanes with their consciousness, and collapses when that collapses.

Here, Du Prel's researches are most valuable, and so too the "exalted" somnambulant consciousness of Hamilton. They go to show that individuality *deepens and intensifies with the indrawing of subjectivity into its more mysterious depths*. Is not this also the testimony of ordinary æsthetic intuition? Are not the Sufis, the mystics, the clairvoyants, the revellers in *Samadhi*, the exploiters of their "higher selves" with us? Assuredly, they are. It appears, then, that the behaviour of consciousness is other than what on the lines of Universalism or pantheism it ought to be. Important issues are involved here. "That the individual consciousness is not immortal follows from the fact that it has arisen in time, and hence partakes of the nature of a chance-product," observes Belfort Bax,* whose idealism is that of the Hegelian Left. Assuredly, if the Universal-theory is adopted the individual has a sorry chance, its time-content, the personality-filling becomes dismally contingent, "irreducible to any law or cause," as elsewhere observed.† That "I" and "you" refer to the Subject, a nineteenth-century-human experience, instead of a cave-lion's or hyena's of the palæolithic age remains on these lines inexplicable. If, however, we view the personality as memorized output in time of an *individual* Meta-conscious Subject, all difficulties may hereafter be seen to vanish. The Subject in question may, perhaps, be even now mediating its reality as conscious immortal individual, *while the doctrine of palingenesis may enable us to explain the "thisness" even of the most puzzling particular personality, certainly to remove the latter from the mere category of the Contingent.*‡

The leap, then, to a Universal Subject is arbitrary and violent in itself, and opposed to the only witness available—the pure glow of the luminous I-reference itself. Later on in this work we shall climb to a Universal Metaconscious Subject, suspending and interrelating the minor individual metaconscious Subjects within itself, but this logical ascent stands to our I-reference only as mediate to immediate reality, *It may be deceptive, the other cannot be.* Having attained,

* Page 89.

† Page 85.

‡ "Mere" because, as we shall see, the personality is really in great measure a "chance product."

however, this Subject as ultimate ground of consciousness-in-general, I shall supplement the views now advanced. I shall then exhibit the many as only explicit revelation of the One. The self-externalization of this Universal Subject will be viewed as realized in the exclusive self-centred subjectivities of monads, whose activities constitute the sum of reality. Consciousness, after all, will be the Universal Subject unfolding, not, however, as a unity, but as a MULTIPPLICITY OF CENTRES, each of which is a universe to itself.

But is the essence of the Subject exhaustible? Is the Subject an outpourer of theoretically enumerable modes of consciousness? We believe that it is not. We believe that though conditioned in the world-process (through subordination to the yet to be established Universal Subject) it is properly a purely spontaneous productivity beyond limit, let, or law. The unconditioned element posited empirically in human freedom, and somehow felt to obtain, is the *ἔτι*, or factness, which here finds its *δίῳτι*, or ground. The presentation of the world is itself witness of this all-pervasive freedom, and in genius of a high order spontaneity of production of a like sort may be dominant. There is further the more advanced argument drawn from the nature of the Universal Subject. The world-order not having been excogitated from experience after the manner of human design, must have sprung from a spontaneity native to pure Spirit. If Spontaneity is predicable of the universal Metaconscious Subject, it must be equally predicable of the Subordinate metaconscious Subjects which may be hereafter directly affiliated on it. Unless this is granted, the Subject becomes merely a nidus of numerically finite states, and Hume receives a sort of transcendental recognition. But it remains to establish much before this result is advanced on a sure foundation.

The formula "States of consciousness appear," we may now enlarge into "States of consciousness appear as content and revelation of an individual Subject." Now, these States have two Sides, our mental consciousness, and our object consciousness. It remains, then, to show more precisely how these two Sides come to originate and mature. And of chief importance is the inquiry about the latter, seeing that it means the Survey of External Perception with its many

implicated riddles. The solution which lies before us may be erroneous, but will, at any rate, provoke useful criticism. Its initial statement will illustrate in a measure the striking words of Carlyle: "This so solid-seeming world, after all, is but an air-image over Me, the only reality; and nature with its thousand-fold production and destruction, but the reflex of our own inward force, the phantasy of our dream." And it will endeavour to vehicle, though in another connection, the enthusiasm of Fichte when he wrote, "In all the forms that surround me I behold the reflection of my own being broken up into countless diversified shapes, as the morning sun, broken up in a thousand dewdrops, sparkles towards itself." Having in these citations indicated the poesy native to idealism, we have now to address ourselves to an unimpassioned logic, and do our best to appreciate the labours of our past great teachers while repairing discoverable breaches. Whence, then, the perceptions of a world? Why, seeing that these perceptions are necessarily only states of our own Subjects, do we come to have them *in the order and fashion that they arise?* The answer will be attempted in a theory fusing the standpoints both of Subjective and Objective Idealism.

CHAPTER IV.

THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT AS EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.

1. THE CASE FOR SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM.—2. THE INADEQUACY OF SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM.—3. THE TRANSITION FROM SUBJECTIVE TO SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE IDEALISM.

“Nothing is perhaps more extraordinary, in the operations of the mind, than to see it transport its sensations out of itself, and spread them as it were over a substance to which they cannot possibly belong.”—D’ALEMBERT.

“Our knowing and what we know are identical.”—HUTCHISON STIRLING.

“Objects gross and the unseen soul are one.”—WALT WHITMAN.

“The soul is like the ocean in which there is present an infinite number of very obscure perceptions, and distinct perceptions are like islands which emerge from this ocean.”—LEIBNITZ.

STRETCHED on the yielding sand, I contemplate a noble spectacle—one of those gorgeous vistas with which Nature enchains reverence and belittles Art. All along the fringe of this long Indian strand the curls of Father Neptune are being tossed into wild confusion; far away in the distance gleam half-hidden bungalows and the white city; overhead the cloud-flecked sky is taking on a deeper azure; while in the background bosage-girdled trees are souging out the requiem of the dying day. And now in the fulness of his Eastern glory the Sun is skimming the palm-tops on the distant plains, summoning the ryot from his plot, and dropping a dusky veil on the hull-down steamers in the offing. A blaze of indescribable colour decks his path, while planted in his heart a rainbow-tinted fan of peerless beauty stretches eastward over the darkened deep. Now he is gone, and in his wake speeds old Night, rising majestically in her cloudy car. And with the gathering gloom a change comes over the soul. Intoxicated with objects, it would fain rest awhile to brood over its libations. For deeper even than joy at Nature’s loveliness there has been borne upon it that time-

honoured whisper of the Sphinx ever courting its answer. Whence this glorious complex of space-hung time-strung appearances now curtained by darkness? Whence this wondrous variety of sensations with their even more bewildering modes of grouping? And the soul has, perforce, to inquire how the experience has come to be for it, and what is its import in the sublime and mystic structure of knowledge?

Idealism alone absorbs this scene, theories such as "trans-figured" realism mutilate it. From the standpoint of our view of the Subject, Idealism is, indeed, obligatory. The spectacle of this Indian sunset is the unfurling of a mystic Subject, its revelation of itself to itself in a blaze of gorgeous pictures. It is no strife of mere notions that drives this conviction home, no tedious concatenation of phrases that obscure the thought they vehicle—the seizure of real and ideal, the clasping of opposites in unity, is here, at least, direct. Spencer has supposed that idealism stands on a plinth of mediate inferences. He is in error. It is immediate deliverance of consciousness. Abstractly put, the ground for the deliverance is this. Though the opposites "mind" and "world" differ in many regards, they agree on the fundamental count of being states of my Subject, and this supreme harmony overrides each and all of the minor discords adducible. How significant is this idealism for the philosopher! what a Cræsus it seems to make him! In the concrete world he confronts his own reflex, realizes the whole sweep of its glory as his birthright. This world he surveys is not cut off from his Subject. His Subject could not know *by way of* states of consciousness something alleged to be *quite other than* states of consciousness; contrariwise, in this world it must know itself, its own self-revelatory output. Every object is revealed as a bundle of determinations of consciousness, as either an actual perception or one conceived as possible. The concrete real is the sum-total of such determinations of consciousness; and these, again, are all projections of the essence of his Subject. Knowledge, in fine, "inner" and "outer" is nothing but the Subject in the plenitude of its varied richness. In the light of this thought, the stern world of science is transmuted. This world is no

longer a dismal mechanism of which our Subjects are incidents, but rather imagery projected by our Subjects as means of their own development. No longer are we lost in a stellar desert, we are but as builders who have wandered at midnight into vast fabrics formerly upreared by them, but not till the morning recognized as their handiwork. Idealism floods everything with romance. What wonder if we scent our immortality when we now resurvey the wondrous starry heavens. In the dawn of maturing consciousness we may, indeed, greet this canopy with rapture. Its vastness is the gauge of our soul-depths. It is ours, truly *ours*, and harbinger of a grand and mysterious future.

A classification of Theories of consciousness with reference to External Perception has been attempted by Hamilton, with, however, results of dubious value. The broad lines of his classification are, nevertheless, of considerable interest.

I. Non-Substantialists or Nihilists, who deny substantial Reality and resolve experience into bundles of "baseless appearances." *

II. Substantialists, who affirm substantial Reality.

Monists :—

(a) Materialists, who regard material objects as ultimate, and mind as their product.

(b) Idealists, who evolve material objects from mind.

(c) The Absolute Identity school, which regards mind and matter as "phenomenal modifications of the same Common Substance."

Dualists :—

(d) Natural Dualists, who hold to the duality of mind and matter, and maintain that an independent world is known *immediately* in the act of conscious perception.

(e) Hypothetical Dualists or Cosmothetic Idealists, who, denying the immediate knowledge of an independent world by consciousness, *infer* one to account for perception. This, the refuge of the majority of philosophers, is subdivisible again

* As Hamilton remarks, of dogmatic Nihilism "there is no example in modern philosophy." But in ancient philosophy the Buddhists are well to the fore, *e.g.* the Madhyamikas. There is a curious feature about their thinking which has no counterpart in Europe. I refer to the hypothesis that sensations generate ideas, and ideas in their turn, unconsciously to us, sensations, just as a plant produces a seed, and the seed again a plant.

into two phases—that which regards the immediate object of perception as other than a mere “representative” mental mode (*e.g.* Malebranche), and that which regards it as a representative mode of the mind itself (*e.g.* many of the Platonists, Arnauld, etc.). These two phases include subordinate theories which it is needless here to particularize.

The defects of this classification are numerous. The various phases of Idealism are not properly brought out. Further, Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, are huddled confusedly into the pen of Absolute Identity, as believers in mind and matter as phenomenal modifications of a substance. A common *substance*, we may note, is expressly repudiated by Hegel as protest against what he conceived to be the neo-Spinozism of Schelling. Mind to him is not a modification of a substance, but the “truth” of a natural body; and bodies, again, as a whole, are but the otherness, or manifestation, of the *spiritual* Idea. “Phenomenal” modifications are not here in question. Fichte’s idealism is cited as “anthropological,” whereas Fichte declares that his Ego is (not the “mind” Hamilton is thinking of at all, but) “*absolute thinking*” or *Reason*, the I as Universal. Kant, again, is stowed away among the rabble of cosmothetical idealists.* Fancy Kant with his “empirical realism” and hatred of psychological idealism being thus accommodated! Waiving various other objections, we may note that no provision is made for that really “natural” dualism by which not only modes of extension and resistance, but the leading secondary qualities also, *e.g.* colour and sound, are referred to an independent world. This is the Natural Dualism of us all, not the eviscerated dualism which Hamilton ultimately serves up. For the ordinary civilized man and the savage, the world consists of various coloured, resonant, hot, cold, etc., resisting extensions which exist of themselves, wholly independent of our knowledge of them. The shepherd on the moor believes that the thunder of the storm exists whether he hears it or not, the savage holds to the independent reality of the lightning flash, and not infrequently deifies it. Such Natural Realists

* Apropos to Kant, Hamilton observes that “the external world, as known, was only a phenomenon of the internal” (*Metaphy.*, vol. i. 400). It is needless to say that this is not Kant’s doctrine at all. It serves to show how far the erudition of critics may dwarf their insight.

are more loyal to their creed than Hamilton, whose eviscerated objects would seem to them veritable scarecrows. The scientific realist discards like Hamilton the secondary qualities,* but, unlike him, inclines to fall back on the mechanics of the solid extended atom, or on extensionless points serving as centres for attractive and repulsive forces. He, too, is a votary of ABSTRACTION. Abstraction here generates the fallacy of regarding the elements of wholes as themselves wholes, and wholes, too, of a special order. Weeding objects of the majority of their attributes, the scientific realist hypostatizes the two or three left as the ground of the rest. Not only does he pick experience to pieces, but he projects arbitrarily selected pieces into the "back of beyond" of the experience so treated. The old mechanical atom and the force-centre are made up of two or three attributes torn thus from the complexity of *known* objects, and artificially isolated as noumena independent of knowledge. It is by manipulation of such noumena that the materialist explains the indefinitely complex reality—experience—by hypostatizing a few aspects of the very complex to be explained. This favoured-nation clause, by which special elements of wholes are torn from them and then made "noumenal," is to the last degree ridiculous. Idealism apart, the reader would do well to consult Hume.† Considering the ascription of only subjective reality to the secondary qualities, he shows that the primary are utterly unthinkable in their absence. "When we reason from cause and effect we conclude that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continued and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe which has such an existence." It is odd enough to hypostatize barren abstractions, but when the abstractions are found to be verbal, incapable even of clear mental representation, the situation grows ludicrous.

Criticism of such thinking is really, however, out of place—*only the appearance of states in a Subject being as yet settled*. Still delay is not uninviting. It must be pointed out to these realists that Berkeley's prime difficulty remains over. "Can

* A procedure as old as Democritus: cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* vii. 163, ἐρεῖν ἄτομα καὶ κένον.

† *Treatise*, pt. iv. § 4.

there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their being perceived so as to conceive them existing unperceived?"* he asks, and cynically we await the answer which (nearly) two centuries have not yielded us. Without question no one can think of anything, the terms of which are not states of consciousness, actual or possible. The materialist who speaks of a mechanical atom is imaginatively depicting its perception by himself as a small ball or cube, etc., duly invested with colour. This atom is simply an idea in his consciousness; the abstract independent existence he assigns to it, a mere string of words. Believers in an occult "substance" of matter are in a yet worse plight, for, as Berkeley observes, no one can even *imagine* a substance such as this. Its existence is confined to the sphere of diseased language.

The keynote of our Subjective Idealism may now be definitely struck. Given a Subject with an object-consciousness, this object-consciousness is by implication *I*'s. The Material world in space is no more than a bundle of its presentations. We talk, as Ferrier says, of the perception "of" matter, but in so doing we duplicate in words, though in words alone, one fact. The situation is simple enough. A Subject has a system of external perceptions, which are sharply contrasted with its internal or mental experiences, its emotions, and thoughts. Most men in view of this contrast regard the perceptions, or parts of them, as somehow independently real. But if these perceptions *are* the Subject, how can they possibly subsist when *It* is ABSTRACTED FROM. The assertion is nonsense, a flat contradiction in terms. It is not averred that my *thought* of a tree, previously seen, exists apart from my Subject; such a proposition would be regarded as utterly nonsensical. But the thought after all is a veritable echo or faint duplicate of the original vivid presentation known as "tree," a presentation which, like it, was given for and in my Subject. *Differ* as do thought and percept in many ways, they *agree*, then, on the fundamental count of being experiences for this Subject. Hence there arises the question: Whence the sweeping current distinction between the Subject's mental- and object- consciousness? Surely

* *Principles of Human Knowledge.*

it must found on the manner in which the states of the object-consciousness are presented? And the inference is that, when this manner of presentation has been satisfactorily accounted for, the idealist case must win all along the line. Indeed, to say that the Subject's states are *Its*, is to say that they are not states of anything else, and the real outstanding problem is how to get metaphysically clear of the circle of this colossal Subject—how to attain to an ontology which shall exhibit it as only a minor wheel within the wheel of a Universal Subject. To employ Platonic language, we certainly perceive shadows on the walls of the cave, but are there discoverable any "noetic" and Transcendent Realities answering to them?

To say "*the Subject's states are Its*" seems a superfluous mumbling with words, but, like many other such verbal propositions, the one in evidence may serve to arrest, clarify, and sharpen popular thinking. In practice most people quite ignore its purport. At any rate it exhibits Idealism in provisional possession of the field. Reid and Hamilton may very effectively criticize a one-sided idealism which affiliates world on the mere memory-fed "mind." It is sun-clear that the testimony of consciousness is for an empirical dualism; mind itself being a general name only for a succession of thoughts and feelings heralded, historically speaking, by presentations. But if the truth of empirical dualism is obvious, that of a transcendent dualism embracing an independent material world is not. Even Hamilton's much-trumpeted real extra-organic world is found in the end to be got at only by experience of "locomotive effort," and this effort itself is clearly a deliverance of consciousness.* Such a deliverance, as all other possible deliverances, is necessarily within the circle of the Subject, and not outside it. Even were it provable that we possess special innate intuitions or notions compelling us to think objects as independently real, Idealism would have nothing to retract. The magic circle of the Subject would be shown to have its content determined

* Hamilton's thinking is so *slippery* that it is with some satisfaction that I fall back on the verdict of Veitch on this head. "He [Hamilton] finally denies any perception of external or extra-organic objects through sight, indeed through any sense except that of locomotive effort, yielding us resistance and extension" (*Hamilton*, p. 135. Blackwood's Phil. Classics).

in an arbitrary manner, but the arbitrariness would still be within its pale.

The citadel of Subjective Idealism is impregnable. The Subject is all-pervasive. But with championship of this fact my adhesion to the doctrine ends. While contending that knowledge can only be primarily knowledge of our Subjects, I admit that this egoistic idealism will not stand alone. There is an interesting supplement available. The Subject in the act of knowing itself may *duplicate* what obtains beyond it; hence a chink is left through which Objective Idealism has its say.* Of specification of this chink anon. Suffice it for the moment to indicate various aspects of experience which Subjective Idealism, taken by itself, cannot even hope to rethink. Among these aspects is the outreaching to a world-order *preceding* our evolution as *conscious* individuals, an outreaching with which Astronomy, Geology, and Biology cannot possibly dispense. We must somehow find room for the belief that a nebula gave birth to this solar system, that our planet cooled down, that strata were deposited, valleys eroded, mountains upheaved and carved, that winds blew, clouds gathered, rain fell, that numberless hordes of minerals and plants thrived and passed away long ere animal and human percipients such as we know could have dawned. If we try to rethink science on the lines of Kant's doctrine of Time, we have chaos—a world which begins abruptly in the consciousness of the individual, but which nevertheless, *when once established* in consciousness, inevitably suggests its priority to the individual who confronts it. Belief in the mere Subjectivity of Time is fatal to the intelligibility even of Kant's own Nebular Hypothesis. To summarize the objection, *The world as presented presupposes antecedents somehow prior to the consciousness in which it hangs, and Subjective Idealism is incompetent to grapple with the crux.* Along with this difficulty goes that touching the organism—the so strange object that haunts me throughout life, and stands in such close relations with the maintenance and phases of my consciousness. How comes it that a phenomenon only among phenomena—one object only among the bewildering variety of

* This duplication is something very different from that justly open to the saucer of Ferrier, as we shall see anon.

objects—should stand in these peculiarly intimate relations with consciousness. If I fire a bullet through a tree or a box I remain conscious, but if I similarly perforate my head, all the reality I know, head *and other objects*, together with the “mental” order itself, will at once disappear. Again, if I cut a loaf of bread in half, I may interpret the process as merely phenomenal sundering of what was itself merely a phenomenon. But if I cut the throat of the object I term Brown’s body, an *alien consciousness*, to wit Brown, is snuffed out, and the connection of this latter event with the phenomena taking place in my Subject has to receive a quite special treatment. Facts like the above are, in a metaphysical regard, momentous, and constitute very tough, if not quite indigestible morsels, for Subjective Idealism to swallow. A further difficulty might be held to lie in the *seeming* reality of a *common world* rendering the workaday mutual relations of men possible, and presenting itself to each by way of aspects suggesting a coherent independent unitary whole. This point will bear expansion. Many other difficulties could be cited, but these, I opine, will suffice. The upshot is, that Subjective Idealism unaided cannot rethink experience. The supplement of Objective Idealism is requisite.

But before entering on this theme, I propose to glance at two important phases of Objective Idealism—those of the metaphysic of Sankara and Hegel respectively.* And let us first hear Sankara.

For our present purposes, at any rate, the philosophy of Sankara may be regarded as the developed teaching of the Upanishads.† It rests on a pantheism tersely summed up in the celebrated “Thou art That” of the Khândogya

* Hegel is usually termed an Absolute Idealist, but my reference here is to the standing given to Nature on the lines of his idealism.

† Cf., however, for the contrary view, Thibaut, Introduction to translation of the Vedānta Sūtras with Sankara’s commentary, vol. xxxiv., *Sacred Books of the East*, p. cxxv. Thibaut holds, that, though the Mâyâ doctrine of Sankara cannot be said to contradict the teaching of the Upanishads, it is not a following out of any doctrine positively inculcated by them. “The mode in which the physical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls originate is left by the Upanishads very much in the dark.” The Upanishads, indeed, that I have read, as translated, exhibit no system, but rather a poetic, though often very happy, outreaching to a fragmentary spiritual metaphysic. Still the emphasis which, viewed collectively, they lay on “the Self” seems clearly to pave the way for a denial of all other reality as encroaching on the majesty of this abstractly monistic ground.

Upanishad. The Brahman of Hindu thought seems originally to have meant no more than the propulsive force of creation (M. Müller), but it came subsequently to stand for a universal spiritual Self, described as pure being, pure knowledge, and pure bliss. This Self, like the Absolute Ego of Fichte, is no personal substance *having* knowledge, but is "infinite knowledge," unilluminated, however, by consciousness, being referred to in the Taittiriya Upanishad as "knowledge, truth, and infinity."* It is this one Self which irradiates all consciousness, buttresses the world-process, and constitutes the goal of the mystic. Now Sankara is no subjective or psychological idealist, and, indeed, assails the very advanced Humes of his day in terms which contrast favourably with poor Reid's efforts.† He holds, in fact, to a spatial timed world quite independent of *contingent individual* percipience. And his explanation is this. Co-eternal with Brahman or the Self (a predecessor of the "I as universal" of the Germans) we have Mâyâ described as neither being nor non-being, not being for Brahman alone is this, not non-being for it is the principle of cosmic illusion, a sort of Lockean "I know not what" by way of which the Self acquires the *seeming* appearance of definiteness and determinateness. Owing to *fictitious* limitation by Mâyâ, the Self, (like Fichte's Absolute Ego indeterminate till confronted by the non-Ego), yields the first and highest emanation, the Logos, Iswara, or Demiurge, of whose projected body the world-process, with its wealth of evolved aspects, physical, superphysical, etc., consists.‡ This Demiurge, relatively omniscient *quâ* the world-process, is the source of all design, whether displayed in connection with material co-existences and sequences, or with the souls undergoing their gloomy pilgrimage of rebirths.§ Other emanations are also posited,

* The Absolute as Result is a conception which does not seem to have struck the Vedântins. Truth is, with them, the *prius*, the Monism being abstractly conceived.

† Cf. Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 183 et seq., for some incisive passages which are curiously modern in their style. Thibaut's translation of Sankara's commentary should be consulted by those who wish to see the standpoint of the Advaitic philosopher in full.

‡ "This same Self emanates in the form of the omniscient Demiurgus; whose counterfeit presentment or fictitious body is *cognition in its utmost purity*" (Sankara, cited by Gough, p. 55).

§ "The migrating souls are themselves inert. Their bodies and their senses

e.g. the Self as Hiranyagarbha, and Viraj or Prajapati. The former in its subjective aspect is one with the "sum of souls that identify themselves with their tenuous involucra,"—involucra which answer to the vehicular supersensuous media, or $\delta\chi\omicron\iota$ of the Platonists.* Objectively it comprises the corresponding supersensuous environments. Viraj or Prajapati, again, is subjectively one with the sum of souls in the condition of the familiar workaday consciousness, objectively with their known physical environments. Ultimately, of course, all units of consciousness are rays of the one fictitiously limited Self, individuated by way of Mâyâ. By the side of this One Reality even the Demiurge is illusory.

The grandeur of the Upanishads places them wholly beyond compare among the intellectual gems of sacred literature. In this regard, indeed, they constitute a noble offset to the barbaric squalor and meanness of conception characteristic of the old Jewish Theism; they have even adumbrated after a fashion basic contentions of the imposing philosophies of Germany. Their shortcomings, as developed by Sankara, are, however, serious. We have first to note the sorry make-shift of a solution reached by positing an inexplicable surd Mâyâ alongside of the one Reality, Brahman. One Reality, pure Being, with a surd somehow outside it and not of it, is a miserable offer to metaphysic. It is impossible to credit the surd with anything short of the same Being which is conceded to Brahman—the evasion of this necessity is verbal. The function of Mâyâ resembles that of the active "matter" which enabled Plato to account for the given world without holding that the Supreme Idea had sundered itself into the contingent particularity and differences of finite things. Plato's inexplicable surd is a true parallel to Mâyâ. Sankara would have fared better had he identified Mâyâ with a Fichteian *ideally-real Non-Ego* created and upheld within the very Self it limits, only in this case a real, as opposed to a fictitious activity, would have had to be conceded to

act, but they do not act. . . . There is no individual liberty of action. Their bodies are mere puppets and the Demiurgus pulls the strings. . . . All that they seem to see and do and suffer is the jugglery of this arch-illusionist" (*Ibid.*, pp. 231, 232.

* The three intermediate between the physical body and the causal body are referred to.

Brahman. As things stand, Brahman is simply an abstraction yoked to a surd, a blank self-identical Unity devoid of all determinateness and plurality.* Deduction of a world-order is impossible; the Monism is divorced from the concrete. The infinite is made wholly to negate the finite—an impossible situation in reality. A barren "Unity" is emphasized, plurality—the wondrous variety that gives consciousness its life and meaning—dismissed as illusory. Like Parmenides and Plato, Sankara minimizes the significance of the world of sense, and he seems here on the whole truly to echo his scriptures.† Modern thought requires no Aristotle to vindicate this world—assuredly it is studded with miseries, but it is none the less sublime for that. It should be added that precise treatment of issues, such as Space and Time, is lacking, while there is seemingly no explanation of the crux as to how individuals come to "get at" things which as objective states of the Demiurge are independent of them. On the other hand, in its recognition of possible super-physical phases of objectivity, and the closely inwoven theory of palingenesis or Rebirths, many modern champions of Adwaitee Vedantism note, and note rightly, merits not found in most of its German and Greek analogues.

The theory of Mâyâ is, of course, as much Greek as it is Indian, and, doubtless, grew out of similar antecedents in both cases. Observation of nature upsetting the primitive belief in stable objects, these objects get to be considered "unreal;" finally, the whole stream of experience of which these objects are parts is subjected to a like impeachment, and recourse is had to an abstract transcendent *Reality* lifted above all fleeting shows. Various protests, however, are

* How well Schwegler's criticism of Spinoza applies here! He "sacrifices all individual existence to the negative thought of unity, instead of enabling this unity by a living evolution into concrete variety, to negate its own barren negativity."

† The *aperçu* in the Brihadaranyaka deserves note, however. "This Self shaped itself after the shape of everything that it might unfold its essence." A grand insight this, but one which would give to the sense-world a standing of very high importance overlooked by the apostles of Mâyâ. While criticizing Sankara, we may profitably advert to the qualified Monism of Râmânuga, who urges amongst other things that the *multiplicity* of the manifested world was originally latent in Brahman, and that this world constitutes a *true revelation of Brahman's essence* (as opposed to Sankara's Mâyâ or a Parmenidean unreal show). He holds also with equal fervour to that *individuality of the individual* so zealously espoused in this work.

audible among the cheers which originally greeted such a solution. Just as Râmânuga so wisely upholds the "becoming" or flux of Nature as a *true revelation* of Brahman, so Aristotle (as against Plato and Parmenides) vindicates Nature and mind as in every sense real, as a system of spiritual becoming; in-itselfness or possibility passing continuously into actuality or form. For us there will be no hesitation as to what view to adopt. We shall regard the flux of appearances as the *cradle of Reality itself*, not as a Mâyâ backed by Platonic or Adwaittee Vedântist abstractions, but as the means of the Evolution of the Absolute, an evolution which takes places through multiple minor Subjects. But to this standpoint we have not as yet legitimately progressed.

Having briefly indicated Sankara's position, it remains to criticize the allied doctrine of Perception of Hegel, and to note carefully the standing which it allots to Nature. We may summarize this theory as follows. Nature is the thought of the IDEA; this thought or externalized logic, returns upon itself or becomes conscious in the organisms of animals, and becomes self-conscious in those of men. Nature, then, on Hegelian lines is the objective presentment of the IDEA which answers in a fashion to the "Self;" while on those of Sankara it is that of the *Demiurge*, who in his turn is an emanation of the Self as fictitiously limited by Mâyâ. Now, according to Hegel, our consciousness of objects seizes the objects themselves; the so-called noumenon being only the *phenomenon fully known*. That which physically considered is organism is in itself thought, and when this thought becomes conscious, or "reflective," it yields a genuine experience of things which is gradually elaborated into the mature mind. Such a view it is which, indicating objects as prior in time to individual consciousness, but as truly mirrored in that consciousness, underlies much of the revived enthusiasm for Hegel. Let us consider the view with explicit reference to this thinker.

A Nature-philosophy of this kind avoids the Spencerian reproach of converting Evolution into a dream. *It can rethink Scientific Cosmology*. It can incorporate, when properly followed out, the full sweep of the development-hypothesis.

And it has no overt cause of quarrel with physiological psychology; since with it every psychological fact is for an alien consciousness a physiological one. But it succumbs, nevertheless, to analysis. We may indict it on various counts. The first of these bears on the assumption of the Idea as standing *directly* behind all individuals alike. The problem here involved has been already treated in another regard when we were engaged in discussing the Subject. The second bears on the inability of the philosophy to explain how we become conscious of objects *external to the organism* at all. If *organism* becomes conscious, surely it is cerebral process, visceral change, etc. (or the activities of which they are shadows), that we ought to know instead of *extra-organic* trees, chairs, and tables. At best, it will be observed, only changes of organism could become known, so that between knowledge and nature a gulf would still continue to yawn. Hegelians leave us noumena after all, though these are no longer surds, but of the same nature as consciousness. The third bears on the Hegelian perplexity touching sensations—the abstractly viewed “content” as opposed to the “form” of our object-consciousness. Here we shall do well to call up the remarks of one of the clearest metaphysical heads of to-day, Professor Seth. His words bear on more than one field of our research.

“Idealism in its great historic representatives—Plato and Aristotle in the ancient world,* Schelling and Hegel in the modern—has dealt hardly at all with the question as to the existence or non-existence of matter (?), as it is phrased, about which the ‘philosopher’ of the popular imagination is supposed to be continually exercising himself. *Probably not one of these mentioned has, when pressed on the subject, a perfectly satisfactory theory to offer as to the ‘existence’ which belongs to the so-called material system, which at once unites and separates individual intelligences. . . .* The real existence of the material system is comprised in the intelligible

* Barring stray suggestions, I must contest this view. Aristotle is no thoroughgoing idealist, for he certainly alleges that we do not know what the pure object is *per se*, and argues for a Noumenon in the Kantian as opposed to the post-Kantian sense of the term. Cf. *ἡ ἕλη ἔγνωστος καθ’ αὐτήν* (*Metaphysic*). This is a noumenally rooted “surd.” Plato, again, is no idealist in the modern sense, as he writes from a cosmological standpoint. He too, posits an irresolvable surd—the hyle—resisting the Demiurge.

forms of which it is the vehicle [categories]* (the surd that remains over being incidental to our position as incomplete intelligences), and. . . consequently its *ratio essendi*—the ultimate *ratio* of all *essendi*—is to be found in a system of intelligence within which both Nature and Man may be embraced."† Now the point is this. I, also, would contend for a system of real-idealism embracing Nature and Man, but I find the Hegelian exposition of it halting. With Hegel Nature is a "*ratio mersa et confusa*,"‡ spectral categories usurp the throne of the concrete *σύνολον* of reality, mere verbal thought or Logic is put forward as the first without forerunner. Sensation a "*Surd*" in a system of Absolutism! Was ever such admission made before? Scrape this "*Surd*" off the real, and the whole structure collapses and leaves not a rack behind. I believe it was Herschel who estimated that there are discoverable some 30,000 shades of colour in the Roman mosaics alone. To regard such sensation as a surd is to decline the brief for Absolutism. One can understand Hume trying to spin forms out of sensations, but to spin sensations out of forms (out of the categories which are the "thought-in-itself" or quintessence of the Idea, for Hegel) is to waste words. Terms may become related, but can bare relations breed terms? It were better to abjure this philosophy of Reason entirely, and assert outright that not intelligence, reason, or thought, but a *supra-intelligent, extralogical Subject* is *prius*. Fussing with logical abstractions would then cease. Nature would then be regarded as a superlogical *σύνολον* projected as concrete unity of form and matter, and reason or thought as mere empirical phenomenon in individuals.

But this Nature, were it *in situ*, would not be the Nature we know; it is, if anything, the *archetypal one* of which aspects are, perhaps, *duplicated* in the perceptions of our multiple subjects, but not a datum with which we are now *immediately* in touch. Is there any ground for holding that an objective real common to all percipients is directly given

* Cf. *supra*, Part I. Chaps. VIII., X.

† *The Development from Kant to Hegel*, pp. 57, 58.

‡ This neat expression dates from Cudworth, who adopted a Platonic Hyle as his "*Surd*."

in perception? According to Belfort Bax, a strong sympathizer with, albeit an emendator of, Hegel, there is: "You and I alike perceive the table, the same table, not two different impressions of an occult table in itself, as the imperfectly developed empiricist supposes, nor two different tables, as the psychological idealist must needs suppose; else thought and language have no meaning. *This objective point, at which our consciousness ceases to be distinguishable as mine and yours, but which to me and to you, so far as we are individuals, is given as for all possible consciousness, is not a mere determination of me, i.e. of my mind, like my personal thoughts, feelings, and desires, but is a determination of that ego or subject for which my mind itself is object, of the I which is never in consciousness, inasmuch as it is the subject of consciousness.* The objective, then, is that element or factor in knowledge which, though *per se* extra-individual, the individual makes his own by reproducing in his concepts." * Now here, again, crops out the inevitable question of the Subject, and here, again, I must repeat that the Subject declares itself *as individual*, and that this individuality invests not alone our concepts, but even our so concrete worlds which tend ever more and more to stand revealed as outputs of our own self-revelatory Subjects. It is most true that our "*minds*" only reproduce (and work up) these worlds in their concepts, but the worlds so reproduced are projections of numerically discrete Subjects. This view, which we have already considered on its merits, is confirmed by the results of inquiry. Even for human percipients we note that the objective real reveals itself in differing shapes. The tables that a short-sighted man and a colour-blind man perceive are not even superficially much alike, much less numerically one. And, as remarked by Flower from a naturalist's standpoint, "the familiar world which surrounds us may be a *totally different place for other animals.*" On the lines of a doctrine which allows only for a Universal Subject, it is odd that such varied experiences should obtain. But on the supposition that the nature *we* know, is only a presentment for our individual Subjects, not an objectively posited datum shared in by all individuals alike, difficulties such as this

* *Manual of the History of Philosophy*, p. 221.

vanish. And we need not withal be "psychological idealists," for we at least have assigned "mind" a standing, which it derives wholly through the object. Further, we may yet be able to trace even our multiple self-revelatory Subjects back to a Universal Subject sundered into centres which it holds separate while, also, supporting and connecting them—a Subject broken into a manifold wherein its self-externality is realized, and yet, at the same time, in a measure transcended. And with recognition of this doctrine we may further come to see that *Reality* is nothing but the *blaze of this Subject, coruscating and flashing in the glassy essence of the individual minor Subjects*—which are it and yet equally not it,—it as their common ground and not it as *discrete* within it. This is the supplement which, when worked out in the detail, will convert our Subjective into Subjective-Objective Idealism, a synthesis of Leibnitz and Hegel, backed by the Universal Spontaneous Metaconscious Subject. It is now incumbent on us to march at once to this goal.

The problem to be faced is this. All I know directly is determinations or states of my Subject. But I find the implied Subjective Idealism will not conveniently work. I must, therefore, contrive in some manner to transcend my direct experience. Still any results I may harvest must, by the very nature of the case, be stated in terms of experience. There must be no chatter about unknown surds, occult substances, and so forth; all such are mere diseases of language, microbes of speculation "cultivated" in the congenial word-messes of logicians. Whatever the Subject moots, it can moot only as *like itself*, and that is tantamount to saying that *the results to which we reach out MUST be spiritual*, must be essentially akin in nature to the delving Subject itself. Realizing this, let us set to work.

States of consciousness appear in my Subject. But beyond the sphere of my Subject, there are states of consciousness upheld in other Subjects. How did I originally obtain this belief? how do I now justify it? I obtained it by way of association, enormously furthered by heredity, and yielding its result without any call for voluntary inference; the

primal belief in Ejects * being due to association of experiences like my own with those special states of my perceptual consciousness classed as human and animal organisms. Thus, I have the perceptual states interpreted by ideal recall as "two men gesticulating," and with the *presentations* of their forms and actions there cohere inseparably the representations of certain complex thoughts, volitions, emotions, and perceptions which are projected as two alien "selves" into the presentations. Hence my belief in Ejects, a growth only recognized, and not easily retraced, by the adult consciousness. But taking over the growth, the adult consciousness is apt to seek grounds for its justification; for how comes it about that certain of *my own* states cohering with certain others of *my own* states answer to *transcendently real subjectivities wholly independent of my states?* There is an amusing passage in *Alice in Wonderland* which will illustrate the situation. Alice is contemplating the Sleeping Red King and Tweedledee observes—

"If he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you'd be?"

"Where I am now, of course," said Alice.

"Not you!" Tweedledee retorted contemptuously, "you'd be nowhere. Why, you're *only a sort of thing in his dream!*"

"If that there king was to awake," added Tweedledum, "you'd go out—bang—just like a candle."

Now, it would not do for the veriest sceptic to assure his audience that they were figments of his dream. The figments might raise a fictitious laugh. Yet the celebrated Fichte in his later works maintained that speculative analysis leaves us other subjectivities as only "specific modes of representation," and betook himself in consequence to mysticism. Fichte would, of course, act as if the belief in such subjectivities was certain, when an audience claimed his services, but nevertheless he might ask himself in private whether he had not been capering wildly in a personality-barren dream of his own. Note here the irony of events. In the seclusion of the study such meditations possess both force and value. Reason seeks some indirect guarantee of experience. But outside the study, in the market-place, we have to note that *Experience is*

* Clifford's term. An Eject is an inferred consciousness based on the *ejecting* of my own subjectivity into certain objects of experience, e.g. a human organism.

its own guarantee; it is only the speculative analyst who can doubt, and he only at times. Plunged in the actual, inseparable associations leave him no choice, but of themselves constitute his conviction. Thus runs the stream rendering *practical* doubt impossible. The exploiting of this belief will prove wondrously lucrative, but it will illustrate also that all beyond our own Subjects is, *metaphysically* speaking, uncertain. To know properly, one must *be* what one knows—not reach at it imaginatively through a “void immense.” The object must be ourselves, and ourselves the object—a secret which underlies all mysticism from Hindu and Neo-Platonist ecstasies downwards.

Vindication of Eject-making may be asked for. Mill remarks here that Induction is not necessarily confined to the sphere of the individual consciousness.* The hypothesis that specific experiences other than mine attach to what I call Brown's or Smith's actions is verified by further perception of actions such as I know would follow *like experiences* in my own case. Thus, perceiving a frowning face, I connect with it an angry Eject; and when blows rain upon me, the genuineness of the inference is verified by its correspondence with what I might do myself. Mill maintains, however, that there is no parallel evidence in regard of Matter. He, nevertheless, seems to have accepted Noumena of objects, and to have been on this count classifiable with Hamilton's cosmothetic idealists.

The conscious justification of the belief in Ejects is, therefore, Induction on the lines of the Complete Method. But Induction is nothing more in this case than attention-driven association, an elaborate way of following out the same path which involuntary processes have already pursued. Experience remains its own guarantee. And that this conclusion is valid, a little reflection will assure us. Mill, being idealist, has to regard the “bodies” to which he accords ejective personalities as *his own states of consciousness*. Hence, his inductive proof rests on association of certain of HIS OWN states of consciousness with certain others of HIS perceptual states of consciousness. It does not properly carry him beyond his Subject. Ejects, however, not being matter of dispute, it

* *Exam.*, p. 259 (5th edit.).

remains for us to see what the belief when exploited necessarily leads to.

Locke proved his Deity and his matter by a transcendent use of the notion of causality,* that is to say, by maintaining more or less overtly that the Subject itself and effects within the Subject are referable to causes in an extra-experiential domain. Now, although we shall have to modify the "causal" interpretation of this view very considerably, we shall, also, have to admit that precious metaphysical glimpses are possible by following out the clue which it adumbrates.

As an aspect of its content, the Subject holds before itself the world, the whole play of perceived objective relations. But scattered through this consciousness are various objects (human and animal organisms) which invite extra-experiential reference to corresponding Ejects. Now, the validity of this reference is not denied by the wildest sceptic. Inasmuch, however, as this reference is based on observed changes in the objects, it follows that *specific changes within my Subject are symptomatic of changes beyond its sphere*. Thus the shifting contorted features of an angry man are nothing more for my Subject than so many colours, lights, and shades, having varying positions in space, and recalling the usual bundles of interpretative mental states. They are simply phenomena of its consciousness. But they are phenomena with an extra-experiential reference to an angry consciousness of which I *have no direct experience*, but which is as real as my consciousness that seeks to symbolize it. The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that, as certain changes in my Subject somehow cohere with other changes beyond its sphere, the transcendent validity of causality † must be held established. This result cannot be ignored by idealism.

And now let us look further. The indices of the changes taking place in other Subjects are, as above stated, changes in our perceptual consciousness of objects. But suppose a case where, from pathological or other reasons, the movements of a face have no longer a true reference to a consciousness beyond our experience. Suppose, in short, that the man goes to sleep. What then? Does the *mere*

* And Berkeley his Deity-Noumenon also.

† Subject to the reservation in respect of meaning to be indicated.

temporary eclipse of that alien consciousness rid our perceptions of their prior extra-experiential reference? Are we to suppose that for this trivial reason the play of our shifting percepts no longer answers to an activity beyond experience? This is just what we cannot do. Having already *a posteriori* proof of the transcendent validity of causality, we shall endow it with a yet further significance. We shall contend that the changes in our perceptions are somehow allied with extra-experiential changes to which the eclipse of the alien consciousness makes only an inconsiderable difference. At last an activity other than that of a human Subject is in evidence. We must recognize that *the changes correspond to activities not in the consciousness of another human Subject, but to activities with which that consciousness is normally only associated.* Thus, indeed, are we enabled to establish the activities of what are ordinarily spoken of as the noumena of objects; for the same reasoning which holds good of the organism correlated with the eclipsed consciousness, *holds good of all objects alike.* We are at last enabled, so it seems, to make good against Neo-Hegelianism the much-discussed Kantian noumena—*plurality* of such noumena being, also, involved in the proof. But we have, also, declared our previous rejection of noumenal *surds.* How, then, is this position to be harmonized with our present standpoint? Let me endeavour to elucidate this important topic. It may possibly be found to furnish a platform of reconciliation between idealism and the atomist doctrines of physical science, and further to weld the leading conflicting aspects of idealism into a fuller accord than has yet been found practicable.

And here let me point out that no result to which we may be driven can possibly undermine the central position of our Subject—the metaconscious evolver of our outer experience, and involver of that into our inner or mental experience. It is the core of explanation, and subordinates all subsidiary detail to itself.

CHAPTER V.

THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT AS EXTERNAL PERCEPTION—(*continued*).

1. PREFATORY SKETCH OF A MONADOLGY.—2. SURVEY OF SENSATIONS AND THEIR RELATIONS.

WITH the true instinct of genius, a great poet most admirably sings—

“Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower; but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.”

This is the poesy of Theory of Knowledge. Answering the inquiry it suggests, we have returned our *first* instalment of a solution—the flower is a determination or state of the *individual* Subject. But as such it has an extra-experiential reference to a sphere beyond this Subject. On the lines of the clue to hand we may now progress further. Once validated, the transcendent use of Causality will prove potent. We must allow that *different* perceptions, and the *different* parts of perceptions, have a similar extra-experiential reference to *different* activities. It is plain, also, that some law obtains whereby the changes of these said activities go along with changes in the perceptions. Pre-established harmony is too clumsy, so we need not resort to that. It will be necessary, however, in this case, to recognize the activities as *partly* causes of the perceptions of my Subject. But for the latter there could be no determinations of consciousness at all, so the question of *its* share in the causation is idle. Regarding, then, the causation as of dual type, we

have next to inquire what are the extra-subjective activities co-operating with the Subject.

Now, we have previously seen that the Subject can think only in terms of experience, hence, if any answer is to be returned, it must be one couched in these terms. Useless, then, to suggest a positing of noumenal surds; unthinkable though named, they are pure diseases of language. Consciousness can deal only with activities akin in nature to itself, and, therefore, with such activities let it deal. Activities, then, have to be posited, and these of a spiritual order—activities such as Hegelians at least will not venture to deny us. But a further difficulty supervenes. Are these activities to be viewed as aspects only of some unindividuated spiritual whole, or are they to warrant us in constructing a Monadology? My reply is that a Monadology confronts us, and that, duly interpreted, it covers the whole field of inquiry.

The transcendent use of Causality steers us to the activity beyond consciousness; a further application of it *differentiates* this into activities, and these activities must, as we saw, be spiritual. A further still shows that these latter are, again, reducible to individuated monads which are ever changing their relations. This view is requisite to *account for* workaday appearances of integration and disintegration of objects, the parts of which may be drawn from or scattered to, all quarters of space. It is further requisite to account for changes in objects stable as to mass—*isolable, hence individuated*, “parts” or “forces,” metaphysically re-readable as *spiritual*, being in both cases inferred. Still more requisite is it to rethink the precise Atomic doctrines of modern Science. Our attitude towards these must be double-faced. On the one hand, we have pointed out that the doctrines as ordinarily accepted constitute a mere playing with abstractions. And the unmanageable character of these leads to the terrible departmental conflicts criticized by Stallo: “The atom cannot be a cube or oblate spheroid for physical, and a sphere for chemical purposes. A group of constant atoms cannot be an aggregate of extended and absolutely inert and impenetrable masses in a crucible or retort, and a system of mere centres of force as part of a magnet or of a Clamond’s battery. The Universal Ether cannot be soft and mobile to please the

chemist and rigid-elastic to satisfy the physicist, it cannot be continuous with Sir W. Thomson and discontinuous at the suggestion of Couchy or Fresnel."* *On the other hand*, it is incredible that the results of Lord Kelvin and other almost as celebrated recent inquirers—to say nothing of the galaxy of reputable historical atomists—are mere jargon. Streams of the most striking evidence converge to establish the worth of the Atomic Theory.† With our proof of the extra-experiential reference of perceptions it need not be rejected. It must be purified, reinterpreted, and adopted. All shows ripe for this consummation. Even Cooke remarks that the Atomic Theory "is a temporary scaffolding, which will be removed as soon as its usefulness is past," and it is here suggested that a Monadology is the fitting successor. The fact is, that the Theory as now stated is a mere system of symbols, utterly inadequate to the reality, but susceptible of being most usefully interpreted and filled in by metaphysic. *The New Chemistry, explicitly atomic physics, is implicitly a Monadology*, as the very terms in which the relations of atoms and molecules are mooted show us. Many of these terms have an obviously subjective import, and this is the less surprising when we remember that, as already said, consciousness cannot really imagine or posit any activities other than those like its own—all assertion to the contrary being disease of language. Once aware of our procedure, what a harvest we may reap. In the revelations of the New Chemistry we confront microscopic spiritual congeners individuals who swarm in unnumbered billions in every square foot of space, individuals with active relations, romantic struggles and alliances—and what, indeed, can be more amazing than the tale of the Carbon radicals?—individuals with whims, permanent needs, enthusiasms, revolutions, stagnations, and so forth. And for aught we can tell, even our atom may itself stand only for a system of wheels within wheels, of innumerable sub-atomic monads bewildering even to dream of. A complete rethinking of Physics and

* *Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics*, introd. to 2nd edit.

† The non-specialist reader may profitably consult Lord Kelvin's instructive lecture (*Silliman's Journal*, July, 1870), Wurtz' *Atomic Theory*, and Cooke's *The New Chemistry*, in the International Scientific Series, for an admirable *précis* of this evidence.

Chemistry on monadological lines would be best left to specialists, and cannot be here attempted. But it will be conducive to lucidity if we deal with the general metaphysical problem involved in some detail.

To give shape to this doctrine of Monads let us enter a little more minutely into the phenomena of Perception. I am lying back, let us suppose, in the stalls at the opera, listening to the grand strains of the ride to the abyss in Berlioz' *Faust*. What are the conditions of my reception of this mass of association-fraught auditory sensation? According to physiology, they are physically a succession of atmospheric blows which, setting a beautiful mechanism quivering in my ear, propagate nervous motions thence into the auditory centres. There, adds physiology, supervenes a new fact, sensations of sounds of various tone, timbre, etc. Now we have already rebutted various theories explanatory of the rise of this "new fact." What, then, is our own? And what is the proximate metaphysical re-reading of the series of physical changes? We conceive it to be this:—

What for physics are atmospheric condensations and rarefactions, have an extra-experiential reference to the relations of monads. Not having yet established a Universal Subject—the Metaconscious I prefer to term it—I stumble on a difficulty in dealing with these "relations." Suffice it, however, to anticipate a little, and regard these monads as grounded in and connected by this Subject, for which they objectively hang together, while regarded by themselves they are *discrete* self-contained centres. For each monad viewed separately there are simply changes of states which vary, rise and fall, and in this mutation exhaust their import—all we confront is a self-contained subjective activity, doubtless unilluminated by consciousness.* But of monads viewed together—as upheld in the Universal Subject—free interactions must be posited. It is just such an interplay we reach to in the case of the problem under survey. Each monad projects new states which a moment before were latent, and these states well up from the depths of its own nature, co-operating with stimulus from without. For each the mere having of the

* Later on an attempt has been made to classify the grades of subjectivity, above and below that of ordinary consciousness.

states is the sole concern, but in the mere having of them it affects its contiguous neighbours, and these their neighbours, and so on.* Finally, this mediation of change flashes into the monads of the auditory centres. What now ensues? Well, it has been shown by various writers that our sensations of sound are a complex, the aspects of which answer to what physically is a variety of combined nervous shocks in ganglia. All then is clear. My Subject *duplicates in itself the isolated states of the ganglionic monads themselves*. When I hear the harmony my Subject mirrors or reproduces for itself certain *specially intense* states of which these ganglia, metaphysically considered, now in part *consist*. Thus the Spencer-Romanes friction-view of consciousness receives here its complement. A curious corollary must be emphasized. Though my Subject projects its states as a *whole*, and so does not have to “unify” them, it, nevertheless, undoubtedly effects a synthesis if we look at the affair from the standpoint of the discrete monads. A variety of states separately present in separate monads are mirrored as united in the glassy essence of my Subject.†

Along, then, the whole chain from brain to instruments we have subjective states coming and going incessantly in ceaseless unrest. Critics may ask how it is that one monad can be thus affected by another. Shall we fling them the hypothesis of *Interpenetration* as adduced by Herbart in explaining the self-conservations of his monads or “reals”? As championed by him, the theory was tacked on to an “intelligible” space. This rider is unnecessary, since the monads as *grounds* of manifestation stand, as we shall see, above the mere *form* (space) in which their manifestation takes shape. Interpenetration conceived in a spatial way could hold only of the manifested “spheres” of the monads, not of the “mathematical points” or centres of emanation which stand for the monads themselves. It will be clear, nevertheless, that an “intelligible” space is not necessarily a source of

* No one, I presume, would credit a monad of this grade with an “ejective” inference to other monads. Ejective inference implies elaborate ideation, and a respectable grade of consciousness.

† To prevent misconception, let me state that, though our human Subjects are just as much monads as are hydrogen and oxygen atoms, I retain the term “Subjects” provisionally as marking a distinction useful for discussion. The point will be dealt with anon.

confusion. From our standpoint it would be no inexplicable Democritan void with specks of sentiency drifting in it, but the spiritual background of a Universal *spiritual* Subject. Suspension of shifting monads in this Subject might be made comprehensible by reference to suspension of shifting ideas of objects in our imaginations—in the one case a supremely full spontaneity of intuition being in question, in the other the poor human mind with its so very shadowy content. It is true that the mind does not suspend individuals, but that is *because it is itself possession of an Individual*, of the Monad, or minor Subject, a fragment of which is revealed as it. But in an *Impersonal* Prius, ground of all reality whatever, individuals could hang side by side without mixing; the Prius as not itself individual, being at the same time in no sense *excluded* by them.

“Interpenetration” may serve as a useful symbol whereby we may steer our course; and later on, in treating of the sense-relations, I shall deal with the interactions it symbolizes at greater length. But whatever value may attach to modes of explaining the interactions, it is highly important to observe that the interactions themselves are beyond doubt. “All magnets are sympathetically connected, so that if suitably suspended . . . one disturbs others, even though they be distant 92,000,000 miles.”* The whole of physical science rethought *on the basis of the monads* is one huge illustration of this truth; and, confronted by this mass of ascertainable fact, we may urge that the special explanations of interaction adopted are of subordinate importance. The basic explanation, however, will be evident. It will be remembered that Schopenhauer ascribed the impinging and interplay of things to the *unity of their ground* in his One All-embracing Will. Similarly, if a Universal Subject clasps all monads, no great perplexity need oppress us, impossible as it must be to form *any mental picture* (which means images arbitrarily selected from some special sense or senses, themselves empirical *aspects* only of the empirical) of the interplay. It is of interest to note that physical science alone is not exhaustive of the evidences of interaction at our disposal. Such well-attested phenomena as those of Telepathy, so

* Oliver Lodge.

admirably exploited by the Society for Psychical Research, render even psychology a tributary to our knowledge, and suggest, indeed, that *behind* the threshold of consciousness an interplay of *human Subjects* surpassing all conception may obtain. Frederick Myers is justly of the view that Telepathy may be pregnant with the most vital consequences for modern thought. Should our view of the relations of monads and monads, monad-groups and Subjects, Subjects and Subjects be correct, it must come to be considered as a merely emergent aspect of a process continually operative.

The monad, let me remark, is no more a surd for metaphysic than one human consciousness is for another. Just as the projected states of my Subject stand out against an indefinitely vast spiritual background, so the overt states of the monad must rise Aphrodite-like out of an equally unfathomable abyss. And every object and part of such object perceived having reference to monads, we discover that the system of activities beyond our consciousness is as spiritual as consciousness itself. Reality is but the One Metaconscious reflected in myriads of ways in the minor centres into which it has sundered itself. No longer can we say with St. Augustine, "*Materiam Spiritumque cognoscendo ignorari et ignorando cognosci.*"* The world of space-hung, time-strung, appearances is my Subject. And in the process of thus revealing itself my Subject reveals *also* aspects of a system beyond itself, of that world which preceded its unfolding in time and subsists independently of it when unconscious. Of *this* system we cannot say with Lewes that "Nature in her insentient solitude is an eternal darkness—an eternal silence;" † on the contrary, we must regard it as pulsating throughout with life, as rioting joyfully in the cataract, the volcano, and the tempest, drowsing in the ice-block and the granite boulder, as thrilling with all manner of sound, ablaze with infinity of colour, and the seat of innumerable petty wills, now clashing, now combining with each other, indifferent to aught save themselves, yet ever pushing on the triumphal car of the world-process. In this Absolute Idealism, *that is also Absolute Realism*, we have lodged all that defenders of "Reality" clamour for, and a vast deal more

* *Confessions*, lib. xii. c. 5.

† *Hist. of Philosophy*, i. 371.

besides. It is not to be supposed that our Subjects exhaust even the poor aspects of the system they confront. The mirroring here is most *shadowy*, and skims the very film on a surface. And how *inaccurate* it often is may be inferred in two ways, from the varieties of content obtaining in the perceptions of different Subjects, and from the mode of perception itself—all extra-subjective objects or monad groups having *normally* to be mediated by sense-organs and a brain.* If the cerebral monads are our windows, how shall we trust what seems to be thrown in? Must not these internunciary monads mix their gossip with their message? Assuredly there is scope for caution. At the same time we must remember that a constant *attuning* is in progress, that the monads work upon each other as a strong-willed man works upon his fellows, and by persistence finally wins the day. Thus the intensity and rapidity of compressions of the auditory nerve accord exactly with those of the aerial sound-waves. And, to cite his Grace of Argyll, "The facts as described to us in this language of sensation are the true equivalent of the facts as described in the very different language of intellectual analysis. The eye is now understood to be an apparatus for enabling the mind instantaneously to appreciate differences of motion which are of almost inconceivable minuteness. The pleasure we derive from the harmonies of colour and of sound, although mere sensations, do correctly represent the movement of undulations in a definite order; whilst those other sensations which we know as discords represent the actual clashing and disorder of interfering waves. In breathing the healthy air of physical discoveries such as these, although the limitations of our knowledge continually haunt us, we gain nevertheless a triumphant sense of its certainty and of its truth. Not only are the mental impressions, which our organs have been so constructed as to convey, a *true interpretation of external facts*, but the conclusions we draw as to their origin and their source, and as to the guarantee we have for the accuracy of our conceptions, are placed on the firmest of all foundations. *The mirror into which we look is a true mirror.*"

* The facts of clairvoyance, and improvisation of sense-areas in hysteria, e.g. in the solar plexus, may, however, with Telepathy and kindred phenomena, be usefully set off against the normal procedure. They fall easily into our doctrines, though they bewilder a materialist science.

On the whole, on the whole. We must not be too exacting. So that the organism responds aright to changes in its environment, it matters little if the mirroring is not accurate to a detail. So that the general relations of monads are seizable, it matters little if we see here and there darkly through the glass of our treacherous cerebral allies. Absence of sensory response to countless grades of light-waves and other stimuli fails seriously to affright us. It is only when the Platonic ideal of metaphysical truth for its own sake begins to haunt us that distrust of a possibly phantom world looms menacingly forth. For *practical* purposes the mirroring is approximately adequate: for a knowledge that aims at absolute certitude and thoroughness it is woefully defective. Recognition of the dream we are now living, were it general, would add numberless recruits to the mystics.

Of a piece with this difficulty is that relating to the mediation of any extra-organic objects at all. Why are these cerebrally mediated pictures what they appear? Why are not the cerebral mechanisms themselves duplicated or adumbrated in our consciousness? In answering this query two considerations will prove valuable. In the first place, the "cerebral mechanisms" of the physiologist are *themselves* mediated pictures, and probably anything but faithful duplicates of the corresponding extra-subjective activities. Theory of Knowledge, therefore, has to deal not with how *these* processes mediate our pictures, but how the activities *answering to them* do. Secondly—and the consideration is of prime moment,—it is not even these latter that are consciously mirrored in our Subjects, but only their *especially intense* aspects. This contention (which reinterprets among other things the "ganglionic friction" theory of consciousness) is well borne out by survey of the defective condition termed darkness. Darkness for us answers to darkness in the subjective life of nerve-monads. It cannot, however, be averred that these monads are eclipsed merely because we do not happen to perceive light. Contrariwise, as physiology and chemistry (when re-read) inform us, their states must be most complex, though of a placid equable type. Yet these complex states are not reflected into the *conscious* side of my Subject; they are submerged among the numberless "petites

perceptions" that fail to rise above the threshold of consciousness. Only that is consciously reflected which from a physiological standpoint would be held to involve ganglionic friction—that is to say, intense monadic activities *determined by and in some measure attuned to vigorous stimuli from without*. Thus it comes about that an extra-organic object or monad-group has its surrogate in my Subject even though speaking through the telephone of the bodily monads. This conductivity of monads is of the highest significance for our practical needs, and, failing it, chaos would ensue. Monads once conceded, Idealism cannot dispense with this hypothesis. It enables us to surmount a difficulty which every thorough-going student of the subject must have noted.

The huge sun *Alpha Lyrae* appears to us as a point. The monad does not show even as that, for it is lost as an individual in the aggregate of massed states backing our confused and shadowy perceptions. For all that, however, it is an *Alpha Lyrae* in itself, complex and wonderful beyond the wildest dreams of romance. And could I throw back the threshold of consciousness far enough into the palace of my Subject, I might find behind a sensation of red or hardness an indescribably complex activity answering feature for feature to the play of the innumerable cerebral monads. Reality dips into the indefinitely vast in the direction of the great and the little alike.

The atomic monads differ, of course, numerically; in their space-order (*so far as they are in space*) in the intuition of the Universal Subject, and in the time-content of knowing and feeling which they are so conditioned as to harbour. What is termed the dualism of matter and force answers to the abstractly viewed aspects of their aggregate knowings and willings; "gravity," for instance, being rescued from the mire of an "occult quality," and regarded as a *summation* of innumerable individual willings of a special sort. Each monad is a limitless background or spontaneity *in itself*,* but the overt states it is so conditioned as to be able to actualize may

* A little reflection will show that the Monads are as *independent* as they are *interdependent*. They cannot be *wholly* dependent on each other for their content, as this would mean a general indeterminateness and emptiness. A spontaneity, here furthered, here checked,—a *struggle for existence* or manifestation pervasive of each and every group—furnishes the best working hypothesis.

be very limited indeed. It has its definite *character* and its definite little fund of perceptions, and possibly of ideas, as we have—Causality carrying us back here to differences between monads just as it carried us originally to the monads themselves. But the character is a class-one; the monads of any group are more like one another, it would appear, than are two peas. The groups themselves are very curiously differentiated. Just as a man differs slightly from A, but markedly from B, so these monad-kinds stand to one another in the most varying degrees of resemblance. It may be that the struggle for existence—the stress of avoiding pains and seeking pleasures in pursuit of full actuality or life—is slowly affecting these characters, and that a metaphysic of chemistry will have one day to take account of this possibly most significant *nisus*. The Evolutionist chemistry of to-day may be cited in defence of this view. The theory of an original differentiation of atoms out of an undifferentiated matrix in part, no doubt, implies it. But there remain over two problems: (1) How far is the character or behaviour of the atom the work of a self-positing spontaneous productivity, how far joint work of native spontaneity and adjustments to surroundings (to other monads) in the later struggle for existence? (2) If the second cause largely helped to determine it, how far is a like process of modification still operative?

Feeling without knowing is blind, knowing without feeling is inert. Monads that merely felt pain and pleasure would be blind, and if they merely “knew,” inert. This has a manifest bearing on the problem of a primæval *chaos*. The chemist inclines now to hold that the elements were evolved from Protyle, or a primary undifferentiated matter. Metaphysically re-read, his arguments go to show that the monads emerged out of the unindividuated essence of the Universal Subject, or possibly some subordinate potency. Let us suppose these monads just emergent—certain of their relations will involve pain, these they seek to negate; certain others will involve pleasure, these they seek to maintain. Determinism in nature rests on this footing—a voracious egoism rules all, and is sole guarantee for the changelessness of what we call the laws of nature. If, then, at the outset monads felt pain, but knew not *how* to avoid it; felt pleasure, but knew not *how* to

prolong it, there was once an era of indeterminism and chaos. With slow *education* of the monads—evolution of *befitting adjustments* to others, adjustments which would involve no “ejective” reference, no felt transcending of their self-contained subjectivities—there would dawn the reign of Law.

Chemists assure us that the properties of H_2O are not the sum of the properties of H and O viewed separately. But for the fact, observes Mill, that the weight of the elements as combined is equal to the sum of their weights as separate, we should probably have adopted a theory of *transformation* instead of one of *combination*. We must hold here that the “elements” are transformed, for the permanence of the weight merely proves that this one attribute is fixed and no more. Retention of changeless simples, whether as mechanical atoms or as Herbartian “reals,” is unnecessary. *A monad changeless and stable under differing relations is a myth. Differing relations imply differing educed states.* As with our own Subjects, so with the atomic monad. What we term the nature of the monad is as fluid as is our own consciousness, and must not be decided by *arbitrary selection of aspects*. Cherishing this view, we need no longer wall off the inorganic from the organic, nor stare stupidly at the facts of crystal growth and rejuvenescence, of protoplasm and the vital cell, protozoic selection of material for “tests,” and so on. The advance is not by way of recombination of old qualities, but by that of progressive elicitation of new. Nature, the archetypal, is a *continuous creation*; the march from firemist to organisms a revelation with something wholly new at every stage of the journey.

Monadology has a notable pedigree. Empedocles of old saw in love and hate the springs of natural causation. Euler read “inclination and desire” into gravitation. Kant reduces matter in one aspect to a unity of attractive and repulsive forces, and Schelling, expanding the hint, bases his objective idealism on a Dynamic Atomism, *i.e.* on a plurality of antagonizing individuated *actions*, all of an unconscious subjective order. Schopenhauer regards Nature as objectivation of Will, but his view of the impermanence of individuals prevents him from constructing a monadology. Von Hartmann

is for force-centres, resolvable into will-idea units, whose representations, however, are limited "to spatial attraction and repulsion of uniformly varying intensity, and whose volitional manifestations consist in the realizing of this limited ideational province"—a barren monadology, indeed. Zöllner holds that "all the activities of natural existences are determined by sensations of pleasure and pain, and are indeed such that the movements within a confined sphere of phenomena look as if they followed the *unconscious* purpose of reducing the total of painful sensation to a minimum." Among practical men of science, Edison is here to the fore, regarding the human body as "maintained in its integrity by the intelligent persistence of its atoms, or rather by an agreement of its atoms so to persist." Man's intelligence is the "sum of the intelligences of which he is composed." We may remark, however, that no "intelligent" persistence is needed, merely a situation where the monadic pleasures and pains are most stably catered for. That real pleasures and pains obtain in monads we have good reason to know; in the agony of toothache, the bliss of healthy muscular action, we have positive *insights into the weal and woe of our own cerebral monads themselves*. The pleasures and pains which subsist simply and rudimentarily in each monad considered separately, are in my Subject lumped into a massive or acute whole. We must, of course, traverse the view that man's intelligence (which, by the way, is only a *part* of his consciousness) is the sum of monadic intelligences. The monads, if their rudimentary states can be termed "intelligent" at all, are individuals, not an individual. The dependence of man's intelligence on brain-function, *i.e.* on related minor monads, is, up to a certain point at any rate, obvious. But, metaphysically interpreted, this dependence merely means that a complex of cerebral activities is continually being duplicated in a central monad which may, of course, very well react on these activities in its turn. Man, in fine, stands in his own monad, the monad which I have termed the Subject, though the mode of unfolding of this Subject is largely guided by the workings of minor monads. Idealism may meet physiological psychology on this platform, and greet her with a warm caress.

The two great monadologists of history are, indubitably, Leibnitz and Herbart. Leibnitz is the founder of Monadology as a science, but, nobly as he spoke, it was still with the voice only of a pioneer. The subordinate monads are said to have no "windows," are beyond stimulation by their fellows. They have, however, a front door through which they welcome a personal Supreme Monad, a being who should really have been barred out in favour of a Universal Metaconscious Subject revealed in and as themselves. Space is made pure subjective illusion, pre-established harmonies dismay us, while the subjective moment of idealism has altogether too free a swing. Having already noticed Leibnitz, I need not repeat my words. Let us pass to Herbart. Here the monads reappear under the name of "reals." But a big reform has been mooted. The Leibnitzian monad contains potentially or *virtually* all that it *actually* becomes; it is a self-active ideating centre embracing a veritable universe in itself. Herbart's monad, on the other hand, derives all it knows from *relations*—with other monads. Thus in the case of the human monad, consciousness is only the sum of these relations with neighbours. The monad is a *purely positive, absolutely simple, changeless* real, devoid of all particularity in space or time, the very antithesis of that dialectical "thing" discussed by Hegel. Whence, then, the changes which the known world exhibits, and which, for Herbart, all point to corresponding noumenal facts. Here supervenes the theory of disturbances, and self-preservations on the part of the monads—that of their varied "contingent aspects" in varied relations while they rest themselves qualitatively the same—and that of attraction, repulsion, and interpenetration in a noumenal or intelligible space. The doctrine of perception thus advanced strips the individual monad of all spiritual spontaneity, and renders, therefore, retention of Theism, for which Herbart is anxious, a hopeless enigma of the system. The "purely positive" and "simple" "changeless" character of the monad is whittled away as the exposition proceeds, and in the case more especially of man is seen to be wholly verbal. Herbart, no lover of Hegel, sought to destroy the view of reality as dialectical process, and the attempt proved disastrous. *The life of a monad is itself a minor*

dialectic within that all-embracing dialectic constituting the universe. Herbart's disconnected "reals" deprive his system of all objective unity, and the altogether mechanical way in which the operations of these "reals" are conceived, furnishes an unsatisfactory contrast with the idealisms of Hegel and Schopenhauer alike. Had Herbart suppressed his mechanical bias, endowed his "reals" with some immanent life, and unified them on the background of a Universal Subject (whose way of intuiting them as attractive, repulsive, and interpenetrative = an "intelligible" space), his Theism might have suffered, but his philosophy would have, perhaps, gained a compensatory stability.

It will now be advisable to look more closely into the question of Sensations and the Relations that enwrap them. Already, however, we have reached a significant result, an Idealism that is equally Realism, that assigns adequate import both to the *ordo ad individuum* and the *ordo ad universum*. The ground for the old spiritualist sneers at sensations has, also, been entirely removed. These bugbears of the intuitionists are no other than spiritual aspects of a slowly unfolding spiritual whole. Said Descartes in his *Dioptrics*, even the simplest sensations as soul-reactions are innate. Said Hume very justly, "in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing but show that they are conveyed by the senses." From our standpoint it will be clear that empirical sensation is of necessity equally *a priori*. It is as the empirical that my subject reveals itself to itself. Whether, therefore, any particular "form" of relation or idea is pre-empirically generated and thrust upon us or shaped within the already generated empirical is a matter of quite subordinate moment.

The empirical content of the Subject may, on the lines of Kant, be classed as Knowing, Feeling, and Willing. But of these, Knowing clearly overlaps and subordinates the others. Some, indeed, have sought to reduce all experiences to it and it alone. "Les volontés sont des pensées," observes Descartes, and Spinoza follows suit. Leibnitz' monad is a purely intelligential unit. Herbart also resolves willing into knowing. Feeling for him = obstructed representations working for emergence behind the threshold of consciousness; desire

being imperfect, while satisfaction of the will is perfect, emergence or realization of these. Hegel, of course, reduces everything to the Logical (really only an *aspect* of empirical knowing), in which all feelings are absorbed as moments. From the standpoint adopted here we may state the matter thus. Consciousness is a dialectical whole made up of related sensations, ideas, and feelings. Feelings pleasurable, painful, and neutral, so far as they enter consciousness, are clearly known, but this fact by no means permits us to whittle their speciality away. In themselves such feelings are irreducible. A toothache, though a feeling, is known, but the element so treated is radically unlike the whiteness or hardness of the tooth. Feelings play a unique part, constituting the spur of our voluntary actions and ethical judgments; knowing emptied of them would, lazy associations apart, be wholly inert and indifferent. *Willing* is Feeling and Knowing conjoined, with, I believe, not infrequently, freedom or spontaneity thrown in. Feeling by itself is not desire, *ignoti nulla cupido*, but bare immediateness; feeling "informed" by knowing, but balked, is desire; knowing-feeling, moving consciously to fuller realization, arrest, etc., of itself, is will. Behind and in the three, however, stands the individual Metaconscious Subject beyond all knowing, feeling, and willing, as the spontaneity from which as contrasted aspects they spring.

Condillac was right in exacting profound respect for the problem of the origin of sensations. Iconoclast though he is termed, he appeals himself to an *activity* of the *soul* for which cerebral processes give the occasion.* The problem is, indeed, a pressing one, but what an array of solutions confronts us! What a dance of conflicting theories have we here—a veritable dance of death for the student. From Democritan *ἀπόρροιαί*, and Lucretian "simulacra," the Aristotelian soul and the Hyle,† we pass to

* *Traité des Sensations.*

† Aristotle, like Plato, never wholly surmounted dualism. His soul (of which life and mind are equally functions) is the complete realization or actuality of the body, the *formative* agency which educes its Hyle or undetermined matter into a fully fledged physico-spiritual determinateness. Still, his anticipations of modern idealism in the *De Animá* (a metaphysical psychology) are most interesting. Empirical Mind he regards as identical with the content it thinks, and as such perishable, and, indeed, ever perishing. The object known = knowledge that has *pre-existed virtually* in the soul *made actual*; here

sensations forced upon us by a deity, sensations forced on us by nerve-processes, sensations forced on us by "noumena," sensations which are Categories made concrete, sensations which are apparitional and inexplicable, sensations which are deduced from an individual or a Universal Subject, and so on, to a tangle of conflicting standpoints. In connection with the present standpoint, the doctrine of Lotze may delay us. Lotze is an *occasionalist*, holding that the soul responds to certain physical signs. He does not posit one point in a pineal gland or mystic sensorium for *reaction* of the soul on the nervous "signs" it responds to. He holds that the nerve-fibrils run "into one nervous parenchyme which opposes no resistance to expansion on all sides, and therefore allows of at least a part of their activity certainly affecting the substance of the soul." This *unextended* soul is not enthroned in the grey matter of the hemispheres, but in the *pons Varolii*, and hurries here and there to meet the impressions intruding through the fibres. But having to hasten thus to a given spot, the soul must have a knowledge of the stimulation itself before it reaches the terminus; hence "some kind of dynamic connection by reciprocity of action" with the nerve-ends has to be further assumed. Such laboured explanation—a non-spatial yet somehow moving and localized soul worked with this strange physiological machinery—is surely uncalled for.* So, too, is the kindred view of Herbart, whose *non-spatial* monad moves to and fro in the organism varying its relations as the needs of *self-preservation* dictate. If the monad is non-spatial, how about the states which fill it? It cannot be alleged that I have not the states called perceptions of books or chairs. But each of these perceptions is *extended*, though not so for an *alien* consciousness. They fill space just as they fill time—nay, taken together, such aggregates of coexisting points *are* my space, viewed as form of external intuition. Not merely percepts, however, but ideas and emotions are extended. My idea of a house is a faint duplicate of what was given as extended, and as such is itself is the idealist offset to his sturdy psychological empiricism. This heralds Leibnitz. This active soul, too, of which we have *no memory*, doubtless suggested to Schelling his doctrine of the *Immemorial Being*. It is imperishable, eternal.

* How on this theory are the facts of telepathy, clairvoyance, improvisation of new sense-areas, etc., to be even covered?

extended. An emotion of surprise fills less of the inner space than does one of anger or of the beautiful. Both External and Internal experience presuppose space; hence my monad, so far as revealed in them, is spatial. But here again the contradictoriness of reality supervenes. As revealed or manifested the monad is spatial—space is simply the incarnation of its spiritual activity,—but as background of manifestation it is not. As background it is not in space, but space, on the contrary, is *for it*, a form, manner, embodiment of its energy. Still, *from the standpoint of the Universal Metaconscious*, it might seem at first sight necessary to ascribe a thoroughgoing space-setting to the manifold subordinate monads. And undoubtedly, in so far as they are externalized, the monads are upheld in a certain order, and this order is assuredly space. The monads that rage in a sun-spot are sundered spatially from those in my inkpot. And as upheld in the Universal Metaconscious, they may be in themselves of most varying space-attributes. So far, so good. *When, however, we discover that these monads are the Universal Subject, that their space-projecting background must in last resort be the Universal Subject itself, we are compelled to conclude that the monads transcend the very space-order in which they are intuited.* The branches, twigs, and leaves of the tree quiver apart in space, the roots are unified in that all-spontaneity whence space itself springs. The Universal Subject is the monads, and stands above its own self-posed form of action.

Our sensations, as I said, are most blurred and shadowy. But what of their derivation out of one another, the higher out of the lower, a theory recently revived by some thinkers. "Every sensation," observes Lewes, "is a group of sensible components." * Ay, and generated out of simpler elements is the cry. Old Democritus really led the way by suggesting touch as the mother sense. With our modern writers the analogy of chemical combination, and survey of the probable historic order of development of the kinds of sensation have undoubtedly counted for much. Among prominent thinkers Taine † and Spencer ‡ derive the entire qualitative

* *Problems*, p. 260.

† *On Intelligence*, pt. i. bk. iii., ch. xi. § v.

‡ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. ch. "Substance of Mind."

differences of sensations from simples, constituting the subjective "faces" of nervous shocks; such simples being differently combined, and so yielding different results. In traversing this view, we note, firstly, that the chemical analogy breaks down—transformation, not composition, holding here. Secondly, we must urge that "following after" and "generated by" are not convertible ideas; thirdly, that Sensations, in so far as they are probed at all, stand revealed each and all as unique aspects of consciousness. Combinations of currents are most instructive in a physiological regard, *e.g.* the modern theories of musical tones and colour, but these combinations themselves require explanation. Each different combination of nerve-currents points to different states of monads, and these states each and all unique, are only to be dealt with as integers elicited from latency. The higher sensations are not the lower reshuffled in some fearful and wonderful manner, but are wholly new phases of reality. Hence theories such as Preyer's derivation of the colour-sense from that of temperature are, at best, only valid with this important metaphysical reservation: the lower stages here do not *produce*, but *herald* the higher in time. And that the cerebral monadic activities have to be "integrated" in a Subject has already been made plain.

Pleasures and pains differ from most other sensations in having a reference to states not of extra-organic, but organic monads, the blurred feelings of which they stand for. Pleasures and pains are essentially different, and attempts to view them, with Von Hartmann, as grades of the same feelings are verbal. Squeezed out of knowing they certainly cannot be, *e.g.* out of Herbartian hindrances and furtherances of presentations and ideas, for, as observed, though overlapped by knowing they present unique features—the *x* and *y* which we seek or shun. In probing their metaphysic a clue may be got from psychology. Says Grant Allen there is to be observed "a general quantitative relation between the amount of pain and the degree of *hurtfulness*, as well as the amount of pleasure and the degree of wholesomeness, while the most pleasurable experiences are found to attend functions which in their normal exercise are most important for the welfare of the individual and the

species."* We may add that the physiological conditions of the feelings might well be subpœnaed for Pessimism. "Massive pleasure can seldom attain or never attain the intensity of Massive Pain, because the organism can be brought down to almost any point of inanition or exhaustion, but in efficient working cannot be raised very high above the average. Similarly, any special organ or plexus of nerves can undergo any amount of violent disruption or wasting away, giving rise to extremely acute pains; but organs are very seldom so highly nurtured and so long deprived of their appropriate stimulation as to give rise to very Acute Pleasure." Observes Bain, pleasures go along with "an *increase* and states of pain with an *abatement* of some or all of the vital functions." Thus far the empiricists. What now of the Metaphysicians? According to Aristotle (whose handling of the whole problem of the feelings is masterly), Pleasure is an accompaniment of the free realization or unimpeded energy of a power, natural or acquired, sensory or intellectual. "Accompaniment"—note it well: he does not squeeze the feeling out of the mere realization or energizing itself. Leibnitz, who views pleasure as feeling of a perfection, and pain as feeling of a defect, does; his endeavour is to educe these out of the workings of a merely ideating or *knowing* monad, on the lines of his theory of sense as confused conception, and of the doctrine of unconscious ideas. Herbart, with his wonderfully "dynamic" presentations and ideas, arrives at a somewhat similar result. Hamilton, who discusses the matter most interestingly, practically follows the Stagirite "Pleasure is the reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded action of a power of whose energy we are conscious; pain, a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power."† Introspection fully bears out this view, and in introspection, be it noted, we are observing the springs of mental Reality where they gush out. Guided, then, by previous hints, by introspective searching of our own monads, and by the revelatory clues as to the alliance of pleasures and pains with increase and abatement of function yielded by physiology, we arrive

* *Physiological Aesthetics*, p. 107.

† For his erudite survey of the discussion, cf. his *Lectures on Metaphysics*, ii. 431-490.

at a result fitting neatly into the Monadology—a result which Kant's definition of pleasure as the feeling of the furtherance of life has very interestingly foreshadowed. It is this: *Pleasures go along with free or furthered activities of monads, as actualized, unfolded, realized; pains with activities that are hindered or repressed.* More briefly, pleasures are feelings of furthered life, pains of menaced death, both being backed by the primitive restless spontaneity of the monads. The overstraining referred to by Hamilton requires no special note—as met with in the case of Man it is a composite effect resulting from the relation of our Subjects to the complexly related bodily monads. When a faculty is “strained,” the pain connected with the event is a reflex in us of disturbed organic relations, of an abatement of vital function implying mutual hindering on the part of monads. It is most important, of course, to observe that our human pleasures and pains embrace not only those proper to our Subjects (*e.g.* those arising from their pure energy, and the mutual furthering and hindering of their *aspects*, *e.g.* a conflict of passions), but those of our Subjects as related to the bodily monads. Harmonious relations between Subject and monads, or monads and monads as reflected, mean *agreeable* feelings, discordant ones *disagreeable* feelings. These results possess a high value in respect of Ethics and Pessimism. And they seem to embody at any rate a portion of the solution round which the various metaphysical and empirical theories have for long revolved at greater or less distances.

Having dealt with sensations, it remains for us to add something touching their relations. The problem of Relations carries us once more to Time and Space. It revives also all the controversies about Categories which we have noticed in Part I. First, however, of Time. Time, for my Individual Subject, is the order of its states of consciousness as “together” “before,” and “after.” It is, however, succession that catches the eye, and is usually identified with Time by the ordinary man. I fully agree with Hume that Time “arises from the *manner*” in which the presentations and ideas appear; it is, indeed, the manner itself, no “form” or frame in which the presentations and ideas somehow run or float. A time-form other than the pre-

sentations is nonsense, the purely *verbal* isolation of relations of simultaneity and sequence without the terms related. In time the contradictoriness of reality is most prominent, for here different determinations constitute the life of the *same* object, while the Subject itself is realized by way of continual transcending of the contradictory moments of its time-content. Plato's words, "Time is the moving picture of eternity," are very fine; Time is the way in which the *timeless* Subject reveals itself to itself piecemeal in a panoramic flux of pictures.

The time-order of my perceptions has, however, an extra-experiential reference to other time-orders in monads beyond my Subject. An "infinite glance" would reveal the fact that other monads were spinning their content long ere this present consciousness of mine had arisen. And it would further show that these innumerable monadic time-orders viewed collectively, that is to say, as upheld as in the Universal Subject, constitute an objectively real flux. Only from this standpoint can we speak of a world prior in time to *conscious* individuals, only in this way is it requisite that the subjective idealist view of Time should receive a supplement. The flux in question bears out the saying of Augustine, *Non est factus mundus in tempore sed cum tempore*. And its recognition renders idealism stable, and fully competent to rethink Science.

Space has been defined as the abstraction of self-externality, or the "along-sidedness" of indifferent things. Schelling regards its production as "nothing more than the activity of contemplation objectively posited" (with Time as its circumscribing determinative negation). From the standpoint here adopted space has two aspects, that of a form of relation for the aspects of our *individual* Subjects, as perceiving, feeling, thinking, and willing, and that of a form of activity or self-manifestation of the Universal Subject in which these Individual Subjects and all other monads hang. For our experience space is a *continuum*, the order of our states as alongside of one another, as so placed, so distant, so big, so shaped, etc.; it is the abstraction of their manner of appearance as coexisting. So far it is plain sailing. But when we come to consider Space as form of manifestation of the

Universal Subject, we have to consider not merely the order of states or aspects of a discrete individual but a space in which *multiple individuals* in some problematical manner are set. Space in this regard is the way of affirmation of the subordinate monads, the *sundering of the Universal Subject into self-externality*, into discrete centres, a discreteness, however, never wholly complete, owing to the ultimate unity of their ground. We have seen, however, that it is only *in so far as they are manifested* that these monads are intuited* in space. Not only is this space wholly subjective or spiritual, but its positing concerns *only the two manifested sections* of the monads—that of the “*spheres*” of *potencies* or realizable energies which they are so conditioned as to project, and that of their yet *more overt manifestations* as sensation, perception, and thought. As already noted, “The branches, twigs, and leaves of the tree quiver apart in space, the roots are unified in that all-spontaneity whence space itself springs.”

The relations of the monads as discrete or *out-of-each-other* back this archetypal space, the vastness of which is the expression of their indefinitely vast multiplicity. But now comes the question, How do they interact? Well, the ground for interaction should be patent; the monads are all of one mother-stuff, and all, even as discrete, have a common ground. On the whole, interpenetration seems the best working hypothesis, monads the actualizing of which takes place in definite ways now furthering, now hindering the other monads in the subjectivities of which their states get reflected. But does this interpenetration obtain between the monads as projected, or the monads as background of the projection? Between the monads as projected, between the furthering and hindering activities which stand between their more overt forms, sensation, etc., and the unmanifest background of the metaconscious,—otherwise we cannot *account for* the observed relations of the contiguous and distant things we know; our staunch ally Causality claiming here a further tribute. *Actio in distans*, e.g. gravity, would

* “Intuited,” because I wish to avoid the necessity of referring to the spontaneity of the Universal Subject as if it were rational, a situation the term “thought” might seem to imply. “Thought-intuition” might, perhaps, serve our purpose, as it would indicate that concrete clairvoyant fulness compared with which “Reason” is a mere bloodless ghost.

constitute a riddle, but we have yet to ascertain empirically whether intermediate or internunciary monadic action is not present in the various alleged examples of it cited. Supposing, however, that it was established, there would remain open the hypothesis of monadic clairvoyance independent of interpenetration, that of pre-established harmony, and that of the Universal Subject as supplementing the normal activities of the monads by a direct supervisory guidance. But whatever the solution may be, we must bear in mind that at any rate the vast majority of phenomena are easily enough re-readable on the hypothesis of interpenetrations. The question that remains over is that touching the manner in which this interpenetration is to be conceived.

Formation of an adequate mental picture of the process is, of course, out of the question. A "picture" means here an image of the visual imagination, and not merely empirically known visual pictures, but every mode of our waking subjective life has to be explained. Take, however, the case of atomic repulsions. Matter is not compressible, as we know, to such a degree as to ostracize it completely from space. This incompressibility means that the atomic interpenetrative monads will not permit invasions which threaten their *lives* (*i.e.* their more overt self-realization or manifestation), beyond a certain limit. Penetration by hostile monads (or by monads whose partial penetration may be beneficent, but whose full presence is burdensome) carries with it *repressed* activities, repressed activities involve pain, and the repulsion of the invader is the *diversion of the repressed energies to self-defence*, these being dammed up to such a degree as finally to menace the invader itself with obscurity and its heralding pains. Now, to think this situation we must employ a geometrical device. Represent the monads as so many circles or potency-spheres now attracting one another and becoming interlaced, now repelling one another and seeking novel relations. The attraction would answer to the furthering, the repulsion to the hindering with its natural curative process. It does not, of course, follow that all attractions *necessarily* imply furthering, for the frying-pan may often be sought only because it is more pleasant than the fire. But the illustration may serve to suffice, and at the worst must

be held the only one available. A very little reflection will show that no mental picture of a pre-empirical activity such as indicated ought even to be asked for.

Reverting now once more to the individual Subject, we have to ask whether its space-intuition is primary, or derivative, as Mill and Bain urge, from simultaneous sensations in time interpreted by successions of other sensations and ideas. The subject is one of chief interest to psychology, but it has also important bearings on metaphysic. A very brief glance at the *crux* may therefore be of interest.

Is there a primitive undeveloped space-form, however crude?—that is the point to emphasize. The space of our matured consciousness (an aspect only of which Berkeley dealt with) is obviously an elaborate construction. Can we, nevertheless, posit a raw space as among the factors that go to construct it? Take the case of Colour. We shall remember that Berkeley recognized a sort of native visual extension, which his active touch transformed into the real visual space we know. Mill, however, was for getting rid even of this reserved tract, and for spinning visual space out of colours originally given only as simultaneous. His exposition (drawn by Hamilton's attack on Brown) is well to the fore in the *Examination*, and that of Bain in the *Senses and the Intellect*. Great ingenuity has been exhibited by both, and many factors previously overlooked or underrated received through their initiative the necessary emphasis. But the attempt, in its comprehensiveness, has failed. D'Alembert's contention, that the mere having of *different* colours (which, as different, must bound one another) presupposes extension, has never been satisfactorily met; and it is not imaginable, to my thinking, that it could be. Impressed, no doubt, by this difficulty, some psychologists have urged that, in addition to simultaneity, there obtains an "*unknown original difference*" between two simultaneous colours, termed a "local sign," a difference as little unveiled to conscious experience (save as to result) as an atom.* Thus, sensations of a like degree and quality are conceived as, nevertheless, somehow unlike. Besides these differences of *discrete* sensations, differences in the voluminousness or "massiveness" of

* Sully.

sensations, such as those answering to *continuous* areas of a book laid more and more fully against the cheek, are regarded as involving these local signs. Following out this clue, certain psychologists have derived colour-space from a synthesis of muscular sensations and ideas, etc., with visual simultaneous sensations differenced by such local signs. Commenting on this kind of procedure, Seth throws up a last but effective barricade. "What is this," he asks, "but to give up the problem, and to end by explaining space by itself? . . . The researches of physiological psychologists have been useful in pointing out the several elements by the help of which, or on occasion of which, the mind [Subject?] comes to perceive Space. But the distinctive element in the synthesis—or, in other words, space, the synthesis itself—remains after the analysis just where it was. It cannot be explained into anything else; it can only be named." * The indictment is a severe one, but, perhaps, a platform of reconciliation is possible even here. We might ascribe the construction of *coexistences* to a synthesis of muscular sensations and ideas, "sensations of motion," etc., with retinal and other sensations, and, nevertheless, uphold what I will call a space-form in potency, *i.e.* in an undeveloped condition, void of all clear import and determinateness. So long, for instance, as colours and their parts are not perceived as *definitely* outside one another, as separated by local intervals appreciable by muscular sensations and ideas, etc., coexistences in any intelligible sense of the term as now employed cannot be said to obtain. Still, the space-potency is there. At this juncture the acute critic will ask, "And to what, pray, do the colours in this space-potency answer?" I reply, *To the way in which the monadic states mirrored are upheld in the Universal Subject here manifested as brain.* In the mirroring of these states my Subject obtains a clue to a true space-order beyond it. The interpretation of this clue, the adjustment of the *mediating* brain-picture to the requirements of the environment mediated, is the work of the empirical synthesis. The space I now perceive is a brain-space so treated as to square with an archetypal space beyond.

An original space-clothing and setting must be assigned

* *On the Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 95, 96.

not only, as is customary, to sensations of sight and touch, but, albeit in varying prominence, to all sensations alike. This is the old view which James re-adopts and polishes in a recent most interesting work.* For him, the "*voluminousness*" common to sensations is the interpretable primitive "extensity," an extensity, however, by no means equally emergent in all kinds of sensation. This attitude practically enrols Bain and Mill among defenders of a primitive space. Thus Bain has spoken of the "*voluminousness*" of colours previous to their being perceived as extended. On the above lines he has really admitted an *undeveloped* space-form, and merely shown how it may have been *developed* by way of association, etc. The voluminousness in question, so pervasive of experience, is unquestionably "spatial," and no ingenuities of controversy can exorcise it.

What now of some other alleged Forms of Relation, of our old friends the Categories? Do they, as alleged, render possible the object, or can the manufacture of the latter be otherwise and more simply accounted for? Some confusion prevails here. "All [objective] reality contains a Thought-element," urge the formalists, as if the fact was disputed! What must be disputed is not thought as inread by association (backed by inheritance), but thought in the garb of abstract Unitary Categories somehow "*realizing themselves in multiplicity.*" It has become the fashion of British Idealism to coquet with these scholastic phantoms, but it has scarcely bettered its position by doing so. Categories of this verbal sort might have satisfied a demand at the opening of the century, but we may now dismiss them as being simply *superfluous* assumptions.

A rude objectivity is native to sensation itself—full objectivity is spun by association along with the rise of those echoes of sensation termed ideas. Out of a blurred neutrum where consciousness is sunk in sensations and memory-ideas of sensations, full-blown objects and the full-blown mind emerge. We can understand why most popular idealisms should require a special machinery to make objects. They regard Mind as *prius* and holder of sensation, hence the problem for them is *how to get sensation adjudged outside*

* *Textbook of Psychology*, ch. "Perception of Space."

it. Hence axioms, judgment-forms, and what not. But an idealism that starts with the Subject, and assigns to the mere memory-fed mind its place, is in no such quandary. In the act of producing sensations for itself, the Subject gives them as objective, as limitations arbitrary, intrusive, appearing and necessarily appearing to empirical consciousness as if strangers from without. In sensation the Subject opposes itself to itself, and this self-negation is the rude primal objectivity of which we are in search. Of the "passage" of sensations into ideas and the complete differencing of mind and world, inner and outer, it is for psychology, not metaphysic, to treat. A splendid harvest of results has been reaped in this quarter, and would require almost a treatise to itself.

Given Time, Space-potency, sensations and their echoes as ideas felt as identical and different, like and unlike, modes of association, and predispositions of the inherited instinctive sort, there is no call for Categories to make the object. These phantoms are superfluous, and must be ruthlessly exorcised. Not categories, but cerebral monads mediate the fuller objectivation of sensation into the ripe world we know; their activities being passively duplicated in the Subject as the infant consciousness dawns. *Nerves and brain wirepull the adjustments of organism to surroundings, and the REFLEX of this adjustive mechanism in the Subject is the very process of the fuller objectivation itself.* Just indicating this field of inquiry, we take leave of Perception, and pass on to a side-glance at the Subject as it passes into Mind.

POSTSCRIPT.—For a brief definition of "monad" we must go to history. Leibnitz, the great champion of Monadology, has his headwaters in Bruno and Spinoza. Bruno's god (Monas Monadum), his soul as simple indissoluble central monad of the body, and allied doctrines, Spinoza's discussion of "substance," his theories of consciousness and body, and the pervasiveness of "thought" gave the clues. Leibnitz' monad is an individual simple substance or centre of spiritual energy. Here similarly Monad = a unitary individual centre of consciousness, actual or potential. The contrasts are for the exposition.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT AS MIND.

PERCEPTION having been viewed abstractly, let us pass on to MIND, thought along with which it becomes fully definite. Object and mind, outer and inner, mutually constitute one another, but for philosophical purposes they must be perforce separately handled. Now, Mind, *i.e.* the memory-fed flux or series of our inner thoughts, willings, and feelings, is, as already observed, a stage nearer the Subject than is the object, for in it is mediated a reconciliation of the self-negated Subject with itself. Our treatment of it here must be cursory. Not being intent on psychology, I do not propose to survey its varied phases, but simply to touch on some points which are specially relevant to our metaphysic. Among these are Freedom, the relations of thought to nerve-motion, the standing of logic and reason, and the stage where reason must give place to Mystic Insight. To these let us pass.

The presentment of the world is itself an output of Freedom. But admitting a spontaneity here, in the mirroring of the monads just treated of,—we have further to ask: Are there discernible flashes of Freedom *in the thick of the empirical itself?* I believe this to be the case.* But I shall urge, also, that no abstract Will-faculty is in question. Freedom is resurrection of the native unconditionedness of

* In the projection of sensations the Subject must be conceived as *actively passive*, seeing that the uprising sensations appear to consciousness as masterful intruders in the production of which it is inert. In the case of free réaction on the given empirical of ideas and feelings it must be held to be *actively determining its own active passivity*, using its previous condition as mere "matter" for the development of a new "form." The contradictoriuness immanent in Reality is here well brought to the fore.

the Subject, a bolt from the blue riving the serried ideas and feelings with which it has previously invested itself. Having donned the robe of necessity, the Subject will be found here in part to doff it. This renascent spontaneity is the metaphysical basis of the belief in so-called Free will. It may have two classes of manifestations—the *higher* phases of *consciously* purposive attention, and certain incursions of the *metaconscious* into the ordinary workaday flow of associated ideas and feelings. All voluntary actions are not “free;” all unwilld changes of the mental order are not “necessary.”

A time-honoured problem may fitly receive homage here. It is clear that, if Freedom obtains, the physical processes in the brain must in some way be modified by consciousness, and it becomes important to ascertain, if possible, the ground of this interplay. Now, we have previously seen how in the having of sensations the states of monads get mirrored or duplicated in our Subjects, and how the brain itself consists of such monads. If, then, states of these monads are mirrored in the Subject, it is certain that changes in the Subject, if spontaneously effected, would be in their turn mirrored in the monads, hence that scope for “causality” from psychosis to neurosis would obtain. Causality from neurosis to psychosis is *always in progress*, may not that from Psychosis to Neurosis equally hold good? Obviously it may, for really the causality is from psychosis to psychosis in both cases alike. Thus one of the most formidable riddles of our modern iconoclasts has been answered.

Note how simply this neurosis-psychosis enigma is met. Direction of the forces of extended nervous units as posited by Descartes is illusory, because a forceless psychosis has to be conceived as somehow initiating a guiding push or pull. But for us, the whole play is spiritual, and what takes place is mirroring in subjective monadic centres of states the same in nature as those which these centres mediate for our Subjects. At once, then, the problem of neurosis and psychosis clears up; the facts suggesting prostration of consciousness before organic automatism and the facts suggesting modification of the organism by consciousness being both alike assimilable. Bain’s sneer at a chain of physical changes ending “abruptly in a physical void

occupied by an immaterial substance," which somehow affected reacts then on the other limits of the void, vanishes from the field.* Interpretable becomes even our case of the man whose thoughts reawoke on the removal of a piece of bone from the brain, and took up the threads of association where originally dropped. Here we have simply the fact that, failing the requisite cerebro-monadic states, there was for an interval no ordinary mirroring in the Subject. Interesting from another standpoint is the case of an Indian ascetic competent voluntarily to reverse the peristaltic action of the bowels. Here, surely, we confront the fact that voluntary *Attention*; i.e. the activity of the Subject, can play down, so to speak, on the monadic wire-pullers of the body. Such a process can in no manner be accounted for by those who regard consciousness as mere obverse of physical links intercalated between nervous stimuli and muscular responses. It is absurd to hold that the attention is here determined by pure physical activities to reverse what physical activities are held to have consolidated during untold geological æons. Nay, the physical stimuli raining on the ascetic are the same in kind as those which affect his fellows. There is only his own Subjective reaction on neurosis to be appealed to. Here, indeed, we have one of numerous cases where consciousness, reared on the vineprop of organism, attains to the power of modifying the supporting vineprop itself. For cases where mere imagination may play down on the monads, we may cite the remarkable effects sometimes produced on the fœtus by terrifying or exciting the mother. Faith-cures illustrate the same thing. Materialists ignore these facts. They exhibit discretion, if not candour. Bare physiological machinery is felt to be hopelessly inadequate to the result.

Voltaire, friend of science though he was, questioning the Uniformity of Law, suggested that a certain indeterminism might obtain in nature. Now, we have argued that *every* monadic change presents spontaneity as well as law, but this fusion of factors is, of course, perfectly compatible with belief in an empirical physical determinism. What, however, if reactions on *their* content are possible with monads, just as with us? May not such reactions exhibit a gleam

* *Mind and Body*, p. 131.

of that freedom more fully revealed in conscious human Subjects. Phrase the matter in mechanical terms. It is possible to conceive of situations in nature where a moving molecule or molecule aggregate may indifferently pursue two or more paths, the forces operative in these several directions being exactly balanced. Inasmuch, however, as it has perforce to move onward in one or other of the directions, the particular one pursued would stand for an illustration of mechanical indeterminism. Assuming, as we may, ample scope for such indeterminism in the complex molecular-atomic mechanics of nature, we may come one day to recognize that the doubt of Voltaire and Stanley Jevons as to a rigid "uniformity of law" may not, after all, have been ill-advised.

And now comes the question of human freedom. We must clearly recognize that the states of consciousness met with in volition are no more than "I"-encircled clusters of feelings and ideas. Will as faculty has been repudiated. Ordinarily "Will" is a situation in which some group of idea-feelings, competing with other groups of idea-feelings, slowly obtains the ascendant, and its explanation calls for no *special* positing of freedom, other than that backing all possible phases of reality alike. Consciousness here = mirrored states of warring and allied cerebral monads, each of which strives to actualize itself, and clashes with or furthers others in the process. It might be dubbed a spectator but for the *reflected activity* which fills it. Organic automatism of this sort sways most of our actions and thoughts, and colours at any rate all.* To say of these ordinary actions that they are "free," means that we are not made to perform them by outer compulsion. Touching this aspect of the question, Spencer's criticism of the Libertarian is apposite: "By speaking as though there were a mental self, present to his consciousness and yet not included in the composite mass of emotion and thought, he is led into the error of supposing that it was not this composite mass of emotion and thought which determined the action. While it is true that he determined the action, it is also true that the aggregate of his feelings and ideas

* Organic automatism, however, may be of the "secondary" sort where the physiological machinery has been shaped by a previously *incumbent*.

determined it; since during its existence this aggregate constituted his entire consciousness—that is, constituted his mental self.”* This criticism holds good over a very wide area of willings. But there are cases of willing that are not so easily negotiable. I refer to the higher phases of conscious resolution to act or not to act, to prolonged effort physical and mental, to certain laboured processes of concept-formation and generalization. As further indicative of Freedom is to be noted that unwilled spontaneity emergent as “flashes” of concept-making, generalizing, and construction of mental imagery. In the latter class of cases we do not consciously bring about the result, but the result is given us in the block by processes behind the threshold of consciousness. Genius is inspirational knowledge married to industry. Such productivity is explicable neither by a mechanical determinism nor by conscious freedom. As dropped into the “mind,” the output is necessary; but, on the other hand, it may stand for the free reactive work of the Metaconscious Subject.

Mansel contends that extraneous evidence makes for the belief in uniform connections between motives and actions.† But he falls back triumphantly on the testimony of consciousness. So, also, must we. Having lingered long in the valley of Necessarianism myself, I would not wish my readers to conceal from themselves the difficulties which in appearance preclude escape. Statistics are ugly, the workaday assumptions of practical men, of historians, legislators, and sociologists, are ugly; ugly, also, are the verdicts of many independent psychologists and metaphysicians. Nevertheless, we have the feeling of liberty to fall back upon, we have also the spontaneity native to the Subject. Are there, then, grounds for believing that the feeling attests the reaction of this free Subject on its content? Is the Subject free *within* as well as *without* the Empirical? Within limits it is.

For Freedom of the conscious sort we must go to the sphere of the higher phenomena of Attention. Attention is

* *Psychology*, i. 500.

† In discussing voluntary Freedom, I have to lay stress on pleasures and pains, but I must not be understood to hold that these feelings are the guides of each and every conscious action. Ideo-motor, Instinctive, Habitual actions, the Expression of the Emotions, etc., may take place without any such *necessary* spurring. But these do not concern us. Voluntary action *prompted* by pleasures and pains is my theme.

of two kinds, and it is only the crown of one of these that concerns us. In ordinary Attention states of consciousness force themselves into prominence, or, rather, are prominent because forcible. But in the higher phases of purposive attention, the Subject seems somehow to react on and hinder or further its states. In the one case, we appear *even to ourselves* psychological automata; in the other, the feeling of freedom is often irresistible, and constitutes the stronghold of the Libertarian party. Psychological automatism is no doubt the condition of most persons around us, but to esteem it universal is, I think, to look at volition with one eye shut. Consider, these higher volitional processes. What fills our consciousness, in the first place, is determined by no conscious agencies. We *deliberate*, for instance, on what association and perception present. The motives are "given," and so far the necessarian can triumph. Further, deliberation itself (where not a habit) requires its motive, a complex one, based on experiences of the pains incident to hasty action and the advantages of an adequate survey. Of the actual motives deliberated upon, urges the necessarian, the strongest must win the day. What, however, is meant by the strongest? That which wins? Such a test obviously will not do, as it begs the question at issue. We have, therefore, to accept Bain's test, that "the strongest motive means the motive strongest *in relation to pleasure and pain.*"* Here, then, comes the rub. The motive, it is said, which makes for most pleasure or promises to abolish most pain will be victor. But is there any ground for the necessity of pleasure and pain thus leading us by the nose? For my part I see none. The supposed "*connections*" between such feelings and acts are really pure figments; all we know are feelings assuredly prompting pursuit and avoidance, but in no sense *tethered* to any determinate actions at all, nay mere apparitional states, aspects, or items of a Subject. Must a Subject always hurry after the aspects called likes, and flee from those called dislikes? Not when it becomes fully conscious. There are cases, for instance, where maintenance of action, albeit first prompted by pleasurable motive, involves pain *altogether disproportionate in strength to the latter*. Thus, anxious to test my endurance, I may hold a

* *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 428.

match between my fingers till it is burnt out. The motive here is the ideal pleasure of self-esteem, but how fares this *ideal* pleasure when compared as to "strength," with the *actual* pains of the burning? We hear much of "faint states" and "vivid states," and assuredly the emotion of self-esteem is very much fainter than the intensely acute pains adverted to. Yet I have seen the match so held. And I have to urge that this case is a sample only of what obtains on a large scale in our volitions, and serves thus to show us *one of the modes* in which Freedom shines through the empirical. Motiveless volition (or "casualism") a true Libertarianism should reject; *all conscious freedom is motivated*. The thing to remember is that the motivation does not exhaust the fact. To take another example—consider the strain incidental to thinking, often painful to a very high degree. We will allow that a pleasurable motive sets us thinking, that we like our work possibly as end in itself, possibly as means to something beyond itself. After a time, however, the pains of attention become serious, shutting out the pleasurable emotional vistas, and leaving us face to face with *merely painful labour*. Must we cease struggling for that? On the contrary, a *nisus* in the teeth of the pain *often unrelieved by any pleasure* is one of the commonest experiences of the thinker. The interpretation of the fact is this. Though pains in themselves prompt Avoidance, the Subject when fully conscious *can ignore the prompting* and maintain the pain in its purity. So far, then, as Necessarianism refers us to "connections" between pain and acts of avoidance, Necessarianism clashes with the truth. The Subject may pursue the line of greatest resistance. It has a motive for doing so, but the motive is often no more than a sign-post, showing the way.

In an ethical regard this fact has a high interest. Bain resolves the disinterested side of sympathy into the operation of "fixed ideas." If, however, ideas may be *freely* fixed or freely sustained in the line of greatest resistance, Morality is seen to be invested with a new lever. A slow *nisus* on character becomes a living reality, bought by continual pain, a *reflected* pain arising from interference with the play of cerebral monads. Language proves here of great worth, as its signs help the fixing vastly. Contemplated through

signs, ends are largely divested of their attractive and repulsive features. A man listening to a moral teacher, say one preaching charity to mankind, may receive the mandate in symbols, "fix" the ideal at once, and carry it *through pains utterly disproportionate to the actual pleasures he reaps*. A new habitude is slowly formed, and in its train finally comes pleasure. The path once cut in the line of greatest resistance becomes easy and congenial, while the old one is choked up with rubbish. This *Freedom* in character-moulding is, of course, limited by the natural susceptibilities to different kinds of pleasures and pains, emotional and sensational, the "sign-post" motives brought to bear, and the nature of the organism; but of its possibility I can entertain no doubt.

The formation of abstract concepts may be similarly in the line of greatest resistance. Conceptual thinking of the highest order often ploughs on with scarce a ray of emotional support. We may start with a pleasurable aim, but continue in the teeth of the severest pains of Attention. In the mode of formation of concepts the contrast between automatism and purposive work under stress is very interestingly illustrated. The Recept, as Romanes terms it, is *received* not *conceived*. It is a Herbartian collective impression, a composite mental photograph, and its recognition has been held to mediate between conceptualism and the older Nominalism of Hume, which admitted only of "particular ideas annexed to a general term." Galton's composite photographs, where various resembling pictures reinforce each other's likenesses, while their differences become blurred, furnish an excellent illustrative analogy. "A *generic* idea" [Recept], observes Romanes, "is generic because the particular ideas of which it is composed present such obvious points of resemblance that they spontaneously fuse together in consciousness; but a *general* idea is general for precisely the opposite reason—namely, because the points of resemblance which it has seized are *obscured* from immediate perception, and therefore could never have fused together in consciousness but for the aid of *intentional abstraction*, or of the power of a mind knowingly to deal with its own ideas as ideas." * A similar

* *Mental Evolution in Man*, p. 68.

standpoint has been adopted by Locke, Mill,* Sully. This intentional stress must not be limited to the case of isolated concepts, but must be extended to whole trains of judgments and reasonings. Such purposive stress is one of the features of our higher discursive thinking, and may be, as I said, in the line of the greatest resistance. Freedom is not only for the "will" but also for "intellect."

How do I form a concept of "animal"? I may possess receipts of various groups—"dog," "horse," "cat,"—where individual ideas are blended without effort on my part. Animals "in general," however, are a medley of remote, widely differing objects, the inconspicuous attributes common to which fail to uprise together in consciousness. It results, therefore, that I have to compare all such available objects, presented or represented, in the light of a continuous act of attention—the strain of which, answering to conflicting innervation currents and various muscular tensions, may be in the line of greatest resistance, particularly if my thought is normally poor in sustaining emotion. Finally, perhaps, by way of observation, experiment, mental comparisons and the aid of books, I succeed in abstracting from the differences and at once fix the like features by names. It is in *fixing* such results that language is so precious to thought; the tunnelling of thought (to recur to a simile of Hamilton's) must be followed by the supporting arch. Still we must note that the tunnelling itself is prior to resort to the arch, the seizing of the points of community to the name which refers us to them in its connotation. Max Müller, indeed, holds that priority of the concept to the name means conceptualism.† If so, we must be content to rest conceptualists. With a more liberal interpretation of Nominalism than Müller's, we need not, however, despair. His Nominalism is rather that of Hobbes than the form of it adopted by Mill.

Romanes classifies ideas as particular, receptual, and conceptual, or intentionally constructed. But these classes are by no means exhaustive. There remains over a class which resembles the receptual in being obtained without

* "The first formation of a concept and, generally (though not always), any fresh operation of judgment or reasoning requires a mental effort" (*Examination*, p. 467).

† *Science of Thought*, p. 268.

effort, and the conceptual in being at times highly abstract. My reference is to the intuitively-gotten concept that rushes on us from the depths of our inner natures, and reveals in a flash what discursive thought may have long groped for in vain. Locke himself says that "the thoughts that come often unsought, and, as it were, *drop into* the mind, are commonly the most valuable of any we have," while Tyndall's inductions, manifesting "a kind of *spiritual inspiration*,"* coming from such a source are illuminative. In their highest manifestations these "flashes" are the sure test of genius, and may create when reduced to system intellectual epochs. Genius, as I observed, is inspirational knowledge married to industry. We must add here that, quite apart from rational conceiving and judging, imagination claims its tribute. What of the inspirations of the true artist or poet? what of the marvellous compositions that poured into Mozart, causing him little more labour than to write them down forthwith? † Ordinary laws of Association seem to shrivel up in this regard. It is significant that Hume himself, foe of mysticism, is heartily with us here. He, too, adverts to "a kind of *magical faculty* in the soul, which, though it be always most perfect in the greatest geniuses, and is properly what we call a genius, is, however, inexplicable by the utmost efforts of human understanding." ‡ Championing Contiguity, Resemblance, and Cause and Effect, he concedes "irregularity" in union of ideas in imagination—concedes what we may interpret as not infrequently output of an imaginative spontaneity or freedom.

REASON has been styled a goddess by revolutionary fanatics—a god by sober-headed philosophers who have wished to rationalize everything. The Idea or Concept of Hegel is logical-rational *prius* of all phases of the manifested universe. Here we shall drag reason from its pedestal, and consider it as a mere stage in the development of animal and human individuals—in no sense *prius* of the world-order, and only a step in the journey towards its goal, a step which (even now

* *Fragments of Science*.

† Cf. the extraordinary account given in Holmes's life of this great master. "If one has the spirit of a composer," said Mozart, "one writes because one cannot help it."

‡ *Treatise of Human Nature*, i. § 7.

for advanced individuals, but) in the distant future for the race, has to be succeeded by that of MYSTIC INSIGHT, by *intuitive immediate experience* of a grade only dimly imaginable by intellect.

Human Reason is no abstract faculty, but a general name for certain modes of association of ideas with ideas or percepts, modes in part due to mirroring of interacting cerebral monads, in part, also, to the *reaction* of the Subject on this mirroring. In its lower stages reason is simply the reflex in this Subject of the working of the bodily machinery which effects neuromuscular response to stimuli. Here the adjustment of the organism to surroundings backs the whole neural business, and the concomitant inferences that fill the Subject are merely reflected patches of certain implicated "receiving" and "discharging" monads. Physiological psychology has done much to base association on neural machinery—much to vindicate Schopenhauer's view that reason dawns as mere minister to the organism—much to upset the absurd psychologies of the past with their hollow "laws," "powers," "faculties," and what not. We may cheerfully welcome its message. Its main conclusions, *duly re-read as we read them*, furnish clues to the working of the lower and many of the more lofty departments of reason. But as indicated elsewhere, on the highest levels of reason, where thinking is voluntarily emphasized as *end in itself*, dissociated from all adjustive reference, we require not merely nerve-mechanisms with psychical patches mirrored in the Subject, but positive *reaction* of the latter on the content it mirrors. Here the vine in its growth begins to affect the vineprop. Between the lowest and highest grades of reason are interposed multiform levels, from the rudest concrete inference interpretative of sensation to the rarified abstract thinking which gets invested with words, and finally, as we shall see, smothered by their tangled and luxuriant greenery. It is not easy to say where and when the reactive work of the Subject supervenes, any more than it is to indicate at what point a number of shot gradually increased in amount become a heap. Still voluntary attention in the line of greatest resistance will always be one test, if present. It is the non-voluntary work which lacks a "scientific frontier."

Reason may be no more than transformation of sensation

into a percept, but, passing beyond this low level, let us take an ordinary and more emergent case of inference. A dog comes rushing down the road, and I, inferring a probable bite, run into a house. Here the inference is no more than *constructive imagery*, accompanied with belief that the imagery will be speedily followed by answering sensations. This is a kind of inference that dominates the ordinary mind, and which must colour also the hardest thinking even of the scientific law-finding intellect. There is a very real inference present, but we must observe that formal logic—with its machinery of Apprehension surveying concepts, of Judgment “uniting” or “separating” them, of “Reasoning” (?), “separating” or “uniting” two by way of comparison with a third—cannot cope with this class of phenomena. Again, I infer that a tramp, whom I meet in a lane is dangerous. Here not even three logical terms are in evidence, only a *feeling* of alarm directly associated with the perception. Concrete Associations, not concepts, bulk our workaday inferences. And these lowly levels of reasoning run flush with those of the constructive imagination.

Reasoning, however, is not always busy with the concrete, either as perceivable or imaginable. Inductions and deductions on the higher levels are largely coloured with imagery (though the differences of individuals here seem remarkable), but may, of course, outsoar the concrete completely. In this event, they demand language both to facilitate and render stable their output. “All A is x ” presupposes language, because in the majority of cases all particular A's are not known, and a word has to stand proxy for phenomena, past, remote, and future. And, since we have here mainly an interpretable formula in view, it is not even the known individual A's that interest us, but rather their *common features*, the key to the future deductions. We see then that the concrete, as such, has vanished, and that *relations* of likeness fixed by words have taken its place. Reason, in fine, has here become abstract, attending only to aspects, and very often very bare aspects of wholes, which, however, evoke their associated ideas, pictorial or verbal, more rapidly and effectively than they would if thought along with a mob of fellow-aspects. Vary as do its phases, the forms of

abstract reasoning, inductive or deductive, are always the same—establishment of relations of likeness and unlikeness; likeness in Metaphysical thinking, passing finally into Identity. It has to be noted that Formal Logic is unable to cope even with abstract reasoning of this character. It has advanced an absurd Inductive Syllogism, that ignores the living processes of thought and is inept in its very statement.* But it is chiefly with deduction that this “science” plays havoc, fettering thought with the clumsiest of clumsy shackles. Here is Spencer’s judgment on the sins of the deductive syllogism: “The process of thought formulated by the syllogism is in various ways irreconcilable with the process of reasoning as normally conducted—irreconcilable as presenting the class while yet there is nothing to account for its presentation; irreconcilable as predicating of that class a special attribute while yet there is nothing to account for its being thought of in connection with that attribute; irreconcilable as embodying in the minor premiss an assertory judgment (‘This is a man’), while the previous reference to the class ‘men’ implies that that judgment had been tacitly formed beforehand; irreconcilable as separating the minor premiss and the conclusion, which ever present themselves to the mind in relation.”

Whence came the stimulus that bred the Logic of which this distorted formalism is a sample? From the controversies between the Sophists and others which led to complicated arguments, thence to a standard for testing these, thence to inquiry into the laws of finite thinking considered as such. This at first unconscious tendency is brought to full consciousness by Aristotle, with whom a science of formal logic is completed, as Kant says, almost at a stroke. Child of Eristics, this science is really no exponent of the living processes of reason; but a very clumsy criterion of its results—a criterion which Bain and Mill’s most admirable Logic as Science of *Proof* has now rendered obsolete. Considered as a study of the “forms of finite thinking,” the Formal Logic of the past is absurdly unreal and pedantic, reminding one of Dryasdust’s study, rather than of the free bright sky of thought. In

* For this syllogism, which sins against the rules of Formal Logic itself, cf. Bain, *Induction*, pp. 3, 4.

actuality the basic forms of thought are identity, difference, likeness and unlikeness as running through the jumbled states of consciousness which psychology treats of. Separation of Form and Matter is never possible in truth; but when the attempt, the "abstraction without separation," is contemplated, it should be conducted with some eye, at least, to reality. As things stand, Formal Logic is the bane of the recruits, and the scandal of the marshals of philosophy.

Identity and Difference, Likeness and Unlikeness, this is the red strand running through all reasonings alike. Where establishment of concrete particularity is in view, it may be eclipsed by constructive imagery, but even then it is present. Thus, before I infer that the dog will bite, I have classed the presentation "dog" with ideas of former *like* presentations, albeit in involuntary spontaneous fashion.* In the highest grades of reasoning the red strand is very plainly revealed. In these, Reasoning has no ulterior end, but is regarded as end in itself. The form of thought here, as elsewhere, is ever identity and difference, likeness and unlikeness—a continuous "differentiation and integration" of states of consciousness being in progress. The so-called Reason in History of Hegel—with its development of differences into contradictions, and the transcending of these in higher principles—is no play of Categories, but an abstract way of contemplating this progress in the race—a progress which may and often does give place to stagnation, retrogression, and decay. Reason has no dynamic power, not even that of immanent negativity. Contradictions dwell pleasantly together in millions of minds, as the history of theology shows us. Failing the spur of *Feeling* (pleasures and pains)—the true inspirer of the world-march,—there is no necessary advance; and Feeling, to spur humanity aright, implies a host of favourable conditions, any one of which, by lapsing, leads to stagnation, retrogression, and decay. What of the Hegelian Reason in China? Is the sound "contingency" to shut our mouths here?

And now comes a curious reflection. In the very process of her Elaboration, Reason is signing her death-warrant. In order to cope adequately with this subject, a separate work will be undertaken, but meanwhile it must suffice to adduce

* Obviously mere reflected brain-activity is behind this.

some few leading considerations. Of course it goes without saying that nothing like a lapse into faith, or nonsense of that description, is contemplated. Quite the reverse. Faith has been defined as a belief in things unseen—"things" which depend on the fashions of the religious imagination of the epoch. The view here propounded *discards all knowledge not based on experience, but, at the same time, proclaims the advisability of recourse to deliverances of an Experience higher than that which now normally obtains.* It is an expansion of the view sketched by Schelling, to wit, that the *separate sciences and abstract systems, now so glorified by man, must, in the dim future, give place to an immediate cognition of Reality, a direct grasp of the world-order in all its living "wholeness" and complexity.*

In respect of continuous thinking, the higher Reason is cordially allied with language, moving clumsily, if at all, in its absence. Slowly its word-fixed abstractions become rarefied, it strays out of touch with the concrete, and transmutes this so real world and mind into a barren horde of *relations*. We start from reality in the block—it confuses us with its hopeless intractable particularity. The difficulty vanishes—the relations of aspects of reality come more and more to enchain us; our *interests* determining what of these we seize and unite in our concepts. Abstract intellect becomes glorified—it and it alone is the truth. But within this intellect each truth—absolute, it may be, for all truths below it and its own stage—is false in relation to another which devours and wholly digests it. The suggestion is now that in this dialectical procession viewed as a whole lies Truth, and our drooping spirits are restored. But lo! generalizations becoming *too rare*, reveal their utter emptiness. I read Spencer's Formula of Evolution and seek therein to embrace a cosmos. In the very embrace the cosmos has slipped away, the thinking of the abstractions is the destruction of reality! My prize is *verba, mera verba*, a phantom world of notions of which the hugeness of the denotation has whittled away the connotation. Reason has passed into her negative. Grasping at everything, she has fallen exhausted in the very flush of victory. And thus it comes about that in the popular contempt for learning lies a gem of purest sheen. Πολυμάθεια

νοῦν οὐ δίδασκει, old Heraclitus is reported to have said. Apart from the *practical* import of useful formulas and generalities, the mass of our abstract knowledge is valueless, a Sisyphean stone which huge labour rolls uphill, and decaying images and a decaying verbal memory speedily roll back. It is a clatter of sounds and phrases, an imposture of the most empty sort. As Schopenhauer says, "All truth and all wisdom lie ultimately in the perception." Those who require *reality*, not its ghost, will do well to think over this illusion of sham knowledge I indicate. They must recognize that not in verbal generalities, solemn histories, musty textbooks, taxonomical lore, and "synthetic" philosophies, but in the fulness of things themselves is Truth's own rich dialectic manifest. Abstractions are crutches of our thinking, to be avoided as far as is practicable. Verbal knowledge, "erudition," formulas of every sort and description are in last resort afflictions which we should be ready to abjure at short notice. Nothing is in itself worth the knowing but the concrete of imagination, ordinary perception, or something higher. Even Science will have to rank as superstitious when mysticism with glowing eye comes to realize the aridity of scientific results, the artificial way in which Science denudes Nature of reality and dishes up the poor relics smothered in weird terminologies and "systems." *Intuition or mystic insight must supersede this stage of formulas, but this intuition, as its etymology implies, will be only a higher stage of experience, a "seeing into" what we now merely sniff.* To the ideal mystic atoms would be realities, drops of living actuality which his Subject would seize in their wholeness; geology, astronomy, history, and the rest no phantoms bred by systematizers and abstractionists, but infinitely complex processions of glowing phenomena seized as they have obtained and obtain in the detail. Reaching out to this goal, we shall learn to rate the erudition of the savant—itsself, however, a vast advance on the past—as a makeshift concealing a cheat. The true cognition is that heralded by the poet, painter, and æsthetic wanderer amid natural scenery, a cognition where an emotional fervour lights up the presentation of concrete reality—a reality truly only of the cerebrally mediated kind, but for all that unspeakably full and grand so far as it goes.

Will it be urged that many historic advocates of this cognition have gone astray? Have not many of the mystics raved? Assuredly they have *called themselves* mystics and done so. Madmen, religious fanatics, and saints have to be allowed for; the dazzling almost overwhelming nature of the illumination for one not ripe for it must be remembered; the probability, too, of which anon, that much mysticism hinges on *mere subjective dreaming* of individual Subjects, has to be discounted. But, grave as are many of the failures, in the very sensing of the possibilities lies encouragement for us—the possibilities if unrealized are there. And the true mystics? Well, it is obvious that, in so far as their efforts are successful, they must be speechless. The cerebrally lighted Subject has a language for us—the Subject plunged in the delirium of its deeper being is separated from us gropers by an abyss!

I take the following from Emerson: “The Arabians say that Abul-Khain, the mystic, and Abu Ali Seena, the philosopher, conferred together; and, in parting, the philosopher said, ‘All that he sees I know,’ and the mystic said, ‘All that he knows I see.’”

This little story gives the contrast of reason and mysticism—of the abstract relation-mongering of the one, and the concrete insight of the other. There is no cause, however, why the true mystic insight should not, in ordinary dialectical fashion, carry over the advantages of reason while amending its so serious defects—nay, embody an even more complete knowledge of relations with an ideal fulness of concrete complexity in the detail. Idealist contemplation of a landscape has always brought this possibility home vividly to me—the detail here being present simultaneously with a delicate bond of relation. Meditative *perception* of this sort is exalted above the discursive *intellect* even now. It is prophetic.

Practice, however, obscures these deeper truths: tossed in the storms of life, most of us have little leisure to glance at the grand vistas which may lie before the soul. For the majority of mankind, in this mind-soiling capitalist age, the message of mysticism is a sound. Speaking even to the thoughtful, we may venture to deny hope to the majority of them also. The mystic insight in question can be only adequately

cultivated by those who, embracing Quietism, can fling Earth's poor joys aside, and wait in patience, and, if need be, asceticism, for the deeper unfurling of their Subjects. To the men of a workaday world this statement will sound monstrous, unquestionably from a practical standpoint it is. But to those who have realized life's tawdriness, vileness, and squalor, who have learned from Plato that the philosopher longs to put away his organism and die out of this unrestful world into the bliss of spiritual knowledge, it may sound less strange. Ideal efflorescence of *knowledge*, ideal *sensual bliss*—ay, for no Puritan spun the universe—what may not await us? The mob howls, but what matters it? If these poor wretches dream more heavily than ourselves, only their own development can rouse them—in this or other lives in the torment of rebirths yet to come. Let those, however, who are awakening bethink themselves of what they are now, and of what they perhaps might be. Now, poor creatures of circumstance, the sport of conflicting monads, creatures whose very world is a dream—a dance of brain-mediated phantasms. In the future, perhaps, beings revelling in an exultant freedom, banqueting on wondrous feasts of experience, and reaching back through their Subjects to the Great Subject in which they, as all reality, hang. The Eastern doctrine of *Moksha*, interpreted on our lines, stands for a great hope—liberation of the Subject from its servitude to lower monads such as make up the body. Ages must roll, untold social changes must ensue before the full meaning of this hope is borne upon the struggling races. Looking back at the past, imagination shudders at the nightmares that must cloud their dreams ere then. But I anticipate—anticipate side phases of a problem which space does not permit me even to state with adequate fulness.

A few corollaries of previous positions may be stated before we pass on to another question.

INHERITED ANCESTRAL EXPERIENCES.—This theory is not to be accepted in the current sense. What are inherited are the nerve-mechanisms—the most important determinants of our present terrestrial experiences. The experience of each Subject is inalienable.

IDEAS.—Strictly speaking, no presentation is ever “recalled” in a faint form as an idea, so far as the ordinary

memory is concerned. Physiological psychology leaves us no option. Every such "idea" stands for a *new state* of the cerebral monads newly excited, and duplicated in the mirroring Subject. It is clear, however, that each state of this Subject (being the Subject in revelation), is imperishable, even though reabsorbed.* *Hence, beside the workaday empirical memory we must suppose another in potency, in which both perceptions and ideas are upheld just as they were originally given.* It is contended that this higher memory is attested by the experiences of trance, of many dying and especially drowning persons. Be this the case or not, its positing is compulsory, and will prove of considerable moment. It is the storehouse of the wisdom hived by the Subject, the jar into which it pours what passes through consciousness. What a sublime yet terrible retrospect its upsetting would yield us! Whiffs from this jar smacking of ante-natal experiences reach us, as we shall see, at times. Meanwhile, a passage in Spencer's *Psychology* (i. § 214) may be found of interest. The suggestion is that in viewing a landscape we have thoughts and feelings not wholly accounted for by our experiences in this life. Inheritance from ancestors—*perhaps a palingenetic Soul-memory* is in evidence? This memory, too, may it not affect the development of our present consciousness? "In the present state of our knowledge of the subject," writes Sully, "heredity only helps us to account for a comparatively few amongst the hosts of peculiarities which go to make up the basis of an individual character."† Possibly, my character is a resultant of nurture, heredity, surroundings, freedom—and a *palingenetic* Subject that has lived in this physical world ere now. We shall see.

The time has now come to treat of the Universal Subject—the Metaconscious—of the great wheel within which our individual Subjects as little wheels revolve.

* Ideas "remain among its [soul's] possessions whether they never or only very rarely come again into consciousness" (Kirchner). Cf. also Hamilton and the many advocates of "unconscious ideation."

† *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 69.

CHAPTER VII.

THE UNIVERSAL SUBJECT.

“Some, indeed, have said non-existent only was this [the Self] in the beginning.”—*Khândogya Upanishad*.

“The whole of natural theology resolves itself into one simple though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined, proposition that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence.”—HUME.

To the secularist the Cathedral is a place where fools worship fictions, a durbar-hall of superstition, a museum of ignorance, hallowing with Art and Pomp the lisplings of a rude and semi-civilized past. But I opine that few cultured liberals stray into the grand old Christian piles untouched by religious feeling. Should one chance on the hour of worship, much may conspire to enthral him. The dream-like harmonies floating down the aisle, the subdued light slanting in through the many-hued sentinel windows, the grandly dim architecture suggestive of entombed heroes and past solemn ceremony, the relief of momentary escape from crass earthly things, the mystic religious atmosphere, and staid demeanour of the worshippers—these are influences which may well temper his rationalism. Surely, he thinks, there is some reality behind all this? Puerile as he deems the creed, superstitious its ritual, he feels, nevertheless, that there lies some precious kernel of truth within this forbidding husk. And, turning his glances elsewhere—to the grave Moslem worshipper in mosque, on housetop, and in desert; to the Hindu in his weirdly carved temple, the Buddhist before his flower-strewn shrine, the Parsee before the sacred fire, the Sufi or Yogi wrapt in mysticism, the Indian before the “Great Spirit,”—he comes slowly to learn that there towers within human nature a citadel inexpugnable by time. And

anon, amid the splendours of mountain, sea, and sky, he too seems to hail a Presence which his words cannot exorcise, his consciousness cannot strive to banish.

Reflection, however, may deal hardly with this datum. Since the Subject only knows its own states, it would seem that the alleged intuition of a God in nature is no other than the intuition of a God in its own object-consciousness; that the Wordsworthian "Presence" is no other than a shadowy Brocken-spectre in itself. In view, indeed, of the treatment of Experience hitherto proffered, there is one course, and one only, open to us. We have to assert that a Universal Subject must either be shown to stand within experience, or, perforce, be ignored as a phrase. What, then, is to be done? Must not this inquiry close at the outset? Tennyson sung, in a well-known passage—

"The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills, the plains,
Are not these, O soul, the vision of Him who reigns?"

—but, from our standpoint the sun, moon, and the rest are presentations suspended within the consciousness of the individual Subject; visions, not of an extra-cosmic Deity, but of the essence of the unfolding subject itself. It is true that these presentations have an extra-experiential reference; but to what? Not, as hitherto established, to a Spirit or Universal Subject, but to a multiplicity of interacting monadic centres. But what if these centres are *related on the background of a Universal Subject*, the arena of their ordering and font of their activity? And what if the *Individual Subject is itself derivative from this Universal Subject*? A spiritual Absolute will then be seen to well up in experience from two converging channels. Considerations bearing on this and kindred issues will now enchain us. I propose, in the first place, to glance at religious sentiment in general; secondly, to state the modern indictment of Theism; thirdly, to establish the doctrine by which Theism is superseded in this work; fourthly, to develop this doctrine in some very important regards, which may be left to declare themselves as the exposition proceeds.

Theories as to the rise of religious sentiment do not directly concern us. The story of the growth of a feeling and its metaphysical re-reading when full-grown are separable

departments of inquiry. Still a glance at the subject may be useful.

Max Müller rests natural religion on intuition of the Infinite as elicited by certain sublime objects. We may suggest, in the first place, that the "indefinite," not the infinite, is intuited; and further that what *advanced* creeds draw upon is rather a vague belief in the *essential spirituality* of this "indefinite:" in the second place, that below the advanced creeds, stretch religious levels where no possible mystical infinite is mooted, but deified ghosts, stocks, and stones are alone in evidence. With respect to the advanced creeds, some phases of Buddhism perhaps excepted, the spirituality of the World-prius appears everywhere as an article of faith, either tacitly presupposed or overtly championed. Behind even the polytheism of the *Edda* stands the "All-Father;" behind the mob of Vedic gods, Brahman. There is a monotheism which precedes the Vedic polytheism, observes Max Müller.* Says Sir W. Jones, "The primordial religion of Iran, if we rely on the authorities adduced by Mosan Fani, was . . . a firm belief that one supreme God made the world by his power, and continually governed it by his providence."† Judaism, Mahometanism, and Christianity ask no comments. Nezahualcoyotl, a king of the ancient Mexicans, raised a pyramidal temple to the same "Unknown God" that Paul sought to reveal at Athens. But the essential spirituality of his Deity must have been vaguely felt even by this monarch, for no one surely raises temples to an algebraic x , or a Spencerian Unknowable. A mere intuition of the "infinite" would be barren, and fail to stir the soul. A supposed community of nature is the real groundwork of the sentiment, and, given this, the indefinitely vast works as effectively as could the infinite.

The origin of this feeling and the vague correlated belief may be referred to Association. It is from contemplation of the bright sky and the gorgeous space-hung panorama generally that Vedic monotheism seems to have taken its rise. Space is the matrix of the belief. Space given objectively as finite is rendered *pseudo-infinite* or indefinite by

* *Ancient Sanscrit Literature*, p. 559.

† *Asiatic Researches*.

association—final limits being foreign to experience, barred out, indeed, by the necessity of thinking fringes to the actual co-existences presented. Recall now a familiar trait of a primitive race—the inreading of Subjectivity into stocks, stones, and trees, and merely broaden the scope ordinarily assigned to it. It will then be easy to understand how the vast spatial complex came to receive a subjective filling; the fusion of these elements yielding an *apparently direct experience of some indefinitely vast spiritual Power*. In its developed form the sentiment of dependence on this Power gathers up contributions from Ethics, Æsthetics, and Intellect; hence the so-called intuition must differ for each man claiming it. In tentatively indicating this so lowly germ, our Empiricism is well within its province, but Empiricism here as elsewhere must be absorbed by Absolute Idealism. The history of the sentiment is one thing; interpretation of the great whole into which that history enters another.

Despite their central reference the specific religions are too frequently base in the detail. The doings of the Jewish god are worthy only of the rude stock that conceived them; Allah, sublime at a distance, will not bear approach. In view of current philosophical cant, it is well to bear this in mind. In glancing, too, at the advanced religions generally, we must remember that the palæolithic men whose flints lie amid the Somme gravels were probably worshipping ghosts and painted stones ages before the god-feeling of the Vedic age had dawned. The beginnings of things are necessarily humble. *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor*. A selfish cringing prayer is all the poor savage knows of. Nay, even in many of the *Rig-Veda* hymns, observes Barth, “the sole address to the gods is, ‘Here is butter, give us cows.’” Through the domain of Religion, as elsewhere, runs a Dialectic. Religion is cradled in selfishness, but may end in selfless-ness; while on its intellectual side it manifests a transition from the gabble of the foul creature offering blood to a fetish, to the sublime standpoint of a Hegel. Religion is difficult to define precisely on account of this dialectic—the feeling of dependence on a superior spiritual power is, perhaps, the only feature all its levels exhibit in common. And even this seems to disappear in the case of the savage who belabours his fetish.

Theism, albeit scared, is still lord paramount of philosophical speculation in Europe. By Theism I understand belief in a conscious god as *prius* of the world-order and the individuals conceived as in it. Now, the rationalist defence of Theism has a high interest for philosophy, of which the metaphysical Brocken-spectres of religionists are usually quite devoid. And here we must note with pleasure that many theologians have freely subjected Theism to the rigours of rationalist inquiry. By meeting the philosopher on his own platform, and so recognizing the subject-matter as of a sort affording scope for opposed theories, they have indirectly undermined dogma, and directly furthered the growth of honest thinking. It was with theologians of this higher type that even the exacting Kant saw fit to cross swords.

In considering the case against Theism, I shall begin by adverting to the examination of this problem made by Kant. The head and front of his position is that the Subject cannot soar beyond experience, or the sum-total of its categorized states of consciousness. He accepted, indeed, in dry scholastic fashion, an "Idea" of god regulative of experience, but he is careful to point out that an admission of this sort does not advance Theology. Indeed, the error of Theology lies in hypostatizing this "Idea," in assigning to this "sum-total of all reality and perfection" an absolute standing independent of our thinking. Conscious, he observes, of the startling character of this step, theologians have attempted to vindicate it by argument; thus mobilizing the forces of reason to succour the hopes of Faith. The three lines of proof generated by this effort are the Ontological, the Cosmological, and the Teleological or "design" arguments. Kant examines these in turn, and unhesitatingly declares them invalid.

The ontological argument infers the existence of god from the concept of him we are supposed to possess. There were two forms of this attempt then in evidence—that of the schoolman Anselm, and that of Descartes. Anselm argued that the word "god" stands for what is thought as the greatest of all existences. Existence, however, in actuality as well as in our conceptions is greater than existence in our conceptions alone; hence god must be held to have an actual existence. This is a good specimen of theological twaddle.

Descartes, again, exploited the old doctrine of "essence." The concept of a perfect and most real being *implies*, he urged, the *necessary existence* of its object. To the "nature" of god as *conceived* by us this predicate of existence is unalterably attached, just as is the attribute of having its three angles = two right angles to the concept "triangle." We cannot suppress it without wrecking the concept. Kant's retort is that "existence" adds nothing to the concept, but merely determines its relation to our knowledge. When we say a dragon exists, we in no way enlarge the attributes of the concept "dragon," but simply vary our way of regarding it. When, again, we say a god does *not* exist, we leave the concept god quite unshorn of attributes. Judgments of existence are not analytical of concepts, but synthetical, determining the *position* of these. Hence comes the satirical touch. A man may conceive a hundred crowns, but his pockets will not be the heavier. By way of mere ideas and abstract concepts, no march to *independent* actuality is possible. The ontological argument, therefore, must be abandoned.

The cosmological argument is weaker still. The feature of this is inference from dependent conditioned facts to an unconditioned First Cause; regress along the series of phenomena to an *Ens Realissimum* or most real Being conceived as their creator and prime mover. This proof of an absolutely necessary first cause is what Leibnitz advanced as the demonstration *a contingentia mundi*. The world is; hence, at some remote prenebular point, it was called into being by the absolutely necessary and independent cause, god—this is the drift of the reasoning. *From dependent and contingent existence we reach independent and necessary existence, and then this necessary existence is further viewed as god*: these are the two main pillars of the inferences. Kant points out to begin with, that this independent and necessary existence is no phenomenon such as those Experience presents, that it is only an *idea* of reason slyly imported into the discussion, and then viewed as a Thing in Itself. Again, Experience yields us no *completed* successions of phenomena; there are always to be found causes of phenomena if we push our researches back far enough. An infinite series of dependent phenomena

is as little to be dogmatically repudiated as a finite series is to be dogmatically accepted. Neither of these views can possibly brave analysis. Were it, however, conceded that the succession of phenomena had an origin, why an inference to god as absolutely necessary cause of this origin? Why a passage from *necessary existence* (held as presupposed by the contingent) to the "sum-total of all Reality and Perfection," or *God*? The answer can only be that the Being who is *thought* as sum-total of all-reality can alone be absolutely necessary. The cosmological thus debouches into the ontological proof, and crumbles in its company.

The third or physico-theological argument is based on the supposed indications of design in nature. The human eye, for instance, suggests a design contingent only to the matter of which it is built, hence a designer; and this designer comes to be viewed as the *Ens realissimum*, the necessarily existing sum-total of all reality and perfection of whom we are in search. The essence of Kant's refutation is this. The argument is too slender; it might, perhaps, be held to suggest a *Noûc* disposing things according to a design. But what of the things on which this design is stamped—what of the stuff which the designer orders and disposes? The argument leads at best only to a Platonic Demiurge working on a given "chaos." To conceive the designer as creator also, we must fall back on the cosmological argument. And respecting the degree of design exhibited, we have to note that perfection is not to be found in this world; consequently that no inference to an ideally perfect being is practicable. To cope with this difficulty, the ontological argument must once more be invoked; and the upshot of the discussion is this—the teleological argument rests on the cosmological and the ontological arguments which have been previously rejected. Rational theology is impossible.

A further enigma may be appended to Kant's criticism. Does design, even where admitted, indicate of necessity a *conscious* designer or conscious designers? We contend that it does not, and on this point we shall have much to say hereafter. Meanwhile let it suffice to note that the contrary view calls for vindication. Theists are apt to consider that indications of design are so many confirmations of their

creed. They are too hasty. Von Hartmann, one of the most prominent modern upholders of Design, is an equally prominent assailant of Theism. We, too, championing an immanent purposiveness—a purposiveness where “form” and “matter” are interwoven—shall place behind our monadology no conscious individual, but that impersonal self-actualizing ground which has been already referred to as the Metaconscious.

The restatement of the Ontological argument by Hegel calls for a word. That argument with Anselm and Descartes seeks to step from thought to existence beyond thought—to absolute being cut off from our direct experience. It is not, of course, in this form that Hegel adopts it. For him the concept is valid, because it is just the Idea coming to full consciousness of itself. Holding as an Absolute Idealist to the unity of thought and being (existence), maintaining that “the thought that is in you is the thing itself,” his attitude is strictly logical. The concept which for Descartes leaps beyond experience, is valid for Hegel *within* experience as output of the dialectical movement of the self-thinking Idea. In a conceptual dialectic such as his, the ontological argument finds, therefore, its appropriate place. Starting as we do from the individuality of the individual Subject, we cannot here adopt it. The thought of the Subject, so far as actual proofs have gone, may be that only of a monad surveying itself.

The deliverances of modern British thinkers on Theism have been startling and are prophetic, indeed, of the great coming Reformation. Mill's doctrine of a *Conditioned* deity, as mooted in his later essays, we have already noted. He holds that inference from traces of Design is the grand way of proving the existence of God, but the enigmas of life are such as compel him to adjudge this god limited. Hamilton, who as an ardent Theist might be expected to adduce cogent proofs, asserts that “the Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion being only the negative of the Conditioned, which last alone can be positively known or conceived.”* This thinker, influenced considerably by Kant, abandons the received theological arguments and resorts to

* *Discussions on Philosophy*, p. 12.

the proof from the moral sense! "With the proof of the moral nature of man stands or falls the proof of the existence of a Deity," * "the only valid arguments for the existence of a God . . . rest on the ground of man's moral nature," †—pretty conclusive evidence of the straits to which assailants of the Enlightenment are reduced. The acute Mansel finds that consciousness, being always consciousness of *this* to the exclusion of the vast possible array of *thats*, implies limitation. ‡ He, too, seeks a haven in the moral sense. Academic objections apart, Theism has nowadays pessimism and our more acute sympathies with misery to reckon with. History with its hideous record plies it with most damaging questions. Biology and Geology revealing Nature "red in tooth and claw," tell it their grim embarrassing story. "God does nothing," grumble the believers. "Would not a moral personal Being or an all-wise impersonal Spirit have hit upon a less cruel factor of organic evolution than the Natural Selection voiced by Darwin?" speculate the doubters. And does not Dean Mansel himself say that "the representation of God after the highest human morality . . . is not sufficient . . . to account for . . . all phenomena: . . . the permission of moral evil, the adversity of the good, the prosperity of the wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving the sufferings of the innocent, the tardy appearance and partial distribution of moral and religious knowledge in the world?" Gautama Buddha, as we know, maintained that, had the cosmos been created by Iswara (the Hindu demiurge), evil would have been impossible, while philosophic Atheism would have been excluded by an unquestionable primæval revelation. Under the stress of this phalanx of objections, the dominance of Agnosticism on the higher levels of thought is inevitable. Agnosticism is a stage

* *Lectures*, i. p. 33. But if our promptings to "righteousness" are held as indicative of Deity, what of the "immoral" promptings which stir the savage, the instinctive criminal, and the unsocial passions of men generally? Elsewhere Hamilton refers to the clue furnished by the insufficiency of our relative experience taken by itself, and the message of "revealed" religion. Both extremes, assertion and denial of the Unconditioned God, are unthinkable, but one of them being presumably valid, collateral considerations may force it upon us. The choice thus falls on Assertion. Granting that this is so, why should the Unconditioned be reinstated in the form of a personal god?

† *Discussions*, p. 623.

‡ Cf. his *Bampton Lectures* where some very able and ugly criticisms of orthodox Theism are advanced.

in an inevitable intellectual dialectic. We are moulting, losing our old mental integuments; running into negations which shall mediate new and richer affirmations, wherein all the difficulties just noted shall be met. Difficulties flowing from the alleged "relativity" of knowledge, and difficulties flowing from survey of the ongoings of phenomena, have run together to form this modern Agnosticism. Theism is occasionally repudiated by agnostics, but it may also be regarded by them as neither provable nor disprovable, after the fashion of Kant as speculative thinker. There are two main phases of agnosticism, the difference between which it is requisite to bear in mind.

There is, first, pure agnosticism to be reckoned with. This is a standpoint of which Comte is a good representative. It confines us to phenomena and the relations obtaining between phenomena.* All that we know is phenomenal only of the Unknown, getting behind the veil being impossible. An advance on this is the modified Agnosticism of Spencer, which backs phenomena with an Unknowable Reality and bids Religion swallow this sop and be silent. It is unnecessary to repeat here the criticisms of this doctrine which have been previously advanced. We may content ourselves with the remark that an Unknowable is of no use whatever to the true philosophy of Religion. Transcendent as may be his Prius, one condition at least is exacted by the cultured religious thinker. He must, perforce, regard this Prius as one in essence with consciousness, as spiritual through and through, either as a primary individual consciousness or as possibility, potentiality, "matter" of consciousness. There is really no option if we fairly confront the *crux*. Once concede a *Prius*, and you must forthwith concede its spirituality; *consciousness cannot even moot an activity which is other in essence than itself*. The "Unknowable" of Spencer is the verbal shadow only of the Metaconscious.

The doctrine to be espoused will not err from narrowness. It proffers a solution which will extend a recognition to atheism, pantheism, theism, and agnosticism alike. A pre-

* Comte, however, must not be credited with the repute—such as it is—of formulating this standpoint. Not to press the claims of Hume or Kant, it will suffice to cite Cabanis: "We only explain phenomena by their relations of resemblance and succession with other known phenomena" (*Rapports*, ii. § 8).

fatory statement of its purport will facilitate subsequent discussion, so I give this at once in brief. The first stage is that of the Metaconscious as *prius*, as the abysmal black night whence individuals, and with them consciousness, uprise. This fathomless Cimmerian Power—this inexplicable spiritual spontaneity—is the font of all reality, and of it viewed thus as *prius* the Atheist, if idealist, is interpreter. Not thought, or reason, not a conscious individual, but this Atheistic ground is the final postulate of philosophy. This *δύναμις* or possibility passes into *ἐνέργεια* or actuality as *conscious individuals*, into the *ἐντελέχεια* or consummated perfection and actuality (to which *ἐνέργεια* as process conducts) as the *complex* of fully unfolded individuals. In the second stage this Power lives through myriads of almost “windowless” subjectivities (a-conscious, sub-conscious, conscious, self-conscious, etc.). It grows thus with the growth of the nations, rejoices with their rejoicings, suffers with their sufferings. He who assists his kind, in art, science, commerce, philosophy, morality, politics, economics, and the rest, ministers to that free complete development of individuals which is equally its own development. Our Universal History is a page of its diary, the stories of the nations constitute the words. Of this stage the pantheist may stand as interpreter. The final stage is that in which the Metaconscious negates its lapse into discreteness and re-emerges as Deity *conscious* of Itself as synthesis, as Unity in difference, of all the [palingenetic] individuals whose journey through reality mediated it. This is the awful Deity whom Renan limns forth in the *Dialogues*, already touched on, and with such a Being we may solace Theism for its losses. As an individualist in metaphysic, I suggest no final mergence of the individual, no Adwaittee Vedantist or Buddhistic theory that dismisses “selves” as illusory. On the contrary, *the individual Self is ever in last resort the only concrete, the only possible reality; an indissoluble ultimate, an end before which all else is superstition.* The Deity of Renan will be no individual, but a republic of interpenetrative individuals, a Being with myriads of eyes, every one of which is itself a Deity. Individualism is vindicated, the harmony of glorified individuals will constitute the Absolute that is yet to be. But

note that, terrible and majestic as it will be, even this Deity cannot hope to claim omniscience. Despite its absorption of the world-process, its ingathering of every throb and quiver of reality, an abyss must remain unplumbed. For behind it must ever loom the inexplicable black night of the Meta-conscious, and into this no intuition divine or other can penetrate. Only so far as it becomes consciousness is the Metaconscious transformed into light.

It remains to establish this Universal Subject or Meta-conscious. The procedure is as follows.

Turn to John Locke and observe his use of Causality. By its aid he reaches out to his independent matter clad with the primary qualities—the mode of reception of our sensations having, as he thought, to be thus *accounted for*. He further argues for the existence of God as transcendent *cause* of our existence as conscious units. That his metaphysical excursions were happy few, perhaps, would maintain, and apart from his use of causality they need not fix our interest. Leibnitz, like Locke, is emphatic in his championship of Causality. *Sans ce grand principe on ne saurait venir à la preuve de l'existence de dieu.* His mode of utilizing it has been noticed, and need not further concern us. What, however, may very fitly concern us is this. On the supposition that others besides myself can read this page, that there are conscious individuals independent of my Subject, the extra-subjective Validity of Causality is empirically assured. In treating of the *Monadology* I exploited this mine very usefully, and shall now exploit it once more. Our problem is: to account for the *plurality* of subjects which, though discrete, are yet, as their struggles and, indeed, most of their experiences show, *interrelated*. In other words, what is the *cause* of these plural interrelated Subjects, the fundamental harmony which their very clashings indicate? The answer can be but this—a Universal Subject which as ground of the minor subjects—the stream holding the travelling eddies—manifests both as their discreteness and relatedness. And note that the notions of Cause and Substance here run into one another. For the Universal Subject is only cause of consciousness in so far as it is the spontaneous substance or essence ever passing into, and revealing itself to itself as, consciousness.

With this result is unearthed the true Rosetta stone of outology.

Exactly the same reasoning applies to the atomic and other lower monads as to our own Subjects. They also are subjects of a humble grade, but every whit as spiritual as our own. Their *interrelated plurality* is due to suspension in a common Subject, manifested discretely in them, but still maintaining itself also in the background. It may be doubted, however, whether the monadic individuals answering to atoms (or their parts, as an atom may stand for a world of minor monads) are definitely "segregated" at all. Individuality at this extreme of the scale may be as fluid as it will prove at the other—only with this difference, that the atom-monad tends to lapse back into the night of the Metaconscious, the human or superhuman monad into the Absolute *that is to be*. But in neither case does individuality fade out. In the case of the atom-monad it retires into pure *potentiality*, is eclipsed, but not suppressed; in that of the highest monads it simply attains full actuality. The Metaconscious as *prius* does not really create monads, but a plurality of monads is ever *immanent in it*, and can at most pass from pure potentiality into manifestation. There never will be mergence of individuals in the "All," because the "All" never was other than the many-hued ground of *individuals*—the unity-in-difference of these infinitely numerous powers. When, therefore, I speak of the self-sundering of the Metaconscious into monads, the sundering only refers to an *emergence*, not to an *origination* of these centres. The Individuality of the individual is the cornerstone of Metaphysic, and cannot be too forcibly emphasized. And this metaphysical doctrine must always gravely affect our view of political and economic ideals. It will be clear, for instance, that prostrations before the "State," and an ethic of inwardness, are only to be classed as follies. The Individual is the only concrete; complete freedom for development of individuals without god, state, law, and force should be the ideal of the reformer, an ideal which, however unrealizable at present, may serve as a clue to those who will watch and wait during the throes of the world's great travail yet to come.

I may here pass in review a seemingly formidable criticism :

“Why must we regard the mother-stuff of the monads as Spirit? Would not an algebraic x do as well?” No, it would not. I may point out, in the first place, by way of negative rejoinder, that the mind cannot really moot, except verbally, any activities whatever, save such as are akin to itself, *i.e.* spiritual. It can only pretend to do so, and the farce is at once exposed when we look close. Positive establishment of the spirituality of the mother-stuff is, however, easy. The truth is that the said stuff relieves us of all difficulty by standing forth as its own witness, by continually unfurling itself *as consciousness*. States of consciousness are not describable as attributes somehow stuck in an alien substance—they are substance or essence itself in the process of becoming what it is in itself. Here is the proof. It has been shown elsewhere that states of consciousness as such are known through and through; that they cannot, therefore, be “in themselves,” or in any occult agnostic sense, other than what they are for us. They are thus indubitably Noumena. But they are not only Noumena, but manifestations of the Subject. But its manifestations being Noumena, the Subject in potentiality cannot be anything alien in nature to them. It results, then, that what states of consciousness declare themselves to be—*viz.*, spirituality—is, also, present in their source, albeit not under the *form* of consciousness. Experience is simply a revelation of a mother-stuff of its own nature. Of this stuff as bare *prius* nothing, of course, could be said. Only by contrasting what has become with what that becoming presupposes is any knowledge of it as *prius* possible. Only in its result does it show itself as what it is in itself. Only from its manifestation does its living actuality spring. To adopt a phrase of Fichte’s, “It is everything, and it is nothing”—the despair of Theism, yet the matrix of that wherein a nobler than the theistic ideal will be realized.

Behind the sunlight of reality, though ever passing into it, is the black night of the unmanifest. No metaphysic can evade this agnostic reservation. The Absolutism I preach claims only that Spirit is known in so far as unravelled, but, inasmuch as this knowledge embraces the vast aggregate of experiences of conscious units, it is a claim of colossal

magnitude. Theistic Relativists favour what may be termed an ignorant faith. Thus we find that the idea of a God past finding out has been eloquently championed by Christian Theists.* “A God understood would be no god at all,” says Hamilton, in approval of this line of thought.† The god of Absolutism, on the contrary, is ever being made manifest and evolved through innumerable individual Subjects. The struggle of these individuals is its cradle; its manhood will be the joint apotheosis of them all.

The Absolute as all-seizing ingathering of reality, “complete, perfect, and finished in itself,” is, then, in a Hegelian sense, essentially Result. But several important divergencies from Hegel reveal themselves. Here is one. The Hegelian Deity, who lives through individuals,‡ constitutes only a stage in our system; this Deity has yet to live *for itself* as their conscious, instead of their now metaconscious, synthesis. Deity, however, must anyhow be viewed as developed; and, in this sense, so far from Deity “generating” the universe, the universe “generates” Deity, who may thus come to stand as *crowning ideal of our endeavours, as a Being in whose making we are now playing our part*. Still as productivity and product are ever one, the essence one with the appearance, the noumenon with the phenomenon, Deity as emergent will only be in the actual what It was already in the potential. Further, as the Metaconscious, as such, is *not in time*, but time is its *way of unfolding*, this Deity for Theory of Knowledge is revealed as self-productive Result. The tail of the serpent, as observed in a former regard, is in the serpent’s mouth. The historically last is, in all save its *form*, as consciousness, the metaphysically first.

Blank identity of an infinite whole with itself—how many philosophies have embraced this standpoint, this abstract infertile Monism! Yet what ground of, and appulse to, manifestation are to be found in a self-identical One that excludes plurality and difference? Such *blank* unity and identity must surely go; in the depths of the Metaconscious lie latent

* Cf. the cases cited by Mansel, *Philosophy of the Conditioned*, pp. 23–28.

† *Discussions*, p. 15.

‡ Theistic Hegelians will object. But the point has been already adverted to.

the manifold differences of a universe. Again, the Meta-conscious is neither infinite nor finite, but both; it is the *all-spontaneity*, but is not fully *manifest* as what it is in itself, hence *finite*; as partially revealed in individuals its "infinity" means no more than the *indefinitely augmentable experiences of an indefinitely augmentable number of such conscious individuals*. The remarks made as to the contradictoriness of the individual Subject apply here also, only on the macrocosmic scale. In fine, we may say that the Meta-conscious is neither self-identical nor different, one nor many, infinite nor finite, knower nor known—but all these at once. It may even be urged, as by some Buddhists, that individuals have emerged from — Nothing. But the Nothing is equally the All, for every state of consciousness of every possible individual rises Aphrodite-like from its awful depths.

The doctrine of a unique primary consciousness has no possible metaphysical support. The Universal Subject cannot be limited so as to be identified with *one* conscious individual, however great and majestic. A personal deity, *as individual*, would to this extent be shut off from other individuals, for whom, therefore, the discovery of some deeper ground would be requisite. Positing such a God-consciousness helps us in no way to explain the rise of *other* centres of consciousness—other unitary egos which, existing *for themselves*, are by supposition outside it. It is for this reason that a personal deity cannot stand as Prius, but at best only as leading monad in a monadology. And behind any Monadology stands the Metaconscious.

Suppose, now, that all the hitherto cited objections to such a god were removed; suppose that a supreme individual consciousness crowns the vast hierarchy of monads. Conceived as dividing or *sharing reality* along with other individuals, he would at once lose his impressiveness. But waiving this point, let us look deeper. This supreme consciousness—this leading monad—would of course have its determinate content and determinate way of unfolding. Whence the provision of this content and this mode? From the abyss of the Metaconscious; *consciousness, as a whole, not being self-creative, but only finding or becoming aware that it is*

*such or such.** A god, then, of this sort would himself be thrust by pre-conscious activities into reality. But here arises a further enigma. Wherefore is *this* special individual emergent as a god, while *that* wells up as a snake-consciousness, *that* as a Shakespeare, *that*, again, as a vivisected dog? Here glowers a hideous contingency, indeed—the one monad coming into a sublimely ample birthright; the others—we among them—into the troubles of this tormented miserable world. Just conceive this god brooding over the problem of his genesis, and vexed with the intolerable thought of his own unbought, unmerited, inexplicable grandeur—with the riddle that Eternity could not solve for him!

Be it observed that the experience on which theories draw uniformly suggests consciousness *as result, never as prius*. All our individual consciousnesses have arisen in time out of metaconscious Subjects, in all probability *viâ* Mill's "neutrum" of states, "vivid" and "faint," etc. The jelly-fish has not probably emerged far out (if out) of this stage—many a babe in the womb perishing ere birth presumably never does. Now, this neutral stage is a step in the externalization of all individual Subjects, which, primarily metaconscious, pass slowly by this route into the degrees of quickening consciousness. They break into a variety of projected states, dissociate and associate these, and thereby slowly awake to being.† Turning from the minor Subjects to the giant macrocosmic Subject, we infer a like procedure. The macrocosmic Subject breaks into a variety of individual Subjects, and slowly awakes to being *as these in their unfolding*. This is tantamount to saying that the evolution of collective individual consciousness is the evolution of Deity, the process which in its resumed entirety will eventually constitute his existence. Eventually, because we are not far advanced yet: the road before us is a weary one, the labour of this emergent

* Even conscious Freedom, as I showed, operates only on the "given," by furthering or hindering aspects of it. All else depends on the working of the Metaconscious in its varied phases.

† An imperfect analogy may be sought in the history of the human race: "Man regarded himself as an object before he learnt to regard himself as a subject; and hence 'the objective cases of the personal, as well as of the other pronouns, are always older than the subjective,' and the Sanskrit *mān, ma* (Greek *με*, Latin *me*), is earlier than *aham* (*ἐγών* and *ego*)" (Farrar, *Origin of Language*, p. 99).

God one of truly terrible rigour. We shall point out anon the mode in which individuals concur to carry this labour through.

And Design? When an architect conceives his plan for a cathedral, or a toy-maker his device for a walking puppet, two leading features are presented. (1) The *raw material is given*. (2) The knowledge embodied in the plan is, directly or indirectly, derived *from experience*. Experience tells them both *what* is to be done and *how* it is to be done. But the Metaconscious is its own raw material, and, as *prius* of experience, cannot possibly learn from experience. Useless, then, to invoke any "Carpenter" and allied theories of creation, or any views which posit reason or intelligence as prime mover. The former do not carry us beyond the standpoint of old Anaxagoras: Πάντα διεκόσμησε Νοῦς—Νοῦς disposed or ordered all things. But admitting this, what of the "things"? An insurmountable dualism is indicated. The Platonic Deity who shapes Chaos (Timæus), the Aristotelian Productive or Creative Intelligence, faced by the indeterminate Hyle, Mill's Conditioned Deity, the theological deity and others come to grief over a like dualism. Fancy a deity operating on an inexplicable surd, about which, *as other than consciousness*, he could not possibly know anything! The second class of views is equally untenable. "Reason," indeed, is a poor incompetent abstraction, impotent of itself to start a world—a world, too, with individuals only *aspects* of whom are rational. Experience gives it its filling, nay, it is *mere classing or re-coördinating of ideas which in last resort are echoes only of perceptions*, and, as such, primarily humble ministers to the organism, a reference, indeed, that seldom disappears entirely. The Metaconscious is beyond reason, will, and feeling; it is the spiritual spontaneity that darts these forth, in the process of its unravelling—it is δύναμις ἐνέργεια, and τέλος of all reality, ever bringing to its consciousness what it is in itself. There is no *logical necessity* here, but a super-rational *extralogical* free spontaneity wholly and hopelessly inexplicable.

The Design, if we admit it, must be *immanent*, an abstractly viewed aspect of the actualizing process itself. Note the way in which it manifests. Geology shows that the

“forces” of denudation and upheaval are continually warring on this planet. It has also been estimated that if the earth is represented by a globe of fourteen inches in diameter, the highest elevation on its surface, Gaurishankar (or, as the vulgarian will have it, Mount Everest), will fall within a sheet of paper laid on the globe, while a tenth part of this sheet will represent the average elevation of the continents above the sea-level.* And it would take only some few millions of years to wear down any continent to the sea-level were the “forces” of upheaval to slumber. This being so, what a marvellous balance of “forces” does the story of the rock-shelves reveal to us; upheaval continuously neutralizing denudation, and denudation upheaval, so as to preserve a satisfactory platform for the stabling of organisms such as ours. And who are the operators? Innumerable myriads of Monads that are utterly indifferent to aught save their own pleasures and pains. Intent on their own wants (wants which, however, are indices of furthered or hindered actualizing), they combine, all unwittingly, to work out a plan ignored by them individually. What, again, cares the hæmoglobin in a red blood corpuscle for the organism when it gluts itself with absorbed oxygen? What reck the majority of men that, in avoiding their pains and courting their pleasures, they are in the main working out the plan of creation? They know this no more than the tenant farmer knows that his rent tender conforms to Ricardo’s law, or lovers that their frenzy has reference to the cravings of unborn Monads for organisms. Thus rules universal egoism, hammering out remorselessly the world-plan—the vast complex of struggling agencies being embosomed in the Metaconscious. Only in advanced human (and possibly superhuman) Subjects is consciously *free* co-operation with, or antagonism to, this world-plan possible.

That activities of a spiritual nature—and others there are none—must be conscious is one of the delusions of popular thinking. It never suspects that consciousness is the form only, not the “matter,” or essence which, as *prius*, reveals itself in the form—it loses sight of the moment of *δύναμις*, of the potential, in that of the *ἐνέργεια*, of the actual. Still

* Keith Johnston.


Philosophy has spoken in no doubtful fashion. "The theory of the Unconscious [Metaconscious] is the necessary, if tacit, presupposition of every objective or absolute idealism, which is not unambiguously Theism," observes Von Hartmann. Thus the Upanishads sing the praises of the Universal unconscious Self. Thus the modern Adwaitee Vedantin derives our present consciousness in last resort from a point in the field of unconscious, or, as we prefer to term it, Metaconscious Spirit. It would be interesting to present the history of the theory as emergent in Modern Philosophy—through Leibnitz, Cudworth, Kant (where, if not explicit, it is assuredly implicit), Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Herbart, Sir W. Hamilton, and others, down to Von Hartmann; but to do so would entail repetition and an exorbitant draft on space. I propose, accordingly, to dispense with this luxury, and pass on to another inquiry—one which seeks to classify the various subjective grades in which the universal Metaconscious manifests itself.

First we start with the atomic monad. The difference between ourselves and such a monad has been broadly put by Leibnitz "as the difference between a mirror and one who sees." * This monad is probably only imperfectly "segregated," tending ever to melt away into latency within the Universal Metaconscious. Judging from all indications, its grade of subjectivity must be a very humble one, and supposing it necessary to posit the atom as "composite," *i.e.* resolvable into sub-atomic monads, and so on, the descent must be proportionate. Levels of this order we may term *a-conscious*. Passing onward, we may note that Von Hartmann ascribes a "consciousness" to the plant, poorer in content, however, than that of the lowliest worm, "a sensation of the physical events of the organization which answer to animal organization and sexual life." The doings of the Protozoa as chronicled by Romanes, † Cienkowsky, and Engelmann most assuredly suggest, in the latter's words, "the presence of some psychic process in the protoplasm." Overt subjectivity, but scarcely what we can call conscious sub-

* *Discours de la Metaphysique.*

† "No one has watched the movements of certain Infusoria without feeling it difficult to believe that these little animals are not actuated by some amount of intelligence" (*Animal Intelligence*, p. 18).

jectivity, obtains here. The discrimination and selection of materials for test-making by Carpenter's Deep-sea organisms—albeit scarcely more wonderful than the doings of carbon radicals—seem to require like explanation. Worms, jellyfish, and so forth, stand presumably on a somewhat higher platform. The many levels of this order we may term *sub-conscious*. They imply, be it noted, the presence of central monads or "souls" wherein the related minor monads get integrated or mirrored as wholes: no worm-soul, no plant-soul, no march beyond the simple monads of which the organic bodies consist. It may be remarked that this lowly soul or central monad has its rude analogue even in the combination-nuclei of so-called inorganic chemistry. In the graphic symbol of an alum molecule—



the aluminium atoms organize and sustain the group, standing in this way for *the soul of a chemical compound*. Even the Human Subject only repeats this business on a higher and very much more complex level.

With rats, cats, and dogs, etc., we are well within the many levels or grades of *consciousness* proper, and with Men within those of *self-consciousness*. Monads that have attained to consciousness, whether animal, human, or superhuman, I call Subjects. The objects, ideas, and feelings in the immediateness of which animals are sunk may for the man become themselves data for study. The dog is conscious of a bone, the man *may* be conscious of it *as a bone* and write a metaphysic of perception concerning it. The animal and human areas overlap, however, considerably, and both alike in their humbler aspects (*e.g.* the organic sensations) run into the

lower subconscious levels we have already noticed. For subjective activities superior to our ordinary perceptions and discursive intellect we pass to the level I have termed *intuitive*. Under this would fall the higher clairvoyant dream-consciousness revealed in some sleepers, hypnotic patients, and others, and the *Mystic Insight* previously adverted to. Experience of the latter sort would combine the advantages of reason and sense along with a deeper and richer content drawn direct from the fountain-head. Further conceivable levels are those of the fully illuminated Subjects—omniscient relatively to some given system or systems of worlds—and, finally, that of the harmony of the perfected Subjects AS DEITY. As transcending in a manner the individual, while yet dependent on it, this level is termed supra-conscious. We thus have—

Levels of Subjectivity :—

1. The Metaconscious.
2. The a-conscious (*e.g.* atom or subatomic monad).
3. The sub-conscious (*e.g.* amoeba or worm).
4. The conscious (*e.g.* mouse or ape).
5. The self-conscious (*e.g.* man, as reflective).
6. The intuitively conscious.
7. The fully conscious.
8. The supra-conscious.

A Subject *completely* realizing stage 5 would represent the discursive rationalizing intellect running into its negative, a transition which, as already observed, must inevitably in the course of the race-progress declare itself.* A Subject in stage 6 might either possess the higher clairvoyant dream-consciousness met with in some religious enthusiasts, etc. (the lower dream-consciousness is obviously a mere echo of the waking consciousness), in which case the *inner spontaneity* of the Subject might reveal itself *with no extra-subjective reference at all*, or enjoy ecstatic intuitive seizure of the states of other monads and subjects, with a full extra-subjective reference. Thus, were astronomy the theme, the Subject would *intuite and understand* at a flash the whole of the phenomena in all their richness and complexity; were it geology, the story of the rock-shelves would lie before it as

* Cf. "Individual Subject as Mind."

this page lies before the reader. Here, then, the Schopenhauerian ideal of knowledge would be adequately realized. A Subject completely realizing level 7 would be fully illuminated, gathering in reality in *one blaze* of gorgeous splendour, but still a definitely discrete individual among individuals. It may be that no Subjects stand as yet on this pinnacle; it may be that there are "Space-societies," the members of which do. The stage, however, is, philosophically speaking, necessary. Lastly, level 8 stands for the fusion of these developed Subjects as Deity, of which, however, anon. As rises a majestic cloud-rack from the ocean-rim, slowly spreading over the sky, till it overshadows the whole seascape, so from a troublous world rises this mighty Being, pausing not till it overshadows the entire complex of individuals.

As mediating our transition to Pessimism, the relations between Metaphysic and Morality may now be profitably tapped. Let us reduce the problem to its essentials. Effecting this reduction, we note that Morality only concerns the *relations* of individuals capable of being *pleasurably* or *painfully* affected by each others' actions. Conceive an isolated individual cast adrift on some untenanted planet; and conceive him further as indulging his passions unreservedly. Prudent or imprudent, wise or ignorant, he might be held, but assuredly neither moral nor immoral. He might brew arrack and court *delirium tremens*, smoke opium and sink into an idiotic lethargy, hang himself, if he saw fit to do so. Morality here must be speechless, though the problem as to whether his conduct "*pays*" or not is one of a peculiarly pressing character—to himself. Again, suppose, a dozen individuals living together, but not susceptible of pleasures and pains. They could not possibly stand in moral relations, because nothing done could mar or further any one's welfare. This view of Morality is of a piece with our theories of pleasure and pain and teleology. Recurring to these, we observe that as Prudence dictates the course yielding most happiness, as happiness is index of furthered actualizing, and as actualizing, again, is revelation of the Metaconscious Itself, *the most far-seeing Prudence by best furthering soul-actualization inevitably furthers the world-plan*. Prudence, however, must be

really far-seeing, and not blunder by emphasizing the lower aspects of consciousness to the prejudice of the higher ones—a very important proviso. So far of the individual, whose aim should be, what Aristotle made it, complete realization of his true essence (*ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*), a process implying subordination of his lower to his higher potencies. Morality proper, however, hinges on the reactions of rejoicing and suffering individuals *associated* in social or other relations. The ideally moral man is he who most completely furthers the happiness and mitigates the miseries of his fellows (*i.e.* best favours their free actualization), and it matters not a pinch whether in so doing he obeys the call of “duty” or not. Duty, as feeling of compulsion, indicates, indeed, defective ethical development. Moralists of the old school must, of course, upbraid this view, but the dialectic of the race-growth will leave them hopelessly stranded.

No confluence of a rational Metaphysic and Morality is observable in the earlier stages of society. Morality is a large stream long before it meets the former, numbering among its tributaries law, public opinion, custom, mandates of religious creeds, the sympathies, etc. At first, this stream bounds merrily down the hills, *always varying, however, its aspect* as it flows over fresh rocks or receives new feeders. But its impetuosity is soon checked. Flowing into the plains it gets sluggish, and even stagnant. An inrush of alien waters is requisite to drive it on, and, at this point we must invoke Metaphysic. Those who are in touch with modern feeling, with the men who labour in the storms and stress of modern European life, often acknowledge with sadness that a great and novel stimulus is necessary if the race is not to fall back. Enlightenment and criticism are sapping the old sanctions in every quarter. Once potent ideals, Christianity among them, are fading. What of the new?

The beginnings of altruist morality are humble. It takes its rise in a covert egoism. A relieves B's sufferings at the outset because he dislikes the ideal pains that B's expressions and gestures arouse sympathetically in himself. But our doctrine of freedom adds a rider. The ego-altruistic sentiments thus started may be evolved into pure disinterestedness, *if* the Subject, driving ahead in the line of greatest

resistance, fixes the ideal of self-sacrifice as one worth culture. Fixed ideas breeding habits, *habitual unselfishness* may result, which no mere hedonistic theory can explain. Of the social utility of unselfishness we need entertain no question. Provided that his emotions are well ballasted with intellect, the altruist is a veritable windfall to his fellows. This is obvious enough, but there arises a further point, the solution of which is anything but obvious, as here our modern optimists and pessimists part company. *What should be the goal of a really far-sighted altruism?* What is the highest ideal that should be cherished by a cultured friend of his kind? Here Morality must be steadied by reference to Metaphysic. Let us evoke an imaginary pessimist critic:—

“The altruist, you say, is a veritable windfall to his fellows. Agreed. Who denies it? Have not pessimists preached with enthusiasm a ‘joy in self-sacrifice’? Philanthropy, my dear sir, is not the question at issue. It is not philanthropy, but the form it should take, that is disputable. The ordinary altruist merely tinkers with the miseries around him; he takes straws from a burden which grows heavier the while with stones. Believe us, it is not mending but ending that Humanity stands in need of. We pessimists, I repeat it, preach altruism, but we dare not, tongue in cheek, delude men with visions of a happy future. We have found that life is a cheat, and have shaped our procedure accordingly. Sympathizing with its victims, we must strive to educate them so as to put an end to the whole sorry business.”

The ideal of modern Pessimism is universal extinction of consciousness in all sentient beings whatever. With the suggestions contributed by Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann to the furtherance of this end, it is not my intention to cope. Here I have simply to indicate how ruthlessly Pessimism, if valid, shatters all social and economic ideals. Obviously if the present is black and the future promises to be blacker, the sooner men can be got to reflect upon the farce and end it the better. In any case, we must be weighed down with dismay. And not only our social enthusiasms, but our own self-culture must languish. Thus, why should I cultivate

intellect at the expense of simpler and often far more attractive sensual pursuits? Why not ape the pig happy, rather than Socrates miserable? Why not, indeed! It is futile to bid me follow out, without question, the "higher potentialities" of my nature. Unless in the long run these *pay*, they are not worth following at all. Here, again, Metaphysic is requisite. We must search for the *import of the individual in the universe*, and, having discovered this import, adapt our procedure accordingly.

Our philosophy is spiritual through and through. But to this individual just emergent from the darkness, what has it to proffer? The universe is of his own essence; but what is he as a point in it? True, he may say with Jelâl the Sufi—

"I am not I; the breath I breathe is God's;"

but, interesting as is this reflection, it does not answer Pessimism. Speaking for myself, I confess that my interest in First Causes, gods, and divine breaths generally, is lukewarm compared with that in my destiny as conscious individual. Unlike Leopardi, I dislike shipwreck in the infinite:—

"Così tra questa
Immensità s'annega il peosier mio
E il naufrago m'è dolce in questo mare."

The boldness of this mariner may surprise us. Leopardi spoke, however, as pessimist. Full sadly had he looked on nature, had cursed the *Metaconscious* in all its terrible and loathsome aspects, as the boa crushing the deer, the lion mangling the antelope, as the hideous story of Man, here and there aglow with glory, but for the most part a revelling in fatuous and swinish egoism. Sick with the sight, we, too, might turn and curse the Power that bore us. *À bas l'Infame*—but, alas, great Pan is dead! What god is left to rail at? We who seek to rail are the revealed *Metaconscious* itself! And yet—why despair at all? A rift shows clear through the cloud-rack. Awful, unbending Power, it cannot be that our woes have been felt for nought. Thou and we together have suffered through the long dark night of Time, and, alas, must suffer still, but we look for a brighter morn, when these weary hours have passed. Take heed, then, that

that morn of hope shall be merry. Let us know we have not been thy sport, but Thyself, attaining to God-head. Let the feast be ready set and the bumper brimming over. Atone, we say, atone with Nirvanic joys for the crime of this blood-stained planet.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE STANDPOINT OF PESSIMISM.

"Whence did Dante take the materials for his hell but from this our actual world? . . . When, on the other hand, he came to the task of describing heaven and its delights, he had an insurmountable difficulty, for our world affords no materials at all for this."—SCHOPENHAUER.

"Strife is the father of things."—HERACLEITUS.

"All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man, but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed."—HUME.

"We sojourn here for one short day or two,
And all the gain we get is grief and woe;
And then, leaving life's problems all unsolved,
And harassed by regrets, we have to go."

OMAR KHAYYAM (*Fitzgerald's trans.*).

Does, or will, conscious individuality yield a satisfactory balance of happiness?—that is the pith of the inquiry on which we have embarked. And, barring a favourable answer, the conclusion should be that conscious individuality is a cheat not worth preservation. If the cosmos is not built for our happiness here and now, it must either be regarded as possibly ultimating therein in the dim vistas beyond the grave, or be frankly set down as detestable and rotten to its vitals. As means to an end we may put up now with a surplussage of transitory pains, but the end in this case must be a flood of compensatory blessedness. Happiness immediate or deferred is the supreme test of Life's worth. There are those indeed who say that life is anyhow worth the living, who, like Miltonic angels, would prefer to survive consciously in woe rather than forfeiting their "intellectual being" to die out of reality. Words, mere words. Beings pinched beyond a certain point will court and necessarily court suicide. For voluntary agents all considerable pain carries with it aversion, i.e. a wish to do away with the

particular states of consciousness in question. A being suffused all through with pain would be continually wishing to do away with consciousness. Let the reader, familiar with suffering, imagine himself subjected to the wiles of some superbly adept torturer—in that grim event I maintain that he would be continuously seeking to get rid of consciousness, that is, of himself as revealed at any particular moment. He might, indeed, at first stand out against the test—strive freely in the line of greatest resistance if prompted by pride. But as the spasms rose in acuteness they would drive his poor motive out of consciousness, and an inarticulate struggle for annihilation would at once set in. A being that could cling approvingly to a life of mental and physical torture is, indeed, a fiction too ridiculous to discuss—if not a contradiction in terms.

The unsatisfactoriness of life has long been the theme of thinkers, but to-day pessimism, loud-tongued or tacit, is beginning to invade the masses. Mrs. Partington might as well try to mop back the Atlantic as the fashionable positivism and Agnosticism to beat back this movement. In a philosophical regard Agnosticism is bad—in an ethical one it is worse, playing havoc with every enthusiasm that assigns to the world a meaning. Depriving men of their old ideals, it leaves them to confront a dread and inexplicable world-order. Questioning the belief in a future life, it confines their gaze to this sad, mean, and petty one here. The situation has its comical side, and might, indeed, amuse us were it not also so serious, so fraught with danger to the democracy now coming to manhood. The difficulty to be faced is that which must always arise when thinkers constitute this life an end in itself. The life, so exalted, is utterly unworthy of the honour, and sooner or later the dupes of the theorists will discover the fact for themselves, when Morality and Culture will receive a tremendous shock. Just now, too, the protests against this life are many. The harvest of the dragon's teeth is with us; the story of the world's long torment has been too well told by historian, economist, and naturalist. A famous passage in *In Memoriam* voices the standpoint of thinking thousands, that of horror at the woes of this planet, tempered, however, by a hope that all may yet turn out well.

But in thousands of others this hope is flickering low, stifled by the breath of Agnosticism, and the gravity of its departure will be momentous. Failing Metaphysic, the rekindler, the progress of the future Aryan races is doomed. Pessimism and chaos will swallow them. Man cannot live by bread alone, not even if buttered by an "Unknowable" of Spencerian churning.

The Metaphysic of the Enlightened Aryan Future will beg no alms from religion. Religion by that distant time will have dwindled to an æsthetic emotion, to a feeling like that with which a poet views the stars or an archæologist the ruins of Baal-ber. And specific dogmatic creeds will have been outlived and clapped into ancient history. The priest will have been adjudged a babler, theology for the most part a disease of language. I do not mean by this that the creeds have no fair side. On the contrary, through their country-rock run distinct veins of usefulness. They are illusions expediting certain stages of the moral and mental evolution of Man—transitory but effective phases of a vast dialectical movement. Precious in the past, they must not, however, be treasured when effete.* As mere survivals backed by organized supporters they are among the greatest foes of Humanity.

Have you watched the phases of a glacier? If so, you have watched those of a creed. First the snowflakes falling like heaven-sent thoughts on the peaks of aspiration. Slipping down the mountain these snowflakes glide into a basin where they are slowly welded into compact ice. So, too, the mystic intuitions of a Jesus or Mohammed receive concrete shape—a shape defined by the nature of the receptive mould. Emergent as a glacier, the ice moves forward slowly, solidly, and irresistibly down the valley. But ever as it moves it changes. Though it wears its channel, it conforms to it also. This hard stiff glacier is theology. Down on its soiled front rain huge boulders and rock-masses—these form the moraines, wreckage from the vast mountains of human folly. As it crushes on, it receives affluents bearing like burdens, and ere

* It is difficult, however, to defend some creeds even on these lines. Thus Rawlinson thinks the "aggregate results" of the Phœnician religion on the morals of the race were probably injurious (*Phœnicia*, p. 37).

long is capped by a layer of hideous rock. Note well how slow is the movement, how huge the crevasse where sharp descents are reached, how the polluting rocks and filth plunge into the very heart of the ice. But note, also, that when broader and fouler than ever the glacier meets its conqueror. Reason, the sun-god, strikes it. Streams now multiply on its surface, the old hard outlines vanish, and a lively torrent rushes wildly from its base. At last, done to death, it drops its burden; a terminal moraine is its cairn, and hard by this a young river rushes rapidly down the slope. Glancing at the terminal moraines of theology, the onlooker should not hesitate. Impressive as may be their genesis, they are in themselves mere rubble heaps. It is on the freed young river of thought, not on the rubble heaps, that his gaze should lovingly linger.

But to some the waters of the river have seemed bitter, and they pour, say others, into a salt lake, marshy, dreary, without outlet. Which, then, is best—to pitch our tent on the glacier or brave the vague rumour of the salt-lake? smother our misgivings with Church-chatter, or accept what rationalism can afford us? He who knows the barrenness of the glacier should not hesitate. Wherever the river leads him, he will at least have left error in his wake.

Among the riddles propounded by the Sphinx the miseries of life are prominent. Always more or less in evidence, they oppress both in their happenings and in the ensuing reflections on these. And to-day, more than ever before, they are fixing the attention of our fellows. The clearer becomes the reflective consciousness of the race, the more they stand out and clamour for some decently optimist rendering. There are two great classes into which these miseries may be parted—those of a sporadic sort, such as famine, disease, poverty; and those of a universal sort inseparable from volition as we know it. It is the first of these classes that appeals to the popular eye, and the glare of its contents is terrible. On what shall the mind linger? To what form of wretchedness and what cases of that wretchedness is it to assign precedence? Says Macaulay, “The whole history of the species is made up of little else than crimes and errors;” and Gibbon, writing in a similar strain, brands it as “little

more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind." What a commentary on Agnostic optimism! It is futile for Spencerians to assure us that a slow evolution is in progress. The men of the present stage of evolution are more discontented than were their forerunners, albeit the physical evils they undergo are, perhaps, of a milder character. Was any century so bored, yet so aimlessly active as this? Were ever the outcries against nature and life louder? The hope, too, of an eventual "complete adaptation" of the race to environment is empty, for the environment is not only unstable but constantly becoming more complex, hence more exacting. And the upshot of all this fever, what is it to be? Spencerians and their like will not say outright that the individual is snuffed out at death, but the drift of their teachings is obvious. Individuals who are the subjective side of nerve-function must presumably perish with their brains. Evolution, then, is to end in a *cul de sac*. The mounds of Nimroud and Kouyunjik are to be held symbolic of human destiny; a great fever and tumult, and but a little while and—desolation. A freezing planet is to end us; universal history is to be wasted. Just survey Gibbon's register in the light of this ghastly dream. The miseries in that register would be a high price to pay for Elysium, but for the privilege of dying out with this squalid planet, faugh! Glance at the maps attached to a History and try to think what those shifting colour-patches mean. What catacombs of buried miseries are laid bare! What immolation there of the individual on the blood-stained steps of progress! And yet it is hinted that individuals as such must go, and with them the race also when the planet begins to age! Strange beyond compare is the agnostic optimism of to-day.

"Nothing is absolutely bad, but each thing is bad in respect to some other," said Bruno and, later, Spinoza. But optimism cannot lay this unction to its soul. From the standpoint of experience, we must assert it to matter nothing whether the bad is a relation or not. It is felt, and that is enough—is a fact that no phrases change. Memories of the past, mingling with the horrors of to-day, rise up before the thinker, and will not be exorcised. So thick crowd these harpies that they quite confuse the sight. On what shall he

lay stress? On bloody wars such as those of the Sargonidæ, Sesostris, Genghiz Khan, Tamerlane, Frederick the Great and Napoleon; on narratives such as those of Cambyses' march to Ethiopia, the Moslem invasions of India, the destruction of Carthage, the retreat from Moscow, and the Taiping revolt; on the innumerable political blood-spillings, errors, crimes, oppressions that befoul history; on earthquakes such as those of Lisbon or Riobamba, eruptions as of Papandayang or Krakatoa; on a Yellow River sweeping away Chinamen like vermin, or a drought whipping off millions of Hindu villagers—martyrs, 40,000,000 of whom never know what a full stomach means; * on religious slaughters such as the Aztec teocalis witnessed; † on the rabble of theological persecutions, factions, inquisitions, and other vilenesses; on the legions of cruel, disgusting, and degrading diseases ever preying on our kind; ‡ on empires and monarchies with rulers, lizard-brained, selfish, and rotten, where "Providence" might have placed heroes; on African savages whose life, Gordon and others tell us, is one of "fear and misery night and day;" on Palæolithic and other savages wallowing helplessly unprogressive through centuries; on the history of the industrial struggle from feudal times onward; on the annals of debauchery bred by natural instincts; on the proletarian hordes who slave, suffer, and are vile around us to-day; on the——? But no more; the pen flies. Dismal, too, is it not, to watch how our cruel likings are fanned? "Each Society," writes a nominal optimist, "has had to maintain itself in the face of external inimical agencies, partly animal but mainly human; and this has required the nature of its members to continue such that the destructive

* Hunter.

† One hundred and thirty-six thousand skulls were found in one teocali by a soldier of Cortes. "Belief might well be staggered did not the old world present a worthy counterpart in the pyramid of Golgothas, which commemorated the triumphs of Tamerlane" (Prescott).

‡ Note how the so-called "natural" man is plagued. "The diseases," writes Stauley, "by which the natives are commonly afflicted are acute dysentery, chronic dysentery, cholera morbus, remittent fever, intermittent fever or ague, typhoid fever, low continuous fever, heart disease, rheumatism, paralysis, small-pox, itch, ophthalmia, sore throat, consumption, colic, cutaneous eruptions, ulcers, syphilis, gonorrhœa, convulsions, prolapsus ani, umbilical hernia, and nephritis. But the great and terrible scourge of East and Central Africa is the small-pox. . . . The bleached skulls of victims to this foul disease . . . lie along every caravan road" (*Livingstone*, p. 533).

activities are not painful to them, but on the whole pleasurable." * Man, however, as we find him, seems altogether a shocking bit of workmanship to crown the geological æons. What is he, after all, but a foggy intelligence allied with an exacting and in many respects disgusting organism, a prey to endless vices, prejudices, defects, and follies. Grand and noble individuals there are many. Still, were men in general revealed to each other in the fulness of their inner mental workings, an unspeakable disgust would arise. Happily, the illusions of deportment veil the Mokannas that glare within.

Turn now to the animal world. What *distrust of the cosmos* this fosters! Animals slaughtered for food, vivisected, overworked, starved, hunted, tortured in every conceivable manner confront us. Do you observe those crows picking out the eyes of a lamb, and that parrot despoiling a sheep of its kidneys? Do you perceive that cobra gorging a terrified frog, those carnivores fleshing their teeth in blameless prey, and man—praying, whining, church-building, hypocritical man—wading through the blood of the victims that go to glut his appetites. Think of the "instinctive" cruelty of cat, cormorant, and moukey, of the scheme of natural selection with its overbreeding, starvation, and slaughter. And glance at this picture taken from Humboldt's gallery:—

"In the rainy season the horses that wander in the savannah and have not time to reach the rising grounds of the Llanos [of the Orinoco], perish by hundreds amidst the overflowing of the rivers. The mares are seen, followed by their colts, swimming, during a part of the day, to feed upon grass, the tops of which alone wave above the waters. In this state they are pursued by the crocodiles; and it is by no means uncommon to find the prints of the teeth of these carnivorous animals on their thighs. Pressed alternately by excess of drought and of humidity, they sometimes seek a pool, in the midst of a bare and dusty soil, to quench their thirst; and at other times flee from water and the overflowing rivers, as menaced by an enemy that encounters them in every direction. Harassed during the day by gad-flies and mosquitoes, the horses, mules, and cows find themselves attacked at night by enormous bats, that fasten on their backs, and cause wounds that become dangerous, because they are filled with acaridæ and other hurtful insects."

* Spencer, *Psychology*, ii. 570.

Teleologists to the fore! Theorists on original sin succour us! Consider how sensitive an animal is the horse, and how utterly *his* soul at least remains unprovided for in your theologic schemes of redress! Winwood Reade (and Gordon is at one with him) tells us in his *Martyrdom of Man* that it is hopeless "to describe or even imagine the tremulous condition of the savage mind; yet the traveller can see from their aspect and manners that they dwell in a state of never-ceasing dread." This is horrible enough in all conscience, and may well stupefy the optimist. But if we sometimes hear of human woes, *e.g.* a destruction of frowsy Chinamen, half malevolently, indignation at animal martyrdom is less grimly handicapped. It has probably done more to foster distrust of the cosmos than anything else. How can we anticipate ultimate happiness at the hands of a Power that works so darkly? And how can any such posthumous happiness blot out the horrors that have gone before?

Life as means to an end may, conceivably, be held as of value; but considered as end-in-itself it is a cheat. Criticizing this life, we must roundly assert that its pains are far in excess of its pleasures. In this belief we may note the confluence of many brilliant intellects. Hesiod, Heracleitus, Socrates, Kapila, Plato, Sankara, Buddha, Sophocles, Euripides, Pliny, the Neoplatonists, Voltaire, Omar Khayyam, Hume, Montaigne, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Byron, Von Hartmann, Leopardi, may be mentioned. Even Epicurus, supposed apostle of Hedonism, advises the sage to steer clear of suffering rather than to seek positive pleasures. Shakespeare's personality is so merged in his characters as to render certitude difficult; but the *Hamlet* "to be or not to be" soliloquy is as true as it is impressive; and in *Henry IV.* the "happiest youth," reading the book of fate, "would shut the book and sit him down and die." Among pessimists, too, must, I think, be classed Hegel, indignantly as some would resent the charge. No legitimate niche can be found in his system for perpetuity of individual consciousness, while in so far as the individual appears in history he is ruthlessly sacrificed to the universal. Emerson admits that "everything connected with our personality fails. . . . Nature never spares the individual." Of the

founders of religions and religious philosophies the majority trample on this life. The Indian teachers are especially noticeable in this regard, while of Jesus Von Hartmann observes truly that he "completely adopted the contempt and weariness of earthly life." A like weariness oppresses the majority of Hindus and Buddhists, and its prevalence may well give pause to the cosy-corner optimists at home.

Voltaire maintains that Pleasure is a dream, and pain alone is real. Philosophically expressed, this is the Plato-Schopenhauer doctrine that pains alone are positive, and that it is their removal which constitutes pleasure. Aristotle long ago upset this doctrine by pointing out that at any rate *some* intellectual enjoyments, and *many* even of the pleasures of sense, have a positive standing of their own; and any one who notes his æsthetic emotions, the glow of muscular exercise, and the pleasures of mere colour, can validate this criticism for himself. Waiving, however, this point, we may affirm with certainty that the great majority of our pleasures are actually heralded by pains, and never at their best subsist long in their purity:—

"Medio de fonte leporum,
Surgit amari aliquid et in ipsis floribus angit."

Grant Allen, in a passage already quoted, has pointed out that "Massive Pleasure can seldom or never attain the intensity of Massive Pain, because the organism can be brought down to any point of inanition or exhaustion, but in efficient working cannot be raised very high above the average." Similarly Acute Pleasure is fleeting and dearly bought, while Acute Pain is both more intense and prodigiously more durable. This is the physiological vindication of Hume's statement that all life's goods could not make a man very happy, while all its evils lumped together would make a wretch indeed. In this regard note the declaration of the envied Abdalrahman, one of the Ommiad Caliphs, which I take from Gibbon:—

"I have now reigned above fifty years in victory or peace; beloved by my subjects, dreaded by my enemies, and respected by my allies. Riches and honours, power and pleasure have waited on my call, nor does any earthly blessing appear to have been wanting to my felicity. In this situation

I have diligently numbered the days of pure and genuine happiness which have fallen to my lot; they amount to fourteen. *O man! place not thy confidence in the present world.*"

And compare Abdalrahman's lot with that of the most miserable man you know. The transition is startling, but it only blackens a picture already of sombre hues. A surplusage of suffering obtains everywhere, and only relatively to his more unlucky fellows is the envied of observers to be held fortunate.

Schopenhauer and Buddha lay stress mostly on my second category of miseries, those more or less inseparable from the normal flow of experience. Thus Schopenhauer professes to establish Pessimism *a priori* by analysis of volition itself. All willing means want, and want pain; of a bundle of wants only a few can be relieved, when at once others crowd in. Man is bound on Ixion's wheel without hope of respite.* Unquestionably this view has been pushed too far—the wheel is not by any means always irksome. Many rich, if transient, positive joys must be allowed for; many hours, even days, of life seem well worth the living. But, dropping these interludes, we may agree with him that Willing, on the whole, is a most undeniable burden. Why otherwise that continual getting rid of this for that state which workaday experience exhibits? Why this *perpetual unrest*, as of a patient covered with bed-sores, who shifts his position only to shift it again? Never can I dwell long on these or those aspects of experience, but must be continually getting rid of them for others to keep myself easy. This is a significant feature of action and thinking alike, and one well worthy of the best attention of the optimists. For inasmuch as the experiences are all equally phases of "myself," the unrest, the continual abolition of them amounts to a continual suicide.

"Civilization begins by supplying wants and ends by creating them, and each supply for the newly created wants begets other wants, and so on *toties quoties*," Sir W. Grove tells us. *Cui Bono* this wild activity, this fretful struggle of ours? Are we not insane to beget children? ought we not

* This is Kant's opinion, too. "Man finds himself in never-ceasing pain" (*Anthropology*).

to end the farce with orgies of rioting and the happy despatch? Look at the hideous drudgery underlying this vaunted civilization—at our courts, education, shops, house-keeping, commerce, mines, newspapers, government, factories, railways, and all the multiform rest. Incessant petty, yet most galling cares, swell the exactions of this treadmill. Do you fly to art for solace? There is surely an oasis here, but its charms make return to the desert all the drearier. Indeed, developed æsthetic feelings make the world a purgatory for those who look sharply around them. The “*hideous and unalterable sordidness*” of this life makes it well that the masses are philistine.* Damascus looks fair from a distance, but within its gates rise the stenches, and the lepers whine in their loathliness. Art, by idealizing, by weeding things of their nastiness, fools many into optimism; it remains for the chill return to the concrete to show the cheat. Even intellectual pleasures are deceitful. The drudgery of thinking and studying is colossal, and their vaunted pleasures in large part only purchasable with continual pain. Custom, too, stales results here as everywhere. *Sordet cognita veritas*. Words accumulate in mountains, and symbols ordered as sciences get weeded of all enjoyable content. An eminent Viennese mathematician, I am informed, attributes his success mainly to his power of enduring pain. And students of Hegel’s *Logic*, Spencer’s *Formula of Evolution*, and of abstruse scientific questions generally, must find, to their cost, what a burden is *honest* abstract thinking. But if the process is painful and the results are staled by custom, *cui bono* the efforts? Once more our agnostics are at fault. *The fact is that, here as elsewhere, human ideals, unless they are to bear rich fruit in “another world,” are a cheat of the emptiest nature.*

But the optimist of the market-place is with us? What, then, of his testimony? In the East the optimist is a rarity, but Europe and the New World are supposed to be better favoured. And undoubtedly very many men in these quarters will avow an optimism when pressed. We must remember, however, that some of these answerers look for reparation for present sufferings in another life—a possibility not here disputed. We must further remember that few men can

* *Riddles of the Sphinx.* β 127

impartially reread their experiences, that even the natural psychologist requires a severe and tedious training. The fundamental bias, of course, is the egoism which likes to see all things bright. Here are a few of the additional sources of bias:—

1. A wish to appear successful and impressive in the eyes of neighbours and acquaintances, rivals in the hunt for happiness—an outcome, this, of the civilized struggle for existence. Along with the reputation of being happy, “manly effort,” “contempt for obstacles,” “unbending fortitude,” etc., get to be specially ascribed to optimists. It need hardly be said that pessimists have no objection to effort, etc., provided these can be shown to be useful to themselves or others; objectless activity is what disgusts them. Avoiding this, they may squeeze more honey out of life than their fellows.

2. The irreflective way in which most men suffer and rejoice, they being too sunk in the immediateness of their experiences to be able to review them *as experiences*. We can only become pessimists at a relatively high stage of reflection—the pessimism, so-called, of the ordinary man is mere inarticulate growling.

3. The temperamental bias. The Negroes whom Reade and Gordon describe as veritable martyrs, are nevertheless “constitutionally gay” between the turns of the rack. The ancient Greeks were similarly temperamental optimists, though their great thinkers succeeded to some extent in undeceiving them. Of Renan, the optimist, a clever journalist has observed: “His happy temper made him sincerely optimist, but his Æolian harp resonance to the sounds of sadness dragged him often into pessimism.”* It is obvious that the “temper” had no right to suppress the resonance.

4. The treachery of the “historic imagination” and the memory. Witness the romance often shed on acute misery by distance. Ὡς ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνησθαι πόνων, but what of the πόνοι in the concrete? History is inevitably romantic to the armchair student. Imagination prompts maintenance in thought of grand pageants, vast armies, delicate diplomatic intrigues, marvellous industrial developments, and so on, revelled in for the sake of their æsthetic content, and these pictures must inevitably warp the judgment. History is an

* Paris correspondent of *Truth*.

arena painful for the gladiators, but pleasant for the spectators. How often, too, we look back wistfully to personal experiences that we positively loathed in the having. Retrospection, where it can, weeds the past of unpleasantness, transmutes even the unpleasantness into a welcome shape. No man voluntarily stores up pure misery. No pictures of French defeats were allowed to mar the galleries of Versailles.

5. The habit of picturing the future with the evils weeded out, as young people usually regard travel, marriage, the professions, the prospect of wealth, etc. This idealizing of reality favours energetic *action*, hence must be furthered by Natural Selection both in animal and man alike. Shakespeare's youth would "sit him down and die" were the book of fate revealed to him. Ordinarily we are forced to ignore more or less the stream of annoyances in which our joys will float like straws. Full recognition of the annoyances would make for immobility. 6. The wish to vindicate by *reason* the impulse or *instinct* that holds us to life. The instinct may perhaps express the "will-to-live," or *fiat* of the metaconscious Subject; or may spring from organic inheritance from ancestors, harking back to primitive defence of the organism. I know a senile optimist who hungers for a ten-years' further lease of life, but in the same breath tells me of the merciless worries and ailments that harass him. It would be absurd to say *his* pleasures outweigh his pains, but nevertheless he struggles on "gamely."* We may notice along with this bias the work of the imagination in picturing vague posthumous mishaps. Life may be painful, but the dreams after death may be worse. 7. The wish to justify by reason the *necessity* most feel to be active. Given a vigorous motor system, a man must be active or suffer from terrible ennui, if not disease. Labour, says Kant, "is irksome; labour has its annoyances, but these are fewer than we should experience were we without labour." The floor we have to tread on is hot, but the goad that urges us is white-hot. 8. The working of "fixed ideas" (or idea-feelings) of enjoyments, either peculiar to ourselves, as a "fad," or of a generally appreciated sort, such as love. The power of these ideas to sway us, to survive the severe buffets of fact, to fasten attention on themselves to

* Note the prejudice implied in the use of this favourite word.

the prejudice of adequate survey, both of facts and the stores of memory, is most striking. From a hedonistic standpoint the conduct they may initiate and sustain may be utterly irrational. Allied with the idealizing imagination they present absurdly roseate forecasts to the victim, and fool him even despite arrays of successive disenchantments.

It results, then, that the wayside pains requisite to realize a Fixed Idea, often absurdly outweigh any possible terminal pleasures. Out of multitudes of instances, the "historic" instances of the love-passion may be selected. Assuredly the lovers proved by their constancy that they pursued what they deemed an end of supreme blessedness. The *fixed idea* upheld them. Still, that the wayside pains predominated, the written records of their anguish appear unmistakably to reveal. And we must remember that the wayside pains here are not all—there are to be added the pains that sully the victory. No successful love yields unalloyed bliss; on the contrary, disenchantment, satiety, and worries, if nothing worse, hedge it. It is the old story. Illusions support us through struggles, are seen at last in their nakedness, and forthwith give place to others equally hollow. Complete freedom from illusion would be akin to quietistic apathy.

The individual being sacrificed in this life, the reply to Pessimism must hinge on the report we may be able to return of his prospect beyond the grave. Individuals, whether conceived as ultimately intermingled or otherwise, exhaust Reality. Premising, then, that we shall return a promising report, we have now *on this supposition* to proffer a prefatory vindication of the world-order here and now. The supposition will itself, I repeat, be vindicated in succeeding chapters, and I mention it once more merely to reiterate that it is indispensable. An optimist devotion to "Humanity" or "Society" is ludicrous unless the individuals behind these abstractions are to be adjudged prospectively fortunate.

The portion of the cosmos we tenant may after all be an addled egg in the nest built by the Metaconscious. Other planets and solar systems might perplex optimists less sorely, and this is a vista of which we ought not to lose sight. On the assumption, however, that things terrestrial are of the

normal sort, how are we to account for the miseries that permeate their working? At the outset we must once more fall back on the Metaphysic of Pleasures and Pains, and more especially of Pains, as already touched on.

Scope for pains originates with the sundering of the Metaconscious into a plurality of minor metaconscious centres—into the monads. Pains answering to hindered or repressed activities, cannot obtain before the rise of minor centres with antagonizing or opposing powers. The dread sundering once effected, each centre necessarily poses as a self-contained exhaustive whole, the reality of which consists in the actualizing of its content. Its Life is its self-manifestation. But the centres are many, all alike seek to break into the joy of free manifestation, and all alike display the imperious inevitable egoism of self-absorbed wholes. All *will* actualize themselves. The result may be metaphorically stated thus. From unmanifest mathematical points in the Metaconscious the monads are self-actualized as living spheres, which expand, interpenetrate, and so hinder and further each others' life, according as their contents agree or differ. A complete "mental picture" proper of this interplay would be an absurd demand to make of Metaphysic; no such picture whatever could by any possibility be appropriate, nothing like "seeing," "touching," "hearing," etc., anything in imagination being intended. Metaphor must obviously suffice. With this mutual hindering and furthering sets in that mighty struggle for Life or Existence, an aspect of which Darwin has so nobly treated. Overtly this fight hinges on pleasures and pains, but looking deeper we note that these are but indices of furthered or dammed up spiritual energies. In the a-conscious monads of the Fire-Mist this struggle becomes interesting and complex; in the sub-conscious, conscious, and self-conscious monads of the vegetable, animal, and human kingdoms it rises to an intensity in places appalling. Note, however, the progressive negation of the self-absorption of the monads.* Already in the animal kingdom the inference to "*ejects*," the maternal and gregarious instincts, etc., have appeared. And in primeval

* Let me note that nothing said here militates against the individuality of the Monad, which even as interpenetrated can perceive changes in other Monads only by way of changes *in its own* states.

Man, along with a notable general advance, we have the rise of Morality. Morality, by whatever sanctions buttressed, is a definite practical recognition of the claims of alien Subjects, and a negation to that extent of the primal rapacious self-seeking of the Subject. In its ruder forms Morality is restricted and brutal to a degree. In its highest forms, as positive altruist benevolence, it is purposive following out of the interests of alien Subjects, by *imaginative* self-identification with really walled-off entities; A being, and acting for, B and C so far as he can think and feel for them vicariously. The ultimate supra-moral condition we might conceive as a "telepathic" union of all Subjects as Deity; their primal exclusiveness being negated *while preserved* in an organic synthesis.* In this speculatively deducible condition complete happiness would obtain, for happiness is the reflex of all unimpeded activity, and here no possible antagonisms could arise. But I anticipate.

The prefatory answer to Pessimism, then, is this. Pain is an accompaniment of hindered activities arising out of the primal sundering of the Metaconscious into conflicting minor centres. If, therefore, metaphysic makes it probable that this hindering is transitory and provisional—a way only of thrusting on the monads a superb content that they could not, or would not have fashioned for themselves—the case for Pessimism is answered, and the vision of a "far-off divine event" rejoices us. Now, the intuitive wisdom of the Metaconscious stands to a human intellect much as does the blazing sun to a spark. With the spontaneity that spun this gorgeous, if grim, universe, no brain-suckled human "reason" can compete—reason is dwarfed, humiliated, disgraced in its presence. What, then, of the maintenance of this so grim World? Is not this maintenance itself significant? *Does not the very hideousness of its events suggest a correspondingly sublime dénouement?* The clairvoyant Metaconscious as *prius* transcends time—it cannot have erred through lack of prescience. And had it erred, It has but to nod, and lo Reality has gone and left not a rack behind. But Reality persists, and with it must persist

* Observe, no *mergence* of individuals in the "All" is indicated in the sense an Adwaiter Vedantin would use it. For myself I am an Individualist of Individualists in a metaphysical regard, holding that the Individual is at bottom the only concrete, exhausting the import of all ideals and efforts.

the higher optimism. The Good, after all, must be fated to emerge from this torment, or on the wreckage of a universe would rush the gloom of eternal night. Hail, then, to the unborn future! The pains of this world accumulate *behind* us, but the banqueting day, the revels of a Deity, are ahead.

Some prominent services rendered by Pain to the world-order (always supposing that order moves to a fair goal) may now be indicated. Pain and Pleasure are overtly the lieutenants of the Metaconscious. On the pains and pleasures of monads hinge what are styled natural laws, the uniformities stacked by science. Natural Laws are really only *verbal generalities*, standing for the *resemblances* of particular cases of coexistence and sequence in certain selected features. Behind the particular facts, however, stand the interacting monads, the activities of which, suffused with pain and pleasure, render their self-contained egoism compatible with order and a world-plan. So much for the "Inorganic." In the domain of the "Organic" the monads are more complexly related and actualized, while central monads, animal and human, make their *début* as conscious agencies. Of the animal body, Pain and Pleasure are broadly speaking the conservators, since by way of the mirrored cerebral monads the interests of the organism and the Subject are largely identified. An animal unsusceptible to pain might squat on a lava-stream, or munch its own leg for recreation. Given, however, a general identity of interest of organism and Subject, harmful actions are avoided, while the field for the play of Natural Selection opens up. Wants breed "faculties," and "faculties," growing with use, in their turn augment wants, the car of advance thereby slowly rolling on, the well-endowed animals being kept up to their work, and the failures being concurrently extirpated. The misery attendant on the advance is no doubt awful, and fault may naturally be found with the method. But what really backs the orgies of animal overbreeding and warfare which stud this planet? Simply this—the pressure for births (*i.e.* relations with the complexly-related organic monads) of animal monads or Subjects that seek to manifest, *at any price*, in any *suitable* quarter. A struggle for life holds not only between phenomenal individuals such as we know, *but between*

the Monads or souls of which these individuals are the output Hence the astonishing multiplication of organisms often pitchforked into reality, only to be at once destroyed; hence the seemingly insensate replenishing of the slaughterhouse. And the blame? The animals reap a whirlwind which they themselves have sown, for in them is revealed the Metaconscious, and from the sundering of the latter into self-absorbed egoist centres sprang the whole mischief. In becoming discrete the Metaconscious invited the torment, and for this great "original sin" it is now paying the penalty *in these animals*. How many enigmas seem to find their solution here! how many, too, of the non-teleological *useless* kinds of pain are explicable as untoward incidents of this dread plunge into discreteness! Will the end vindicate the means?

With regard to Man, Progress demands that he should be always more or less miserable. Having to pass through many experiences, he must not be allowed to bask in the sunshine of this or that one; he must be in a state of *ceaseless unrest*, mainly mediated by pain. The struggle of the monads apart, it is obvious that pleasures as sole motives of voluntary action would never do. Every pleasure would fix attention on the aspect of experience it entered into, until a stronger pleasure supervened, and so on, pleasures always rising in a scale that would bar out return to earlier moods, and finally drown knowing in feeling. As wisely as the primal sundering admitted, is the guidance of Humanity effected. Many useless sufferings we seem able to detect, but they are apparently inseparable from a turmoil in which discrete, self-actualizing monads have to operate, and in which contingency must, accordingly, to a great extent, obtain. But, regarding the process as a whole—considering it, not from the standpoint of a day-fly, but from that of the world-history—we may well marvel at the output. How many years ago was it since the Palæolithic men chipped flints over the site of modern London? What miracles have been unostentatiously wrought since then! Let us put away our Vedas, Puranas, Bibles, and Korans; their dreams pale before this wondrous spectacle.

The Origin of Evil has perplexed many who considered it a blemish. But the truth is, that Evil (*i.e.* pain, or that

which directly or indirectly causes pain) is essential to the actualization or perfection of the whole. Failing Evil, the Metaconscious would be shorn of vast aspects of manifestation—would hug the finite hopelessly. Failing Evil, the rich emotional nature of man, as sufferer, agent, victor, and sympathizer would have been impossible; a psychological scarecrow would confront us. And this Evil, how it levers intellectual and material advance. “The first lesson of History is the good of Evil.”* “The swiftest horse that bears us to perfection is suffering.” † “Imperfection is perfection in its becoming.” ‡ Had the ancient inhabitants of the Nile valley always had food in plenty, no civilized Egypt, suggests Winwoode Reade, would have arisen. A too genial climate, with a too bountiful vegetation, may prevent a race from entering the stream of history; while the staving-off of foreign competition has been known to render a given branch of production a “conspicuous example to the general industrial energy,” even of England.§ An easing of the struggle for wealth may have disastrous effects on social habits, and involve an empire in destruction. Humanity has strange friends. Even persecutions, plagues, famines, wars, bad kings, slavery, and the Roman Catholic Church have done it service ever and anon. From the pains of Fear rose ghost-worship and fetishism among savages, heralding other religious illusions of untold value to mankind. “Necessity is the mother of invention”—of the useful arts and sciences, which emerge slowly in the order of urgency in which they are *wanted*. From the pains of *ennui*, and perplexity tempered by wonder, came the spur to philosophy. *Vexatio dat intellectum*, runs the adage; most great men serve an apprenticeship to hardship in one form or another ere they blaze on a startled world. Initial ease too often means lethargy; pains and fairy-like illusions make the elixir that nerves genius. As for the masses of mankind, coarse animal wants, and the struggle to appease these, prove effective. The Metaconscious wastes no words with pigs, so it takes a stick and drives them.

How wilyly this Metaconscious leads us! How it plies us

* Emerson.

† Eckhart.

‡ Schelling.

§ Mill, “Chapter on Monopolies,” *Pol. Econ.*

with bubble illusions ! Rousseau, in his *Discours sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité*, would have us minimize our wants and fall back on simple living. I will go further still, and maintain that, for those who are free and prepared, the ideal of Quietism and Ascetic Mysticism is the true one. But most men are neither free nor prepared, and it is not in the shaping of the world-plan that they should be. In order to attain to full actuality the Metaconscious must manifest as complex restless societies with huge cumbersome city-mechanisms and pursuits that claim lives of fever. Hence the needful illusions ; hence the infatuation of individuals, swathing themselves with toil, and feeding wants that breed mobs of hungry children—a seemingly objectless activity, comical to contemplate. Under the sway, however, of the Metaconscious these individuals collectively work out results they may ignore, just as the coral insect ignores his reef. Even their crassest egoisms are utilized. Patterson refers to the city of London as “ a sanctuary of Plutus ; a place where men think only of profits, and yet accomplish more good than all our philanthropists.”* The very self-seeking of capitalists, the very industrial development they have effected, is mediating an advance that shall swallow them, and replace this worn-out industrial system with a better. In such great world-historic movements the individual is usually a puppet pulled by pleasures and pains. And at best he is only competent to emphasize by free nismus this or that aspect of the content which the Metaconscious has thrust on his consciousness.

Feelings of pain and pleasure are the horses of the car of progress, Reason at best the guiding charioteer. Both in the individual and the race reason of itself has little or no influence on action. When, however, the charioteer has good horses, his directive influence becomes magical. Racial progress thus assured may be said to exhibit a triply articulated movement : *Want*, or the stage of outreaching, of ideal optimist reforms, social, political, and other ; *Attainment* (or, rather, partial Attainment) of the end desired ; and *New Want*, consequent on satiety, lapse of the reform into the commonplace, together with the emergence of the inevitable “ bad side.”

* *Economy of Capital*, p. 123.

Every stage contemplated has its flaw, unsuspected at the outset, but inevitably developed into its abolishing cause. In respect to optimism, I am not disposed to deny that in special cases of Attainment the pleasure reaped may exceed for a brief time contemporary pains, though, the necessary purchase-money of effort considered, the article is no possible equivalent for the outlay. Thus in the heyday and flushed youth of a *successful* Socialism it is just possible that happiness may for a while overflow its cup. The introductory stage of outreaching, that growing out of our present effete capitalism, is no doubt an Inferno compared with the times that are yet to dawn. The lesson, however, of history is that the more men get the more they want, consummation itself breeding an *ennui* sombre to contemplate. Doubtless future historians, bored with *their* present, will look back regretfully to the "good old times," deceived by the show of mobile appearances, the eager activity, etc. They will forget that behind the gaily lit stage lurked the wearisome longing for something better—the hordes of the unvoiced natural ills—the persistent flouting of the individual, a spectacle comical in one aspect, but in another fit to make angels weep.

Optimist dreams are not realizable *in this world*. On the whole, however, we may contend that Humanity is as happy as is compatible with maintenance of the World-Plan—the complete realization of the Metaconscious. Plunged awhile in its pessimist bath, it will soar all the brighter into the azure when the hour for emergence strikes. Nay, its very torment, when recalled, will lend happiness the *magical constitutive force of contrast*. Having in this way indicated some lines along which a vindication of the world-order is possible, I will now take up a question of surpassing interest. That essential pillar of optimism, the Persistence of the Individual, with its many correlated problems, must now be briefly surveyed.

CHAPTER IX.

ON PERSISTENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

“ Animula, vagula, blandula
 Hospes comesque corporis,
 Quæ nunc abibis in loca
 Pallidula, rigida, nudula ? ”

IF we are to believe that consciousness persists, and persists happily, the indictment of pessimism can be answered; otherwise we must abandon hope. In Individuals is posited reality; all beside these Individuals is illusory. It is only as Individuals that the Metaconscious emerges from darkness; it is only as making for the weal or woe of Individuals that the working of this Power should interest us. In us, indeed, this Power sits in judgment on itself—confronts critically, under the form of consciousness, what it has evolved without consciousness.

On the count of a “future life” the Idealists help us little. I know of no idealism, that is not a monadology, where the belief is *comfortably* housed. And according to Von Hartmann, “that in all the important systems of modern philosophy (apart from Kant’s in consequence, and Schelling’s later declension) there is *no room* for an individual immortality, no one can for a moment doubt.”* The Nature-philosophy of Hegel (where the soul is the “truth” of the organism in the Aristotelian sense) wars silently against the belief, and the thoroughness of the Hegelian idealism is remarkable. Turning to an emendator of Hegel, and one of our stoutest British idealists, Belfort Bax, we may note an explicit rejection of the belief; the individual, being regarded as phenomenon in time, partaking of the nature of a “chance

* *Philos. of the Unconscious*, iii. 83 (Coupland’s trans.).

product."* Extremes meet. On this particular count the idealist and the materialist are often in accord. Stranger still, the hylo-zoists and materialists not infrequently hold here to what the idealists deny. "The received 'spiritualistic' theory," observes Tylor, "belongs to the philosophy of savages;" † that is to say, to a doctrine which explains consciousness by placing an ethereal double behind the physical body. The pre-Socratic Ionian thinkers recognized the soul as a form of the same matter whence sprang the perceived world. Alluding to the attitude of the Early Christian Church, Guizot declares, "I could multiply the quotations infinitely; all would prove that the *materiality of the soul* was in the first centuries an opinion not only admitted, but dominant." And it may be added that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body once widely current in Europe veils a crassly materialist view of Reality. The dogmas indeed of many religions ('sacred' only in the lips of enthusiasts and time-serving critics) differ from ordinary materialism mainly in displaying servility, superstition, and "other-worldliness." But not infrequently they serve as stepping-stones to something higher, and so fill a useful place in the world-process.

The form of Idealism advanced is all-important when the standing of the individual is mooted. In this work Idealism rests on a Monadology, and for this reason is able to rescue the Individual from the Universal. That which becomes "myself" is not a Universal Subject previously externalized as Nature, but a discrete *Individual* Subject which happens to duplicate in its "glassy essence" certain phases in the lives of certain monads, answering to those symbols of the chemist called atoms. Death can no more destroy this Subject than it can destroy the various carbon-monads of the organism—on the break-up of the latter the Subject mirrors certain phases of certain monads no longer, and there is an end of the matter. In itself it is out of time, time is its mode of self-revelation, and this is why empirical individuals, feeling themselves rooted in their Subjects, can

* "Problem of Reality," p. 89.

† *Primitive Culture*, i. 141. But it must be observed that the *facts* of the spiritists as opposed to their *interpretations* of these facts are such as to call for the most careful attention of Science.

say with Spinoza, "We feel and experience that we are immortal." *Obviously then mere disappearance of the states mirrored is no shattering of the mirror.* But here arises a difficulty. If light is to be reflected in a mirror, the reality of the mirror is presupposed. *Failing light, however, the mirror is itself invisible.* It may, therefore, be urged by idealist critics of our theory: "The Subject itself cannot, of course, be destroyed, but need it persist *consciously*? May not consciousness be its mere passing phenomenon in time, a light illumining its mirror and then fading out for ever?" Obviously, from the bare theoretical standpoint, it may. Such, however, is not the view to be championed. I would contend that the empirical manifestation of my Subject constituting my present consciousness is no more than a stage in its progressive unravelling—that what we call birth and death constitute but a shifting of its perceptual-conceptual levels. We have, therefore, to inquire: what clues are there to an *empirical unravelling* other than that now revealed? In other words, what insight is to be had into a possible *antenatal past*, and a possible *posthumous future*?—have we lived before birth, and shall we live after death, and, if so, how?

Various difficulties raised by idealist and materialist critics of a "soul" have been progressively disposed of. But two, of seemingly formidable aspect, remain over. (1) The objection of some cynics and others—an objection which will appeal forcibly to men of the world. It is noted by Kant: "Generation in the human race as well as among the irrational (?) animals, depends on so many accidents—of occasion, proper sustenance; of the laws enacted by the government of a country, of vice even," that so contemptibly begotten a creature is hardly to be conceived immortal. This presses very hardly on the vulgar theories of a soul, but will be here adequately met. (2) The objection drawn from the comparative psychology of men and animals. Ordinarily Man is snugly ensouled, while animals are left out in the cold. Science smiles at this favoured-nation clause, and with justice. She is wont to view consciousness as of many grades; she knows that the radical form of "reasoning" (erst the alleged special attribute of Man) is everywhere the

same, and that the old arbitrary divisions between men and animals are illusory. Above all, she recognizes that *consciousness, not the mere grade of consciousness, is the riddle*. And recognizing this, she asks, "Whereabouts, then, in the hierarchy of creatures does a *persistent* soul-consciousness supervene?" The question is crushing, if addressed to the current theology. The perverse and stupid notion that Man alone persists is the head and front of the difficulty. It is obvious, of course, that the animal monads have as complete a standing of their own as have the human, and that an answer which covers the one class must cover the other also. We shall see that animal monads not only persist consciously, but that they are the recruiting ground of those *more fully unfolded* beings constituting the human races. But of this question hereafter.

How, then, are we to establish the *conscious* persistence of the human individual? A vociferous class of mystics would appeal to "intuition," unable to bear the strain of thinking out metaphysic. But the intuition is by no means universal. "The Phœnicians," says Rawlinson, "seem to have had but small expectation of a future life. A usual expression for death was the time of non-existence. . . . On one grave-stone alone do we find a hope of future existence indicated." The Pentateuch is also strangely silent,* and other instances might be noted. Further, it is hard to understand how any intuition *i.e.* a *present* consciousness, can guarantee what is *yet to be*. A mystic who had soared into the deeper glories of his Subject might possibly transcend time-succession and seize all reality together. But our book-writing mystics will scarcely maintain that they have reached this grade of development. And were they even thus advanced, their knowledge would be useless to us. Philosophy cannot incorporate subjective deliverances of so novel a type; it must make good its positions *in a manner intelligible to all, even the most sceptical*. Much, indeed, that is written about intuition is fitted to repel the reader, who finds vagueness substituted for lucidity, scraps and sketches for systems, and laziness

* The supposed "spirituality" of the Semitic Race has been altogether shamefully exaggerated by their champions, and shows beggarly by the side of that of the Hindus—a race of natural metaphysicians.

for hard coherent thinking. "Intuition" of this sort too often begins where competence ends.

The true Mystic, exulting in his higher ecstasis, would be powerless to convoy the public to the belief he holds; Philosophy must, therefore, step in and substantiate it by proofs that appeal to all. Now, on what lines is a future life to be established? I answer, only definitely by way of experience itself. Experience is sole and only reality for the Individual Subject. But inferentially by way of the following possible channels. (1) By way of "telepathic" impact or impress reaching us from a Subject beyond the veil. The by-ways of psychical inquiry are most suggestive, though they demand a large stock of patience. As Kant says, we may even now be in touch with the spirit-world, though this will not be apparent so long as all goes well. Whether, however, a "telepathic" impact of this kind would point *necessarily* to a *conscious* Subject at the other end of the line might furnish an instructive topic for debate. Not always, I opine. (2) By way of the channels indicated by spiritists. As Von Hartmann has argued, the facts of spiritism are beyond question; it is the problem of interpreting them that remains over. Much interesting speculation has been advanced on this head by the modern theosophists, by D'Assier the positivist, and by Von Hartmann himself. The field for inquiry is a wide one, and no fear of ridicule should deter men of Science from freely exploiting this mine. (3) By way of experiments such as those described by Du Prel, Sir W. Hamilton, and others, in which hypnotized and other patients are found to develop an exalted, vividly *individual*, consciousness quite inexplicable by reference to mere cerebral machinery; the result showing that the Subject can actively produce consciousness without necessarily invoking the co-operation of the body. (4) By way of memory of possible *past* lives. If mystics and others sometimes recover vaguely limned fragments of their past experiences, say in Babylon, Thebes, or Baalbec, the evidence, if approved, is significant. The Subjects which flowered in those past life-dreams, and are now flowering in present ones, can obviously flower in others, and presumably, also, have had and will again have some manifestation in the intervals between their "rebirths." (5) It is, however, to the argument

from palingenesis as *deductively established* that I would chiefly direct attention. This argument yields persistence of any given individual as part of a larger process co-extensive with Universal Evolution itself. Recognition of this important argument will be found to place the whole discussion on a new footing. Persistence of the Individual is persistence of a *palingenetic* Subject with a succession of "life-dreams" (the expression is Schopenhauer's); and palingenesis, again, is a necessary result of the impulse of the Universal Metaconscious Subject to actualize itself through minor subjects.

Palingenesis, says Lotze, is a fancy devoid of moral significance. For us the problem will be to invest it with a metaphysical significance on which the other may hang; morality being but means to an end. Now, the customary procedure is to treat Palingenesis empirically—witness our modern mystics and theosophists,—and this procedure, it must be confessed, alone appeals to the popular mind. Leaving those who cater to that mind at their business, we shall here regard the *deductive* as, philosophically speaking, the most important line of proof, and tack the empirical-inductive arguments on to this to serve as subordinate confirmatory detail. It is impossible otherwise to realize the sublime purport of the doctrine, while, failing the deductive vindication, many of the accepted empirical arguments are most unstable and unsatisfactory. The defects of the received treatment the Concrete Metaphysical Method will enable us to amend. *Combination* of means is requisite. Deductive Exploiting of inductively-gotten premises must go along with verification by empirical laws and particular facts in the concrete.

The Universal Subject, or Metaconscious, as *prius* is unreal; it is only actual, as we saw, as result. Its passage into Reality is the passage of the minor individual monads into Reality. Since, then, the unfolding of the Metaconscious takes place through individuals, complete unfolding of these latter is essential to the complete unfolding of the Metaconscious as the Absolute. The Absolute as complete, perfect, and finished Reality conscious through and through implies the preservation of every individual consciousness. We have

previously urged that an immanent design stirs the universe, a design which is aspect only of the march from δύναμις through ἐνέργεια to ἐντελέχεια, from the unmanifest to the manifest, and thence to consummated and perfected actuality. Such a design cannot ignore the individual, for it is only through individuals that it is realized. *Contingent vanishing points will never do*—continual passage of individual units into the darkness would thwart the world-purpose. What, therefore, must obtain is a means whereby every individual monad shall round off its unfolding in the completest possible manner, and co-operate, further, with other monads so as to evolve a coherent systematic world-whole, the fruit of which it will ultimately seize for itself. This, then, is the central position: *Persistence of individuals as conscious is deducible from the belief in the self-realizing Metaconscious previously vindicated.* It follows, also, that this persistence must take the form of *palingenesis*, since the monads constituting the slowly unfolding world-whole have continually to change their relations with one another. The universe is made up of individuals of various grades, its development is the expression of their development, and this, again, rests on their mutual furtherances and hindrances as variously related. This necessary change of relations is the key to the riddle. Considered in respect of Man and Animal, it underlies the doctrine of "rebirths" as popularly understood. But we must not over-emphasize this phase of it. *The humblest atom-monad undergoes a ceaseless palingenesis.* When hydrogen-monads "combine," as we say, with oxygen-monads as H_2O , they have *special overt states* answering to these special relations; when, again, they occur in H_2SO_4 , they have *other overt states.* Now, *these two sets of states of the hydrogen monad answer to what for the human Monad would be two life-dreams, or two separate "rebirths," and the known shift of its relations is Palingenesis on the lowest level.* Not only, therefore, can palingenesis be deduced from the doctrine of the Metaconscious, but in the case of the *lower* monads it can, also, to a great extent, be experimentally verified. Save in respect of *complexity*, Palingenesis, as here conceived, is exactly the same affair for the higher human monad as it is for an atom of hydrogen—a change of the relations of monads. We are thus led

to regard the universe as in last resort an aggregate of palingenetic individuals, the unfolding of which constitutes the Evolution of Deity.

Having indicated this line of vindication of Palingenesis, we may proceed to treat it empirically with special reference to the cases of man and animal.

CHAPTER X.

ON THE MODE OF PERSISTENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

CAUTION is desirable not to confound Palingenesis proper with its ruder adumbrations and misinterpretations. Thus we read in the *Ordinances of Manu* that "a Brahman who drinks spirituous liquor would pass (into the womb) of worms, insects, winged insects, winged (creatures) that eat manure and beings delighting in destruction. A Brahmin (who is) a thief (would pass) *thousands of times* (into the womb) of spiders, snakes, chameleons, animals living in water," etc., and much more nonsense of the same sort.* Southern Buddhism equally admits possible retrogressions of human souls into animal bodies. Similar views were ventilated by the Pythagoreans, by Plato (*Phædon*, *Phædrus*, *Timæus*), and prevail also among races such as the Papuans, Zulus, and even the Dyaks of Borneo. Abstractions such as "Justice," "Karma," "merit," "demerit," etc., tacked on to a somewhat naïve metaphysic, warp the views of the modern theosophists. Still, all discounts allowed for, the critic must pay his tribute to the remarkable popularization of the doctrine due to their vigorous efforts.

Plato, Plotinus, and the great Indian thinkers, are not bad friends for a doctrine. Hume himself thought palingenesis the "only system" of individual persistence to which philosophy can hearken, impracticable as it is to reconcile this belief with his other views. Drossbach says that the eternal duration of the soul is certain, and that it will ever manifest in perpetual transitions from life to death and death to life. Lapses of consciousness in the life-series will serve to make

* *Ordinances of Manu*, pp. 374, 375; see also pp. 373-377. (Sacred Books of the East).

consciousness realized *as such*. Drossbach holds also to the belief in an ultimate renascence of memories, and thinks that later on in the progress of mankind human souls may be *reborn with consciousness of their entire past*. It is difficult to see how any monadologist of the Leibnitzian or Herbartian schools can possibly reject palingenesis. Even Schelling in his later neo-platonic writings accepts it; Schopenhauer is its enthusiastic advocate. Herbert Spencer has urged that any world-wide belief persistently entertained through ages may be held to have a basis of truth. Now the mob-backing of palingenesis is astonishingly great, comprising, perhaps, half mankind, and this fact may well give us pause. So prevalent is the belief, that Schopenhauer considered it had a better claim to be held an "Idea of the Reason" than any of Kant's three scholastic figments. It is curious how this doctrine appeals even to the rudest minds, while often stirring the higher to enthusiasm. Giant religious systems such as Hinduism and Buddhism incorporate it; numerous deep thinkers either embrace it or hover hesitatingly in its neighbourhood; the mysteries and mystic literature of diverse nations whisper it; poets, such as Virgil, Tennyson, and Wordsworth vaguely sense it; even Mohammedan Sufis, bigoted Christian fathers, Valentinian, Gnostic, and Marcionite heretics avow it; nay, the New Testament itself contains passages meaningless except as implying the belief.* In a number of the *Contemporary Review*, 1878, Francis Peek argues that it is symbolically expounded in the Gospels, and Dr. Kingsford's quaint work, the *Perfect Way*, champions a like view. Among notable modern upholders of palingenesis must be ranked the spirited leaders of Theosophy; also Carl du Prel, author of the *Philosophy of Mysticism*, C. C. Massey, Alger, Pezzani, Maitland, Kardec, Reynaud and Figuier (to whose strange book, *The Day after Death*, I owe my first definite grasp of the belief). Palingenesis, indeed, has an extremely wide and able *clientèle*, the most conflicting schools of thought rallying to this standard. Not bare acceptance, but the mode of acceptance of the doctrine, enables us to separate the combatants.

* Thus the often-cited passage, John ix. 2, seems to imply a floating belief of the kind among Jesus' followers.

Among data confirmatory of palingenesis, aptitudes or "faculties," seemingly inexplicable by heredity and nurture, may first suitably arrest us. The appearance of a genius in a family of dullards, or of a scamp in one of saints, constitutes, indeed, proof positive of palingenesis for the ordinary naïve mystic. Taken, however, empirically by themselves, such data are untrustworthy—the complication of the agencies determining the growth of consciousness being so great. Just as the purely empirical method cannot cope with complex situations in sociology, so it is incompetent to cope with the factors which stand behind the phenomenology of consciousness. The uprising of a novel faculty, etc., is assuredly a hard fact; but then, after all, palingenesis is not *necessarily* its explanation. Given a central monad related to subordinate monads, how are we to tell offhand what novelties the subtler interactions of the latter can produce, and what not? And, again, if the central monad is spontaneously productive, may it not evolve out of itself novel powers without necessary reference to any pre-natal experiences whatever? Obviously it may, hence the empirical "proof" of palingenesis by resort to suddenly emergent powers, etc., is, taken by itself, valueless. It is only as *confirming a deduction*, as presenting us with facts such as our hypothesis would lead us to look for, that this empirical inquiry is serviceable. With this reservation we may now proceed to exploit it for what it is worth.

It is just from facts which outrage (or seem to outrage) a general law that we often learn most. From the perturbations of Uranus, which seemed to run counter to the theory of Gravity, Neptune was inferred, then detected in the concrete. From the perturbations or some of the perturbations of Heredity, Palingenesis may be tentatively inferred, after the way of an *empirical law*, demanding the subsumption just indicated. Ribot admits that there are exceptions of a puzzling nature to the law of Heredity, the metaphysical purport of which we have already given. Galton's striking case of the twins, who, with the same nurture, became quite dissimilar young men, may be remembered. The dissimilarities in the emotional and intellectual endowments of members of the same family are sometimes remarkable, and,

though very largely explicable on other than palingenetic lines, are still strikingly fertile in suggestion. How strange some of these "variations" are! Berkeley's five younger brothers showed no signs of his sunny spirituality; his own predispositions were such as to drive him into revolutionary philosophical thinking at the age of twenty-four, when the *New Theory of Vision* was written, and probably most of his thinking had germinated. Michael Angelo saw a man modelling in clay in a garden, and was forthwith obsessed by the enthusiastic desire to become a sculptor. Kant's heredity explains nothing, while his brother was a nobody. Pericles could beget no worthier sons than Xanthippus and Paralus, Aristides had to put up with a Lysimachus. Farrar says of Domitian, "How such a mixture of depravity and savageness, of falsity and ingratitude, can have sprung from the union which also produced a Titus is a mystery of atavism"—possibly, we think, of something else. The great and good Marcus Aurelius inflicts on his country the fiendish Commodus. Hegel's mystical precursor Böhm was the son of bumpkin parents, but was forced by an inward nisus to think and write. Bacon, Queen Elizabeth's "young lord keeper," is prematurely grave. "His gigantic scheme of philosophical reform is said to have been planned before he was fifteen, and was undoubtedly planned while he was still young."* How the scent of an *old soul* hangs about Bacon! And Shakespeare—he, too, seems a very *old soul*, sleek with multiform aspects of the world inwardly received and digested. The redundancy of experiences harvested in past lives seems to overflow in his genius—he is not of one life's making. Some persons, again, appear as if born earth-weary and *blasés*. Among these are the ascetics and mystics of the higher non-theological sort, who having drunk the cup of life to the lees are heedless of it when proffered to them anew in this life. Curious heredity-problems are those presented by the children of Shakespeare, Milton, and Cromwell. Why this amazing drop? Again, some of the great military geniuses, *e.g.* Alexander, Condé, Clive, and others, possessed an almost intuitive mastery of their science—palingenetic inheritance, perhaps, co-operating with

* Macaulay.

physical inheritance and the education and surroundings of this life. Warren Hastings left the desk to blossom offhand into a leader of men, showing himself, as Pitt remarked, a "heaven-born general," no clue to the mystery being forthcoming. Shall I continue these researches? It was not a mathematician who begot Gauss, a musician Handel, a painter Titian, and there is not, says Weismann, any proof of the presence of special talent in the ancestors of these splendid geniuses.* The mathematical, musical, and artistic faculties often emerge suddenly, and, *even if inheritable*, may appear at their best only at the *commencement or middle* of a succession of individuals. It should be noted that Weismann recognizes such gifts as not on a footing with instincts—their *speciality* differencing them,—nor yet as explicable by natural selection, "because life is in no way dependent on their presence." But he concludes, with singular obscurity, that "talents do not appear to depend upon the improvement of any special mental quality by continued practice, but they are the expression, and to a certain extent the by-product, of the human mind, which is so highly developed in other directions." Few but will agree with me that this explanation is merely verbal.

Huxley might have well recalled Hume's dictum on "metempsychosis," when he penned the following instructive lines: "There are Pascals and Mozarts, Newtons and Raffaells, in whom the *innate faculty* for science or art seems to *need but a touch to spring* into full vigour." † "The child that is *impelled to draw* as soon as it can hold a pencil; the Mozart who breaks into music and *inspired* music as early; the boy Bidder who worked out the most complicated sums without learning his arithmetic; the boy Pascal who *evolved Euclid* out of his own consciousness: all these may be said to have been impelled by instinct, as much as are the beaver and the bee. And the man of genius is distinct in kind from the man of cleverness, *by reason of the working in him of strong innate tendencies* which cultivation may improve, but which it can no more create than horticulture can make thistles bear figs." ‡ But we must repeat that the term "instinct"

* "Heredity," *Essays*, pp. 91-93 (Eng. trans.).

† Hume, p. 208.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

cannot properly be applied to these *special* individual endowments. May it not be that to Palingenesis we must, in part, look for an answer—to possible renaissance of intellectual and emotional proclivities fostered in a previous life or lives? The conditions of this resurrection will be simple. We have seen that no state of the Subject can be wholly destroyed; that all we think, perceive, and feel must be reabsorbed into the depths of the Subject; that, in fact, the only possible kind of suppression of an experience is its lapse back into the potentiality whence it emerged. Now, the reabsorbed states must stand to presented states as “energy of position” does to *vis viva* in physics. To adapt palingenesis in this aspect to physiological psychology, we have only to hold that the monads of the organism penetrated by the Subject can be affected by this educible “energy”—an energy which reinforces the original potency-groups which the Subject was so conditioned as to vehicle. No intrusion of this energy into consciousness in its original form need be posited. In Plato’s *Phædon* and *Phædrus* a theory of reminiscence is broached, and the soul, having previously contemplated the Ideas, is made to recover them imperfectly when embodied. But no such necessary recovery of specific past experiences need be posited here. The “energy” simply furthers the building up of a new consciousness in determinate ways, and if, unusually strong, must manifest as “insight,” “genius,” “intuitive seizure,” and the *enthusiasm* which (according to our view of pleasure) accompanies the free or furthered activity of every very great power or “faculty.” The rush of joyous ideation in a genius is strongly suggestive of the re-emergence into actuality of powers, natural or acquired, that have previously *re-lapsed* into potentiality.

There are epochs in the life of nations characterized by “bursts” of activity very suggestive in their way. Among such are the age of Pericles, that of Augustus, that of the German transcendentalists, and that of our own nineteenth-century scientists. Humboldt observes in his *Cosmos* that “in the history of the development of human knowledge, we have already remarked, the appearance, within short intervals of time, of important though seemingly accidental discoveries, and of *great minds clustered together*; and we see

this phenomenon repeated in the most striking manner in the first ten years of the seventeenth century." And in his essay on *Old Edinburgh* (1856), Hugh Miller notes that "it is perhaps beyond the reach of philosophy to assign adequate reasons for the appearance at one period rather than another of *groups of great men*. We know not why the reign of Elizabeth should have had its family of giants—its Shakespeare, Spenser, Raleigh, and Bacon; or why a Milton, Hampden, and Cromwell should have arisen together during the middle of the following century; and that after their time, only men of a lower stature, though of exquisite proportions, should have come into existence, to flourish as the wits of Queen Anne. Nor can it be told why the Humes, Robertsons, and Adam Smiths should have appeared in Scotland together in one splendid group, to give place to another group scarcely less brilliant, though in a different way." Obviously, if science cannot account for the rise of individual geniuses, it cannot cope with the rise of groups of these geniuses of a like sort. No doubt the ruling interests, culture, etc., of the age are most important determinants of the growth of the individual. Similarly, the states of the oxygen monad are most important determinants of the states of the associated hydrogen monads. But in both cases emerges a spontaneity for which the determining influences afford only the occasion. An able writer, criticizing Taine (who subordinates the individual wholly to his age), observes, "There is always the 'personal equation' to be considered, which is entirely independent of the spirit of the age. This personal equation becomes, too, more important as we approach the great men of letters. . . . In the case of Shakespeare, the man's own nature is so important that merely to regard the spirit of the age helps us not at all."* It must not, indeed, be forgotten that, though the age moulds individuals, individuals also make the age.

This psychical heredity, as we might term it, must not, however, be ridden to death. If the human Subject reacts on its organism, it is, also, reacted on in its turn, and probably to a far more considerable extent. Millions on millions of monads invade it. That a mass of "predisposition"

* *Spectator*, March 11, 1893.

is of physically initiated origin, that the guidance of the growth of human consciousness is mainly due to inherited organic conditions, no student of modern psychology can for a moment doubt. The Subject, conditioned as to what it may evolve of its own initiative, is further, and almost abjectly, conditioned by the organism allied with it. Buckle's studies on climate and character are relevant. Galton tells us "that the difference of the *moral character* and the physical constitution of the various tribes of South Africa is connected with the *nature, soil, and vegetation* of their dwelling-places." * "The contrast between a sensuous and a reflective nature might take its rise *in the outworks of the sense-organs apart even from the endowments of brain,*" observes Bain.† I have previously adduced various physiological data which exhibit the servitude of the Subject to the masterful cerebral monads, and need not readduce them here. We should note, also, that a determinate grade of consciousness is always (so far as observation goes) found allied with a determinate sort of organism. The ant-consciousness, the lion-consciousness, the toad-consciousness, the snake-consciousness, the human-consciousness, all illustrate this law.

Current loose mysticism must, therefore, be amended. Upholders of palingenesis must concede that a large, nay a predominantly large portion of the content of consciousness has no reference whatever to a "karmic" or alleged psychical heredity. The form of manifestation of human consciousness is a *compromise* between the activities of the Subject and the modes of feeling, thinking, and willing *thrust upon it* arbitrarily by the organism. And ordinarily, I take it, the compromise is *immensely in favour of the organism*. In the case of animals there is no means of evading this view. "One ant," says Büchner, "will let herself be killed rather than let go the pupæ which she holds, while another will let them fall and run away like a coward." Kardecists themselves could not urge that these differences in character were inherited from former lives! In a species of termite there is maintained a large red-headed soldier or "Kshatriya," caste with formidable nippers. The characters of the soldiers

* *London Journal Royal Geogr. Society*, vol. xxii.

† *Mind and Body*, p. 35.

and the workers are quite different. Who would care to resort to palingenetic inheritance here? As result of the interbreeding of a wild and a tame species of animal, a *blend* of dispositions may usually be observed. And in domestic breeds "a cross between a setter and a pointer will blend the movements and habits of working peculiar to these two breeds. Lord Alford's celebrated strain of greyhounds acquired much courage from a single cross with a bull-dog, and a cross with a beagle generations back will give a spaniel a tendency to hunt hares." * Here palingenetic inheritance must be put aside; the supposition would be ridiculous. Obviously, the organism is master; the Subject or central monad merely projecting states answering to states of the organic monads, being, in fact, only actively passive. Viewing my empirical consciousness as in great part similarly produced, I incline to regard any given human consciousness as *predominantly a chance-product*, the mirrored organic monads giving the Subject to a great extent a quite arbitrary filling. This, of course, is at variance with any possible version of Oriental "karmic" lore, but that is a detail which cannot, unfortunately, be helped. It may be asked, Was, then, selection of its organism by the central monad arbitrary? Certainly not. Selection, however, implies a compromise, the organic monads are actualized in certain ways, and as such they *must* be mirrored. Further, the *struggle for manifestation of the remanifesting human Monads*—for life at all costs—has to be allowed for. All seek suitable organisms, but most must put up with make-shifts.

Experience being always the grand test, Memory of *specific incidents* of a previous life would be decisive. Unfortunately the Pythagorases are few, and not always, unfortunately, to be trusted. Accepting their declarations, we might almost think that only great souls are reborn; plebeians being seldom, and scavengers never subjected to the ordeal. Still, extravagances apart, it remains likely that vague memories of specific incidents may at times, and more especially in dreams, surge up, and that for a more advanced humanity than ourselves these may pass from vagueness into distinctness. Drossbach, as we saw, thinks that advanced souls

* Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, p. 198.

in the future human races may recollect their entire past.

Schopenhauer sees in palingenesis the life-dreams of an indestructible WILL, and holds that some vague intimation of our former lives may really obtain.* Had he discarded his blind individual will for a spiritually metaconscious Subject, I should be quite in accord with this view. That such intimations (as opposed to *specific* memories) occur frequently is a startling statement, but it is one which may nevertheless be seriously entertained. What is that sense of being older or younger in soul than our fellows—a feeling by no means necessarily connected with the span of the present life? Is there not a reference to prenatal stages of experience passed or not passed by ourselves and others? What of our deeper enthusiasms and friendships? What, again, are those chords that vibrate to a perception of a grand natural vista? Spencer, who admits here an element not embraced in the experience of this life, falls back on obscure echoes of our ancestors' experiences. But do not the obscure representations appear as echoes of *our own past experiences*, and not other people's? Such appears to me to be the case, and, if so, to offer a strong empirical confirmation of palingenesis. Similarly, when the harmonies of a gorgeous opera, the shock of a terrible crisis, the pageantry of some historic spectacle dash breaker-like on consciousness, there arise echoes of a mysterious past, weirder than any romance. The *force* of the present impressions drags forth the sheaves of a prenatal ingathering:—

“Something is, or seems,
That touches me with mystic gleams,
Like glimpses of forgotten dreams—
Of something felt, like something here;
Of something done, I know not where;
Such as no language may declare.”

Let no one be surprised that the gems of this *spiritual memory* flash so dimly. Its clear emergence in our workaday consciousness would mar the business of life. What we ordinarily term memory is something altogether different. Enough has been said of the alliance of the Subject and organism to show that all ordinary definite “memories” are really feeble new

* *The World as Will and Idea*, iii. pp. 299-306 (Haldane and Kemp's trans.).

presentations answering to *definite cerebral changes*. But the organism and its nervous adjuncts are not concerned with prenatal matters, but with processes having reference to the needs of this physical life. "Body is the true river of Lethe," remarks Plotinus. Bearing in mind this point; bearing in mind also, that even our ordinary definite memories slowly become indefinite, and that most drop altogether out of notice, we shall attach no importance to the naïve question, "Why does not Smith remember who he was before?" It would be an exceedingly strange fact if he did, a new Smith being now in evidence along with a new brain and nerves. Buddha, many Indian ascetics, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and others are said to have recalled previous life-dreams. We, however, may perhaps, congratulate ourselves on our blindness.

It is, necessary, to add that palingenesis does not imply remanifestation of the bundle of thoughts, feelings, and willings which make up the mind of any given birth. As Schopenhauer contends, the "intellect" is a new growth for each birth, a growth, he thinks, chiefly determined by heredity from the mother's side.* The kernel of our answer is this. Mind, or internal experience, is only possible through external experience, and external experience starts afresh with every birth. Each life-dream is a wholly novel affair, coloured only by the echoes of former life-dreams.

It may be that closer researches into human and animal fecundity may one day prove of significance for our inquiry. Many of the allegations here are stimulating. Notable among these are the alleged increase in the percentage of births after depopulating wars, and the enhanced generation of males said to attend this; the free breeding of unprotected species, and what Von Hartmann alludes to as their "natural sanative force." And we read in Schopenhauer's "World as Will and Idea," that "when, in the fourteenth century, the Black Death had for the most part depopulated the old world, a quite abnormal fruitfulness appeared among the human race, and *twin-births were very frequent*. The circumstance was also remarkable that none of the children born at this time obtained their full number of teeth; thus nature, exert-

* *On Heredity*, ch. xliii. bk. iv., "World as Will and Idea."

ing itself to the uttermost, was niggardly in details. This is related by F. Schnurrer, *Chronik der Seuchen*, 1825." The curious phenomenon of *racial sterility*, usually no doubt referable to ordinary causes, but sometimes, it would appear, not so explicable, deserves mention.* "The process of depopulation in many provinces of the Roman dominions, since the Antonines, has been excessive, and unaccountable on any of Malthus's hypotheses. We may instance, especially, the north coast of Africa, so populous in the palmy days of Rome, and Asia Minor and Syria—to say nothing of Turkish countries further East still. According to Merivale, Asia Minor, and Syria, once supported 27,000,000 of people. According to McCulloch they do not now contain more than one-fourth of those numbers. Yet we do not find that they have become either unhealthy or infertile."† Other cases might be cited. A like enigma touching animals has been dealt with by the famous Sir Richard Owen, F.R.S.: "Attempts have been made to account for the extinction of the race of northern elephants by alterations in the climate, or by violent geological catastrophes, and other like extraneous physical causes. When we seek to apply this hypothesis to the apparently contemporaneous extinction of the gigantic leaf-eating megatherium of South America, the geological phenomena of that country appear to negate the occurrence of such destructive changes. . . . With regard to many of the larger mammalia, especially those that have passed away from the American and Australian continents, the absence of sufficient signs of extensive extirpating change or convulsion makes it almost reasonable to speculate with Brocchi, that species, like individuals, may have had the cause of their death inherent in their original constitution,

* A subsidiary but interesting assertion is the subjoined. Mandsley, treating of a degenerate *insane* variety, remarks that "it may be affirmed with no little confidence that, if the experiment of marrying insane persons for two or three generations were tried, the result would be *sterile idiocy and extinction of the family*. . . . Nature puts it under the ban of sterility, and thus prevents the permanent degradation of the race" (*Body and Mind*, pp. 44, 45, "Degenerate Varieties"). What, however, is the agency here vaguely represented as Nature?

† W. R. Greg, *Enigmas of Life*, p. 68. He refers us to Dureau de la Malle, liv. ii. ch. 13; Gibbon, i. ch. 2; Merivale's *Roman Empire*, iv. 433, vii. 602, 604, 608, as giving cases of races and nations where the decline in numbers is not explicable by unwholesome lives, lack of food and food-producing soil. But his appeal to the condition of the nervous system as the cause is unsatisfactory. However, the reader of Greg will best judge for himself.

independently of change in the external world, and that the term of their existence or the period of the exhaustion of their prolific force may have been ordained from the commencement of each species." "Species," however, being *flatus vocis*, we are left with individuals, and here diversion of the stream of remanifesting animal Subjects may prove a solution. Views similar to Owen's have been, also, broached by Page * and Mantell.†

A modern German theory of the love-match is of interest. It is that the match is mediated by the will of a soul seeking a rebirth which requires a special heredity; the outcome being the metaphysical as opposed to the physical marriage. Du Prel has been accounted its originator, but that honour rests actually with Schopenhauer, who declares that the eagerness of the Individual Will to phenomenalize itself "is just the passion of the two future parents for each other." ‡ More lately Von Hartmann has contended (and, in another connection, Herbert Spencer) that the amatory passion wells up in part from a sphere beyond individual subjectivity. Du Prel, like Schopenhauer, has sought to localize this impulse in the will of a Subject desiring a particular embodiment. No doubt the passion subserves other aims than those of the enamoured illusion-wrapt couple. Abstract its metaphysical *raison d'être*, and such love becomes what Rosalind called it, "merely madness." The end is provision of organisms for monads; the *friendship* which is the durable source of "marital joys" not being, of course, taken into account. Caution, however, is desirable before stereotyping our explanations.

Palingenesis must be held to extend from the lowest rungs of the ladder up to the highest. This is a necessary outcome of the Monadology, and facts can at best illustrate it. With regard, however, to the distinction between men and animals, it is now certain that the Chinese wall, erst made to separate them, must be removed. If we except the feeling of the sublime, the moral and religious sentiments, all the Emotions we experience occur, albeit often in rudimentary

* *Manual of Geology*, p. 468.

† *Geology of the Isle of Wight*, p. 339.

‡ *World as Will and Idea*, iii. 343, 344 (Coupland's trans.).

form, among animals.* The power of purposive introspective reasoning is the special endowment of Man, urges Romanes, who has conducted the most careful inquiries of the day. And when we come to consider that the highest reasoning hinges on the feelings of *identity* and *difference*, *likeness* and *unlikeness* (of symbols)—feelings equally underlying the simplest perceptions of animals,—the alleged mystery of this endowment vanishes. Waiving, however, questions of grades, I must repeat that subjectivity, not special forms of it, constitutes the riddle. Every animal consciousness is the manifestation of a monad as discrete as are our own monads, and every argument which makes for a belief in the persistence of consciousness after death applies to the animal as it does to us. Optimism, also, it should be observed, must cope with the vicissitudes of suffering and rejoicing animal units just as it must cope with those of overrated overtrumpeted man. No system holding that the vivisected dog, the slaughtered antelope, the tortured jutka-pony die clean out of reality, can be optimist. The nature of things would be soiled with a foul and inerasible blot. Palingenesis and palingenesis alone is able to succour optimism at this juncture. It sees in the higher animals monads which will unfold into Shakespeares, Newtons, and Kants. But what of these higher animal Subjects themselves? The answer is that they have arisen out of still lower levels. Still, there is a difficulty here, that of the disparity as to numbers of the higher and lower animal Subjects. There are probably more termites in a big Indian compound than there are higher animal Subjects on this planet. Are we, then, to regard these latter as the *surviving fittest* of an innumerable submerged brood. Such a view would flow from our original doctrine of the Metaconscious. It is, further, of a piece with the struggle for existence which goes on in the sea, on the earth, in the air, with our inferential knowledge of the wars of atom-monads, and our direct knowledge of the ceaseless conflict of thoughts and feelings within ourselves. Every monad fights for its own hand, and the necessity of self-actualizing overrides all else. *Anything so that we may unfold*—is the watchword. Egoism is the basic fact, altruism an after-

* Romanes.

thought. Hence the continual pressure of creatures on the means of subsistence, hence the replenishing of breeds which exist seemingly only to be slaughtered, hence in large measure the torments and toils that vex mankind. Will the economist check over-population? He may talk, but what boots it? So long as the consciousness of the living can be *wirepulled from behind the veil*—so long as *feelings* tumultuously intense can prompt them—so long will mere *Reason* be impotent to baffle the consummate wiles of the monads that pant for reality.

The foregoing wiles notwithstanding, it is certain that the hordes of the higher monads must tend vastly to distance the present means of providing suitable bodies. This means a most keen struggle for manifestation, in which the monad most attracted to a nascent body (*i.e.*, the monad which most *further*s, and is *furthered* by, the monads of that body) will win. Unquestionably the submergence of the unfit monads must take place on a large scale, and if so Prudence would enjoin great caution in respect of the pursuits and amusements we favour. The *summum bonum*, indeed, is to escape from the troubles of rebirth altogether—the Eastern idea of *Moksha*,—but this deliverance is only expedient when the monad has been developed up to a relatively exalted point. Happiness must be an element in any end worth cultivating, and we should shape our plans accordingly. For the great majority of men rebirth seems a necessary torment, and the serious question for them is whether they are to keep abreast of progress, or, being elbowed out of the way by competing monads, to sink back into temporary obscurity. Here, then, a caution may be requisite. There is no personal Morality—there is only prudence, and prudence suggests that all the lower soul-potencies should be duly subordinated to the higher as these progressively unfold. Debauchery may be an object worth pursuit to the savage; for the advanced man it is really a sacrifice of his best interests, not necessarily here and now, but hereafter. It may throw back his monad in the struggle for remanifestation or rebirth. Let him beware, then, of competing monads. Individualism is the most weighty truth of metaphysic. In the last resort every monad fights for its own hand, and woe betide the weaker in

that battle. Egoism, I repeat, is the basic fact, altruism an after-thought, or veneer.

The mechanism of rebirth need appal nobody. It is just as much and just as little mysterious as are the monadic preferences and aversions backing an explosion of gunpowder. The germ-plasm penetrated by the birth-seeking monad is itself only an aggregate of humbler monads. The monad most strongly attracted (*i.e.* whose activities most *further*, and are most *furthered* by, the monad-aggregate) will necessarily appropriate a nascent organism, elbowing off a crowd of rivals in the process. Have we "action at a distance" here in the space in which monads hang in the Metaconscious? Probably not; still internunciary monads, if present, baffle our present means of detection. The activities in the birth-seeking monad grounding the attraction are probably of a dual sort—those springing from the "energy of position" of reabsorbed states already noticed, and those springing from hitherto dormant powers which are pressing for emergence and actuality. That the penetrating monad must react considerably on the organism is certain, but its work is probably a very subordinate factor in the building-up of its structure. A slow *nisus* is about all we can bargain for.* Agencies making for malformation, disease, etc., it seems wholly unable to suppress.

Every birth carries with it a compromise between countless monadic activities; every given "knowing consciousness" is predominantly a chance-product. Still over the whole business broods the Subject, limited in its power to shape the compromise to its satisfaction, but doubtless counting for much if we consider life as a whole—

"There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will."

Schopenhauer bears witness to a "secret and mysterious power which seems to guide the individual life,"† and elsewhere argues for a transcendent fatalism "which the attentive consideration of his own life, after its thread has been spun to a considerable length, suggests, perhaps, to every one."‡

* With this and several other points which space compels me to notice briefly, I propose to deal elsewhere in a separate volume of essays.

† *World as Will and Idea*, iii. 325.

‡ Parerga.

The providence here apparent is *our own individual Subjects*, conditioned in special ways for the world-process. Stern, nay terrible, Masters working in a fashion beyond consciousness, these Subjects thrust portions of themselves into reality (*i.e.* consciousness), and then appear to these portions as alien external powers. There is no god such as pictured by theology—there are only Individual Subjects intent on their own unfolding.

The interval between rebirths, judged by terrestrial standards, might indifferently last a few seconds or a million years, *according as the pressure of Subjects for rebirth was met by adequate breeding or not.* Death or dissociation of a Subject from an organism is generically the same as the break-up of a chemical compound, and the interval between rebirths answers similarly to the free period of a liberated atom. An interval (to us) of a few seconds might for the Subject concerned embody æons. De Quincey has stated that his opium dreams meant centuries of weird experience. No difficulty lies here—time is no stiff frame, but the stream of states of consciousness itself. With regard to the modes of experience filling the interval we must frankly avow our nescience. It is possible, however, that in this “free” period the native *spontaneity* of the Subject may find rich expression; the subject building its own ideal world of satisfactions. Innumerable sorts of posthumous joys may await us, while no doubt there must be a terrible side to the matter. I should not care to die a Napoleon, a Torquemada, a Nero, the monads I had oppressed might react on me. Vistas, however, of a definite sort are denied us. *Cultivons notre jardin*—we know very little of this world, and imagination cannot possibly gauge another when it has to work with shadowily inadequate ideas culled from sense. Still the following passage taken from the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*,* one of the finest of the expressions of ancient Indian wisdom, is of interest: “This same Self has two stations: any given present embodiment, and the embodiment that is next to follow. And there is a third: the state intermediate between the two—the *place of dreams*. Standing in the place of dreams it sees both these stations, this embodiment and

* Gough, *Phil. of Upanishads*, p. 180.

the embodiment next to come. In the place of dreams it steps on to the path it has made itself to the next embodiment, and sees the pains and pleasures that have been in earlier lives, and are to be in after lives. When it proceeds to dream, it takes to itself the *ideal residues of its waking experience in former lives; it fashions for itself an ideal body, and dreams in its own light, and then the Self is its own light. . . . There are no houses, no pools, no rivers; but it projects before itself houses, pools, and rivers, for it is still in action.*"*

What sublime visions may be unfolded to the Platos, the men of science, and all who have fought for truth during this troublous, chequered life! Here, the modern Theosophists are to the fore, their theories touching "Devachan" and the borderland, as put forward in *Esoteric Buddhism*, being most admirable spurs to discussion. I may append to the foregoing this rider: "Even if . . . we adopted a supposition . . . that after death the Ego recovered a fuller consciousness, the memory of all its past lives, these lucid intervals, though they might produce great moral effects, would not in themselves form part of the phenomenal development, and the latter would appear to be *continuous* from phase to phase of phenomenal consciousness." This very reasonable observation is culled from that interesting book, the *Riddles of the Sphinx*, a work which deserves the hearty appreciation of all serious thinkers.

The question of organisms other than the physical body merits a brief notice, a notice the brevity of which will be duly atoned for elsewhere. Are there discoverable any sheaths or bodies (involucra, ὄχοι, upadhis, koshas, etc.) besides the body with which my Subject is now provably allied, bodies such as the Upanishads, the Vedantist philosophies, Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Swedenborgianism, and so many other systems of thought speak of? We must reply that, at any rate, one other such body is known—the "perisprit," "astral body," "tenuous body," "ghost," "doppelgänger," "form manifestation," "double," "ethereal body," etc., of our philosophers, spiritists, mystics, religionists and occultists the world over. This, at least, has been experimentally established

* "In action"! Oriental lethargy here! The "Self," however, only exists so far as it acts.

by modern psychical research, with which the names of A. R. Wallace, Crookes, Zöllner, and a galaxy of distinguished *savants* are so honourably connected. So far we are on firm ground. The Platonists, Hindus, and others posit, however, other bodies of a yet subtler character, while the modern Theosophists, who have most powerfully and instructively revived inquiry in this direction—a boon for which they merit the warm acknowledgments of philosophy—present an elaborate classification of such bodies. Not possessing, however, any evidence on this head, we must leave the problem in abeyance—it is a question not for metaphysic, but for an extended science and psychology. But while suspending judgment on this head, we may advance one assertion confidently. Those who assert with Adwaitee Vedantins that, failing some subtle bodily vehicle, discrete individuality is impossible, are in error. The monad is radically individual. “Vehicles” of any sort merely serve as material for reflection in its mirror. My Subject, indeed, might present to itself a cosmos were all lower monads and the higher monads termed Subjects snuffed out. It is an immortal individual, a first without forerunner. A barren monism which denies plurality and difference to *Brahman*, and explains the world by way of the wretched device of *Mâyâ*, proves the bane of Adwaitee thinking. When will philosophy see that a Monism must imply Pluralism, and a Pluralism Monism, whenever any *comprehensive* rendering of metaphysic is attempted?

I now come to the question of the *distribution* of pleasures and pains among individuals. We have already had cause to see that Evil, or Pain, is a necessary constituent of the world-process; it remains only to consider the mode in which this necessary constituent is allotted to individuals considered as passing from birth to birth.

Pains pure and simple are facts to be abolished and deplored. But pains occurring along with other complex experiences may be interesting, and even when dreaded may, as means to an end, enter into the perfection of the whole. A large number of pains are undeniably useful, but this is by no means universally the case. Many pains torture and degrade, with apparently no compensatory advantage to the individual or individuals in general. And we note further that individuals,

while all more or less harassed by useful and useless pains, are sometimes harassed in a specially acute degree. "Le genre humain n'est pas placé entre le bien et le mal, mais entre le mal et le pire." D'Holbach's condemned thief remarks to a mate, "Is this not what I have told you that in our business we have one more evil than the rest of mankind?" The observation is excellent, for the man already hampered by the evils of an unsocial or vicious nature is further pestered by legally enforced evils. He is a fair illustration of the specially tormented individual among other tormented individuals.

Theories of special suffering referring us to prenatal "sin" will obviously never do. Ask an ordinary advocate of palingenesis why Smith is suffering from cancer, and he will solemnly assure you that prenatal misdeeds were the cause. One would think many painful experiences were only invented in order to "punish" us for indulging in disreputable practices. We note here worn-out ethical categories, such as "sin," etc., transported into Metaphysic, and a miserable empiricism (which leaves Pains and Pleasures themselves wholly unexplained) substituted for hard thinking. Current theories of palingenesis have much to gain from a Monadology consistently carried out. They have yet to realize that the major portion of human and animal sufferings is a *chance product beaten out of the clash of furthered and hindered monads*, having no direct reference to any psychical heredity whatever. Thus a forest-fire sweeps away hordes of animals, inflicting hideous pain; but who is going to invoke prenatal causation here? Arbitrary thrusting of pain on individuals is all that we can accept. Natural Selection well illustrates this *arbitrariness of the misfortunes of animals*. Similarly, we must not be continually harping on prenatal causation in the case of Man. Man's pains (as well as his entire consciousness) in any given birth are predominantly chance-products, outrages which the Subject, invaded by the bodily monads, has, perforce, to brave. To take a concrete case. The Calabrians destroyed in the earthquakes of 1783-6 stood on a geological area contiguous to volcanic foci. Certain changes, explosive and other, had to occur, and in their train were dragged incidentally the miseries of human

victims. Doubtless, either in the interval between death and rebirth, or in the next rebirth itself, corresponding pleasurable reactions may arise. But this probability does not erase the fact that the miseries were originally thrust on the Calabrians in purely arbitrary fashion. The events illustrate a universal practice—immolation of the empirical individual whenever such immolation is expedient, and no “law of ethical causation” had any standing in the transaction. The millstones of the world-process have to revolve; if grain falls between them, it is ground—*voilà tout*. Geologic convulsions are necessary incidents of planetary life. The woes of the Calabrians were incidents of an incident. To shift the picture, let us note the look of trees in a forest. There are weakly trees, deformed trees, diseased trees, oppressed trees, and insolently vigorous trees. What obtains here, obtains, only with greater emphasis, among men and animals. The varied lots of the trees answer to the varied lots of men and animals, all mainly chance products of the wars and alliances of monads.

Terms such as “*karma*,” “*karma-nemesis*,” “*merit*,” “*demerit*,” “*Universal Justice*,” and so forth, will prove of no service. They are abstractions, outputs of an effete ethical religionism bred in the East. It should be clear, too, that laws of “*ethical causation*,” apart from their abstractness, are altogether too narrow in scope, ethic having no concern with a large portion of our pleasurable and painful experiences in this life. “*Universal Justice*” in this connection is a playing with words. A Justice that first arbitrarily tortures an individual, and *then* compensates it, is grotesque. As well knock a man down and then give him a shilling. Further, as Schopenhauer has urged, nothing could ever compensate us for a moment of really mortal fear—the supposed compensatory joys and the fear are quite incommensurable things.

If we wish to show how pains and pleasures are shared, we must avoid all abstractions. Above all, the “Law of Karma,” often hypostatized by Hindus, Buddhists, and modern theosophists (and discussed as possibly “intelligent”!) must be jettisoned. It is an expression, not an agency; a *name*, not an *explanation*. Jettisoned, also, must be the habit of placing any “laws” whatever behind facts; laws are at

best *verbal generalities* stating the likenesses of minor laws and facts; and here it is not abstract likenesses, but the power **BEHIND THE FACTS**, that we must get at. Now, what does lie behind facts? If my reasoning has been correct, *monads furthering and hindering one another*. Here, then, are the concrete dynamic agencies wanted. And since pleasure= $\text{an accompaniment of free or furthered monadic activity}$, and pain that of obstructed or hindered activity, we must somehow be within hail of a solution. The crux is—How are pleasures and pains distributed on (what *we* should call) equitable lines to individuals during the series of their re-births? The answer now reached is that, if any equitable balancing obtains, it must obtain by way of the interactions of monads. How now are we to reduce this result to one of greater precision?

If we turn to physical nature, we shall find *Rhythm* universally present—a feature no one has illustrated with greater ability and fulness than has Herbert Spencer. If we turn to psychological and sociological domains, we shall find it everywhere present. Life, again, observes Schelling, is dependent on continuous *violations and re-establishments of an equilibrium*. And in his most interesting essay on *Compensation*, Emerson remarks: “There is somewhat that resembles the ebb and flow of the sea, day and night, man and woman, in a single needle of the pine, in a kernel of corn, in each individual of every animal tribe. The reaction, so grand in the elements, is repeated within these small boundaries. For example, in the animal kingdom the physiologist has observed that no creatures are favourites, but *a certain compensation balances every gift and every defect*. . . . The theory of the mechanic forces is another example. What we gain in power is lost in time; and the converse. The periodic or compensating errors of the planets are another instance. The influences of climate and soil in political history are another. The cold climate invigorates. The barren soil does not breed fevers, crocodiles, tigers, or scorpions. The same dualism underlies the nature and condition of man. *Every excess causes a defect; every defect an excess*.” These are generalities drawn from the given or empirical, but they serve also as indices of the workings of monads—of *continual*

violations and re-establishments of an equilibrium in the domain of feeling—a domain where every excess of pleasure will have its swing back into a defect or pain, and *vice versâ*. But in what sense “excess” must be interpreted is not yet clear. Barring due interpretation, our theory will be not only empirical, but incompetent even as such.

All monads toiling through this world are victims, but some are victims in a terribly high degree. Life here being predominantly painful, not one is really, but only relatively, fortunate. It is clear, then, that an excess of pain endured by any given individual in one birth cannot be wiped out in another birth. To harass an individual with more pain because he has already suffered much would be an odd sort of compensation. But what can be effected is this. The individual in question may bear *less than his natural share of the world-burden in his next birth or births*, while harvesting, also, more of the poor joys that, oasis-like, dot their expanse. He may further harvest joys really worth the name in that “place of dreams” which (if the author of the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* is right) lies betwixt two births. The pains accompanying dammed-up activities would turn to joys if the said activities here burst their barriers. And the greater the misery of the past life, the greater would be the bliss.

But the balancing of pains in the sequence of births themselves is of more immediate interest, and we may sketch the procedure thus: Association of the human Subjects, A, B, C, with organisms, *i.e.* monad groups x, y, z , yields three “minds” differing in respect of the quantity and quality of their *feelings*. Let these “minds” range in order of net painfulness of their feelings, C, B, A. Now, what will this mean? Simply this, that the activities of monad C have, indirectly or directly, been obstructed more than have those of B and A.* Suppose, further, that the organisms, x, y, z , die, and that C, B, A, after an interlude, again seek births. But available for this purpose is only the solitary organism p , promising to further well any one of the three. All will rush to the relation, but C will thrust B and A aside, and penetrate p 's monads itself. And why? Because its

* The *reflected* pains of the bodily monad, important as they are, are in virtue of the reflection made its own.

previously *dammed-up* or obstructed activities (whence the original suffering) are in *excess of those of its rivals*, and enable it, therefore, to win in the struggle for existence.* Balancing of the pleasures and pains of different monads is thus assured in the long run; every monad having powers which press forward into actuality, and are only dammed up into greater mass by repression. *Oppression works its own cure* by reinforcing the causes which make for favourable conditions in the future. *Order springs from the disorder of the struggle of rival monads*. The problem, nevertheless, if we confront details, exhibits an amazing complexity, and elsewhere I shall have to cope with the many puzzles that still remain over. The variety of grades of monads, the variety in their knowledge and feelings, the disturbing action of freedom, the relation of agent and patient (*e.g.* of carnivore and prey, of inquisitor and victim, of friend and befriended, and so on)—these and like difficulties complicate the inquiry. Still, the clue to the labyrinth seems to be with us, and we may proceed confidently to the exploration, always, however, mindful of the fact that *Reason* in last resort is a stammerer, and *Mystic Insight* the hierophant who can alone say the last word.

A word now on the Deity who shall emerge from the turmoil of a universe.

* In the strictest sense of the term, since the monad only *exists* so far as it is *conscious*. *but is it not conscious? the pleasure of consciousness? b-430*

CHAPTER XI.

ON THE IMMANENT END OF THE PERSISTENCE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL—THE DEITY OF RENAN.

“The universe would be thus consummated in a single organized being, in whose infinity would be gathered up millions and millions of lives, past and present at the same time.”—RENAN.

INDIVIDUAL monads, now blazing with the light of consciousness, now withdrawing into darkness—these are the foundations of reality. But whither does this aggregate of individuals tend? Is the whole pother objectless? Schopenhauer’s view of the destiny of the individual would make it so—“These constant new births constitute the succession of life-dreams of a will which is in itself indestructible, until, instructed and improved by so much and such various successive knowledge in a constantly new form, it abolishes or abrogates itself” *—but his Annihilation-view hinges on the misinterpretation of the Subject already noticed. The Individual Subject is not Will—not a mere blind activity—but a spiritual spontaneity of which, in its present manifestations, will is merely an aspect. It is not *below*, but *above* reason, a sun of which reason is a transient feeble spark. If, then, from our rational standpoint an objectless universe is absurd, *à fortiori*, it would be monstrous from that of the Universal Subject. Self-revelation of itself to itself is the purpose of this Subject; the *immanent* meaning of reality. Annihilation of individual consciousness would thwart this. Now, we have treated of this Subject as *δύναμις* (potentiality) and as *ἐνέργεια* (process of becoming actual). Let us proceed to contemplate it as the *ἐντελέχεια*, or consummated perfection and actuality to which the *ἐνέργεια* leads—in a word, AS THE ABSOLUTE.

* *World as Will and Idea*, iii. 300 (Coupland’s trans.).

The Individual, I repeat, is the only concrete, and should dwarf all else whatever. *Prostration of this individual before gods, masters, creeds, states, etc., is, so far as it is profitless, an illusion.* Even self-sacrifice in behalf of other individuals should be an incident, not an incubus of action, lest it encroach on the royalty of the Individual. Self-sacrifice may be as much a defect as its opposite, and may further prove highly objectionable to persons who dislike being officiously saddled with indebtedness. Supreme, however, as are individuals for our metaphysic, they have a common root, they have emerged from a common mother-stuff, are drifting to a common goal. *Voluntary co-operation* with one another is, therefore, expedient. Unfolding into ever richer reality, they come slowly to realize that their interests lie in mutual furtherance rather than hindrance, that the suppression of those tendencies that make for others' suffering is, on the whole, the best of possible policies. Monads of the lower grades are absorbed in self, indeed they cannot be reasonably supposed to know of the existence of other monads at all—only of the changes in *their own states* which association with such monads generates. In men they begin to *draw together*, the element of "furtherance" gets to be consciously preferred to the element of "hindrance." Men, however savage, cohere as tribes, develop rude sympathies, language, customs, laws, etc., all of which pre-suppose an instinctive feeling of the identity-in-difference of their monads. In the modern State the feeling is becoming more and more explicit, and its effective growth is essential to the success of any of the projected forms of Socialism. Finally, the morality of the hearth, the tribe, and the nation will pass into a deep enthusiasm for mankind, nay, for all the sentient creatures that are now struggling around us.

Magnificent vistas lie ahead of us, and it may be that in other worlds palingenesis will be a lighter burden, perhaps a positive delight. But whatever may hap, in foul weather and fair, in darkness and light, in our sorrow and our joy, the METACONSIOUS stands by the "roaring loom of Time," ever intent on its aim. And that aim, that completed actuality, will be Deity—a galaxy of perfected individuals rich with the memories of their past and bathed in the

unspeakable glories of their Subjects. The strife of emergence will have died away. The *division of labour* in which Deity is cradled will have given place to *interpenetrative individuals*, each fully conscious of the rest, which, like it, will be wrapt in a final Unity retrospectively illumining the whole past cosmos. In this sublime Unity the wondrous panorama of this and other as yet unfathomed worlds—the superb march of astronomic and geologic events—the infinitely varied detail of cloud, sea, storm, volcano, cataract, of whirling globes with wondrous interiors and weirdly fretted surfaces—the romance of plant, animal, human and superhuman history—will be caught up and spread out in one indivisible divine intuition. Erst nothing, Deity will have harvested a universe. Such a view constitutes a synthesis of the standpoints Atheism, Pantheism, Theism, and even Agnosticism. Atheism holds of the Metaconscious as *prius*, Pantheism of Deity revealed in walled-off monads, Theism of the sublime Being, the “*identity-in-difference*” of all-embracing monads, who completes the circle. Agnosticism holds of the Metaconscious in so far as not yet revealed—of the unmanifest background which even Deity cannot seize. One more point. In the composite Deity who resumes the universe, the Metaconscious restores to itself its Unity-Difference in a higher form. Of this Deity, spontaneity complete must be predicated, and, as no arrest of this spontaneity is possible, supreme happiness also. And this Deity, though historically a growth, is, in all respects save consciousness, a metaphysical *prius* also, for in it the Metaconscious will have revealed to itself as actuality what it ever possessed as potentiality. We are Atheists, Pantheists, Theists and Agnostics in a breath.

Our task is fulfilled; an audacious venture ended. Gazing on the stream of things, we have sought to interpret its most radical meaning. We have found Deity to emerge from the gloom of the Metaconscious. We have visualized it prophetically as the Absolute. But a caveat must be entered even here. Individuals, as immanent in the Metaconscious, are infinitely numerous, and possible world-processes limitless. Hindu conceptions, such as the “Days and Nights of Brahma,” crowd upon us, and these compel us to add that the Absolute is not merely Result, but that it is

strictly speaking, a result never completed. Before the vistas thus opened out the soul stands wrapt in emotions. Deity rises before it as immanent purpose not only of this universe but of universes that have been, and of universes that have yet to be. No longer does it dream of "Unknowables" or an *alien* divine consciousness, but it confronts an ocean of spiritual reality, an ocean which it is its own destiny to be. It may well garland this thought with emotion, and predict for it a standing when the current theology has perished and its legends are told to children, as we now tell of Hera or Phœbus. The god of theology is a mere individual among individuals. The God of Absolutism is all that is, ever was, or ever shall be—a unity of interpenetrative individuals who have bought their glory by suffering.

THE END.

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